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1. Motivation for the study 
According to the prevalent approach in legal science, the responsibility for 
protecting individuals’ human rights lies in the positive obligations of the 
State. Non-State actors are to be regulated and controlled by the State through 
its domestic legal system. However, many non-State actors are in a position 
to greatly affect individuals’ enjoyment of their human rights. This is 
particularly true of non-State entities carrying out public functions or with 
control over an area of territory (e.g. non-State armed groups), or even being 
in a position to direct States in the adoption and implementation of certain 
domestic laws and policies (e.g. international organisations). However, single 
individuals may also be in a position of relative power over other individuals 
(whether within in their own home or in society more generally), due perhaps 
to their gender, their position within a family, or their membership of a certain 
race or social class. This places them in a position where they can more easily 
affect another individual’s rights. Arguably, some non-State actors are even 
in a position to protect or fulfil individuals’ human rights. Of course, this is 
not true in every circumstance or for every right. However, at least a 
‘negative’ duty of non-State actors not to infringe international human rights 
is being increasingly recognised throughout the international community. 
The traditional human rights paradigm in the international legal 
discourse was founded on a relationship of dependence and trust on behalf of 
individuals towards States as the primary subjects of international law;1 
                                                 
1 Reflected in the fact that States ‘possess the totality of international rights and duties 





human rights provided them with ‘fundamental guarantees and standards of 
legal protection’ against potential abuses of State power.2 The focus of 
international human rights law has therefore been on the actions of States; 
private actors would normally fall within the remit of domestic criminal laws3 
or private laws,4 rendering international governance of their actions 
unnecessary. Nevertheless, the ‘new-medievalism’ of international relations5 
is steadily replacing the Westphalian, one-dimensional State-centric model 
of the international legal order with a multi-layered system.6 As a by-product 
                                                 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 1949 ICJ Rep 174, para 180. 
2 August Reinisch, ‘The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State 
Actors’ in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2005) 38. 
3 See Nigel Rodley, ‘The Evolution of the International Prohibition of Torture’ in Amnesty 
International, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948-1988: Human Rights, the 
UN and Amnesty International’ 63, cited in Clare Mcglynn, ‘Rape, Torture and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2009) 58(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
565, 594. 
4 Many limits on the permitted actions of private persons can be found, for example, in the 
fields of domestic tort law and domestic contract law. The interpretation and application of 
domestic private law between private parties have for some time also included human rights 
elements, which has been the subject of much academic discussion, particularly in the context 
of the European Union. See e.g. Sonya Walkila, Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in 
EU Law (Europa Law Publishing 2016); Marek Safjan, ‘The Horizontal Effect of 
Fundamental Rights in Private Law – On Actors, Vectors, and Factors of Influence’ in 
Purnhagen Kai and Peter Rott (eds), Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation 
(Springer International Publishing 2014); Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘Social Rights, Human 
Dignity and European Contract Law’ in Stefan Grundmann (ed), Constitutional values and 
European contract law (Kluwer Law International 2008); Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, 
‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights, Privacy and Social Justice’ in Katja S Ziegler (ed), 
Human Rights and Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2007). See further, 
Hugh Collins, ‘On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law’ in Hans 
Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford University Press 2014); 
Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi and Giovanni Comandé (eds), Fundamental 
Rights and Private Law in the European Union: Vol. I and II (Cambridge University Press 
2010). 
5 Henry Bull, The Anarchical Society: A study of order in world politics (1st edn, Columbia 
University Press 1977) 281, discussed in Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, International 
Relations: The Basics (Routledge 2007) 103-104. 




of globalisation, this is creating a ‘neo-feudal’ society in which power and 
influence are distributed amongst various actors.7 But States, originally 
targeted for obligations because of their socio-economic and legal power 
monopoly over individuals ‘in the absence of legal restraints’,8 are 
continuously losing ground to non-State actors.9 It is increasingly evident that 
despite trusting States to protect individuals from interference with their 
rights by third parties, domestic laws are not (always) sufficient or effective 
in governing the actions of non-State actors vis-à-vis human rights.10  
 This encroachment of non-State actors is not confined to practical 
effects; whilst under the current legal framework the State remains the 
primary actor, some non-State actors have now obtained a certain political or 
even a ‘law-making’ role.11 States are no longer the only actors adopting 
                                                 
regimes, see e.g. Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime Collisions: The 
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25(4) Michigan 
Journal of International Law 999 (translated by Michelle Everson). 
7 Kal Raustiala, ‘The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks 
and the Future of International Law’ (2002) 43(1) Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 2. 
8 Frances Raday, ‘Privatising Human Rights and the Abuse of Power’ (2000) 13 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 103, 108-110, cited in Jan A Hessbruegge, ‘Human Rights 
Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors’ (2005) 11 Buffalo Human Rights Law 
Review 21, 26. 
9 For example, multinational corporations – see e.g. Jilles LJ Hazenberg, ‘Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights Duties: Perfect and Imperfect’ (2016) 17(4) Human Rights 
Review 479. In addition, and sometimes as a consequence of this, individuals increasingly 
rely on actors other than States to enjoy their human rights (e.g. the provision of human rights-
related services, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). 
10 This is particularly the case when transnational private actors are concerned. As Gunther 
Teubner points out, ‘[i]n the global context, the State influence on private actors is more 
indirect, more distant’, and it becomes harder to hold States responsible for the actions of 
private parties (under the doctrine of ‘indirect horizontal effect’ – see Chapter 3 of the present 
book). Gunther Teubner, ‘The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by “Private” 
Transnational Actors’ (2006) 69(3) The Modern Law Review 327, 329. 
11 This term is used here cautiously, to represent the contributions that many non-State actors 
make towards the drafting process of both binding and non-binding instruments (i.e. ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ international human rights law). For a discussion of the role of private parties in the 
development of binding and non-binding rules, see Esther van Schagen, ‘Source of Concern 
or Room for Experimentation? Private Autonomy in the Development of Alternative 
Regulation in German and Dutch Private Law’ (2016) 3 European Journal of Comparative 





instruments aimed at implementing or developing international law 
(including aspects of international human rights law).12 Non-State actors are 
becoming increasingly involved in global governance, whether through 
contributions to international law itself or through (self-)regulation by private 
bodies.13 As a result, non-State actors are beginning to entrench themselves 
in the international human rights regime. Non-State actors are also becoming 
increasingly entrenched in the regime by other actors, including scholars and 
civil society. For example, there now exist many studies, projects and 
initiatives examining the ways in which non-State actors could be held 
accountable for interfering with the enjoyment of human rights.14 There are 
also more and more non-legally binding instruments being adopted, including 
by the United Nations (UN) itself, to encourage non-State actors to respect 
human rights and States to more rigorously regulate non-State actors (a 
popular example being the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights15). Furthermore, human rights adjudicatory bodies have found 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Jean D’Aspremont, ‘International Law-Making by Non-State Actors: Changing the 
Model or Putting the Phenomenon into Perspective?’ in Math Noortman and Cedric Ryngaert 
(eds), Non-State Actors in International Law – From Law-Takers to Law Makers (Ashgate 
2010). For discussion in the context of non-State armed groups, see Anthea Roberts and 
Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the 
Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 37(1) Yale Journal of International Law 
107. 
13 As Yannis Papadopoulos has noted, ‘[a] plethora of non-state and sector-specific 
governance arrangements have been established’ on a transnational level, emerging 
particularly since the 1980s. See Yannis Papadopoulos, ‘The challenge of transnational 
private governance: Evaluating authorization, representation, and accountability’, Laboratoire 
interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques Working Paper No. 8 (2013) 1. 
14 See e.g. Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2005); University of Antwerp, ‘About GLOTHRO’ 
<www.uantwerpen.be/en/projects/glothro/about-us/> accessed 7 November 2017, which 
involved extensive research on the human rights obligations of non-State actors; and Jean 
D’Aspremont and others, ‘Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and States in 
International Law: Introduction’ (2015) 62(1) Netherlands International Law Review 49, 
which forms part of a collection of articles on ‘Organized Non-State Actors’. 
15 See UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-




themselves faced with many cases in which the direct causal responsibility 
for harm to human rights lies with a non-State actor, rather than a State.16  
One reason for this is that the emergent doctrines of horizontal effect17 
do allow victims of human rights violations some degree of remedy, but are 
not always effective in changing the actions of the non-State actors 
responsible. This is because, just as with the human rights instruments 
themselves, the doctrines of horizontal effect are predominantly based upon 
the positive obligations of States. The positive obligations require States to 
protect individuals’ enjoyment of human rights from the harmful actions of 
non-State actors. Some aspects of horizontal effect do, admittedly, require 
States to effectively regulate the actions and operations of non-State actors in 
their territory. However, this does not allow for situations in which States are 
unable to effectively control non-State actors, or where a State is too 
dependent upon the benefits it obtains by keeping a non-State actor happy to 
be in a position to impose human rights-related standards upon them. For 
example, human rights infringements caused by the actions of non-State 
armed groups are very problematic in terms of horizontal effect. In many 
situations of non-international armed conflict, the State party to the conflict 
loses control not only over the non-State armed group it is fighting but also 
areas of land and the provision of essential services. In such a situation, an 
individual whose rights have suffered due to the non-State armed group 
cannot effectively claim redress using current applications of horizontal 
effect; it would be neither just nor appropriate to hold the State responsible 
for something so far outside of its control. For this reason, it is desirable to 
tackle the problem more directly, by addressing the conduct of the non-State 
armed group itself. It is also desirable to adopt an approach that could, in the 
absence of legal means, improve the protection of human rights on the 
ground. The main challenge is therefore seen to be the achievement of the 
                                                 
Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, John Ruggie’ (21 March 
2011) A/HRC/17/31 (UNGPs). 
16 See Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 





practical results of the horizontal effect of human rights standards in the 
absence of de jure horizontal effect. 
This is not to say that extra-legal efforts have not yet been taken to 
achieve human rights protection in relation to non-State actors. Indeed, recent 
years have seen a boom of such measures being taken to try to encourage or 
pressure non-State actors to operate in compliance with international human 
rights law and standards. Measures include, inter alia, the adoption of non-
legally binding international principles on business and human rights, many 
attempts to effectively engage with various non-State actors, and allowing 
non-State actors to self-regulate. Each kind of measure taken has yielded 
different results. However, no single method has provided a blanket solution 
to protecting human rights from the harmful actions of non-State actors.18 
Going beyond a purely legal approach to non-State actors and human rights, 
many of the initiatives taken can be seen as part of a broader, governance 
approach. Despite reaching towards the same goal and often taking a multi-
stakeholder perspective, the initiatives do not currently fit into a coherent 
governance framework. In addition, a by-product of the fragmented approach 
is that overlapping actions may be taken in some areas to the detriment of 
others.19 It is therefore even more desirable to tackle the problem of non-State 
actors and human rights in a holistic and structured manner. This requires 
looking at the interaction between different actors, actions and the 
mechanisms at our disposal to improve human rights protection.  
2. Aims and contributions of the study 
This book has several goals. Its main aims are, firstly, to critically analyse 
the horizontality of international human rights law as found in international, 
regional and national legislation and jurisprudence as well as (to a more 
                                                 
18 Measures taken in relation to particular non-State actors will be discussed in Chapter 3, 10 
and 11. 
19 This raises an issue of coordination between actors and initiatives, which will be addressed 




limited degree) scholarly works, and secondly, to suggest a new approach to 
improving human rights protection vis-à-vis non-State actors: a multi-level 
governance approach.  
First, from a legal perspective, the book aims to contribute to the 
current debate on the horizontal effect of human rights. On a general level, it 
aims to set out the scope of the current human rights law framework, provide 
a critical understanding of what human rights obligations actually entail, and 
offer some views as to why the limits to the legal framework have been set 
(and continue to remain) where they are. The book also seeks to bring 
together international laws, jurisprudence and scholarly works on horizontal 
effect at the international, regional and national levels and to build on 
previous studies on the treatment of non-State actors. In particular, it aims to 
add a new way of conceptualising the types of indirect horizontal effect 
currently employed by human rights monitoring bodies and courts. These 
aims pertain to the legal parts of the book (Parts 1-3). 
The book also has aims regarding political science, specifically in the 
field of governance studies (Part 4). Here, it seeks to provide the legal 
readership with a good understanding of what governance is, and what it 
means to take a governance approach towards international human rights. 
Importantly, the study also aspires to contribute to legal and political science 
literature on multi-level governance and to use the theory in a new context 
and on a broader scale than it has been to date. Through the explanation and 
application of multi-level governance to two case studies, the book aims to 
demonstrate the practical workings of the current legal approach to horizontal 
effect as well as the suggested multi-level governance approach. In its 
adoption of a multi-level governance approach to human rights, the study 
seeks to demonstrate how previous and current initiatives on non-State actors 
and human rights could form part of a multi-level human rights governance 
regime that operates in a more structured and cooperative manner. Through 
the chapters on case studies, the study aims to provide concrete proposals for 
improving human rights protection in relation to infringements by particular 
actors, therefore also providing a more practical perspective which 





the governance approach taken in this study, the suggestions made address 
the different kinds of actors involved in human rights governance, rather than 
solely law-makers or policy-makers. 
3. Key assumptions  
The book is built on key assumptions concerning the purpose of human 
rights. One’s opinion on this has a bearing on the perceived necessity of 
ensuring human rights compliance by non-State actors and on the extent to 
which it is considered appropriate to mould and extend the scope and content 
of rights to adapt to societal changes (such as the prevalence of human rights 
interference by non-State actors). My own understanding of the purpose of 
human rights will be explained here and should be borne in mind when 
reading the book. 
  First, it is important to point out that the purpose, or value, of human 
rights is closely connected to the basis of human rights itself.20 For example, 
those who believe that human rights have a moral basis may see the purpose 
of human rights as being the furtherance of good moral behaviour. Similarly, 
those who believe that the basis of human rights is the protection of human 
dignity may view the purpose of human rights as ensuring a minimum level 
of dignity for every human being. This study will start from the assumption 
that human dignity is at the core of human rights.21   
The idea that human dignity lies at the core of human rights is 
extremely popular. Evidence of the relationship between the two can be 
found in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
                                                 
20 A discussion of different philosophical bases of human rights in the sense that they derive 
from natural or positive law, will not be discussed here. A thorough and extremely interesting 
discussion of different philosophical approaches to human rights can be found in Marie-
Bénédicte Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European 
Convention (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
21 For a discussion of the relationship between dignity and human rights, see Willy Moka-
Mubelo, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity’ in Reconciling Law and Morality in Human 




(UDHR).22 The preamble emphasises that through the preceding Charter of 
the United Nations 1945,23 Member States ‘reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and 
in the equal rights of men and women’. Furthermore, the preamble of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 explicitly ‘recogni[ses] 
and reaffirm[s] that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth 
inherent in the human person’.24 Indeed, the importance of the ‘inherent 
dignity…of all members of the human family’ for human rights is reaffirmed 
in the preamble or in the substantive provisions of all of the core UN human 
rights treaties.25 Andrew Clapham has highlighted that ‘human dignity as a 
raison d’être of human rights’ can be seen in national and international 
human rights instruments alike, and constitutes a ‘key justificatory argument 
for respecting human rights’.26 Jack Donnelly also takes a strong stance, 
arguing that human rights are vital ‘for a life of dignity, for a life worthy of a 
human being’.27 Clapham helpfully explains that if human dignity is accepted 
as the basis of human rights, the identity of the perpetrator of human rights 
(i.e. the party responsible for infringing human rights) becomes of little 
interest.28  
                                                 
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A 
(III). For a full discussion of the importance of dignity in international, regional and national 
human rights instruments, see Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655. 
23 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
1 UNTS XVI. 
24 UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (12 July 
1993)) A/CONF.157/23. 
25 This construction is used, for example, in the preambles to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities. Another phrasing can be seen in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into 
force 4 January 1969) UNTS vol. 660, 195. 
26 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (Oxford University Press 
2006) 533. 
27 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press 
1989) 17, cited in Andrew Heard, ‘Human rights - Chimera’s in sheep’s clothing?’ (1997) 
<www.sfu.ca/~aheard/intro.html> accessed 7 November 2017. 





Following this reasoning, as a basis for human rights, human dignity 
could also justify (and possibly even legitimise) the imposition of some 
degree of human rights obligations on non-State actors. Using similar 
reasoning, Clapham goes on to explain that even if a particular non-State 
actor were to use their own human dignity as an argument against having to 
respect that of other individuals, too much attention should not be paid to this 
– States routinely invoke the protection of other individuals’ dignity in 
response to claims that they are violating someone else’s.29 In such situations, 
a balancing exercise is carried out to determine whether the State should be 
held responsible for the violation of dignity/human rights, or whether their 
actions were indeed justified on the basis of protecting the rights or dignity 
of others (see Chapters 3 and 6).  
 The second purpose of human rights taken as a starting point in this 
study is the protection of individuals from actors that have a degree of 
authority or power over them. Within international human rights law this is 
reflected by the fact that individuals (seen as the more vulnerable actors) are 
protected from abuse of power by sovereign States, the primary (and in theory 
the most powerful) actors at the international level.30 As explained above, the 
abundance of non-State actors now operating nationally or internationally 
with growing competences, resources and authority (sometimes even over 
States) has considerably expanded the range of actors now in a position of 
power or authority over the enjoyment of individuals’ rights.  
 Other purposes of human rights are less convincing, however. In more 
recent years, human rights have been used for the purpose of lending moral 
legitimacy to particular points of view or political decisions. In many 
instances, ‘human rights’ seems to have replaced ‘morality’ as the key 
buzzword.31 This is evident in the wide use of the human rights rhetoric in 
                                                 
29 ibid 534. 
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the mass and global media. Whether accurately or not, the media often 
invokes human rights arguments to strengthen or legitimise arguments. 
Social media has also taken up the use of human rights terminology in 
countless cases and has even been praised for contributing to human rights 
monitoring.32 While in some cases various media outlets can shed light on 
potential or previous human rights violations, in others it can be undesirable 
for true human rights protection. One of the main problems here is a lack of 
understanding on behalf of the layperson as to the content of international 
human rights. Indeed, a report by the International Council on Human Rights 
Policy highlights ‘a serious lack of knowledge about what human rights are’ 
as one of the main problems regarding media coverage of human rights-
related stories.33 Such use of human rights in arguments may also reflect a 
belief or understanding that human rights are to be considered a tool to 
promote justice. This purpose of human rights is seen not only in the media 
but also throughout the human rights community. For example, the well-
                                                 
Human Rights an Alternative to Moral Values?’ (2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law Online 367, 368-369. 
32 See Christoph Koettl, ‘Twitter to the Rescue? How Social Media is Transforming Human 
Rights Monitoring’, Amnesty International Human Rights Now Blog, 20 February 2013 
<www.blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-east/twitter-to-the-rescue-how-social-media-is-
transforming-human-rights-monitoring/> accessed 7 November 2017. 
33 The fascinating, in-depth report discusses many challenges that are faced by journalists 
when reporting stories with human rights issues. These range from having to ‘dumb-down’ 
media reports, difficulties arising in the editing process, bias, and difficulties in precision. See 
International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Journalism, Media and the Challenge of 
Human Rights Reporting’ (2002) 114 <www.ichrp.org/files/reports/14/106_report_en.pdf> 
accessed 9 November 2017. Importantly, at least some organisations are becoming more 
aware of this, and are offering tools to journalists to promote and encourage responsible 
human rights reporting. For example, ‘Speak Up, Speak Out’ has published a ‘A Toolkit for 
Reporting on Human Rights Issues’ (2012) 
<https://www.internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/Internews_SpeakUpSpeakOut_Full.
pdf> accessed 9 November 2017. The toolkit provides information and advice on many issues 
relating to journalism and human rights, to help journalists and reporters take a nuanced and 
sensitive approach towards human rights issues. Further efforts include action taken by the 
International Organization for Migration to train journalists on human rights issues. See 
International Organization for Migration, ‘IOM Trains Puntland Journalists on Human 
Rights’, 23 February 2016 <www.iom.int/news/iom-trains-puntland-journalists-human-





known Center for Economic and Social Rights states as its primary mission 
the promotion of justice through human rights.34 However, the Center also 
plays a crucial role in the protection of dignity, illustrating even more clearly 
that the purpose of human rights can be multifaceted. 
4. Key definitions  
The meaning of the terms ‘State’ and ‘non-State’ actors deserves, because of 
their frequent use in the book, to be clarified here. It is also important to 
explain the use of certain other terminology throughout the study. This will 
be done here for the words ‘obligations’, ‘responsibilities’ and ‘duties’, as 
they are often (particularly across different disciplines) used in different 
ways, or even interchangeably. This book uses them to refer to distinct kinds 
of requirements, as explained below.   
4.1 State actors 
The use of the term ‘State actor/s’, or ‘State’ is used frequently throughout 
this study. In discerning who is considered to be a State actor, the 
international law (secondary) rules on attribution are extremely useful, as 
they lay down who is considered to be a State actor, and when the conduct of 
non-State actors can be considered to be the conduct of the State. The rules, 
which are introduced in more detail in Chapter 4, are codified in the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (DASR), which were published with 
commentary on each article.35 Article 2 DASR provides that there are two 
elements of an internationally wrongful act by a State, the first being that the 
conduct ‘is attributable to the State under international law’.36 The DASR 
frame the discussion in terms of ‘State organs’ and explain that this term 
extends not only to the direct State organs forming part of the central 
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government, or the highest officials, but ‘to organs of government of 
whatever kind or classification, exercising whatever functions, and at 
whatever level in the hierarchy, including those at provincial or even local 
level’.37 Following the DASR, the definition of ‘State actor’ used throughout 
this study is therefore quite broad. 
4.2 Non-State actors 
This book defines ‘non-State actors’ more by what they are not than what 
they are – the term ‘non-State actor’ is used to refer generally to all actors 
that are not classified as ‘State actors’.38 This is a very broad definition, as it 
includes, inter alia, private actors such as individuals,39 local communities, 
civil society (i.e. non-governmental organisations), private corporations 
(whether national or multinational), as well as international organisations and 
non-State armed groups.  
The term ‘private actor’ is sometimes used instead of ‘non-State 
actor’, as this term is often used by (for example) the adjudicatory bodies 
whose jurisprudence is examined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this book. Further, 
although the term ‘non-State actor’ is used regularly throughout the book, 
where a discussion relates to a particular non-State actor, the specific actor is 
identified.  
4.3 ‘Obligations’, ‘responsibilities’ and ‘duties’ 
Throughout this study, the term ‘obligation/s’ will be used in reference to 
legally binding requirements. It is therefore used predominantly to refer to 
the conduct required of States rather than non-State actors, since international 
human rights law does not typically directly address the obligations of non-
State actors in legally binding documents. In case the term ‘obligation’ is 
used in reference to a behavioural requirement of non-State actors, this will 
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(Oxford University Press 2009). 





be explained.  
 The term ‘duty’ will be used as sparingly as possible outside the 
context of the ‘duty of due diligence’, which will be thoroughly explained 
and discussed in the study. On those occasions where ‘duty’ is used outside 
of this context, it will refer to a legally binding requirement, similarly to 
‘obligation’. 
 The term ‘responsibility’ and ‘responsibilities’ are distinguished here 
from ‘obligation’ and will be used to refer to non-legally binding 
requirements, predominantly found in soft-law instruments. Responsibilities 
are mostly discussed vis-à-vis non-State actors. This definition follows the 
approach of John Ruggie in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.40 As Ruggie explained in a later publication, the term is used 
‘to indicate that respecting rights is not an obligation that current international 
human rights law generally imposes directly on companies’.41  
5. Research questions 
The primary and overarching research question of the study is:  
How are interferences with human rights caused by non-State actors 
dealt with under international human rights law and practice, and how 
could a multi-level governance approach apply to better protect 
individuals’ human rights from the harmful conduct of non-State 
actors? 
In forming an answer to this question, the book examines several sub-
                                                 
40 UNGPs (n 15). For a discussion and critique of a sharp distinction between binding/non-
binding requirements for non-State actors, see Florian Wettstein, ‘Normativity, Ethics and the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Critical Assessment’ (2015) 142(2) 
Journal of Human Rights 162, discussed in Marlies Hesselman and Lottie Lane, ‘Disasters 
and Non-State Actors – Human Rights-Based Approaches’ (2017) 25(2) Disaster Prevention 
and Management (2017) 526, 527. 
41 John G Ruggie, ‘The construction of the UN “protect, respect and remedy” framework for 
business and human rights: the true confessions of a principled pragmatist’ (2011) 2 European 





1. What is the nature and scope of international human rights law 
obligations and do they allow space for non-State actors?  
2. What is the ‘horizontal effect’ of international human rights law, 
and how is it related to the different types of human rights 
obligations?  
3. To what extent, and how, is the horizontal effect of human rights 
reflected in international, regional and national legislation, 
jurisprudence and scholarly works? 
4. Moving beyond horizontal effect through human rights law, how 
can a governance approach to human rights be envisaged? 
5. What kind of measures can be taken under a multi-level 
governance approach to human rights in order to better protect 
individuals’ rights from non-State actors? 
6. Research design  
This study is designed to take the reader through the logical steps of moving 
towards a law and governance approach to international human rights (for 
what concerns horizontal effect). When faced with a particular societal 
problem, many legal scholars focus solely on the law and how to improve 
it.42 A recurring contemporary challenge is how to apply and amend the law 
in light of today’s society, which may be very different from the one in which 
laws were adopted. This can require legal scholars to stretch the current law 
to its limits, to push the boundaries of interpretation and legitimacy, and to 
rely heavily on active and open-minded judges to fill the gaps that the positive 
law does not always fill. This book takes a ‘law and governance’ approach 
which looks for a solution to a societal problem beyond the confines of the 
law.43 Such an approach views laws as instruments of governance, as part of 
a governance structure which comprises activities by many different actors, 
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both public and private. The study is therefore built on the premise that to 
solve a societal problem, ‘we cannot cleanly separate the search for the best 
laws on the one hand, and the search for the best modes of governance on the 
other’.44 
 The law and governance approach of the study has shaped its design. 
The study was developed in a way that would allow the shortcomings of the 
international human rights legal regime in solving the relevant societal 
problem – the prevalence of interference by non-State actors with the 
enjoyment of human rights – to be demonstrated. In particular, the research 
questions were developed and answered so as to gain as thorough an insight 
as possible into the way that international law deals with the societal problem. 
The prescriptive part of the book was then designed to show how a (multi-
level) governance approach could address the problem and build upon 
governance activities (including legal ones) to better protect the enjoyment 
of human rights from the harmful conduct of non-State actors.  
 The study is interdisciplinary, bringing together aspects of legal 
science and political science and contributing to both fields (as explained in 
Section 2). In terms of its scope, the general conclusions of the book 
regarding a multi-level governance approach to international human rights 
are intended to apply to all kinds of non-State actors. The use of case studies 
was chosen to show how the approach could be applied to specific actors, and 
the conclusions in this regard are not of general application. The book is also 
very international in focus – although it does draw upon examples of 
horizontal effect at the regional and national levels, the focus throughout the 
study is how international human rights law is applied on these levels.45 It is 
for this reason (as well as restrictions of space) that theories of horizontal 
effect in the private law of national legal systems have not been dealt with in 
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detail, only being discussed thoroughly in relation to the United Kingdom.46 
The example of the UK was chosen for two reasons. First, the UK was chosen 
because it has a specific piece of legislation (the Human Rights Act 1998) 
which was adopted to incorporate a regional human rights treaty into 
domestic law. This allowed a thorough comparative analysis between the 
regional and national levels in particular, as it enabled differences in the way 
in which the same rights – those contained in the European Convention on 
Human Rights – were applied on different levels in cases concerning human 
rights interference by non-State actors. A further reason for choosing the UK 
as an example is because of the large amount of case law and scholarly 
discussion available on the issue of horizontal effect in UK domestic courts. 
This allowed a thorough analysis of the way in which horizontal effect is 
applied within the UK, which in turn contributed to a more thorough 
comparative analysis between the three levels examined.  
 A note should also be made here on the choice of case studies, which 
are: (1) the World Bank; and (2) non-State armed groups. While the actors 
have each been the subject of research projects in the past, they have not to 
date been used as concurrent examples to strengthen the same argument (i.e. 
that international law is insufficient for protecting individuals’ rights from 
interference by non-State actors) or to test the same theory (multi-level 
governance). Nonetheless, although both actors have very different natures, 
they can both be said to operate to some degree in the public sphere – while 
certainly considered to be non-State actors, neither the World Bank nor non-
State armed groups could be said to operate privately. The World Bank, for 
example, plays a large role in the financing of development programmes in 
many countries and can have a considerable degree of influence over such 
programmes and their results (including their impact on human rights). 
Recent focus on the World Bank’s relationship with human rights from UN 
bodies as well as within academia, as well as recent developments in the 
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Bank’s policies and infrastructure make the World Bank a very interesting 
and current case study for the present book. Furthermore, the status of the 
World Bank as an international organisation raises additional questions 
regarding both horizontal effect and governance – highlighted by the ongoing 
and as yet unanswered challenges and criticisms regarding the lack of 
accountability of international organisations – both of which are central to 
this study.  
In contrast with the World Bank, non-State armed groups usually 
operate nationally, although their conduct can have international 
ramifications. It is their position as semi-public entities and the control that 
they can have over territory and resources that raise the most questions about 
non-State armed groups’ compliance with human rights standards. Naturally, 
the nature of the groups themselves as well as the context of non-international 
armed conflicts in which non-State armed groups operate, raise specific 
challenges in terms of the horizontal effect of international human rights. 
Additional challenges concerning governance arise, especially due to the fact 
that non-State armed groups usually operate outside of the control of the 
State. Non-State armed groups therefore make a particularly interesting 
choice of case study for the present study, which brings together issues of 
horizontal effect and governance and suggests ways in which to overcome 
challenges.   
 Both the World Bank and non-State armed groups have been the 
subject of much (academic) scrutiny for what concerns human rights and they 
are both subject to at least some rules of international law. They have both 
also been explicitly mentioned by UN human rights bodies as ‘actors other 
than States’ that may be subject to some human rights obligations.47 
Nonetheless, their human rights responsibilities (or potential obligations) 
have not been sufficiently clarified. This makes them very interesting studies 
for the purposes of the present book. The attention that has been paid to other 
                                                 




non-State actors’ human rights responsibilities (and obligations), namely 
multinational corporations, has been much more concrete and has led to 
significant progress within international law (although, as seen in Chapter 3, 
no binding obligations have yet been placed on business enterprises). While 
the work towards the horizontal effect of human rights vis-à-vis multinational 
corporations (and business enterprises more generally) is used where relevant 
throughout the book, it was decided not to use this type of actor as a case 
study. There has been a huge amount of literature published on business and 
human rights from different perspectives, most notably from legal and 
‘corporate social responsibility’ perspectives. In addition, very concrete 
inroads, both legal and extra-legal, have been made regarding business and 
human rights at the international, regional and national levels, including 
negotiations for a binding treaty on business and human rights. While this 
raises questions of its own regarding horizontal effect, developments 
concerning the World Bank and non-State armed groups are arguably less 
advanced, and perhaps more in need of a nudge in the right direction. 
Furthermore, the amount of studies and initiatives already undertaken in 
relation to multinational corporations would also make it very difficult to do 
justice to them as a case study in one chapter. Nonetheless, the general 
conclusions made in the present study certainly do apply to multinational 
corporations (as well as other non-State actors), and their role within a multi-
level governance approach to human rights could be the focus of a future 
study. 
 In relation to the suggestions made in the book of measures that could 
be taken under a multi-level governance approach to international human 
rights, it is important to clarify that they are not designed to function as 
proposals for policy and law-makers per se. Although some of the measures 
could indeed be taken up by policy and law-makers, the measures are 
suggested with many kinds of governance actors in mind, and many of them 
can be taken up by actors with a less formal governance role, as explained in 





7. Research methods 
The nature and design of this book are such that several research methods 
have been taken in different parts of the study. The main overarching theory 
of the study, horizontal effect, was initially researched using a literature study 
(at the international, regional and national levels, respectively). The literature 
study was not confined to academic literature, but also included many reports 
of international organisations as well as UN agencies and subsidiary organs 
(e.g. the work of Special Rapporteurs and the Human Rights Council). 
Primary as well as secondary sources were used to gain an overview of the 
theories and state of the art of horizontal effect in legal science.  
Once an overview of the horizontal effect of international human 
rights law had been formulated, doctrinal legal research, or ‘legal 
systematization’48 (i.e. a critical conceptual analysis of relevant legislation 
and case law49) was conducted to identify whether and how horizontal effect 
can be found in international human rights law and in the jurisprudence of 
(human rights) adjudicatory bodies at the international, regional and national 
levels. This can be seen in Chapters 4-7, in relation to which a comparative 
legal method was also used to compare the ‘law in action’ as well as the ‘law-
in-the-books’.50 A comparison between the ways in which horizontal effect 
has been applied on and within each level was made throughout Chapters 4-
7 and the outcome is explained in the critical analysis in Chapter 8. Chapter 
5, in particular, provides a comparative analysis of how different UN human 
rights treaty supervisory bodies apply horizontal effect, while regional human 
rights systems were compared in Chapter 6. Where necessary, a fuller 
explanation of the precise research methods used for these analyses is 
contained within the individual chapters. The comparison in Chapters 4-8 is 
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two-fold; on the one hand, the legislation and the different approaches and 
practice of the adjudicatory bodies examined on each level are compared; on 
the other hand, the different theories and types of horizontal effect found 
across the different levels are compared with one another. The analysis and 
its conclusions are based on inductive reasoning. As a result, the specific 
sources analysed and findings made in the previous chapters lead to a more 
general conclusion regarding the horizontal effect of international human 
rights law.  
 The remainder of the book is prescriptive in nature and builds on the 
findings of the comparative analysis to suggest a multi-level governance 
approach to international human rights. A literature study was conducted to 
gain a thorough understanding of theories of governance, and multi-level 
governance in particular. The findings from this study were then used to 
suggest a new, governance approach to international human rights. It is at this 
point that the law and governance approach of the study becomes fully 
evident. The research for the two case-study chapters was conducted through 
another literature study as well as further doctrinal research. The case study 
chapters follow deductive reasoning to make specific conclusions regarding 
the particular actors’ impact on human rights, based on the more general 
conclusions concerning multi-level governance (in Chapter 9).   
8. Structure of the study  
The present book is divided into four parts. Part 1 provides the theoretical 
framework for the study. It therefore deals with the ‘Nature and Scope of 
Human Rights Obligations’. Part 2 examines the ‘Horizontal Effect of 
International Human Rights at the International Level’, while Part 3 conducts 
a similar examination of the ‘Horizontal Effect of International Human 
Rights at the Regional and National Levels’. Part 4 suggests a new approach 
to the ‘Horizontal Effect of Human Rights Beyond Law – A Multi-Level 
Governance Approach’. Finally, ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’ are 
made. 
Part 1 is composed of three chapters that lay down the theoretical 





the first two research questions: ‘What is the nature and scope of international 
human rights law and obligations and do they allow space for non-State 
actors?’; and ‘What is the ‘horizontal effect’ of international human rights 
law, and how is it related to the different types of human rights obligations?’. 
Chapter 1 looks critically at the development of human rights, in 
particular through the three types of State obligations established by the 
scholarly concept of the tripartite typology of human rights. Chapter 2 
explains why (and how) international human rights law is vertical in nature. 
It also explains why States and scholars have traditionally shied away from 
including non-State actors directly in the international human rights law 
framework. Chapter 3 examines what ‘horizontal effect’ actually is. Within 
this chapter, examples from academia as well as from practice demonstrate 
the main different types of horizontal effect of international human rights law 
and provides examples of how they can be manifested. Chapter 3 also offers 
examples of how the tripartite typology has been applied to non-State actors. 
This chapter remains quite general, as the study’s in-depth analysis of 
horizontal effect takes place in Chapters 4-8. 
Having set the parameters of the human rights law framework in Part 
1, the study moves on to examine the treatment of non-State actors in law and 
in practice (Parts 2 and 3). Parts 2 and 3 answer the third research question: 
‘To what extent, and how, is the horizontal effect of human rights reflected 
in international, regional and national legislation, jurisprudence and scholarly 
works?’. 
Part 2 consists of Chapters 4 and 5, which address the horizontal 
effect of international human rights at the international level. First, Chapter 
4 considers examples of horizontal effect that can be found in international 
legislation, particularly in international human rights treaties. Chapter 5 
comprises a comparative analysis of the ways in which five UN human rights 
treaty bodies apply horizontal effect in their general comments and views on 
individual communications. Both chapters in Part 2 are critical in their 




international human rights law. 
Part 3 moves to the regional and national levels, consisting of two 
more chapters of critical and comparative analysis. Chapter 6 addresses 
horizontal effect within the main three regional human rights systems: (1) the 
European system under the Council of Europe; (2) the African human rights 
system under the African Union; and (3) the Inter-American human rights 
system under the Organization of American States. Each system is analysed 
separately, with three aspects being discussed in relation to each system. 
First, examples of horizontal effect in scholarly works pertaining to the 
respective system are examined, demonstrating the state of the art within each 
systems and clarifying the contribution of the chapter thereto. Second, 
examples of horizontal effect in the system’s human rights legislation are 
identified and discussed, and third, examples of horizontal effect in the 
system’s jurisprudence are investigated. Chapter 7 conducts an analysis of 
horizontal effect at the national level. In this chapter, horizontal effect as 
allowed for by the United Kingdom’s (UK) Human Rights Act 1998 is 
critically examined. The legislation, scholarly works and practice of the UK’s 
judiciary are each critically examined in this chapter. 
Part 4 moves from analysis to proposals for a new approach to the 
horizontal effect of international human rights and answers the fourth and 
fifth research questions: ‘Moving beyond horizontal effect through human 
rights law, how can a governance approach to human rights be envisaged?’; 
and ‘What kind of measures can be taken under a multi-level governance 
approach to human rights in order to better protect individuals’ rights from 
non-State actors?’. 
Chapter 8 reflects on the critical analyses conducted in Parts 2 and 3 
and identifies the main trends of horizontal effect running through the 
international, regional and national levels. In doing so, it pinpoints three types 
of indirect horizontal effect used on the international, regional and national 
levels. Due to the scarce findings of direct horizontal effect within human 
rights law, Chapter 8 and its conclusions focus on indirect horizontal effect. 
The findings of Chapter 8 set the foundations for Chapter 9, which introduces 





provides the reader with an understanding of governance and how it relates 
to international human rights. Chapter 9 also explains the multi-level 
governance approach which is applied in the remainder of the book. Chapters 
10 and 11 then apply the knowledge gained so far in the study to specific case 
studies. Chapter 10 concerns the World Bank and Chapter 11 concerns non-
State armed groups. The case studies reinforce the claim that the current legal 
framework fails to adequately protect human rights. Chapters 10 and 11 also 
explain how the actors would fit within a multi-level governance system of 
human rights and provide examples of measures that could be taken to move 
towards such a system. 
Finally, ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’ are offered. This part of 
the book draws together the findings of each chapter and provides 
conclusions on: the nature and scope of international human rights 
obligations; the horizontal effect of human rights; multi-level governance 
approach to non-State actors and human rights; and conclusions regarding 
the case studies. The conclusions summarise the answers to the main research 
question of the book as well as the sub-questions, highlight the contributions 
of the study, and suggest topics for further research. Final recommendations 
are offered regarding measures to be taken under a multi-level governance 
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The classifications of international 
human rights 
 
1.1 Preliminary remarks 
The classifications and nature of international human rights and their 
obligations has been much discussed. Huge developments have been made 
since the first, somewhat restrictive rights were legally enshrined in the 
earliest human rights instruments.1 These developments are evident in both 
the range of international human rights currently enshrined in international 
treaties and the way in which they have been interpreted and applied. This 
chapter deals primarily with the theoretical development of human rights, 
particularly through the ‘tripartite typology’ of human rights. Despite being 
an academic construct rather than a concrete norm, the concept has proven to 
be particularly useful in delineating the scope and content of States’ human 
rights obligations. 
 It must be noted here that much research has already been conducted 
into the ‘horizontal effect’ of international human rights law; indeed, an 
abundance of literature can already be found on ‘non-State actors and human 
rights’.2 This chapter, along with Chapters 2 and 3, relies heavily on the 
                                                 
1 Referring here to (for example) the Magna Carta 1215 and the French Declaration on the 
Rights of Man and Citizen 1789. For in-depth discussions on the history of human rights and 
their development, see e.g. Lynne Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (Norton 2007); 
Micheline Ishay, The history of human rights: from ancient times to the globalization era 
(University of California Press 2004); Rhona KM Smith and Christien van den Anker, The 
essentials of human rights (Hodder Arnold 2005).  




existing literature to set out the theoretical framework of the study.  
1.2 A brief overview of the development of the UN human rights treaties 
The introduction of human rights into international legal documents is 
extremely well rehearsed and will not be dealt with in detail here. This section 
provides a basic overview of the development of human rights in 
international instruments to show the expansion of the field of international 
human rights law within the last 60 years.  
The term ‘international human rights law’ is often used 
synonymously with the ‘UN human rights system’, so great has been the 
influence of the United Nations on the development of human rights. Since 
the adoption of its first international instrument containing specific human 
rights, the UDHR,3 the UN has been responsible for the drafting and adoption 
of ten major international human rights treaties. Two of the UN human rights 
treaties are regularly referred to as the ‘twin’ covenants:4 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),5 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).6 Both 
Covenants were adopted in 1966 in response to the atrocities carried out 
                                                 
(Hart Publishing 2016); Nicolas Carrillo Santarelli, ‘Non-State Actor’s Human Rights 
Obligations and Responsibility under International Law’ (2008) 15 Revista Electrònica de 
estudios internacionales; Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with Human 
Rights (Intersentia 2011); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(Oxford University Press 2006). 
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A 
(III) (UDHR). 
4 The Covenants are generally considered to be the first major human rights treaties laying 
down the full range of substantive rights, although the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was actually adopted a year earlier, on 21 
December 1965 and entered into force on 4 January 1969 (UNTS vol. 660, 195).  
5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS vol. 999, 3. For discussion, see e.g. Ben Saul, 
David Kinley and Jacqueline Mowbray, International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 2014). 
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) UNTS vol. 999, 171. For discussion, see e.g. Sarah Joseph and 
Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, 
and Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013). 
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during World War II.7 The rights enshrined in the Covenants were more 
extensive and arguably more concrete than those contained in the UDHR. As 
the first generally applicable legally binding human rights documents, the 
Covenants pushed human rights into a new era. However, this was not 
accomplished without some reluctance. The notion of including what some 
States considered to be vaguer and more resource-demanding economic, 
social and cultural rights in a binding instrument was seen as somewhat 
revolutionary, and was met with substantial criticism,8 particularly from 
Western States. The division between Western States, which favoured civil 
and political rights, and the Eastern bloc, which favoured economic, social 
and cultural rights, became increasingly evident during the Cold War9 and 
throughout the negotiations on the adoption of the two 1966 Covenants. It 
was this strong disagreement that resulted in the adoption of two separate 
Covenants in 1966, rather than one comprehensive agreement containing all 
of the rights laid down in the UDHR.10 Nevertheless, the UDHR, 
incorporated into the two Covenants,11 has ended up providing a platform 
                                                 
7 See Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (2008) 1 
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law <www.un.org/law/avl> accessed 19 
August 2017. 
8 For more discussion of the reluctance to give economic, social and cultural rights the status 
of enforceable rights under international law, see below, Section 1.3.1. 
9 William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press 2009) 418. 
10 A full explanation of the reasons for adopting two separate Covenants will not be discussed 
here, but can be summarised in James Simarian’s comments on the drafting procedure of the 
twin Covenants in 1952:  
Although the term “rights” is used in both the civil and political articles and 
the economic, social and cultural articles, it is used in two different senses. 
The civil and political rights are looked upon as “rights” to be given effect 
promptly. The economic, social and cultural “rights” are looked upon as goals 
toward which countries ratifying the covenant would undertake to strive, 
achieving these objectives “progressively” over a much longer period of time.  
James Simsarian, ‘Progress in Drafting Two Covenants on Human Rights in the United 
Nations’ (1952) 46(4) The American Journal of International Law 710, 711 [footnotes 
removed].  
11 Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (1st 




from which human rights could skyrocket.  
Fifty years after the adoption of the twin covenants, the United 
Nations has adopted a plethora of human rights treaties, each with a specific 
purpose. Specialised treaties now protect vulnerable groups, including 
women, children, people with disabilities and migrant workers to name a few. 
The UN has now adopted ten ‘core’ human rights treaties (including the 1966 
Covenants).12 Such broad protection and apparent support for human rights 
by the international community is to be commended. However, the system is 
now facing widespread criticism for the resulting fragmentation of human 
rights, which some believe could lead to less, rather than more effective 
human rights protection.13 An evaluation of this falls outside of the scope of 
the present study, but it is important to recognise that whether in the correct 
direction, or whether slightly wayward, the international human rights regime 
has, and continues to, evolve. Evolution particularly occurs in reaction to 
international events and new realities not envisaged by the initial human 
rights regime (as evidenced by the adoption of the two Covenants). This must 
be borne in mind in the context of the development of the nature of human 
rights obligations. Some (often incremental and cautious) developments have 
also begun occurring in relation to the subject of international human rights 
obligations. These progressions will be discussed in subsequent chapters of 
this book.   
The following section will discuss the more theoretical development 
of international human rights law, demonstrated through the ‘tripartite 
                                                 
12 See website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
‘Core International Instruments’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx> accessed 19 
August 2017. As De Schutter explains, the reason for referring to the treaties as ‘core’ is that 
they have ‘certain common characteristics’, and that they all seek to ‘protect and develop’ the 
values of the UDHR. De Schutter (n 11). 
13 The main reason for this, it is argued, is not conflict within the text of the treaties 
themselves, but rather inconsistent and conflicting application and interpretation of norms by 
the human rights treaty bodies established for this purpose. See, e.g. Marjan Ajevski, 
‘Fragmentation in International Human Rights Law – Beyond Conflict of Laws’ (2014) 32 
Nordic Journal of Human Rights 87. 
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typology of human rights’.14 
1.3 The nature of obligations under international human rights law 
The nature of obligations under international human rights law has been a 
topic of much academic discussion. With the success of the adoption of 
international human rights treaties from 1966 onwards, attention began 
turning to questions of how to give effect to the provisions in the treaties, and 
how they should be implemented by State parties. A major concern regarding 
international human rights law has always been how to detail the scope of 
action expected of States, and what exactly individuals can claim under the 
various treaties. Although a precise delineation of each human right is 
practically impossible, human rights scholars have developed a very useful 
tool that can be applied across the board of human rights to outline the action 
that States must take to fulfil their obligations. The model, known as the 
‘tripartite typology of human rights obligations’, will now be explained. 
1.3.1 The tripartite typology of human rights obligations: introduction 
The concept of a typology of human rights obligations was first introduced 
by Henry Shue in 1980. His construct envisaged State obligations to ‘avoid, 
                                                 
14 The development of human rights is also reflected in the ‘generations’ of human rights, 
introduced by Karel Vasak: Karel Vasak, ‘A 30-Year Struggle’ [1977] The UNESCO Collier 
29. The generations refer to different categories of human rights and roughly correspond with 
the chronological development of human rights. There are currently three generations of 
human rights (the first referring to civil and political rights; the second to economic, social 
and cultural rights; and the third to collective rights). Collectively, the generations have been 
said to ‘echo the cry of the French revolution’: ‘Liberté, Equalité, Fraternité’. See Frans 
Viljoen, ‘International Human Rights Law: A Short History’ (2009) UN Chronicle 46 (1&2). 
However, while the analogy of generations may be helpful in tracking the chronological 
development of human rights, the terminology risks encouraging the notion that later 
generations supersede earlier generations, which is incorrect. For criticisms on the use of this 
terminology, see e.g. Patrick Macklem, ‘Human Rights in International Law: Three 
Generations or One?’ (2015) 3 London Review of International Law 61; Carl Wellman, 
‘Solidarity, the Individual and Human Rights’ (2000) 22(3) Human Rights Quarterly 639; 
and Philip Alston, ‘A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or 
Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?’ (1982) 29(3) Netherlands International 




protect and aid’15 human rights, although it was later overtaken by Asbjørn 
Eide’s ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ typology.16 The typology attempts to 
answer the widespread criticism that the obligations enshrined in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were 
‘resource-demanding’,17 and that their nature and scope were ‘extremely 
vague’.18 This focus on the breakdown of obligations rather than rights 
endeavours to dispel the traditional hierarchy that places civil and political 
rights in a more favourable, superior position over economic, social and 
cultural rights.19 The hierarchy stems from the somewhat simplistic (but 
initially widespread) point of view that civil and political rights involve 
purely negative, ‘cost-free’ obligations whereas economic, social and cultural 
rights involve positive, economically draining obligations.20 The latter rights 
were therefore seen as placing a much greater burden upon the State. This led 
to economic, social and cultural rights being less justiciable than civil and 
political rights, a detrimental move that was aggravated by the fact that the 
ICESCR was not initially accompanied by an individual complaints 
mechanism, whilst the ICCPR was.  
More recent trends show that national, regional and international 
human rights regimes are much more inclusive of justiciable economic, social 
and cultural rights.21 Nevertheless, the opinion that economic, social and 
                                                 
15 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton 
University Press 1980) 160. 
16 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, ‘Final Report of Asbjørn Eide, Special Rapporteur for the Right to 
Adequate Food: The Human Right to Adequate Food and Freedom from Hunger’ (1987) 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23. UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, Asbjørn Eide, ‘The 
Human Right to Adequate Food and Freedom from Hunger’ (1987) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23. 
17 Ida E Koch, ‘Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?’ (2005) 5(1) Human Rights 
Law Review 81, 84. 
18 Philip Alston and Katarina Tomaševski (eds), The Right to Food Guidelines: Information 
Papers and Case Studies - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984) 55. 
19 Koch (n 17) 82. 
20 Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003) 126-127. 
21 This is evidenced by the recently adopted Optional Protocol to ICESCR establishing an 
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cultural rights demand more positive action from States remains fairly 
popular. Nonetheless, closer evaluation of the breakdown of each right allows 
this assertion to be strongly refuted. This is particularly so when assessing 
rights such as the right to a fair trial, which for States in a post-conflict 
situation can require large costs to implement, particularly when looking at 
the establishment of a functioning independent judiciary, for example.22  
It has now been generally accepted that the typology as such may be 
applied to all human rights, not just economic, social and cultural rights. 
Magdalena Sepùlveda, for example, has argued that ‘even those civil and 
political rights considered as the most classical negative rights […] are 
interpreted as imposing a spectrum of duties with different levels of State 
involvement’.23 This is strengthened by Fons Coomans’ statement that this 
‘variety of obligations’ is applicable to ‘all human rights, be they civil and 
political, or economic, social and cultural’.24 Failure to satisfy any of the 
obligations has been held to constitute a violation.25 
                                                 
individual complaints mechanism and the adoption of the European Social Charter to 
supplement the European Convention on Human Rights (which contains only civil and 
political rights). In contrast, the Inter-American human rights system still does not allow for 
the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, despite the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘Protocol of San Salvador’). However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
recognised the importance of these rights by using a broad interpretation of civil and political 
rights (such as the right to life) to encompass protection of some economic, social and cultural 
rights (such as the right to health), effectively allowing cases of economic, social and cultural 
rights to be adjudicated. See Tara Melish, ‘Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Manual on Presenting Claims’ [2002] SUNY 
Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2002-01. 
22 See Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9(2) 
Human Rights Quarterly 156, 184. 
23 Sepúlveda (n 20) 137 [emphasis added]. 
24 Fons Coomans, ‘The Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 749, 752-753. 
25 International Commission of Jurists, ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’, 26 January 1997 





1.3.2 The obligation to respect human rights 
The ‘lowest rung’ of State obligations is that to respect human rights.26 
Simply speaking, this entails an obligation on the State to refrain from taking 
any action that would infringe the enjoyment of individuals’ human rights.27 
For example, the obligation to respect human rights in relation to the right to 
housing requires States inter alia to refrain from forcibly evicting individuals 
from their homes.28  
According to Ida Koch, the ‘negative’ wording of the obligation to 
respect may actually be interpreted as giving rise to a much more positive 
obligation than was originally intended.29 This is because it now requires 
respecting existing access to human rights enjoyment, refraining from 
denying or limiting enjoyment of rights. This suggests that the State must 
already be providing these things to individuals, and therefore a positive 
aspect is already involved.30 In practice, the kind of actions actually required 
of States under the obligation to respect would depend on the standard of 
human rights enjoyment under a particular right which is already being 
enjoyed by individuals in the State’s territory/under their jurisdiction. 
Interestingly, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CteeESCR) has actually spoken of States protecting human rights 
under the obligation to respect. Koch has noted that in its General Comment 
No. 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the CteeESCR 
included positive elements in the obligation to respect the right to health.31 
This blurs the distinction between the obligations to respect and protect, 
which could cause a problem for State parties. Although in theory this should 
                                                 
26 Alston and Quinn (n 22) 184. 
27 International Commission of Jurists (n 25) 81. 
28 ibid Guideline 6. 
29 Koch (n 17).  
30 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11)’ (12 May 
1999) E/C.12/1999/5; UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education 
(Art. 13)’ (8 December 1999) E/C.12/1999/10; UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)’ (11 August 2000) 
E/C.12/2000/4; Koch (n 17) 88. 
31 Koch (n 17) 89. 
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not have a detrimental effect, since the parties should observe each of the 
obligations in the typology, it may cause some confusion. In turn, this could 
perpetuate the claim that economic, social and cultural rights are vague. It 
may cause particular problems when the obligation to respect is, as shall be 
seen in Chapter 3, applied to or imposed upon non-State actors. Since non-
State actors have not yet been subjected to the obligation to protect human 
rights, the blurring of lines here between the obligations could be 
troublesome. 
1.3.3. The obligation to protect human rights 
This section will analyse the State’s positive obligation to protect, and how, 
when applied correctly, this results in the prevention of such interferences by 
non-State actors through the implementation of treaty standards in a State’s 
domestic laws and policies. When a State fails in this regard, it could lead to 
the State being held responsible for the harmful actions of non-State actors.32 
According to Eide, the protective function of human rights is the most 
important of all.33 Indeed, the obligation to protect has been afforded a huge 
amount of attention, by legal scholars and practitioners alike. This is 
increasingly evident in relation to the protection of individuals’ enjoyment of 
rights from the actions of powerful non-State actors such as multinational 
corporations.34 
                                                 
32 This can be considered a form of ‘indirect horizontal effect’. For a thorough introduction, 
see Chapter 3.3.1. 
33 Asbjørn Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Asbjørn Eide, 
Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, social, and cultural rights: A textbook 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 30. 
34 See e.g. Dimitris Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Routledge 2012); and Andrew Clapham and Mariano Garcia 
Rubio, ‘The Obligations of States with Regard to Non-State Actors in the Context of the Right 
to Health’ (2002) Health and Human Rights Working Paper Series No. 3 
<http://www.who.int/hhr/Series_3%20Non-State_Actors_Clapham_Rubio.pdf> accessed 14 
January 2018. Although they may not focus exclusively on it, the vast majority of scholarly 
works on the topic of non-State actors and human rights deal at least in part with States’ 
obligation to protect human rights, and others also discuss the responsibility of non-State 
actors themselves to protect human rights. See e.g. Clapham (n 2); Florian Wettstein, 




In concrete terms, the obligation to protect ideally results in the 
prevention of interference with rights by non-State actors through the 
implementation of treaty standards in a State’s domestic laws. This has been 
interpreted to require States to take immediate steps to ensure that violations 
by the State, its agents, and non-State actors are prevented.35 It should also 
include providing access to impartial legal remedies in the case of any 
violations, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.36 As an example, 
Principle 6 of the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of 
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights37 explained the 
obligation to mean that the failure of States to ensure that private employers 
comply with basic labour standards may amount to a violation of the right to 
work or the right to just and favourable conditions of work (protected under 
Article 7 ICESCR).38 In the context of the economic, social and cultural 
rights generally, the UN Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions 
states that the obligation to protect requires States to take ‘active measures to 
protect all persons from racial or other forms of discrimination, harassment 
and the withdrawal of services’.39 
The advantage of the obligation to protect (and indeed the tripartite 
typology in general), is that it appears to work from the premise that 
proponents of human rights should remain cognisant of the fact that although 
                                                 
Governmental Institution (Stanford University Press 2009). 
35 Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions’ (2005) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training12en.pdf> accessed 18 August 
2017, 17-18. 
36 ibid. 
37 FIAN International, ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ <http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-
navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23> 
accessed 19 August 2017. 
38 ibid Principle 6. The Maastricht Principles are not legally binding, however they ‘aim to 
clarify the content’ of States’ obligations relating to economic, social and cultural rights in an 
extraterritorial context. That the obligation is delineated as such in this specific context, in 
which any state obligations are under contestation, supports an argument that they be so 
delineated within a State’s territory and jurisdiction as well. See ibid preamble. 
39 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 35) 18. 
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rights are framed and given content to in the form of obligations, the ultimate 
goal is not to place burdens upon States, but rather to provide individuals with 
the desired conditions/result. This is supported by Manisuli Ssenyonjo’s 
description of the obligation as ‘generally entail[ing] the creation and 
atmosphere or framework by an effective interplay of laws, regulations and 
other measures’ in relation to non-State actors, which enable beneficiaries of 
human rights to fully benefit from human rights.40 In this respect, an 
‘obligation to regulate’ can be seen to be emerging through the practice of 
some of the international and regional human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies.41 The obligation to regulate will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 
during the analysis of the bodies’ jurisprudence. 
The obligation to protect as part of the tripartite typology has not been 
explicitly codified in any international treaties. However, it has been 
substantiated by several bodies. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the European 
Commission on Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights have made it evident that the obligation requires States to 
‘take positive action to control [non-State actors] and prevent and punish’ 
infringements by them.42 Furthermore, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights explain that the obligation requires ‘effective 
policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication’, to protect against human 
rights abuses by non-State actors within their territory and/or jurisdiction.43 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the nature of the required 
                                                 
40 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart 
Publishing 2009) 24, 111. 
41 This obligation has been discussed by scholars. See e.g. Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling 
Privatization with Human Rights (Intersentia 2011); and Marlies Hesselman and Lottie Lane, 
‘Disasters and Non-State Actors – Human Rights-Based Approaches’ (2017) 26(5) Disaster 
Prevention and Management 526. 
42 See Aoife Nolan, ‘Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-State Actors 
through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the “Obligation to 
Protect”’ (2009) 9(2) Human Rights Law Review 225, 251. 
43 Principle 6, UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 




measures as being appropriate – a State is not required to take all possible 
measures.44 The nature of the measures expected will depend on the situation 
at hand. Furthermore, according to the ECtHR, a State may not be held to 
have breached the obligation to protect due to ‘mistakes, oversight, or [the 
fact] that more effective steps may have been taken’.45 Rather, the omission 
to protect must have ‘considerably increased the risk’ of human rights 
violations by non-State actors.46 All of these ideas and findings feed into the 
State duty of due diligence, which will be addressed in detail below. 
Interpretation and application of the obligation to protect by international and 
regional human rights monitoring bodies will be seen throughout Chapters 5 
and 6. 
1.3.3.1 The duty of due diligence of States  
The duty of due diligence, as a positive State obligation relating to the 
prevention of human right abuses, is inextricably linked to and may be 
derived from the obligation to protect.47 Due diligence is an obligation of 
conduct (rather than result), meaning that it is more the tangible effort, and 
‘progressive’ steps made by States which fulfil the obligation, rather than the 
success of these actions per se.48 In the human rights context due diligence 
‘requires action reasonably calculated to realize the enjoyment of a particular 
right’,49 whereas an obligation of result would ‘[require] States to achieve 
specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive standard’.50 At first sight, this 
may appear to be a less demanding or effective type of obligation, but in 
reality it is necessary in situations where the State may not have automatic 
                                                 
44 This is suggested by Clapham (n 2) 362. 
45 ‘Report of the European Commission on Human Rights in relation to Osman v. UK’ (1 July 
1997) para 92, referred to in Clapham (n 2) 362.  
46 Osman v United Kingdom, App No. 23452/94 (28 October 1998), Separate opinion of Mr 
S Treschel, cited in Clapham (n 2) 362.  
47 For a full discussion of due diligence in international law, see Joanna Kulesza, Due 
Diligence in International Law (Brill\Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2016). 
48 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 35) 61. 
49 International Commission of Jurists (n 25) para 7. 
50 ibid. 
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control over private actors, making the actual realisation of rights unrealistic 
(perhaps a notion connected to the ‘minimum core obligation’ which 
recognises the differing capacities of States to fulfil rights immediately, and 
allowing their progressive realisation).51  
Joanna Bourke-Martignoni’s evaluation of due diligence in the context 
of violence against women appears to suggest that the duty would also extend 
to addressing the causes of human rights violations by non-State actors,52 as 
well as introducing domestic laws to ensure the effective investigation and 
redress when they have occurred. This supports the idea that one of the main 
tenets of the obligation to protect is the prevention of interferences by non-
State actors; in terms of protection, prevention is better than a cure. In the 
context of the prohibition on the use of child soldiers, Special Representative 
for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy also formulated, 
in her capacity as Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, a 
‘checklist’ of measures which would fulfil the duty of due diligence, 
including ‘appropriate measures in the field of education and the media to 
raise awareness…’,53 thus entailing quite extensive steps to be fulfilled. 
As a principle in international law more generally, due diligence may 
depend on the foreseeability of a non-State actor’s conduct. As Robert 
Barnidge explains, it could involve particular knowledge of the State (i.e. of 
some intended harm, which they could have prevented but failed to do so),54 
                                                 
51 This concept was elaborated upon by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in its explanation of Article 2(1) ICESCR which stipulates this to be the nature of the 
rights within it. See ibid. 
52 Joanna Bourke-Martignoni, ‘The History and Development of the Due Diligence Standard 
in International Law and Its Role in the Protection of Women against Violence’ in Carin 
Benninger-Budel (ed), Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 56. 
53 Radhika Coomaraswamy, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Its Causes and Consequences’ (10 March 1999) E/CN.4/1999/68, para 25, in Carin 
Benninger-Budel (ed), Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 118. 
54 This was held by the General Claims Commission in Janes (US v Mex) 4 RIAA 82 (1926), 
87, cited in Robert Barnidge, ‘The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law’ (2006) 




and it also extends to exercising due diligence in relation to the transboundary 
effects of acts by private individuals within a State’s jurisdiction, as was held 
in the Trail Smelter case.55 The extent of the duty differs according to 
prevailing circumstances, and according to the resources available to a State. 
This is because the duty is context-dependent, meaning that the scope of 
actions required by the State is dependent on the situation on the ground. For 
example, the usual degree of (host State) police presence required outside an 
embassy would be low, requiring little State action. However, in the event of 
a protest or riot aimed at the embassy and taking place in its vicinity, more 
police action would be required to control the situation and prevent unlawful 
behaviour.56 Similar standards can be said to have developed in the context 
of human rights, in which the duty is also context dependent. 
Due diligence has been applied as a principle under international 
human rights law by several monitoring bodies and human rights courts, 
examples of which will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. While it has been 
interpreted and applied slightly differently by the various bodies, a very 
common expression of the duty is that to ‘prevent, investigate and punish’ 
human rights violations by private actors.57  
1.3.3.2. The development of due diligence in international human 
rights law 
It is important to be aware that the changes taking place in relation to 
globalisation, privatisation and the increased power of non-State actors may 
affect the way in which due diligence develops. On the one hand, the 
                                                 
55 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Trail Smelter Case, (United States, Canada), 16 
April 1938 and 11 March 1941, Vol. III, 1905-1982, discussed in Barnidge (n 54) 99-102. 
56 This was seen to some extent in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(Hostages) case (United States of America v Iran) 1980 ICJ Rep 3, in which the International 
Court of Justice held Iran to have failed in its duty of due diligence to protect the premises of 
the United States of America’s (US) embassy in Tehran, and to act preventively, (despite 
giving previous assurances) when the embassy was sieged by private actors. See Barnidge (n 
54) 110-113. 
57 See e.g. Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras, IACHR (Ser. C) No. 4 (29 July 1988) paras 79, 
172. 
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changing nature of the relationship between certain non-State actors, the State 
and individuals, and the taking on of more traditionally State functions by 
non-State actors (i.e. through the provision of State services), may mean that 
the scope of the obligation to protect and the duty of due diligence will 
expand accordingly. As a State secedes more activities to non-State actors, it 
may be necessary for a wider-ranging duty to emerge. This may be happening 
in relation to some actors. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, for example, detail the duties that States should observe in 
relation to businesses.58 The Principles provide for concrete measures that 
States should take to protect individuals from the harmful actions of 
businesses. For example, they require States to ensure that there are effective 
mechanisms in place for individuals to gain redress for human rights-related 
harm they have suffered at the hands of multinational corporations.59 We see 
similar standards in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,60 which require all 
adhering States to establish National Contact Points to deal with situations in 
which a multinational corporation is believed to have negatively affected an 
individual’s human right.61 
On the other hand, the new levels of influence being reached by some 
non-State actors could mean that the obligation to protect becomes 
increasingly difficult to fulfil. For example, in the context of multinational 
corporations, it may be difficult to obtain information relating to their daily 
operations. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) trying to improve the 
human rights impact of multinational corporations in the coal industry have 
often found that corporations are unwilling to share information with States, 
or with the public at large.62 Short of States obliging corporations to provide 
                                                 
58 UN Human Rights Council (n 43).  
59 ibid Principle 25. The Principles will be introduced in more detail in Chapter 3.2. 
60 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ (2000, revised version 2011) 
<http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf> accessed 25 August 2017. 
61 ibid Guideline 11. The Guidelines and the National Contact Points will be introduced in 
more detail in Chapter 3.2. 




information, it may be difficult to determine which measures need to be taken 
by States under the duty of due diligence in order to ensure that the daily 
operations of such corporations do not infringe the human rights of (for 
example) their employees. A worrying trend of political influence of 
corporations may even mean that the State is unable to take the requisite 
measures to oblige a corporation to publicise information without the threat 
of losing the investment of the corporation within its territory.63 
In addition, the vast range of non-State actors and the circumstances in 
which they operate may make it impractical to develop concrete standards 
that States should follow under the duty of due diligence. Indeed, this may 
not even be desirable given that the contextual nature of the duty suggests a 
case-by-case analysis of what States must do. The fact that due diligence is a 
duty of conduct rather than result is also of relevance here. This means that it 
is not the outcome of State action that will render the duty fulfilled, but the 
fact that the action has actually been taken (provided that it is appropriate).64 
Although reasonable (it must be acknowledged that States have a limited 
capacity to act, particularly due to restraints on resources), this underlines the 
major setback of the obligation to protect in achieving its aim of protecting 
individuals from the harmful actions of non-State actors. A victim who brings 
a complaint against a State using the obligation to protect will not be able to 
gain any kind of redress for the violation of their rights if the State has taken 
all feasible measures and still failed to regulate the actions of the non-State 
actor to the effect that they respect human rights. The lack of direct 
obligations for non-State actors precludes the victim from obtaining a remedy 
                                                 
Garment Industry’ (2013) <http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/TimeForTransparency.pdf> accessed 
25 August 2017, 1-2. 
63 Daniel Aguirre, ‘Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (2004) 35 California Western International Law Journal 53, 53-54. 
Worryingly, this extends to influence at the global level, for example over policy-making at 
the World Trade Organization. See Action Aid Trade Justice Campaign, ‘Under the Influence: 
Exposing Undue Corporate Influence over Policy-Making at the World Trade Organization’ 
(2006) <www.actionaid.org> accessed 25 August 2017. 
64 Nigel D White, ‘Due Diligence Obligations of Conduct: Developing a Responsibility 
Regime for PMSCs.’ (2012) 31 Criminal Justice Ethics 233, 254. 
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vis-à-vis the direct perpetrator of the harmful acts, and the duty of due 
diligence precludes them from gaining it indirectly, whereas if the case had 
been brought against the State that had, itself, committed the same actions as 
the non-State actor in this scenario, the victim would have been able to gain 
some kind of redress. This obviously leaves a legal lacuna. Further critique 
of the obligation to protect will be left to the following chapters’ analysis of 
horizontal effect in practice. 
1.3.4 The obligation to fulfil human rights 
The CteeESCR has given content to the obligation to fulfil through its 
General Comments. In particular, the CteeESCR stated in General Comment 
No. 12 on the right to adequate food that the obligation to fulfil actually 
requires States to both facilitate and provide this right.65 To facilitate human 
rights requires States to ‘proactively engage in activities intended to 
strengthen people’s access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure 
their livelihood, including food and security’.66 The obligation to provide 
requires direct or indirect State services when individuals or groups are 
unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realise the right themselves by 
the means at their disposal.67  
The obligation to fulfil does not, however, automatically oblige States 
to provide the means and the enjoyment of the rights themselves – a 
misunderstanding that is apparently widespread, and perpetuates a very 
narrow understanding of the nature of (economic social and cultural) rights.68 
On the one hand, the typology envisages individuals being able to secure the 
enjoyment of their rights themselves as being the ultimate goal of human 
rights, with States only stepping in (in terms of the provision of resources) as 
and when individuals do not have the capacity to do this. Indeed, Eide saw 
                                                 
65 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12’ (n 30).  
66 This quotation is also persuasive evidence of the interdependence and interrelatedness of 
human rights. See ibid, as quoted in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (n 35) 19. 
67 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12’ (n 30).  




this not only as a possibility, but an expectation to be placed on individuals.69 
On the other hand, States are not expected to directly provide all of the 
resources necessary for human rights enjoyment. Instead, it is accepted that 
they delegate tasks such as the provision of essential services concerning 
human rights to private actors. The State would still remain ultimately 
responsible for ensuring that these private actors are regulated effectively 
enough to ensure that the provision of the services complies with human 
rights standards (whether or not the issue of human rights is actually made 
explicit in the delegation of tasks). Interestingly, this is also reflected in 
universal service obligations, for example the EU Universal Service 
Directive of 2002.70 
According to the Maastricht Principles, the obligation to fulfil (as a 
whole) requires ‘states to take appropriate legislative, administrative, 
budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realisation of such 
rights’.71 The obligation could therefore include the provision of public 
services by the State, the development of targeted plans of action and 
strategies, and ‘comprehensive and immediate legislative and policy 
reviews’.  
In addition to the obligations found in the tripartite typology, the 
CteeESCR has repeatedly referred to measures to be taken by States in order 
to promote human rights. This is not mentioned as another branch (or sub-
branch, as is the case with the obligations to facilitate and provide) of the 
typology. Rather, it appears to permeate each of the State’s obligations under 
the typology. This could be because Member States of the United Nations are 
arguably already under a separate, general obligation to promote human 
rights under Article 55 of the United Nations Charter72 (and arguably also 
                                                 
69 ibid 29. 
70 European Union, Universal Service Directive, 2002/22/EC. 
71 Maastricht Principle No. 6, as cited in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (n 35) 15. 
72 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI. Article 55 states that the UN ‘shall promote: […] universal respect for, and 
observance of, fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion’. The UDHR refers to the affirmation of States’ faith in human rights through the 
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under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).73 The added value of 
making reference to measures to promote human rights lies in the fact that 
the obligation, which is interestingly not included in the ICESCR itself, has 
been given more content by the CteeESCR in relation to specific situations. 
In General Comment No. 14, for example, the CteeESCR explained that in 
the context of the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the 
obligation to promote would require States ‘to undertake actions that create, 
maintain and restore the health of the population’.  
1.3.5 A critical comment on the tripartite typology of human rights 
A full assessment of the tripartite typology and its various dis/advantages 
falls outside of the scope of this study, but several aspects must nevertheless 
be addressed. Firstly, although the typology has been widely applied and 
expanded upon by the CteeESCR, it remains a non-legally binding construct, 
which has not been codified in international human rights law instruments 
themselves. This does not necessarily diminish the effect or advantages of 
using the typology as a starting point for human rights obligations, and does 
not take away from the fact that the way in which it has evolved has 
contributed to a much greater understanding of the concrete measures 
expected to be taken by States in order to comply with their human rights 
obligations.  
                                                 
adoption of the UN Charter, which supports a finding that Article 55 also places obligations 
upon the Member States, rather than only the UN as a whole. See UDHR preamble. 
73 The preamble of the UDHR reiterates that ‘Member States have pledged themselves to 
achieve…the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’. It further determines that States ‘shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for’ human rights. As it involves matters external to the 
administration of the UN and was adopted via a resolution of the UN General Assembly, the 
UDHR is not legally binding itself (see Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 1212). There have been, however, a variety of claims as to the binding 
nature of the rights contained within the UDHR as reflecting norms of customary international 
law. An assessment of the accuracy of these statements falls outside of the scope of the present 
chapter, but the widespread claims do demonstrate the influence that the UDHR has had on 
the development of international human rights law since its adoption. For a fuller discussion 
on the legal status of the UDHR see Vojin Dimitrijevic, ‘Customary Law as an Instrument for 




Contrary to remaining a scholarly concept, the typology has also been 
applied by bodies outside of the United Nations human rights system. For 
example, as noted by Coomans, the African Commission applied the 
typology in the case of The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and 
the Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria.74 However, it is 
important to bear in mind (particularly when looking at the typology in the 
context of potential human rights obligations for non-State actors) that it may 
not be the only way of de-conceptualising human rights and breaking them 
down into concrete guidance for States. In particular, although the typology 
has had a very widespread impact on the breakdown of economic, social and 
cultural rights in particular, it is not immediately obvious how it is intended 
to work in coordination with the progressive realisation of rights demanded 
by Article 2(1) ICESCR. There may indeed be no conflict between the two 
concepts. Nevertheless, the typology and the way in which it has been fleshed 
out itself does not seem to pay attention to which parts of the typology (or 
indeed parts of each obligation within it) would be immediately realisable, or 
would form part of the ‘minimum core’ of human rights obligations.75 
However, the repeated use of the typology, specifically within the area of 
economic, social and cultural rights, suggests that both academics and 
institutions have been able to circumvent potential issues. 
1.4 Concluding reflections on the classifications of human rights 
Based on the foregoing discussions, some general conclusions can be drawn. 
Interestingly, despite manifest developments in the categories and content of 
human rights and the boom of human rights treaties dealing with specific 
vulnerable groups or areas of concern (i.e. indigenous peoples, women, 
                                                 
74 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v Nigeria, Communication No.155/96 (27 October 2001) paras 45-47. This case will 
be discussed in detail below, sufficing at this point to note, as Fons Coomans highlighted, that 
the Commission took an ‘obligation approach’ in this case. This entailed interpreting the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by reference to the obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights. See Coomans (n 24) 749. 
75 As introduced by UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' 
Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) E/1991/23, para 10. 
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people with disabilities, torture, capital punishment, etc.), similar progression 
has not been made in other aspects of human rights law; irrespective of huge 
societal changes and shifts in the division of power within a societies and 
States, the sole bearers of international human rights law obligations remain 
States, to the exclusion of non-State actors. This is for several reasons, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
 The tripartite typology remains a useful tool for several reasons. 
Firstly, by taking an ‘obligations approach’ to human rights, the typology 
focuses attention on the concrete actions that are expected of States by virtue 
of their commitments to human rights treaties. Further, its application in 
human rights monitoring helps to determine when there has been a violation 
in particular cases. The concept is especially advantageous as it transcends 
undesirable distinctions or hierarchies between different human rights. For 
these reasons, this study will take the tripartite typology as a starting point 






The traditional, State-centric approach to 
human rights 
 
2.1 Preliminary remarks 
This chapter explains the traditional, State-centric approach to international 
human rights law and the widespread reluctance to make non-State actors 
direct subjects of international human rights obligations. First, some general 
observations on the vertical effect of international human rights law are 
made. A brief comparison between the nature of obligations under 
international humanitarian law and criminal law on the one hand, and 
international human rights law on the other – spheres of international law 
which do have some (rather substantial) overlaps in terms of content of norms 
– is then drawn. This serves to highlight that human rights law has evolved 
with a strong actor-oriented perspective, whereas the other two fields have 
evolved with a more results-based approach. Following this, the attitudes of 
States and of scholars towards changing the nature of human rights 
obligations to include horizontal application are examined. 
2.2 General observations on the vertical effect of human rights 
obligations 
It is common knowledge amongst international lawyers that the nature of 
international human rights obligations is vertical – being owed by the State 
(as obligation-holder) to the individual (as beneficiary, or right-holder). The 
term ‘vertical’ is used to demonstrate that the State, as an international actor 
and regulated by international law, is placed on a ‘higher’ playing field than 




regulated by national law. The vertical effect of human rights law stems 
predominantly from the fact that traditionally, only States can become party 
to human rights treaties and therefore be legally bound by their obligations 
(although Jan Hessbruegge emphasises that this incapacity does not exclude 
obligational relationships in the non-State sphere1).2 Furthermore, only States 
can be the subject of individual complaints or cases before the international 
human rights treaty monitoring bodies and the regional human rights courts. 
Despite the increased power and influence of non-State actors, there have 
been no real correlative developments in international human rights law 
allowing for obligations to be applied between two actors of the same kind 
operating on the same legal plane.3 This is known as the ‘horizontal effect’ 
of human rights, and will be examined in Chapter 3. 
In other spheres of international law, namely international 
humanitarian and criminal law, it is possible for non-State actors (even 
individuals) to be held directly responsible for violations of international 
norms. This is despite the fact that they do not actually ratify the treaties in 
which these norms are embodied.4 Some scholars believe that this is 
acceptable in these areas of law but that to apply the same concept to human 
rights law would be inappropriate.5 This may be because of the ‘special’ 
                                                 
1 Jan A Hessbruegge, ‘Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors’ 
(2005) 11 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 21, 31-32. 
2 An exception to this is expected with the accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This was legally mandated by the Lisbon Treaty, but although 
an accession agreement was negotiated, it was rejected by the European Court of Justice in 
2015. Since then, no new agreement has been successfully negotiated, casting doubt as to 
when (or even whether) the accession will take place. See European Parliament, ‘Briefing: 
EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (July 2017) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607298/EPRS_BRI(2017)6072
98_EN.pdf> accessed 6 November 2017. 
3 At the national level, it is sometimes possible for non-State actors to be human rights 
obligation-holders, if the relevant norms have been included in domestic legislation. 
Examples of this will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
4 This is reflected in the notion of ‘individual criminal responsibility’, discussed briefly below.  
5 For example, Cedric Ryngaert, despite supporting the application of human rights law to 
non-State armed groups to a limited degree, emphasises the distinction between the rationales 
behind both applications, with that of international human rights law being the vertical nature 
THE STATE-CENTRIC APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
51 
nature of international human rights treaties as creating a relationship of trust 
between the ratifying State and individuals. ‘Regular’ international treaties, 
on the other hand, create a ‘web of inter-State exchanges’.6 In the past, this 
has prompted some to treat human rights treaties differently from other 
international treaties.7 Some authors go so far as to assert that this gives 
human rights treaties superiority over other treaties,8 despite the lack of any 
rule in international law allowing for such a hierarchical notion.  
Just as this difference in the nature of the treaties (i.e. the lack of 
reciprocal obligations within human rights treaties) may be to blame for this 
attitude, it could similarly be down to the differing natures and philosophies 
behind the regimes, which have been reflected through the (separate) 
development of each field of international law.9 Taking the example of 
humanitarian law and human rights law, while some norms within each 
system may require similar conduct or outcomes,10 the ‘realities that each 
                                                 
of the relationship between rights and obligation-holders, and that of international 
humanitarian law being the necessity of civilising armed conflicts. Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Non-
State Actors and International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Institute for International Law, Working Paper No. 146, 5. 
6 UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon 
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to 
Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant’ (4 November 1994) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 
para 17. 
7 E.g. The Effects of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, IACHR (Ser. A) No. 2 (24 
September 1982) para 29. 
8 See e.g. Menno T Kamminga, ‘State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties’ 
(1996) 7 European Journal of International Law 469. 
9 For a more substantive discussion and comparison of these philosophies see Louise 
Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vité, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ 
(1993) 293 International Review of the Red Cross. 
10 For example, both regimes prohibit torture and cruel treatment. See Article 75(2) Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 
7 December 1979) UNTS vol. 1125, 3 and Article 4(2) Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 
1978) UNTS vol. 1125, 609; and Articles 1 and 16 Convention Against Torture and Other 




was primarily crafted to regulate’ are different.11 The rationale behind 
international humanitarian law, which applies only during armed conflicts, is 
to ‘diminish the devastating human cost of conflicts’,12 seeking to avoid 
unnecessary and superfluous suffering. In particular, international 
humanitarian law focuses on protecting individuals that are not directly 
taking part in hostilities (i.e. civilians and those hors de combat). 
International human rights law, on the other hand, seeks to protect all persons 
within a State’s jurisdiction at all times, and does not distinguish between 
categories of people to be protected.13 The different aims of the regimes are 
reflected in their rules on the taking of life – while both in essence allow non-
arbitrary killing, the understanding of ‘arbitrariness’ is different within each 
regime. Humanitarian law ‘accepts the killing of combatants and fighters and 
tolerates the killing of civilians in certain limited circumstances’.14 This is 
significantly broader than the scope of killing allowed under international 
human rights law. Although killing by the State (as obligation-holder) is 
allowed in some situations, this is generally considered to be limited to 
instances of law enforcement officials acting in self-defence or through the 
implementation of the death penalty (the imposition of which is also subject 
to strict conditions).15   
                                                 
into force 26 June 1987) UNTS vol. 1465, 85. 
11 Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 131.  
12 This is evidenced by the rule of distinction, allowing only the targeting of ‘military 
objectives’, and outlawing any targeting of civilians. See International Committee of the Red 
Cross, ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 1’, as discussed in Lottie Lane, 
‘Mitigating Humanitarian Crises during Non-International Armed Conflicts – the Role of 
Human Rights and Ceasefire Agreements’ (2016) 1(2) Journal of International Humanitarian 
Action, 3.  
13 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘What is the difference between IHL and human 
rights law?’ (22 January 2015) <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-difference-between-
ihl-and-human-rights-law> accessed 6 November 2017. 
14 ibid. 
15 For an explanation of ‘arbitrary’ killing under international human rights law, see Icelandic 
Human Rights Centre, ‘The right not to be arbitrarily killed by the State’ 
<http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/comparative-analysis-of-
selected-case-law-achpr-iachr-echr-hrc/the-right-to-life/the-right-not-to-be-arbitrarily-killed-
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International criminal law developed in part as an enforcement 
mechanism for international humanitarian law (and to the extent that the 
norms overlap, international human rights law).16 Although there are now 
multiple international criminal tribunals, the majority are not permanent and 
are restricted in their scope to hear cases related to specific conflicts.17 The 
exception is the permanent International Criminal Court which began 
operating in 2002, nearly 50 years after the (respective) great international 
developments of human rights and humanitarian law.18 The treaty-based 
system allows State as well as non-State individuals accused of grave 
violations of humanitarian law to be held internationally and individually 
responsible for their actions.19 The notion of individual criminal 
responsibility is found in Article 25 Rome Statute.20 The provision allows 
                                                 
by-the-state> accessed 6 November 2017. 
16 For an informative discussion of the history and development of international criminal law, 
see Beth Van Schaak and Ron Slye, International Criminal Law: The Essentials (Aspen 
Publishers 2009). 
17 This refers, for example, to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the latter having closed in 2015. For an overview of the tribunals’ 
work, see respectively United Nations, ‘International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia’ <http://www.icty.org/> accessed 6 November 2017; and United Nations, 
‘Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals’ <http://unictr.unmict.org/> accessed 6 
November 2017. 
18 The International Criminal Court (ICC) began operating when the Rome Statute entered 
into force on 1 July 2002. See International Criminal Court, ‘Understanding the International 
Criminal Court’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf> 
accessed 29 August 2017. The European Court of Human Rights began operating in 1959. 
See Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, ‘The Court in Brief’ 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf> accessed 29 August 2017.  
19 Unlike the more local international tribunals (for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), the 
ICC was established through treaty rather than through a UN Security Council Resolution. 
While this may seem to lend the system more legitimacy as States can actively decide whether 
to be bound by the Rome Statute and comply with the ICC (as opposed to being obliged to 
comply with the hybrid courts due to Article 25 UN Charter), its dependency on the 
willingness of States to cooperate with the Court has (and will continue to) hampered its effect 
in practice. See e.g. Catherine Gegout, ‘The International Criminal Court: Limits, Potential 
and Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace’ (2013) 34(5) Third World Quarterly 
800. 
20 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 




individuals to be held ‘individually responsible and liable for punishment’ at 
the international level for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, or crimes of aggression.21  
Unfortunately, the laudable initial rationale that prompted the growth 
of international human rights law (the protection of individuals from abuse 
of authority by the State) has become outdated due to the amount of authority 
(and potential for its abuse) wielded by non-State actors. Methods of 
achieving the rationale were (necessarily) developed within the confines of 
the international legal order, which, as already stated, is strongly focused on 
the nation-State. Nonetheless, a change of focus for the rationale (for 
example, to the protection of human rights per se) is now evident in much of 
the literature. Regrettably, the views have yet to be transposed into effective 
mechanisms, whether legal or not, to protect individuals from abuse of 
authority by non-State actors. Instead, the legal framework has remained a 
blinkered system.  
The different rationales behind international human rights and 
humanitarian law have led to different relationships between the obligation-
holder and the beneficiary in both regimes. Under international humanitarian 
law, obligations are owed not only by the State but also by any non-State 
individuals that are party to the conflict. As all parties owe each other and 
benefit from the same obligations (at least when obligations are abided by),22 
obligation-holders and beneficiaries are placed on a more level playing field 
and the obligations become more horizontal in nature. As Daniel Helle has 
noted, international humanitarian law is based on an equality of obligations 
for all parties to the conflict.23 This corresponds much more closely to the 
usual nature of obligations in international treaties, which apply horizontally 
and reciprocally between ratifying States (again, based on the concept of 
                                                 
21 See generally Edoardo Greppi, ‘The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility under 
International Law’ (1999) No. 835 International Review of the Red Cross. 
22 Lane (n 12) 3. 
23 Daniel Helle, ‘Optional Protocol on the Involment of Children in Armed Conflict to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2000) International Review of the Red Cross No. 
389. 
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State sovereignty).  
Given the particularities of international humanitarian, criminal and 
human rights law, it is understandable that the latter has developed in a 
different way from other areas of international law. The following sections 
will explore some central reasons for the reluctance of States and scholars to 
accept a development of the international human rights law framework in 
favour of direct human rights obligations for non-State actors. 
2.2.1. Attitudes of States 
One of the most prevalent reasons for States to reject the extension of human 
rights obligations to bind non-State actors is their concern that doing so 
would lend the non-State actors legitimacy,24 almost endorsing their often 
atrocious behaviour.25 Reluctance on the grounds of legitimacy also stems 
from the fact that States are bound by human rights obligations because they 
have ratified the relevant treaties, consenting to be bound by the norms. The 
capacity for doing this goes hand in hand with international legal 
personality,26 which allows an entity to have rights and duties at the 
international level and be viewed as a legitimate player in the international 
field.27 Allowing non-State actors that have limited capacity and personality 
                                                 
24 Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging 
Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 37(1) Yale Journal 
of International Law, 108. 
25 The limitations of the obligations on non-State actors within the Optional Protocol must 
also be addressed here. The Convention places only ‘negative’ obligations on non-State 
actors, involving a lack of action, as opposed to ‘positive’ obligations which require action 
specifically designed to fulfil human rights (see below). 
26 This link was made by the International Court of Justice in the Reparations for Injuries case, 
in which it confirmed the international legal personality of the United Nations on the basis of 
several factors, including its capacity to conclude treaties: Reparations for Injuries Suffered 
in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 1949 ICJ Rep 174, 179, as noted in 
Philippe Sands, Pierre Klein and DW Bowett, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (6th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 475. 
27 See Icelandic Human Rights Centre, ‘International Legal Personality’ 
<http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-





and have not ratified the relevant human rights treaties to be bound by their 
obligations could undermine the primary principle of State sovereignty.28 
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
relating to the treatment of children in armed conflicts implicitly has the 
effect of dispelling the legitimacy concern.29 As will be discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 4, Article 4 of the Protocol refers to the obligation of non-
State armed groups to refrain from using and recruiting child soldiers. This 
would perhaps seem to raise, rather than quell concerns, were it not for the 
fact that Article 4 explicitly states that the obligation of the groups ‘in no way 
alters the status of any parties’ to which it applies. In addition, in a guide to 
the Optional Protocol, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) points 
out that the language of Article 4 also reflects the fact that no legal status is 
conferred upon non-State groups through the provision.30 It can be inferred 
from this that the drafters of the provision were aware of, and wished to 
render obsolete, the concerns that States may have had (or even of the 
inference that the non-State groups may make themselves) relating to the 
effect that including obligations for non-State actors in an international treaty 
                                                 
28 There is currently some debate around whether particular non-State actors have a degree of 
international legal personality and can therefore have rights and duties at the international 
level (outside the context of individuals as beneficiaries of international human rights). See 
e.g. William Thomas Worster, ‘Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors’ 
(2016) 42(1) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 207. It may be questioned how 
international humanitarian and criminal law can impose obligations on non-State actors in the 
absence of their ratification of treaties. Indeed, in the context of the equality of obligations 
mentioned above, ‘any idea that an armed group…could be equal to a sovereign state in any 
respect is heresy for governments obsessed by their Westphalian concept of state sovereignty.’ 
Marco Sassòli, ‘Introducing a sliding-scale of obligations to address the fundamental 
inequality between armed groups and states?’ (2011) 93(882) International Review of the Red 
Cross 426, 427. Yuval Shany suggests that it is the very principle of belligerent equality that 
‘symbolizes…professionalism, “fair play”, and justice, which serve as part of the historic 
building blocks of [international humanitarian law]’s legitimacy’. Yuval Shany, ‘A rebuttal 
to Marco Sassòli’ (2011) 93(882) International Review of the Red Cross 432, 434. 
29 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (adopted 25 May 2000, entered into force 12 February 2002). 
30 UNICEF, ‘Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict’ (2003) <https://www.unicef.org/publications/index_19025.html> accessed 29 
August 2017. 
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may arguably have.  
It may be difficult for States to accept and to adopt this approach on 
a bigger scale, however. As suggested above, the widespread use of such 
provisions would also raise concerns of procedural legitimacy of the treaties 
themselves in imposing obligations on entities without their consent.31 
Furthermore, such provisions would require at the outset a certain swallowing 
of pride by States in recognising that a non-State actor has enough power and 
capacity to be able to take on equal (or at least similar) international 
obligations as the State.  
This is also an issue in relation to the recognition of States of the 
validity of voluntary undertakings of non-State actors for what concerns 
human rights. We can see from State practice that the extent to which States 
are willing to do this differs according to what kind of non-State actor is 
involved. In the context of multinational corporations, States have been less 
hesitant to accept promises of observing some human rights obligations. This 
is evidenced in the widespread support that the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights32 obtained from States, as well as the fact that a 
group of States successfully lobbied the Human Rights Council for official 
discussions to open regarding a binding international treaty on business and 
human rights.33 In relation to non-State armed groups, however, the situation 
                                                 
31 Procedural legitimacy mandates that ‘international norms that affect non-state actors […] 
are in need of the latter’s participation in order to be legitimate’. A full discussion of this falls 
outside the scope of this chapter, it sufficing to note at this point that some academics believe 
procedural legitimacy to be unnecessary if the implementation of the norm is of paramount 
importance. See Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and 
the Legitimacy of International Law’ in Math Noormann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-
State Actor Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Routledge 
2010) 71-72, 73. 
32 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
John Ruggie’ (21 March 2011) A/HRC/17/31. 
33 In 2014 an Open-ended intergovernmental working group regarding transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises in relation to human rights was established by the 
UN Human Rights Council to elaborate a binding international treaty on business and human 
rights. See UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 26/9 (14 July 2014) A/HRC/RES/26/9. 




is somewhat different. Many such groups have adopted declarations or 
agreements (usually with non-governmental organisations such as Geneva 
Call) voluntarily committing themselves to international obligations, 
including some human rights obligations.34 However, these have not garnered 
much State support. States are reluctant to recognise the capacity of non-State 
armed groups to enter into international agreements or to fulfil human rights 
obligations. Therefore, they have often rejected the validity of such 
agreements.  
While interesting, it is also understandable from a political 
perspective. Unlike non-State armed groups, multinational corporations do 
not usually have a political agenda, such as taking control over an area of a 
State’s territory, and/or usurping the sovereign role of the State to some 
extent. Although their intentions may not always be honourable, 
multinational corporations do not therefore pose a direct threat to the very 
existence of a nation-State. Furthermore, giving these entities some kind of 
international obligations would not consequently aid a corporation in its aim, 
whereas it could with regards to non-State armed groups.  
It may be concluded that the attitude of States towards treating non-
State actors as subjects-proper of international human rights law are in some 
cases still largely relevant. However, the practice of (some) States in some 
situations (for example with the Guiding Principles) shows that there has 
been some development in States’ attitudes, with a more nuanced approach 
being taken towards their various concerns in imposing direct human rights 
obligations on non-State actors.  
2.2.2. Attitudes of scholars 
The reluctance of scholars to accept the direct application of human rights 
treaties to non-State actors could be due to the perception that non-State 
actors are incapable of ensuring obligations themselves due to their lack of 
resources and influence.35 The credit of this argument must be recognised, 
                                                 
concerning business and human rights are further discussed in Chapter 3.2. 
34 For an in-depth discussion, see Chapter 11. 
35 This is implied by Chris Jochnick’s assertion that States were given full responsibility for 
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but to state this in such a blanket way is to both simplify the situation and 
underestimate non-State actors to quite a large extent. The degree to which 
the argument is contestable is very context-dependent and will depend upon 
the kind of actor involved. For example, one could not reasonably expect an 
individual to secure the civil and political right to a fair trial, or the right to 
vote.36 One may, however, reasonably expect a multinational corporation not 
to forcibly evict individuals from their homes so that they may use the area 
for their business operations. It may even be reasonable to expect such a 
corporation to provide individuals within a community with resettlement, 
should they require the community to relocate.37 Although discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3, it is relevant to note here that since the breakdown of 
obligations into the tripartite typology of ‘respect’, ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’,38 it 
could be argued that all non-State actors have the means to at least respect 
the human rights of other individuals by refraining from interfering with them 
through their own conduct.39 
An additional objection of scholars to the imposition of human rights 
obligations on non-State actors is that it could allow States to hide behind the 
non-State actors’ obligations and try to elude their own responsibility.40 
                                                 
guaranteeing human rights as ‘they, and they alone, were capable of doing so’. Chris Jochnick, 
‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of Human 
Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 56, 59. 
36 Although States may impose certain standards of behaviour on individuals through their 
domestic laws requiring them to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of these rights. 
37 See for discussion, Lidewij van der Ploeg and Frank Vanclay, ‘A Human Rights Based 
Approach to project-induced displacement and resettlement (2017) 35(1) Impact Assessment 
and Project Appraisal 34. 
38 Introduced by Eide in the 1980s and revised extensively by the UN CteeESCR in its General 
Comments. See UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, Asbjørn Eide, ‘The Human 
Right to Adequate Food and Freedom from Hunger’ (1987) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23; UN 
CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11)’ (12 May 1999) 
E/C.12/1999/5. See also Chapters 1 and 3. 
39 A detailed application of this framework to non-State actors will take place in Chapter 3. 
40 Nirmalan Wigneswaran, ‘Judicial Leadership in International Human Rights: 
Developments in the Law of State Responsibility In Human Rights’ Tokyo Foundation 2009 
<http://www.tokyofoundation.org/sylff/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/sylff_p147-172.pdf> 




States could potentially argue that the fulfilment of a particular right was the 
responsibility of a non-State actor, not themselves, and therefore preclude 
them from having to fulfil the right themselves. As John Knox points out, the 
negotiators of the UDHR acknowledged the danger of including duties in the 
document and the fact that States could use the duties of non-State actors to 
shield themselves from their own obligations.41  
Similarly, it would be possible for governments to rely on the duties 
of non-State actors to limit individuals’ rights as they wished.42 This could 
be by imposing converse duties on individuals (i.e. those owed to the State 
or to society, which ‘run conversely to the vertical duties of the government 
to promote and protect’ human rights43) as opposed to the correlative duties 
(‘private duties to respect the rights of others’) that would be preferable.44 
John Knox has noted that during the negotiations of the UDHR,45 John 
Humphrey (the first director of the UN Human Rights Division)46 had 
suggested including private duties to ‘contribute to the common good’ of 
society and the State.47 This was rejected out of fear of abuse by States.48 
                                                 
41 John H Knox, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [and Duties]’ (Opinio Juris, 6 
November 2007) <http://opiniojuris.org/2007/11/06/the-universal-declaration-of-human-
rights-and-duties/> accessed 29 August 2017. 
42 John H Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102(1) The American Journal of 
International Law 1, 34. 
43 ibid 1-2. 
44 ibid 2.  
45 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 
A(III). 
46 See Knox, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [and Duties]’ (n 41).  
47 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and 
Intent (University of Pennsylvania Press 1999) 239-240, 248, cited in John H Knox, 
‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102 The American Journal of International Law 1, 5. 
48 See Knox, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [and Duties]’ (n 41). Roger Alford 
believes this to be incorrect, citing a passage by Cassin (the principal drafter of the UDHR) 
to argue that duties were excluded to avoid implying a ‘metaphysical and religious statement 
about the nature of man’. Cassin had found the challenge to be finding ‘a formula that did not 
require the Commission to take sides on the nature of man and society, or to become immured 
in metaphysical controversies, notably the conflict among spiritual, rationalist, and materialist 
doctrines on the origin of human rights’. See his response to Knox’s post, submitted on 6 
November 2007. 
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However, the inclusion of ‘duties to the community’ in Article 29(1) of the 
UDHR may be interpreted as leaving the elucidation of these duties the 
prerogative of the State. The safeguard of Article 29(2), the language of 
which has been adopted and developed in the core international human rights 
treaties (the so-called ‘legitimate limitations’ clauses to be discussed in 
Chapter 3 of the present book)49 should provide adequate protection against 
abuse by States, as it essentially confines limitations to those necessary to 
protect society or the rights of others.50 However, given the context of the 
adoption of the UDHR as the first major human rights document, it is 
understandable that such caution was taken. It is due to this potential abuse 
of private obligations that the transparency and extent of obligations owed by 
non-State actors, if introduced, would have to be made explicit, and 
international regulation would be necessary, limiting the power of States in 
this context.  
2.3 Concluding reflections on the State-centric approach to human rights  
The above discussion demonstrates that placing direct human rights 
obligations on non-State actors faces many different challenges, routed both 
in the international human rights legal framework as well as in the attitudes 
of States and scholars. The way in which the regime has developed legally 
has not allowed space for application to non-State actors, primarily due to 
concerns of State sovereignty. Although some of the beliefs or concerns 
arising from the possible application of human rights law to non-State actors 
remain real and relevant in today’s society, there are some ways of 
circumventing undesirable outcomes (as seen with Article 4 Optional 
                                                 
49 E.g. Article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS vol. 993, 3 allows for 
limitations of the rights it contains, but ‘only in so far as this may be compatible with the 
nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a 
democratic society’. 
50 Article 29(2) reads: ‘[...] everyone shall be subject only to such restrictions as are 
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 




Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child). The attitudes are 
important to bear in mind when deciding how to move forwards with 
encouraging the compliance of non-State actors with international human 
rights law standards. Despite widespread pressure to do so, the international 





Horizontal effect of international human 
rights in the current legal framework1 
 
3.1 Preliminary remarks 
As explained in Chapter 2, international human rights obligations are vertical 
in nature and do not apply between non-State actors. Nevertheless, there is a 
huge volume of literature and research trying to identify the best way to 
protect human rights from non-State actors and hold them responsible for 
violations. Human rights scholars tend to divide the application of human 
rights obligations to non-State actors into two strands; (1) ‘direct horizontal 
effect’; and (2) ‘indirect horizontal effect’, which will both be examined in 
this chapter. The terms are very often used in the fields of constitutional law 
and private law, particularly within the European context.2 Much of the 
                                                 
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in: Lottie Lane, ‘The horizontal effect of 
international human rights law in practice: A comparative analysis of the general comments 
and jurisprudence of selected United Nations human rights treaty monitoring bodies’ (2018) 
5(1) European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 5. 
2 In the context of fundamental rights within the European Union, see, e.g., Sonya Walkila, 
Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in EU Law (Europa Law Publishing 2016); Hugh 
Collins, ‘On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law’ in Hans 
Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford University Press 2014); 
Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi and Giovanni Comandé (eds), Fundamental 
Rights and Private Law in the European Union: Vol.Marek Safjan, ‘The Horizontal Effect of 
Fundamental Rights in Private Law – On Actors, Vectors, and Factors of Influence’ in 
Purnhagen Kai and Peter Rott (eds), Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation 
(Springer International Publishing 2014); Hugh Collins, ‘On the (In)compatibility of Human 
Rights Discourse and Private Law’ in Hans Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European 




debate surrounding horizontal effect comes from, in particular, Germany and 
the United Kingdom.3 However, the terms are also used at the international 
level, with scholars such as John H Knox discussing the ‘horizontality’ of 
international human rights law, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen considering 
the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ responsibilities and obligations of non-State 
actors.4 Although rarely, the term ‘direct horizontal effect’ has also been used 
by one of the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies (see Chapter 5).  
 The aim of this chapter is to explain the concept of the horizontal 
effect of international human rights law. It therefore explains some of the 
ways in which it can be manifested and applies the tripartite typology of 
human rights obligations to non-State actors. The work of various scholars 
and examples from the practice of different adjudicatory bodies are used to 
illustrate horizontal effect. The examples of practice provided here are 
illustrative and do not necessarily coincide with those examined in the much 
more comprehensive analysis of horizontal effect in human rights 
jurisprudence conducted in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
                                                 
and Giovanni Comandé (eds), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union: 
Vol. I and II (Cambridge University Press 2010); Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘Social Rights, 
Human Dignity and European Contract Law’ in Stefan Grundmann (ed), Constitutional values 
and European contract law (Kluwer Law International 2008); and Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, 
‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights, Privacy and Social Justice’ in Katja S Ziegler (ed), 
Human Rights and Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2007).  
3 See e.g. Justin Friedrich Krahé, ‘The Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law 
Relationships’ (2015) 2(2) European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 124; 
Alison L Young, ‘Horizontality and the Human Rights Act 1998’ in Katja S Ziegler (ed), 
Human Rights and Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2007); Gavin 
Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law: A Bang or a 
Whimper?’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 824. For discussion of horizontal effect in the 
German context, see for example, Kara Preedy, ‘Fundamental Rights and Private Acts - 
Horizontal Direct or Indirect Effect? – A Comment’ (2000) 1 European Review of Private 
Law 125. 
4 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘The Practice of Shared Responsibility in Relation to Private 
Actor Involvement in Migration Management’ in André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos 
(eds), The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2016). 
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3.2 Direct horizontal effect of international human rights 
The direct horizontal effect of human rights treaties ‘lays duties directly upon 
a private body to abide by its provisions and makes breach of these duties 
directly actionable at the instance of an aggrieved party’.5 In other words, it 
places non-State actors under direct and explicit obligations to respect, 
protect or fulfil human rights. Direct horizontal effect would allow 
individuals to gain redress directly against the perpetrator of their human 
rights, and to hold non-State actors directly responsible. 
Direct horizontal effect is sometimes discussed from the perspective 
of a victim of a human rights violation, in which case it is considered to have 
two components – substantive and procedural. Substantive horizontal effect 
would enable individuals to claim violations of rights owed to them by non-
State actors, whilst procedural horizontal effect would allow an individual to 
‘enforce his fundamental rights against another individual’.6 At the 
international level, this would challenge the existing rule that complaints of 
human rights violations may only be brought before human rights monitoring 
bodies (and for the most part, human rights courts) by individuals against 
States.7 In today’s international human rights framework, this is not possible. 
As it stands, neither substantive nor procedural direct horizontal effect can be 
found in international human rights law. This has been reiterated many times, 
for example by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRCtee) in General 
Comment 31: ‘obligations are binding on States and do not, as such, have 
                                                 
5 Phillipson (n 3) 826. 
6 Pieter van Dijk and Godefridus JH van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 1998) 23 [emphasis added]. 
7 See, for example, Article 1 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) UNTS vol. 
999, 171. Some human rights bodies allow complaints to be brought by other actors, such as 
non-governmental organisations, on behalf of an individual. However, the object of the 
complaint is always the individual concerned. As mentioned in Chapter 2.2, the European 
Union will be acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights, although it is not 
known precisely when this will happen. See European Parliament, ‘Briefing: EU accession to 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ (July 2017) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607298/EPRS_BRI(2017)6072




direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law’ (see Chapter 5.3.1).8 
Although this is the current state of play, there have been significant 
strides towards direct horizontal effect for business enterprises. Most notably, 
in July 2014 the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 26/9, through 
which it established an open-ended, intergovernmental working group with 
the mandate ‘to elaborate an internationally legally binding instrument to 
regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises’.9 The working group has made 
considerable progress, with its latest report showing that a detailed 
framework and overview of the contents of a treaty on business and human 
rights has been developed.10 However, it is it likely to be quite some time 
before a final version of the treaty has been adopted and gained enough State 
ratifications to enter into force.11 
Slightly earlier developments towards direct human rights obligations 
for businesses occurred through the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).12 The UNGPs were drafted by 
                                                 
8 UN Human Rights Committee (HRCtee), ‘General Comment No. 31: The nature of the 
general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 
2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 8. 
9 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 26/9, ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding 
instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights’ (14 July 2014) A/HRC/RES/26/9. See also Lottie Lane, ‘Private Providers of Essential 
Public Services and de jure Responsibility for Human Rights’ in Marlies Hesselman, Brigit 
Toebes and Antenor Hallo de Wolf (eds), Socio-Economic Human Rights in Essential Public 
Services Provision (Routledge 2017) 152-153. 
10 Chairmanship of the open-ended intergovernmental working group, ‘Elements for the Draft 
Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Respect to Human Rights’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/Legally
BindingInstrumentTNCs_OBEs.pdf> accessed 6 November 2017. 
11 For discussion of the development of a treaty on business and human rights, see e.g. Olivier 
de Schutter, ‘Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (2015) 1 Business and 
Human Rights Journal 41; David Bilchitz, ‘The Necessity for a Business and Human Rights 
Treaty’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 203. 
12 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
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John Ruggie in his capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, and were unanimously endorsed by the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2011.13 Significantly, the UNGPs contain a direct 
responsibility (as opposed to an obligation) for businesses to respect human 
rights, as well as a responsibility to conduct human rights due diligence (see 
Section 3.4.2.2).14 Although the UNGPs are not legally binding, they have 
had a tremendous impact; both States and businesses have taken concrete 
action towards the implementation of the UNGPs. This includes, for example, 
the adoption of ‘National Action Plans’15 and national legislation by States 
(see below) and measures such as human rights impact assessments, human 
rights policy statements, reporting and training by businesses.16 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines)17 have also 
helped to pave the way to direct horizontal effect for businesses. The OECD 
Guidelines were first adopted in 1976 and have been reviewed several times. 
The most recent review took place in 2011 and resulted in the addition of a 
                                                 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (21 March 2011) A/HRC/17/31 (UNGPs). 
13 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 17/4, ‘Human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises’ (16 June 2011) A/HRC/RES/17/4. 
14 UN Human Rights Council, UNGPs (n 12) Principles 11 and 17. 
15 National Action Plans detail the government’s activities and plans on how to help 
businesses improve their respect of human rights. For more information, see Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘State national action plans’ 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx> accessed 6 
November 2017. For a scholarly discussion of national action plans, see Claire Methven 
O’Brien and others, ‘National Action Plans: Current Status and Future Prospects for a New 
Business and Human Rights Governance Tool’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 
117. 
16 For an extensive database detailing the action that has been taken by businesses and States 
to implement the UNGPs, see the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Type of 
Steps Taken’ <www.business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-
tools-examples/implementation-by-companies/type-of-step-taken> accessed 6 November 
2017. 
17 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’, 27 June 2000 (revised version 2011) 




new chapter on human rights which is consistent with the UNGPs, 
strengthening the commitment to human rights already included in the OECD 
Guidelines.18 As with the UNGPs, the OECD Guidelines are not legally 
binding. However, they require adhering States to establish a ‘National 
Contact Point’ (NCP), making it the only instrument on the responsibility of 
businesses that has a ‘built-in grievance mechanism.’19 NCPs are mandated 
to ‘provide a mediation and conciliation platform for helping to resolve cases’ 
of non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines.20 Since the 2011 revision, the 
number of NCP cases dealing with human rights has increased dramatically.21 
However, even before this, some NCPs referred to international human rights 
treaties in their ‘Final Statement’ on a case.22 While important, this is not 
altogether surprising, since the previous version of the Guidelines (adopted 
                                                 
18 Although the OECD Guidelines do include specific recommendations on human rights, they 
focus on responsible business conduct more generally. For an explanation of the Guidelines’ 
content, aims and implementation, see OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Responsible Business Conduct Matters’ (2014) 2 
<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/MNEguidelines_RBCmatters.pdf> accessed 6 November 
2017. 
19 ibid. 
20 OECD, ‘Cases handled by the National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ 1 <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Flyer-OECD-National-Contact-
Points.pdf> accessed 6 November 2017. 
21 ibid. 
22 See, for example, UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, ‘Final Statement of 25 September 2009 (Survival International vs Vedanta 
Resources plc.’, No. 58-62. The case concerned a British mining company called Vedanta 
Resources operating in India, which was found to have failed to conduct adequate impact 
assessments regarding in indigenous and human rights. Ultimately, the NCP found that the 
company ‘did not respect rights and freedoms…consistent with India’s commitments under 
various international human rights instruments.’ See Amnesty International UK, ‘Briefing for 
UK National Contact Point on Human Rights Implementation of OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ (February 2013) 9-10 <www.oecdwatch.org/publications-
en/Publication_3966> accessed 6 November 2017. See also OECD Watch, ‘Survival 
International vs Vedanta Resources plc’ <www.oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_165> accessed 6 
November 2017; and Ibrahim Kanalan, ‘Horizontal Effect of Human Rights in the Era of 
Transnational Constellations: On the Accountability of Private Actors for Human Rights 
Violations’ in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law 2016 (Springer International Publishing 2016) 423. 
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in 2000) provided that companies should ‘respect the human rights of those 
affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s international 
obligations and commitments’,23 and explicitly referred to the human rights 
legal framework. 
Perhaps the UNGPs’ and OECD Guidelines’ most significant 
contribution to (binding) direct horizontal effect has been their influence on 
legislation adopted at the national and European level. Notable examples can 
be found in the United Kingdom. For example, both The Companies Act 
2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 and the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 contain provisions requiring certain businesses to 
disclose information related to human rights.24 In the Modern Slavery Act in 
particular, this extends, for businesses over a certain size, to information as 
to ‘what action they have taken to ensure there is no modern slavery in their 
business or supply chains’.25 Further examples of legislation influenced by 
the UNGPs can be found in France and the US.26 A recent law passed in 
                                                 
23 OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, 27 June 2000, General Policies 
Chapter, para 2. 
<www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/2000oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprises.htm> 
accessed 6 November 2017. See for discussion, Amnesty International UK (n 22) 4. 
24 Section 414C (7)(b) The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
Regulations 2013 No. 1970 requires quoted companies to prepare a ‘strategic report’ which 
must contain a review of the company’s business ‘to the extent necessary for an understanding 
of the development, performance or position of the company’s business, include [...] social, 
community and human rights issues, including information about any policies of the company 
in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies.’ Examples of regional 
legislation influenced by the UNGPs include: European Union, Directive 2014/95/EU 
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups (22 October 2014); and European 
Union, Regulation 2017/821/EU laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for 
Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-
affected and high-risk areas (17 May 2017). See also CLT Envirolaw, ‘Overview of key 
Business & Human Rights Legislation for companies’ <www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/clt_human_rights_legislation-1.pdf> 
accessed 6 November 2017.  
25 UK Government website, ‘Modern Slavery Act 2015’ 
<www.gov.uk/government/collections/modern-slavery-bill> accessed 6 November 2017; 
Part 6, Section 54(4) Modern Slavery Act 2015. 




France requires certain companies to make ‘vigilance plans’ that must, inter 
alia, include ‘reasonable vigilance measures to identify risks and prevent 
serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.27 
Further developments towards direct horizontal effect have been 
made through the jurisprudence of several national legal systems. A full 
discussion falls outside the scope of the present book due to its international 
focus, but it is interesting to see that some courts have held private owners of 
publicly accessible spaces to be directly bound by the fundamental rights to 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.28 In effect, the private 
owners’ enjoyment of their property rights have been limited in order to allow 
individual/s to exercise their right to freedom of expression/assembly.29 
                                                 
Code Section 1714.43; Senate Bill 657 (Steinberg) (2009-10)). The legislation requires that 
certain private companies disclose ‘efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from 
[their] direct supply chain for tangible goods offered for sale’. For discussion, see Kamala D 
Harris, ‘The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: A Resource Guide’ (2015) 
<https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf> accessed 6 
November 2017. 
27 Loi no. 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des 
entreprises donneuses d’ordre (JO du 28eme mars 2017, no.1) (Law No. 2017-399 on the Duty 
of Care of Parent Companies and Ordering Companies). See for discussion Sandra Cossart, 
Jérôme Chaplier and Tiphaine Beau de Lomenie, ‘The French Law on Duty of Care: A historic 
Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights 
Journal 317. 
28 The cases have been decided at the provincial and state level as well as the national level. 
See e.g. Supreme Court of California, Robbins v Pruneyard Shopping Center [1979] 23 Cal. 
3rd 899. A similar example is a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in 
which a private and publicly owned airport was held to be directly bound by fundamental 
rights. However, the airport in question was 52% State-owned, giving the State a ‘controlling 
influence’, which enabled the Court to avoid discussing the property rights of the airport 
owners and reduces the significance of the outcome for what concerns direct horizontal effect. 
See BVerfG, 1 BvR 699/06 vom 22.2.2011, Absatz-Nr. (1-128) 
<www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2011/02/rs20110222_
1bvr069906en.htm> accessed 6 November 2017. For discussion, see Livia Fenga and Helena 
Lindemann, ‘The FRAPORT Case of the First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court and its Public Forum Doctrine: Case Note’ (2014) 15(6) German Law Journal 1105; 
and Orsolya Salát, ‘From the Mass Mind to Content Neutrality: Freedom of Assembly in a 
Comparative Perspective’ (2012) <www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/salat_orsolya.pdf> accessed 6 
November 2017.  
29 In the case of Robbins v Pruneyard Shopping Center (n 28) for example, the privately-
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Other courts, though not going this far, have engaged in discussions 
concerning how much discretion private property owners have for what 
concerns the enjoyment of freedom of expression/assembly on their property 
and whether public property owners enjoy the same level of discretion.30 
Similar case law can also be found at the regional level, although in these 
proceedings the State has remained the ultimate obligation-holder rather than 
the relevant private actor, thereby ruling out direct horizontal effect.31  
At the international level, although not within the realm of 
international human rights law, there have also been cases in which human 
rights obligations have been upheld against private actors. For example, in a 
significant case in 2014 the European Court of Justice balanced the rights and 
interests of an internet search engine operator (Google) against those of a 
‘data subject’ (an individual).32 In applying the relevant law (the Data 
Protection Directive33) it considered the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union.34 It found that unless interference with the data subject’s 
rights to privacy and data protection could be justified, they would ‘as a rule’ 
take preference over the rights and interests of the internet search engine 
                                                 
owned shopping centre that had refused to allow a group of high school students to solicit 
signatures for a petition to the government were obliged to allow the solicitation on the basis 
that ‘sections 2 and 3 of article I of the California Constitution protect speech and petitioning, 
reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.’ A 
similar finding had been made by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Marsh v 
Alabama 326 U.S.501 [1946], although such outcomes appear to be relatively rare. See for 
discussion Salát (n 28) 370. 
30 Supreme Court of Canada, Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada [1991] 
1 SCR 139; Ontario Provincial Court Criminal Division, R v Jack Layton [1986] CarswellOnt 
792, 38 C.C.C. (3 d) 550; Supreme Court of the United States, International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness v Lee [1992] 505 US 672. 
31 An example of this is the case of Appleby v United Kingdom App No. 44306/98 (6 May 
2003) at the European Court of Human Rights, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
32 ECJ Case C-131/12 Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de 
Datos (13 May 2014) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0131> accessed 6 November 2017. 
33 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ 1995 L 281/31. 




operator and the general public.35 
Similar cases have also been decided by private dispute arbitrations. 
For example, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has 
upheld the right to freedom of expression against a private corporation and 
has interpreted the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, which codifies the 
law applicable in WIPO disputes, to be applied with reference to international 
human rights law standards that are not included in the policy.36 The 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which hears 
investment disputes between States (acting as private actors) and private 
actors, has also considered human rights law in some decisions.37 However, 
this remains an exception rather than the rule, and scholars have pushed for 
further consideration of human rights in investment arbitration,38 warning 
against ‘considering international investment law in a vacuum’.39 For 
example, arguing for greater harmonisation between international human 
rights and international investment law, Bruno Simma and Theodor Kill 
suggest using international human rights law as ‘external rules’ when 
                                                 
35 Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (n 32) para 97. 
An interference could be justified by the ‘preponderant interest of the general public in having, 
on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.’ 
36 WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., 
Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc., and Bridgestone Corporation v Jack Myers, Case No. 
D2000-0190, discussed in Kanalan (n 22) 453-454. 
37 As Kanalan notes, this has even been true in cases where the parties, who determine the 
applicable law in a given dispute, have not agreed that human rights law will be applicable. 
Kanalan (n 22) 454-455. 
38 For a very detailed discussion of the relationship between international human rights and 
investment law, the ways in which human rights are brought into investment disputes and 
suggestions as to how human rights could be better integrated into investment arbitration, see 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst Ulrich and Francesco Francioni (eds), Human Rights in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2010); Andreas 
Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 
2012). 
39 Bruno Simma and Theodor Kill, ‘Harmonizing Investment Protection and International 
Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology’ in Christina Binder and others (eds), 
International investment law for the 21st century. Essays in honour of Christoph Schreuer 
(Oxford University Press 2009) 678, 679. 
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interpreting investment treaties.40 
Finally, in recent years there have been several instances of 
international bodies holding non-State actors (in particular non-State armed 
groups) to be bound by some jus cogens norms. For example, in 2012 the 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (the body established 
by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate alleged violations of 
international human rights law in the country since March 201141) stated that 
‘at a minimum, human rights obligations constituting peremptory 
international law (jus cogens) bind States, individuals and non-State 
collective entities, including armed groups.’42 This has been reiterated by the 
UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, which found the same 
obligations to bind non-State armed opposition groups as well as States.43 
These claims are strengthened by international criminal law, which enables 
members of non-State armed groups to be held individually responsible at the 
international level for violations of some jus cogens obligations.44 However, 
                                                 
40 See ibid. The use of external rules is consistent with the rules of interpretation found in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) UNTS vol. 1155, 331. A similar argument has been made by Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? 
The Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 
Ernst Ulrich and Francesco Francioni (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law 
and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2010) 45. 
41 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution S-17/1, ‘Situation of human rights in the Syrian 
Arab Republic’, A/HRC/RES/S-17/1.  
42 ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic’, A/HRC/19/69, para 106, cited in Geneva Academy, ‘Human Rights Obligations of 
Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration of the Practice of the UN human Rights Council’ 
(2016) Academy In-Brief No. 7, 22 <www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-
files/InBrief7_web.pdf> accessed 6 November 2017. 
43 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt’, 
A/HCR/28/66, 29 December 2014, paras 54 and 56, cited in Geneva Academy (n 42) 29.  
44 Article 25 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002) allows individuals to be held ‘individually responsible and liable for 
punishment’ at the international level for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide or crimes of aggression. Although not all of these can also be said to be human rights 
standards, according to M. Cherif Bassiouni, they all have the status of jus cogens. M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’ (1996) 59(4) Law 




in this context the obligations are not framed as part of human rights, but 
criminal law, and therefore cannot be considered to be true examples of direct 
horizontal effect of international human rights law.  
Further developments towards direct horizontal effect are buttressed 
by scholars via the suggestion of new theories or bases for direct horizontal 
effect.45 Specifically, some literature suggests focusing on our understanding 
of human rights themselves, as opposed to human rights law, in order to 
justify placing direct human rights obligations on non-State actors.46 Ibrahim 
Kanalan is one proponent of this approach, arguing that many previous 
theories of direct horizontal effect fall short because of their focus on staying 
within the confines of the international legal framework.47 He suggests a new 
concept based on the ‘normative power of human rights and the consideration 
of the functional differentiation of society’.48 Scholars such as Dennis Arnold 
also rely on a particular conceptualisation of human rights and favour direct 
horizontal effect in relation to multinational corporations in particular. 
Arnold has repeatedly argued that ‘agentic accounts of human rights provide 
an appropriately deep foundation for corporate human rights obligations’.49  
                                                 
45 See e.g. Nicolás Carillo-Santarelli, Direct International Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Actors: A Legal and Ethical Necessity (Wolf Legal Publishers 2017). For an overview 
of theories of direct horizontal effect (within the European context), see Nuno Ferreira, 
Fundamental Rights and Private Law in Europe: The Case of Tort Law and Children 
(Routledge 2011). 
46 See e.g. Manfred Nowak and Karolina Miriam Januszewski, ‘Non-State Actors and Human 
Rights’ in Math Noortmann, August Reinisch and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actors in 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2015) 118; Kanalan (n 22); and Jean Thomas, ‘Our rights, 
but whose duties? Re-conceptualizing rights in the era of globalization’ in Anat Scolnicov and 
Tsvi Kahana (eds), Boundaries of state, Boundaries of Rights: Human Rights, Private Actors, 
and Positive Obligations (Cambridge University Press 2016) 6. 
47 Kanalan (n 22). 
48 ibid 456. Within his work, Kanalan relies on ‘systems theory’ and in part on the work of 
Gunther Teubner, who has also addressed new theories of direct horizontal effect. See e.g. 
Gunther Teubner, ‘The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by “Private” 
Transnational Actors’ (2006) 69(3) The Modern Law Review 327; and Gunther Teubner, 
‘Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal effect?” (2011) 40 Rechtsfilosofie & 
Rechtstheorie 191. 
49 Dennis G Arnold, ‘Corporations and Human Rights Obligations’ (2016) 1(2) Business and 
Human Rights Journal 255, 264. See also Denis G Arnold, ‘Transnational Corporations and 
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Other scholars have taken a broader perspective, developing theories 
of shared responsibility between State and non-State actors,50 as well as 
‘multi-duty bearer regimes’.51 A discussion of the projects falls outside the 
scope of this book, but they are extremely interesting and show that scholars 
are working to fill the ‘accountability gap’ arising from the lack of direct 
horizontal effect in new ways.52  
All of these examples show that at the national, regional and 
international levels, real developments have been made in various contexts 
towards the direct horizontal effect of human rights. Nonetheless, most of the 
concrete, binding developments have taken place outside of international 
human rights law, the direct application of which between non-State actors 
remains extremely limited. 
3.2.1 The legitimacy of direct horizontal effect of international human rights 
law 
The legitimacy of imposing direct human rights obligations on non-State 
                                                 
the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights’ (2010) 20(3) Business Ethics Quarterly 371; Denis 
G Arnold, ‘Global Justice and International Business’ (2013) 32(1) Business Ethics Quarterly 
125; Denis G Arnold and Andrew Valentin, ‘CSR at the Base of the Pyramid: Exploitation, 
Empowerment, and Poverty Alleviation’ (2013) 66(10) Journal of Business Research 1904. 
50 The ‘SHARES’ Research Project on Shared Responsibility in International Law has been 
steadily growing in its reach and output, and offers ‘new concepts, principles and perspectives 
for understanding how the international legal order may deal with shared responsibility’ 
between State and non-State actors. It specifically focuses on allocating responsibility to 
multiple actors that have contributed to the same violation of international law, and has dealt 
with the issue of the lack of direct, binding human rights obligations for non-State actors. See 
e.g. SHARES website <www.sharesproject.nl/> accessed 6 November 2017; D’Aspremont J 
and others, ‘Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and States in International 
Law: Introduction’ (2015) 62(1) Netherlands International Law Review 49. 
51 See e.g. Wouter Vandenhole and Willem van Genugten, ‘Introduction: An emerging multi-
duty-bearer human rights regime?’ in Wouter Vandenhole (ed), Challenging Territoriality in 
Human Rights Law: Building blocks for a plural and diverse duty-bearer regime (Routledge 
2015) 1. 
52 Wouter Vandenhole and Willem van Genugten, for example, suggest a ‘fundamental 
rethinking of [the] basic tenet of human rights law’, that ‘human rights obligations are 
primarily incumbent on the territorial State’. See ibid. See also Lottie Lane and Marlies 
Hesselman, ‘Governing Disasters: Embracing Human Rights in a Multi-Level, Multi-Duty 




actors is a matter of much debate in the academic community. Authors such 
as Gunther Teubner are of the opinion that the validity of fundamental rights 
obligations for some non-State actors (namely multinational corporations) 
cannot be questioned.53 As explained above, current international human 
rights law mandates that States are the primary subjects of international 
human rights law. Simply speaking, as elected representatives of their 
citizens, States have the legitimacy to make decisions as to which laws should 
apply within their own jurisdiction. At the international level, in the absence 
of an elected world government, the legitimacy of State obligations could be 
said to stem from the sovereign equality of States and the fact that they bind 
only themselves through the creation and adoption of international norms. 
The source of legitimacy for the imposition of direct obligations on non-State 
actors at the international level therefore raises some questions. This section 
will discuss the potential legitimacy of direct international human rights 
obligations for non-State actors.  
The concept of legitimacy can be examined from several 
perspectives. For the purposes of the present book, it is viewed in relation to 
the creation and content of legal norms.54 Legitimacy is generally defined as 
having two components, the first procedural and the second substantive (also 
referred to as input and output legitimacy55).56 Procedural legitimacy means 
                                                 
53 See Gunther Teubner, ‘Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?’ (2011) 40(3) 
Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 191, 198. 
54 For discussion on different perspectives towards legal legitimacy, see A Javier Treviño, The 
Sociology of Law: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives (Routledge 2017). 
55 In recent years, a third perspective, ‘throughput’ legitimacy, has been recognised. 
Throughput legitimacy ‘connects input legitimacy and output legitimacy by through emphasis 
on the procedural quality of the law-making process. Throughput legitimacy refers to a 
process that allows input to feed into output through transparency, procedures that ensure 
wide representation, and options for deliberation’. Karin Buhmann, ‘The Development of the 
‘UN Framework’: A Pragmatic Process Towards a Pragmatic Output’ in Radu Mares (ed), 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 90. 
56 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy 
of International Law’ in Math Noormann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor 
Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Routledge 2010) 71-73.  
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that the way that obligations/norms were created was legitimate, in that they 
were made with the consent or participation of those affected by them. Many 
scholars are of the opinion that for any international human rights obligations 
to be placed directly on non-State actors, they must be procedurally 
legitimate following the premise that ‘international norms that affect non-
state actors [...] are in need of the latter’s participation in order to be 
legitimate’.57 However, there are some scholars who believe that procedural 
legitimacy in the case of some fields of international law (human rights 
included) may not actually require the consent or participation of non-State 
actors. The reasoning behind the assertion is that if the expected result of an 
obligation’s implementation is of paramount importance, it may negate the 
necessity of the norms being adopted with the consent of affected parties.58 
Cedric Ryngaert argues that in the absence of participation by non-State 
actors, if a ‘legal norm or its implementation has in itself an important 
substantive value’, participation is not necessary.59 He highlighted the fact 
that international criminal law obligations are imposed upon non-State actors 
without their consent, nevertheless remaining legitimate because of the 
‘heinous character’ of their violation.60 More broadly, this could also be 
because of the character of international criminal law obligations.  
However, the argument appears to suggest a hierarchy of human 
rights norms – that violations of some rights are more serious than others. 
This goes against one of the fundamental tenets of human rights that all 
human rights are equal and are based on the dignity of the person.61 Jamie 
Mayerfeld actually uses this tenet to his advantage in reaching a similar 
conclusion to Ryngaert. He states that in the context of human rights, 
procedural legitimacy does not require the consent of those bound by the 
norms because the nature of human rights ‘allow[s] us to take certain actions 
                                                 
57 ibid 76. 
58 ibid 71-72. 
59 ibid 71. 
60 ibid 72.  





regardless of other people’s opinions’ and ‘place[s] obligations on other 
people whether or not the other people agree’.62 To argue otherwise would 
‘make [one’s] dignity hostage to other people’s opinions’.63 Following 
Mayerfeld’s reasoning, one could even argue that international human rights 
law is not essentially based on consent at all. This perspective, however, 
remains that of a minority, although States may be reluctant to give non-State 
actors a significant participatory role when it comes to law-making. As 
Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran note, ‘States jealously guard their 
lawmaking powers as a key attribute of statehood, making them generally 
resistant to the idea of sharing such powers with any nonstate actors’.64 
However, rhetoric and actual commitment may fail if there is not 
sufficient organisational commitment to the norms. Demanding non-State 
actors to conform to human rights norms without having been included in 
their development and adoption may result in more challenges to their 
implementation and respect. It has been repeatedly found that non-State 
actors are more likely to conform to a rule or norm when they have 
participated in the adoption of it.65 This risk is especially pertinent in light of 
the fact that the expertise and knowledge of many non-State actors who 
would have human rights obligations lies in different fields – including them 
in the norm creation process would also, in effect, provide the non-State 
actors directly involved with knowledge of their impact on human rights, and 
would also act as awareness-raising for non-State actors more generally. 
Overall, at the international level, direct, binding human rights 
                                                 
62 Jamie Mayerfeld, The Promise of Human Rights: Constitutional Government, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and International Law (University of Pennsylvania Press 2016) 201; and Jamie 
Mayerfeld, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Law’ (2009) 19(1) 
Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 49, 76. 
63 Mayerfeld, The Promise of Human Rights (n 62); Mayerfeld, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy 
of International Human Rights Law’ (n 62) 77. 
64 Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging 
Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 37(1) Yale Journal 
of International Law 108. 
65 As Ryngaert explains, ‘“[o]wnership” of rules indeed furthers the effectiveness of the rules, 
because non-state actors, having made the law (or at least having been involved in the making 
of the law), can be considered to have internalised that law.’ Ryngaert (n 56) 76. 
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obligations for non-State actors may be legitimate but should include the 
actors’ participation in the development of the rules. A possible exception 
will be raised in Chapter 11 concerning non-State armed groups, but the 
importance of participation will be highlighted throughout Chapters 9-11 in 
the context of good governance. In these chapters, it will be seen that 
consent/participation is not only important regarding the legitimacy of legal, 
binding obligations for non-State actors, but also as a general principle to be 
followed throughout a governance system. 
3.3 Indirect horizontal effect of international human rights 
Due to the lack of direct horizontal effect of international human rights law, 
the concept of indirect horizontal effect gains relevance. In a situation of 
indirect horizontal effect, it is the State, not the responsible non-State actor, 
against whom the victim claims an interference with their human rights. The 
State is therefore also the entity that is (if the claim succeeds) legally 
recognised as being responsible for the harm suffered by the victim. This is 
regardless of the fact that the act violating the human right was done by a 
non-State actor. Essentially, this results in a diagonal application of human 
rights, often through a State’s direct obligation to protect individuals from 
the harmful actions of other non-State actors. Under this construct, while the 
State remains directly responsible, indirect obligations, which derive from 
international law, are imposed on non-State actors; it may well be that 
through the State’s fulfilment of its obligation to protect, a non-State actor is 
under an obligation to adhere to certain human rights standards imposed by 
national law (thereby receiving direct obligations at the national level as 
well).66 
Because the focus here is on the international level, the definition of 
                                                 
66 Indeed, this activity is expected of States under international human rights law – as Manfred 
Nowak and Karolina Januzewski state, ‘international law confines itself to regulate non-state 
actor behavior through indirect horizontal obligations requiring the state to intervene, through 
domestic legislation and other appropriate measures’. See Manfred Nowak and Karolina M 
Januzewski, ‘Non-State Actors and Human Rights’ in Math Noortmann, August Reinisch and 




indirect horizontal effect adopted differs somewhat from popular definitions 
in the national or European (Union) context – Gavin Phillipson, for instance, 
defines indirect horizontal effect as meaning that ‘whilst the rights cannot be 
applied directly to the law governing private relations and are not actionable 
per se in such a context, they may be relied upon indirectly, to influence the 
interpretation and application of pre-existing law’.67 This understanding of 
indirect horizontal effect is more relevant at the national level, where it is 
possible to have cases in which both parties are non-State actors. Under this 
definition, it would fall to the national judiciary to apply international human 
rights standards when giving judgments, even when they are dealing with a 
case that only involves non-State actors.68 Phillipson’s position will be 
discussed at length in Chapter 7 regarding horizontal effect at the national 
level (within the United Kingdom). 
Alison Young explains that there are two ways in which to distinguish 
between direct and indirect horizontal effect. The first depends on whether 
the claim is brought regarding a Convention right directly, or whether it relies 
on alternative legislation which is then interpreted in a way that gives effect 
to the Convention right; the legislation includes an obligation which mirrors 
or reflects the right protected by the Convention.69 This distinction is not as 
relevant at the regional and international levels because the relevant judicial 
bodies on these levels only have jurisdiction to hear cases regarding human 
rights instruments. Indeed, at the international level each UN human rights 
treaty body only has the jurisdiction to hear individual complaints regarding 
a single treaty. The second way Young identifies to distinguish direct and 
indirect horizontal effect is more relevant to the regional and international 
levels and is adopted (with the exception of Chapter 7 on horizontal effect at 
the national level) throughout this book. The method looks at the nature of 
the subject of the human rights complaint – the horizontal effect is direct 
                                                 
67 Phillipson (n 3) 826. 
68 Conor Gearty, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Common Law’ (JUSTICE Seminar), as 
cited in Phillipson (n 3) 826-827. 
69 Alison L Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ in David Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the 
Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
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when a private actor is subjected to the human right obligation, whereas it is 
indirect when the law is made subject to the human right at stake.70 This is 
clearly so in a case where a State is under a positive obligation to protect 
individuals’ rights from the harmful actions of other private actors.  
Although some academics may believe that the distinctions between 
direct and indirect horizontal effect are simply a matter of semantics, there is 
quite a large practical difference between them,71 particularly for the victims 
of the violations. There is a crucial ideological distinction between seeing the 
actual perpetrators of the violations as ‘real’ subjects of international law as 
opposed to holding the State indirectly responsible. At some point, we have 
to let go of the habit of seeing the State as some kind of ‘parental’ figure, 
responsible for the guaranteeing the welfare of its citizens,72 and allow the 
non-State actors – often more akin to adolescents (torn somewhere between 
the dependent individual, and the autonomous, independent nation-State) – 
to take on responsibility for their own actions. The perpetual obstacle here is 
determining at which point this line should be drawn, and how. Should there 
be a method akin to the ‘Gillick competence’ test developed in UK common 
law73 to determine this by applying established criteria? Should standards be 
generally applicable to all non-State actors, or should there be differentiated 
norms according to different types of actor? Is it legitimate to establish 
international norms to force non-State actors to operate in a certain way? A 
discussion of all of the possibilities falls outside of the scope of the present 
study, but the questions were borne in mind during the analysis in Chapters 
4-8 of this book and the suggestion of a new, interdisciplinary approach in 
Chapter 9. 
The following sections will provide examples of the way in which 
                                                 
70 ibid. 
71 John H Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102(1) The American Journal of 
International Law 1, 29. 
72 Chris Jochnick, ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the 
Promotion of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 56, 59. 
73 This test is used to determine whether or not a child has the competence to either consent 
to medical treatment without the consent of her legal guardian. See Gillick v West Norfolk and 




non-State actors can have human rights standards imposed upon them under 
international human rights law. The analysis is not exhaustive but rather 
illustrative, since indirect horizontal effect is thoroughly analysed in Chapters 
5-8. 
3.3.1 State obligations to protect human rights 
At the international level, the most apparent form of indirect horizontal effect 
is explainable by way of a diagonal trajectory, or perhaps a triangular 
relationship between two non-State actors and the State. The two non-State 
actors are legally on an equal footing (regardless of their equality of position 
in practice) and the State maintains its vertically superior position, remaining 
the sole human rights obligation-holder. As such, the line of responsibility 
must pass to the State as the human rights obligation-holder. This is normally 
achieved by holding the State responsible for not protecting the individual 
from the harmful actions of the other non-State actor, although it may also be 
through holding the conduct of the non-State actor to be attributable to the 
State (and therefore being able to treat it as State conduct). This is possible 
because of States’ duty to protect the enjoyment of individuals’ rights from 
harmful actions by third parties, as explained in detail in Chapter 1. As John 
Knox explains, in fulfilling their obligation to protect human rights, States 
are required to impose duties on individuals through the implementation of 
their own domestic laws.74 Because of this, the incapacity of holding the non-
State actor directly responsible for the human rights interference does not 
automatically exclude obligational relationships in the non-State sphere.75 
This relates back to Sir Nigel Rodley’s point that, in theory, States deal with 
                                                 
74 See Knox (n 71) 28. This statement was made in the context of international obligations 
prohibiting slavery, but is also appropriate in relation to many norms of international law. The 
importance of using the obligation to protect human rights to fill the lacuna in human rights 
protection caused by the lack of direct horizontal effect has been emphasised by the Human 
Rights Committee. UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 31, The nature of the general legal 
obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 
2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 8. 
75 Jan A Hessbruegge, ‘Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors’ 
(2005) 11 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 21, 31-32. 
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the behaviour and punishment of non-State actors through their domestic 
law.76 Indeed, adopting and enforcing such laws form part of the State’s 
obligation to protect individuals from interference with the enjoyment of their 
rights by third parties, as explained in Chapter 1.  
3.3.2 Balancing individual rights against one another 
Within the State’s positive obligation to protect human rights, it is possible 
for non-State actors to be implicitly burdened with obligations through the 
State imposing legitimate limitations on their human rights. Legitimate 
limitations involve action being taken by a State and can involve the rights 
of two individuals being balanced against each other, with one being given 
precedence over the other. Unlike the overarching obligation to protect 
human rights, legitimate limitations leading to the balancing of rights are 
specifically laid out in particular provisions in relation to only some rights. 
The obligation to protect more generally, on the other hand, requires State 
action in relation to all human rights.  
 Few human rights are absolute and cannot be subject to limitations, 
which are generally allowed by human rights treaties to a certain extent. For 
example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows 
certain rights (i.e. Article 19 providing the right to freedom of expression) to 
be restricted, if it is necessary for one of the specific reasons of respecting the 
rights or reputations of others, the protection of national security or public 
order, or the protection of public health or morals.77 Further, restrictions of 
the right must be ‘provided for by law’.78 This may result in States 
                                                 
76 See Nigel Rodley, ‘The Evolution of the International Prohibition of Torture’ in Amnesty 
International, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948-1988: Human Rights, the UN 
and Amnesty International, 63 in Clare Mcglynn, ‘Rape, Torture and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2009) 58(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
565, 594. See also Lane, ‘Private Providers of Essential Public Services and de jure 
Responsibility for Human Rights’ (n 9). 
77 See Article 19, para 3, ICCPR. 
78 Article 19, para 3, ICCPR. A similar criterion in the European Convention of Human Rights 
has been clarified by the European Court as including unwritten as well as written law, which 
must be adequately accessible and of sufficient precision. The law must also be of a certain 




introducing national laws requiring private actors to conduct themselves in a 
particular way, restricting their own rights for the protection of others. The 
test that human rights bodies must conduct in order to determine whether a 
limitation was indeed legitimate is one of proportionality. When the reason 
for the limitation being invoked is the protection of the rights of others, this 
test essentially requires the adjudicating body to balance the enjoyment of 
one right against another. An example of such a limitation would be when a 
State adopts legislation prohibiting religion-based hate speech, which 
naturally limits one actor’s right to freedom of expression in favour of 
protecting another individual’s right to freedom of religion. This occurred in 
the case of Ross v Canada before the Human Rights Committee,79 in which 
it was held that the suspension of a schoolteacher from his post at a school in 
a very Jewish community due to his offensive remarks against Judaism was 
not a violation of his right to freedom of expression. The court emphasised 
the provision in Article 19(2) ICCPR that ‘the exercise of [this] right [...] 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities’, which were particularly 
important in the present case given the position of authority in which the 
claimant was placed.80 The limitation of the applicant’s right in this case 
clearly allowed the State to require him to act in a particular way, which 
implicitly placed an obligation on him to respect the rights of others. Further 
practice concerning the balancing of rights will be briefly discussed in 
Chapter 6 with reference to examples of case law from the European Court 
of Human Rights. 
3.3.3 Prohibition on the abuse of human rights   
As well as allowing for balancing exercises and legitimate limitations to be 
placed on rights, the international human rights framework also contains a 
                                                 
and 49; and Rotaru v Romania, App No. 28341/95 (4 May 2000) para 52, discussed in Olivier 
De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (1st edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 287-364, which includes a very thorough examination of 
legitimate limitations on human rights. 
79 Ross v Canada (736/1997) UN Doc. CPPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (18 October 2000). 
80 ibid para 11.6. 
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prohibition on the abuse of individual rights. While it is not framed as a legal 
obligation for non-State actors, the doctrine prohibits (taking the example of 
Article 17 ECHR) ‘any activity or [...] any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater 
extent than is provided for in the Convention’. Significantly, this prohibition 
is aimed at ‘any State, group or person’, thereby including individuals within 
its remit.81 As Antoine Buyse explains, ‘[t]he provision’s main aim was to 
prevent totalitarian and extremist groups from justifying their actions by 
invoking the ECHR.’82 
While the restrictions allowed by Article 17 go to the substance (or 
scope) of human rights, which will be examined in more detail below, there 
are also provisions in various human rights treaties that prohibit the 
admissibility of cases that take advantage of the right to make a human rights 
complaint in a way that goes against the purpose of human rights.83 This can 
be seen, for example, in Article 3 of the First Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR,84 which prohibits the admissibility of cases ‘which it considers to be 
an abuse of the right of submission of such communications or to be 
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant’. A similar clause can be 
found in Article 35(3)(a) ECHR, which allows the ECtHR to declare 
inadmissible any claim that it considers to be ‘an abuse of the right of 
individual application’. From these two provisions, the link between an abuse 
of the right of submission and human rights obligations for non-State actors 
may not seem to be immediately clear. Indeed, it is not possible to say that 
                                                 
81 Emphasis added. 
82 Antoine Buyse, ‘Dangerous Expressions: The ECHR, Violence and Free Speech’ (2014) 
63(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 491, 484, citing Ždanoka v Latvia, App 
No. 58278/00 (17 June 2004) para 109. 
83 This is notwithstanding the fact that the majority of decisions by the ECtHR regarding 
Article 17 have occurred during the admissibility stage rather than on consideration of the 
merits. The term ‘substantive’ and ‘admissibility’ are used in the present Chapter to 
demonstrate that Article 17 ECHR concerns the concrete scope of certain rights, whereas 
Article 35(3)(a) ECHR and Article 3 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR operate more as 
procedural bars to prevent certain claims from being brought. 
84 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 




there is a direct obligation arising from the provisions, but rather that they 
place a restriction on the exercise of individuals’ rights. The provisions 
prevent frivolous and potentially damaging claims from being brought, 
preventing individuals from using the precious resources of the human rights 
complaints mechanisms for selfish and/or illegitimate ends.85  
The more ‘substantive’ prohibition of abuse of rights is more akin to 
a legitimate limitation of human rights, as will now be explained. In the 
context of the right to freedom of expression, the European Court of Human 
Rights has explained that  
[T]here is no doubt that any remark directed against the Convention’s 
underlying values would be removed from the protection of Article 10 
[freedom of expression] by Article 17 [prohibition of abuse of rights].86  
This suggests that Article 17 could have a similar effect to legitimate 
limitations of human rights; Article 17 essentially restricts certain 
manifestations of enjoying human rights in order to protect the rights of 
others, by excluding them from the Convention’s protection. The difference 
is, however, that with Article 17 there are no clear-cut criteria stipulating 
when the prohibition is to be applied. Rather, whole areas of (for example) 
speech are ‘categorically’ excluded from protection by the Convention using 
the prohibition on the abuse of rights.87 The ECtHR’s jurisprudence has been 
criticised for the unclear way in which it chooses which categories should be 
excluded from protection.88 Moreover, in theory, the prohibition could be 
                                                 
85 The extent to which human rights claims can be said to be inherently selfish in nature falls 
outside the scope of the present book. For an interesting introduction to this issue, see Marie-
Bénenicte Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European 
Convention (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
86 Seurot v France, App No. 57383/00, decision on the admissibility of 18 May 2004, as cited 
in European Court of Human Rights Press Unit, ‘Factsheet – Hate Speech’ (2017) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017. 
87 For a critique of Article 17 in light of this, see Cannie Hannes and Dirk Voorhoof, ‘The 
Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights Convention: An 
Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?’ (2011) 29(1) Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 54, 55. 
88 Buyse (n 82) 495-496. 
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invoked against abuses of every right in the Convention, whereas legitimate 
limitations of human rights may only be invoked regarding those rights 
containing a specific provision to allow this (e.g. Article 10(2) ECHR). The 
difference between Article 10(2) and Article 17 may allow restrictions to be 
placed on individuals in a broader range of circumstances through the 
prohibition of abuse of right. In practice, the Court appears to treat abuse of 
rights and legitimate limitations of rights as two alternative approaches for 
restricting the enjoyment of individuals’ rights.89 The way in which the Court 
seems to have treated Article 10(2) (allowing for legitimate limitations to be 
placed on freedom of expression) and Article 17 interchangeably has also 
been met with criticism,90 blurring the role of the two different provisions. 
While concerns regarding the application and use of Article 17 by the Court 
are well-founded, the provision may still have an important role in placing 
implicit duties on individuals and groups to respect human rights, which will 
now be discussed.  
Much of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding Article 17 has been in 
the context of the freedom of expression. In this setting, the prohibition on 
the abuse of rights relates mostly to ‘hate speech’. The term ‘hate speech’ 
covers the expression of views that reflect religious hate, racial hate, ethnic 
hate and negationism and revisionism (e.g. denial of the Holocaust during 
World War II).91 When applied to cases involving an alleged use of hate 
speech, Article 17 essentially has the effect of placing indirect duties on 
individuals or groups to refrain from expressing themselves in a way that 
interferes with the rights of others (e.g. with their freedom of religion or non-
discrimination). These duties are much clearer in the ICCPR. Instead of 
having an ‘abuse of rights’ clause like the ECHR, the ICCPR includes a 
specific provision curtailing the freedom of speech, to the same end as Article 
17 ECHR. Article 20(2) ICCPR provides that ‘[a]ny advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
                                                 
89 European Court of Human Rights Press Unit (n 86).  
90 Buyse (n 82) 495-496. 




hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’. This is comparable to the 
exclusion of hate speech through Article 17 ECHR, and is notably contained 
in a separate provision from the legitimate limitations of freedom of 
expression under Article 19(2) ICCPR. The wording of the provision 
suggests that the scope of prohibited expression under the two regimes is very 
similar (see scope of ECHR-prohibited speech above). The crucial phrase 
within Article 20(2), however, makes the duties involved more explicit. 
Unlike Article 17 ECHR, Article 20(2) ICCPR contains the words ‘shall be 
prohibited by law’. This places direct obligations on State parties to take 
positive measures to adopt particular laws to protect individuals from speech 
that amounts to advocating ‘national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’. Logically, such 
legislation would necessarily include provisions placing obligations on 
individuals and groups to refrain from such speech/expression, indirectly 
placing obligations on non-State actors to respect human rights.92 It can thus 
be argued that the ECHR and the ICCPR both place indirect obligations on 
non-State actors, relying again (as with the most common form of indirect 
horizontal effect) on States’ obligations to protect human rights. 
3.4 The tripartite typology of human rights and non-State actors 
When examining the scope of human rights obligations of non-State actors, 
it is useful to borrow from the delineation of human rights obligations for 
States. Chapter 1 conducted an analysis of the most common tool for 
determining the extent and scope of human rights obligations – the tripartite 
typology of obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. The 
relationship between non-State actors and each branch of the tripartite 
typology will be briefly assessed in this section. The aim is to sketch how the 
typology may apply to non-State actors despite not being the subject of 
obligations under international human rights law.   
                                                 
92 A more detailed analysis of non-State actors’ obligations to respect human rights will take 
place below, Section 3.4.1. 
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3.4.1 The obligation to respect human rights and non-State actors 
The obligation to respect human rights is a negative obligation that requires 
States to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of individuals’ human 
rights. In theory, there is nothing inherent in the nature or characteristics of 
non-State actors that would prevent them from being able to respect human 
rights. Indeed, if States are properly fulfilling their obligation to protect 
human rights, they will ensure (through the laws and policies) that non-State 
actors respect human rights (once again going back to the reasoning of John 
Knox and Nigel Rodley explained in Chapter 2). Whether this is sufficient 
enough to avoid obligations to respect human rights at the international level 
is a complicated issue, however. As will be demonstrated in Part 4 of this 
book during the discussion of the case studies, some non-State actors operate 
outside of the control of the State. Others are able to manipulate the laws 
applicable to them due to the non-extraterritoriality of human rights 
obligations (e.g. multinational corporations operating in States that are not 
party to or have not implemented certain international human rights treaties 
can take advantage of this within their operations even though they may be 
subject to strict domestic laws when operating within their headquarter State).  
Ultimately, whatever the rationale behind it, more and more 
discussions of the obligation to respect are taking place in relation to non-
State actors. For example, a Handbook developed by the United Nations for 
National Human Rights Institutions recognises that not only States, but ‘all 
actors’ who have an official bearing on the fulfilment of rights must consider 
this in their actions, and make sure that they do not impinge upon their 
fulfilment.93 Although again in the context of economic, social and cultural 
rights, this implies that certain private actors, who have been recognised as 
being in a position to affect the realisation of rights, must abide by an 
obligation to respect human rights. This could include, for example, private 
                                                 
93 Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions’ (2005) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training12en.pdf> accessed 18 August 




providers of essential public services such as healthcare.94  
Although the Handbook only speaks of actors with an ‘official 
bearing’ on human rights, developments (particularly in soft-law instruments 
and in the various documents of several UN human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies) provide us with more examples of such actors than may initially be 
expected. For example, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights hold corporations to have a duty to respect international human 
rights.95 Significantly, the Guiding Principles envisage concurrent but 
separate obligations to respect human rights for State and non-State actors 
(i.e. businesses). Rather than seeing the obligation to respect human rights 
purely through the lens of the State obligation to protect human rights, the 
Principles detail specific duties for business enterprises to respect human 
rights throughout their operations.96 Other actors with a duty to respect 
human rights could include non-State armed groups, given the fact that 
Article 4 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (discussed in Chapter 5)97 explicitly requires such groups to refrain 
from recruiting and using child soldiers (i.e. to respect the prohibition). 
Finally, individuals could have limited duties to respect human rights, as 
imposed through States’ domestic laws (for example pursuant to the 
prohibition on the abuse of rights and Article 20(2) ICCPR discussed above). 
                                                 
94 For a discussion on the relationship between private essential public service providers and 
human rights see Lane, ‘Private Providers of Essential Public Services and de jure 
Responsibility for Human Rights’ (n 99); and more broadly Antenor Hallo de Wolf, ‘Human 
Rights and the Regulation of Privatized Essential Services’ (2013) 60(2) Netherlands 
International Law Review 165. For discussion of private providers of healthcare specifically, 
see Antenor Hallo de Wolf and Brigit Toebes, ‘Assessing Private Sector Involvement in 
Health Care and Universal Health Coverage in Light of the Right to Health’ (2016) 18(2) 
Health and Human Rights 79. 
95 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (21 March 2011) A/HRC/17/31, 
Principle 11. 
96 See ibid Principles 11-15. 
97 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (adopted 25 May 2000, entered into force 12 February 2002). 
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A more general obligation to respect human rights for non-State actors 
(although still geared towards businesses) can be found in the UN’s ‘Guiding 
Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ drafted by Magdalena 
Sepúlveda Carmona, former Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights. The principles emphasise that  
[n]on-State actors [...] have, at the very minimum, the responsibility to 
respect human rights, which means to avoid causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts through their activities, products or 
services, and to deal with such impacts when they occur.98  
The Principles are again a soft-law instrument and remain quite vague 
in terms of content, but they do demonstrate that the notion of non-State 
actors’ respect for human rights as an international standard is gaining 
traction. Adopted one year after the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, Sepúlveda Carmona seems to have taken the opportunity, as 
evidenced in the quotation above, to ensure the assertion of responsibility to 
respect for non-State actors in a broader context through the Guiding 
Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights.99 
The above are only a few examples of initiatives taken as part of the 
UN-promoted drive to make non-State actors more aware of the negative 
impact they may have on the human rights of individuals, and to operate in a 
way that does not interfere with individuals’ rights. More initiatives will be 
dealt with in detail in Part 4 of this book, where previous efforts to impose 
                                                 
98 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles 
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ (2012), adopted by the UN Human Rights Council, 
‘Final draft of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights’, submitted by the 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ 
(18 July 2012) A/HRC/21/39, para 100. 
99 For a breakdown of the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights and 
guidance on their implementation, see International Movement ATD Fourth World and 
Fransiscans International, ‘Making Human Rights Work for People Living in Poverty: A 
handbook for implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights’ (2015) <http://www.atd-fourthworld.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2015/05/2015-
09-01-GuidingPrinplsEPHR-HANDBOOK-EN-ATD_FI_Handbook_English_WEB-1.pdf> 




obligations to respect human rights upon non-State actors are discussed. 
3.4.2 The obligation to protect human rights and non-State actors 
The obligation to protect human rights is simultaneously the most inherently 
connected to the actions of non-State actors, yet may be the hardest to apply 
directly to non-State actors. Chapter 1 explained that the obligation to protect 
human rights requires States to take positive action to protect the enjoyment 
of individuals’ rights from interference by non-State actors. On the face of it, 
this requires States to ensure that non-State actors respect human rights. 
Nonetheless, it may also be possible and desirable to place obligations to 
protect human rights on some non-State actors. It may be difficult to do this 
in relation to individuals, as they do not generally have the capacity or the 
resources to ensure that other actors do not infringe upon human rights. 
Extending the obligation to protect human rights to individuals may also 
place too much authority in the hands of individuals. Therefore, if this 
obligation is applied to non-State actors, it must be done so carefully and in 
a nuanced manner. It may be possible, for example, to argue that the 
allowance of citizens’ arrests may help to ensure human rights protection in 
some situations (e.g. to prevent a murder or theft from taking place).  
3.4.2.1 International humanitarian and criminal law 
Until now, references to non-State actors’ obligations to protect human rights 
have been much fewer than those to respect human rights. A notable (albeit 
brief) exception is the discussion by Yaël Ronen regarding the implicit 
imposition of the obligation to protect human rights through international 
humanitarian and international criminal law.100 As the application of these 
fields of law to non-State actors are discussed in detail elsewhere in the 
present study, this section will contain only a brief explanation of how the 
two regimes could be considered to include human rights obligations for non-
State actors. 
The reason for looking at human rights obligations through the lens 
                                                 
100 Yaël Ronen, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors’ (2013) 46 
Cornell International Law Journal 21, 23. 
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of humanitarian and criminal law is the fact that international humanitarian 
law and criminal law impose direct obligations on non-State actors. As Ronen 
argues,  
some types of [non-State actors] – and individuals within them – are 
already directly bound by certain international legal norms that 
essentially protect human rights, albeit under a different legal 
classification and in narrowly-circumscribed contexts.101   
The legal norms referred to by Ronen may not mention human rights 
explicitly. However, they sometimes have the effect, in practice, of protecting 
human rights due to considerable overlaps in the content of norms across the 
regimes. An example of this is the prohibition of torture. There exists an 
absolute prohibition of torture in international human rights law (under 
Article 7 ICCPR and the Convention against Torture)102 and in international 
humanitarian law.103 Violating this norm under humanitarian law can lead to 
individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law.104  
The ‘narrowly-circumscribed contexts’ referred to by Ronen concern 
the extent to which international humanitarian and international criminal law 
actually apply to a particular non-State actor (which depends on a 
determination that a given situation amounts to an ‘armed conflict’ and, for 
some norms, that the non-State actor has a certain level of organisation and 
control)105 and the extent to which human rights standards are actually 
                                                 
101 ibid 23 
102 Article 7 ICCPR states that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free 
consent to medical or scientific experimentation’, made absolute through the prohibition on 
derogating from Article 7 under Article 4(2) ICCPR. Article 2(2) of the Convention against 
Torture similarly gives the prohibition an absolute nature: ‘No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.’ 
103 Torture is ‘prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever’ by Article 4(2)(a) 
Additional Protocol II. 
104 In certain situations, the commission of torture can be considered a crime against humanity 
under Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute, falling within the substantive jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court. 




encompassed by those norms. It will be argued in Chapter 11 that some 
human rights norms are much more detailed than corresponding international 
humanitarian and criminal law norms. In these cases, the non-State actors’ 
obligation to protect human rights will be of a different (most likely lower) 
standard than would be expected under a direct application of international 
human rights law. It could be said, however, that certain norms of 
humanitarian and criminal law should be interpreted in light of the 
corresponding obligations under international human rights law, which may 
constitute the lex specialis in some situations during times of armed conflict. 
This argument will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 11 of this book. At this 
point, it suffices to say that non-State actors’ obligations to protect human 
rights during armed conflicts may be broader than originally expected. 
3.4.2.2 Due diligence of non-State actors  
Even more evidence of an obligation to protect human rights owed by non-
State actors can be found in the many documents and initiatives pushing for 
human rights due diligence to be conducted by non-State actors. The due 
diligence of States explained in Chapter 1 has become one of the main ways 
in which States have been held to their obligation to protect human rights. 
The (non-legally binding) standards for non-State actors have been developed 
on several levels and vary according to the actor involved, although most 
research in this area pertains to businesses. 
As explained by the International Law Association (ILA) Study 
Group on Due Diligence, the UNGPs drafted by John Ruggie focus on the 
due diligence of businesses.106 Curiously, due diligence is dealt with under 
the pillar of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, whereas it 
is dealt with under States’ obligation to protect human rights. This may be 
due to the lack of a pillar based on a corporate obligation to protect human 
rights, or the fact that the due diligence is in relation to a company’s own 
                                                 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (8 
June 1977, entry into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609. 
106 International Law Association Study Group on Due Diligence, First Report (March 2014) 
<http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups> accessed 29 August 2017, 19. 
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activities rather than third actors’. However, this use of the terminology 
seems to blur the distinction between obligations to respect and protect 
human rights, as States’ due diligence obligations fall under the obligation to 
protect human rights despite seeming to have been broken down into similar 
obligations as the corporate due diligence responsibility.107 The UNGPs note 
that to fulfil due diligence responsibilities, corporations should ‘identify, 
prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human 
rights’.108 This is extremely reminiscent of States’ due diligence obligations 
to ‘prevent, investigate and punish’ human rights violations caused by the 
actions of non-State actors.109 Significantly though, according to the UNGPs, 
the due diligence responsibilities of corporations also consists of a clear 
obligation to carry out human rights impact assessments. The ILA Study 
Group on Due Diligence pointed out that Principle 17 requires that a 
corporation’s due diligence process ‘should include assessing actual and 
potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, 
tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed’.110 
Business enterprises are further expected to ‘integrate the findings from their 
impact assessments across relevant internal functions and processes, and take 
appropriate action’, under Principle 19. This appears to be quite a significant 
obligation and has been developed and built upon by many researchers and 
organisations in an attempt to help businesses across different sectors 
understand their role better.111 It is submitted that the elaboration of positive 
                                                 
107 A similar blurring of the line between respect and protect was discussed in Chapter 1. 
108 UN Human Right Council, UNGPs (n 12) Principle 15(b). 
109 Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras, IACHR (Ser. C) No. 4 (29 July 1988) para 166. 
110 International Law Association Study Group on Due Diligence, First Report (March 2014) 
<http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups> accessed 29 August 2017. 
111 See, for example, Sandra Roling and Thomas Koenen, CSR Europe, ‘Human Rights Impact 
Assessments: A Tool towards Better Business Accountability’ (Business and Human Rights 
Research Centre) <https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-
materials/Impact-assessments-CSR-Europe-June-2010.pdf> accessed 29 August 2017; Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Corporate Responsibility 
to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretative Guide’ (2012) 





obligations under the typically negative obligation to respect human rights 
confuses the use of the terminology. Using different terms to describe very 
similar obligations in the context firstly of States and secondly of non-State 
actors does not demonstrate a transparent and clear delineation of non-State 
actors’ responsibilities. In order to properly clarify the obligations and the 
differences between State and non-State actors for what concerns human 
rights, it may be better to disregard the terminology typically used for States 
in favour of new terminology for non-State actor obligations. Although using 
well-known and well-used terms can usually help clarify meaning, in the 
current context the use of ‘respect’ in the UNGPs appears to do more to blur 
the distinction between types of obligation. Giving ‘respect’ a different 
meaning in the context of non-State actors may be necessary (as non-State 
actors’ respect for human rights may require different action to be taken), but 
to avoid confusion it would be better to either use the same definition as is 
used for States, or to find new terminology to typify the obligations of non-
State actors (perhaps along the lines of a broader responsibility of 
‘consideration’).  
Despite the confusion and the due diligence responsibilities of 
businesses under the UNGPs, it cannot be concluded that non-State actors 
appear to have an ‘obligation to protect’ human rights in the same manner as 
States. Perhaps the nature of non-State actors as the very actors that States 
protect human rights from under their obligations makes this impossible. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that under the guise of a corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, various positive obligations are placed 
upon this category of non-State actor to ensure that human rights are not 
negatively impacted.  
3.4.3 The obligation to fulfil and non-State actors 
The positive obligation to fulfil human rights requires States to facilitate 
individuals to realise their rights themselves. Where individuals are incapable 
of doing this, the obligation to fulfil requires States to directly provide 
individuals with the resources to realise the rights. Generally seen as the most 
burdensome obligation of the tripartite typology, there has been very little 
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push to impose obligations to fulfil on non-State actors. The argument 
discussed in Chapter 2 that non-State actors may not have the capacity or 
resources to realise human rights is particularly pertinent in this context. It 
must be remembered however, that bar a full extension of the current 
international human rights law framework to non-State actors, any change in 
the current regime would allow for differentiated and nuanced obligations to 
be placed on different non-State actors. The fact remains that at present, many 
non-State actors do actually play a large role in the fulfilment of human 
rights. This is due, in part, to the fact that many public services have been 
privatised. A classic example of this is the provision of water. In many 
countries, private companies are responsible for the provision of water, 
subject to governmental regulation (as part of States’ obligation to protect 
human rights). For example, water provision in the United Kingdom was 
privatised in 1989112 as part of a ‘privatisation boom’ under the Thatcher 
government.113 The change delegated the responsibility to provide water to 
consumers to various private water companies. Regulatory authority, 
however, remains with the State, primarily conducted through the Office of 
Water Services (OFWAT). OFWAT is a national non-ministerial 
governmental body that is mandated with the responsibility to ensure that ‘the 
companies [it] regulate[s] provide consumers with a good quality and 
efficient service at a fair price’.114 In other words, OFWAT is responsible for 
                                                 
112 The privatisation occurred through the Water Act 1989. For an explanation of the history 
and developments of water privatisation in the UK, including the Water Act 1989, see 
OFWAT, ‘The Development of the Water Industry in England and Wales’ (2006) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rpt_com_devwatindust270106.pdf> 
accessed 29 August 2017. 
113 Alistair Osborne, ‘Margaret Thatcher: One Policy That Led to More than 50 Companies 
Being Sold or Privatised’ The Telegraph (8 April 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/alistair-osborne/9980292/Margaret-
Thatcher-one-policy-that-led-to-more-than-50-companies-being-sold-or-privatised.html> 
accessed 29 August 2017. 
114 See the UK Governmental Organisations website 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/the-water-services-regulation-authority> 
accessed 29 August 2017. See also the official OFWAT website, <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/> 




making sure that private companies provide water in such a way as to fulfil 
consumers’ right to water.115 In this example, the UK government maintains 
legal responsibility of its international human rights obligation to fulfil the 
right to water, the factual realisation of which is the responsibility of the 
private water companies.116 This disparity in responsibility is possible 
because although States can delegate factual tasks for the implementation of 
human rights, it is not possible for them to delegate legal responsibility. This 
conclusion is implied from the fact that ‘[s]tate cannot by delegation (even if 
this be genuine) avoid responsibility for breaches of its duties under 
international law’.117 In a situation where the State has delegated certain 
activities in relation to which human rights violations have occurred, the 
relevant customary international law rules mandate that the actions of the 
private actors be attributed to the State, making the State the relevant actor 
for the purposes of the violation.118 This means that even though private water 
                                                 
115 This conclusion is based on the ‘AAAQ’ framework for the right to water, requiring States 
to provide water of adequate availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality. For more 
information on the framework see UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2000) 
E/C.12/2000/4, para 12; The Danish Institute for Human Rights, ‘The AAAQ Framework and 
the Right to Water - International Indicators’ 
<https://www.humanrights.dk/publications/aaaq-framework-right-water-international-
indicators> accessed 29 August 2017. For more explanation of how private service providers’ 
responsibilities and operations correlate with human rights standards and the AAAQ 
framework, see Lane, ‘Private Providers of Essential Public Services and de jure 
Responsibility for Human Rights’ (n 9). 
116 It may be possible for the water providers to be seen as carrying out a ‘public function’, 
which under the Human Rights Act 1998 would allow individuals to bring cases against the 
companies themselves for violations of various rights found in the European Convention on 
Human Rights under Section 6(3)(b). This possibility will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
117 Ian Brownlie, ‘State Responsibility: The Problem of Delegation’ in Konrad Ginther and 
others (eds), ‘Völkerrecht Zwischen Normativem Anspruch und Politischer Realität’ (1994) 
300-301; see also International Law Association Committee on Accountability of 
International Organizations, ‘Final Conference Report Berlin 2004’ <http://www.ila-
hq.org/index.php/committees> accessed 29 August 2017; Lane, ‘Private Providers of 
Essential Public Services and de jure Responsibility for Human Rights’ (n 9). For discussions 
of practice, see Chapters 5 and 6. 
118 A full explanation of the law of State responsibility falls outside the scope of this Chapter. 
However, it is important to note that the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on 
HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
99 
companies can (for example) be held responsible at the national level for 
failing to comply with the relevant regulations (including those laid down in 
legislation), they can never be held to have violated international human 
rights, or be said to have an obligation to fulfil human rights at the 
international level.  
 There have been some moves towards suggesting that non-State 
actors may have a role, if not a responsibility in the fulfilment of human 
rights. It has been recognised, for example, that although States are obliged 
to fulfil human rights, they are not expected to provide every resource 
themselves; Marlies Hesselman and others note that a State is rather expected 
‘to mobilize resources, not to provide them all directly from its own coffers’ 
and to ‘employ’ or ‘redirect’ the private sector’s resources to help realise 
human rights.119 As will be seen in Chapter 5, a recent general comment of 
the UN CteeESCR discusses the obligation to fulfil in the context of business 
enterprises.120 Generally speaking, though, there remains little evidence that 
(binding or non-binding) international human rights standards for non-State 
actors should extend to obligations to fulfil human rights.  
                                                 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts stipulate two criteria that must be 
fulfilled for a State to be held responsible for a violation of an international obligation: (1) the 
existence of an obligation owed by that State; and (2) attribution to the State of the conduct 
violating the obligation. Article 5 of the Draft Articles states that ‘the conduct of a person or 
entity which is not an organ of the State [...] but which is empowered by the law of that State 
to exercise elements of governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State’. See 
for discussion, James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge 
University Press 2013). 
119 Marlies Hesselman, Brigit Toebes and Antenor Hallo de Wolf (eds), Socio-Economic 
Human Rights in Essential Public Services Provision (Routledge 2017) [emphasis added]; 
discussed in Marlies Hesselman and Lottie Lane, ‘Disasters and Non-State Actors – Human 
Rights-Based Approaches’ (2017) 25(2) Disaster Prevention and Management (2017) 526. 
See also Anastasia Telesetsky, ‘Beyond voluntary corporate social responsibility: corporate 
human rights obligations to prevent disasters and to provide temporary emergency relief’ 
(2015) 48 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1003. 
120 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 24 on 
State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 




3.5 Concluding reflections on the horizontal effect of international 
human rights in the current legal framework 
The above discussions demonstrate that in spite of the lack of direct human 
rights obligations for non-State actors at the international level, there are 
several examples of indirect obligations and even limited direct 
‘responsibilities’.121 As well as using the ‘traditional’ way of achieving 
indirect horizontal effect through States’ obligation to protect human rights, 
there are various other methods that can be used to determine the conduct of 
non-State actors vis-à-vis human rights. Balancing individual rights against 
each other through using the legitimate limitations available in some human 
rights provisions can essentially control the extent to which non-State actors 
can interfere with other’s human rights. The same argument can be made for 
the prohibition on the abuse of individual rights, which also has the effect of 
imposing an indirect obligation to respect human rights upon non-State 
actors.  
 The tripartite typology of human rights does not currently apply in 
full to non-State actors. However, on a soft-law basis it is possible to say that 
a non-State actor responsibility to respect human rights has been upheld and 
supported by many different institutions, including various UN bodies. The 
obligation to protect has also been applied to non-State actors to some extent, 
through the guise of the duty of due diligence. The way in which this has 
occurred to date has unfortunately blurred the obligations to respect and 
protect human rights somewhat, but the standards are being gradually carved 
out in a coherent and informative way (in the context of businesses). The 
obligation to fulfil is harder to apply on a legal level to non-State actors. 
However, it is obvious from many of the operations and mandates of 
(particularly privatised) companies that non-State actors have a large role to 
                                                 
121 As explained in the Introduction to this book, generally speaking, ‘duties’ and 
‘responsibilities’ refer to non-binding standards, whereas ‘obligation’ refers to legally binding 
standards placed upon an entity. For a discussion of the distinction between such terminology, 
see Florian Wettstein, ‘Normativity, Ethics and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: A Critical Assessment’ (2015) 142(2) Journal of Human Rights 162, discussed 
in Hesselman and Lane (n 119). 
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play in practice in the fulfilment of human rights. The current international 
legal framework could, in theory, inform the potential legal obligations for 
non-State actors vis-à-vis human rights, but its current application to them 
remains indirect, and responsibility for human rights for what concerns the 
private actors’ mandates remains with the State itself. To gain a better 
understanding of the application of international human rights to non-State 
actors, the jurisprudence and interpretations of international, regional and 
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Horizontal effect of international human 
rights in international legislation 
 
4.1 Preliminary remarks  
Albeit scarce, there are some limited examples of the horizontal effect of 
human rights that can be found in international legislation. This chapter 
examines several examples, which although not numerous, differ in their 
degree of directness. The legislation considered for this chapter was the 
‘core’ United Nations international human rights treaties (as explained in 
Chapter 1) and two instruments that are not legally binding in themselves, 
but are very authoritative texts that are generally considered as having, at 
least in part, customary international law status:1 the UDHR2 and the 
International Law Commission’s International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.3 The 
                                                 
1 A norm may be considered to be customary in nature when there is widespread, 
representative and consistent practice of that particular norm (state practice), and a belief by 
the states practicing the norm that they do so because they are legally bound to (opinio juris). 
These elements are derived from Article 38 Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(1946), but were given more content in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, 
particularly in North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Merits) 1969 ICJ Rep 3 paras 60-83. See 
generally Brian D Lepard (ed), Reexamining Customary International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2016).  
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) 
(UDHR). 
3 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (2001) Yearbook of the International 




analysis in this chapter is limited to examples that could be construed as direct 
horizontal effect within the documents. This is because those provisions that 
give rise to indirect horizontal effect are analysed through the practice of the 
relevant human rights body in Chapter 5.4 
4.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
The UDHR was adopted in 1948 through United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 217A.5 The document was born out of the need to avoid repetition 
of the horrific consequences of World War II6 and became the foundation 
upon which international human rights law would be built.7  
 Despite the fact that the document is not legally binding, it is 
considered by many scholars to have the status of customary international 
law and now ‘exerts a moral, political, and legal influence far beyond the 
hopes of many of its drafters’.8 Even so, because of its nature, the main 
authority of the UDHR comes as a helping hand for human rights treaty 
bodies and courts when interpreting other (binding) human rights obligations. 
The document may only really be cited as providing one of few examples of 
‘potential’ horizontal effect of international human rights – ‘potential’ used 
here to demonstrate that whether the UDHR would actually lead to horizontal 
effect would depend upon the interpretation given to various rights, as the 
drafters of the UDHR ultimately decided not to include substantive private 
duties in the document’s main provisions.9 This was due to a fear of the 
                                                 
4 This includes, for example, Article 2(e) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 
September 1981) UNTS vol. 1249, 13. 
5 UDHR (n 2). 
6 United Nations, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights: History of the Document’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/> accessed 29 
August 2017. 
7 United Nations, ‘The Foundation of International Human Rights Law’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-
rights-law/index.html> accessed 29 August 2017. 
8 Hannum Hurst, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law’ (1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 287, 
289. 
9 John H Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102(1) The American Journal of 
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UDHR’s drafters that including duties for individuals could allow States to 
take advantage of this to limit the application or enjoyment of individuals’ 
rights (as mentioned in Chapter 2).10 Ultimately, the reference to private 
duties may be found in the Preamble and Article 29(1) of the UDHR. The 
Preamble states that  
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance.11 
Taken at face value, the Preamble seems to place quite extensive 
responsibility on a variety of non-State actors to promote and secure 
international human rights. Indeed, many scholars rely on the Preamble as a 
basis upon which to claim that non-State actors should, or even do, have 
international human rights obligations.12 However, upon closer inspection, 
the Preamble may simply be pointing to the shared responsibility of members 
of society to try to embed the idea of human rights in teaching and education. 
This would mean that rather than having substantive obligations themselves 
(except perhaps for the right to education), their duties are more related to 
ensuring understanding and awareness of international human rights. As 
Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail declare, even if it is generally 
acknowledged that the Preamble of the UDHR amounts to customary 
international law, the question still remains as to the scope of the obligations 
that could be imposed upon non-State actors as a result13 (the same question 
arising from Article 29(1)). For example, which non-State actors could the 
obligations apply to? Would the obligations for non-State actors be the same 
as those of the State? Is it legitimate to place human rights obligations on 
                                                 
International Law 1, 3. 
10 ibid. 
11 Emphasis added. 
12 Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security 
Companies under Public International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 318. 




non-State actors through customary international law (which traditionally 
applies only to States)? These questions remain at the forefront of academic 
research. 
 Article 29(1) UDHR simply states that ‘[e]veryone has duties to the 
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible’, without specifying what kind of duties these could be. Concerns 
that duties could result in undue limitations of human rights were 
counteracted by Article 29(2), which delimitates the extent to which 
limitations could be placed on the rights in the UDHR.14 This seems to have 
formed the basis for human rights treaties allowing for the ‘legitimate 
limitation’ of human rights (for example Article 8(2) European Convention 
on Human Rights).15 Unfortunately, because of the wording of Article 29(1), 
it is not really possible to infer concrete human rights obligations for non-
State actors, or to determine the extent to which non-State actors could be 
held responsible for the realisation of human rights. The influence of the 
UDHR in imposing human rights obligations on non-State actors must 
therefore not be overstated.  
4.3 International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility  
The second example of a possible application of obligations to non-State 
actors in a non-legally binding international instrument is more tenuous and 
is found in the DASR.16 The DASR were adopted in 2001, since which time 
they have been commended twice by the United Nations General Assembly.17 
                                                 
14 Article 29(2) states that  
[i]n the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of 
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
15 See Chapter 3 for a brief discussion of legitimate limitations of human rights. 
16 DASR (n 3).  
17 The General Assembly commended the DASR to the attention of Governments in 2001 and 
2004 (via Resolutions 59/35 and 62/61 respectively). See James Crawford, ‘Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (United Nations Audiovisual 
Library of International Law 2012) <www.un.org/law/avl> accessed 29 August 2017. 
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The DASR, although never becoming a binding treaty, are now widely 
considered to constitute (although not in their entirety) customary 
international law and have been widely applied in practice.18 
 Manisuli Ssenyonjo comments that the DASR ‘indicat[e] that 
responsibility for human rights violations “may accrue directly to any person 
or entity other than a State”’,19 quoting Article 33(2) DASR as part of an 
analysis of the extent to which non-State actors are bound by international 
human rights law. However, this must not be interpreted too deeply, nor taken 
out of context; the full text of Article 33(2) reads: ‘[t]his Part is without 
prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, 
which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State’, thereby 
referring to rights, rather than responsibilities, that may accrue to non-State 
actors.20 Article 33(2) is found within Part II of the DASR, which deals with 
secondary obligations owed to other States or to the international community 
as a whole.21 The DASR do not deal with primary rules of international law 
(e.g. those found within the international human rights law framework), 
which allow non-State actors to hold States responsible for violations of 
norms. Indeed, the Commentary to Article 33(2) emphasises that non-State 
actors were mentioned because in general ‘the articles do not deal with the 
possibility of the invocation of responsibility by persons or entities other than 
States’;22 Article 33(2) merely points out that it is for primary norms of 
international law ‘to determine whether and to what extent persons or entities 
other than States are entitled to invoke responsibility on their own account.’23 
                                                 
18 See United Nations, Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, ST/LEG/SER B/25 (United Nations 2012); James Crawford, ‘State Responsibility’ 
[2006] MPEPIL 1093 para 65. 
19 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘The Applicability of International Human Rights Law to Non-State 
Actors: What Relevance to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights?’ (2008) 12 The 
International Journal of Human Rights 725, 736. 
20 The full text of Article 33(2) states: ‘This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from 
the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity 
other than a State.’ 






It therefore seems a rather considerable jump to infer from Article 33(2) that 
non-State actors may accrue some kind of responsibility under international 
law.  
 The DASR do deal with the actions of non-State actors to some extent, 
but do not allow for the actors to be held responsible on their own account. 
Instead, any actions of non-State actors falling within particular categories 
are treated as actions of the State, therefore leading to indirect horizontal 
effect at most. The conduct and actors falling within the categories include: 
(1) those ‘exercising elements of governmental authority’ as delegated by a 
State;24 (2) those ‘directed or controlled by a state’;25 (3) those exercising 
elements of governmental authority ‘in the absence or default of o the official 
[State] authorities’;26 and (4) those whose conduct is ‘acknowledged and 
adopted by a State as its own’.27 
 It may be said that while the DASR do indicate certain openness to the 
idea that the conduct of non-State actors can have the effect of violating an 
international norm, the instrument does not envisage direct obligations for 
non-State actors. To over-interpret the Articles or to read something into their 
provisions for the purpose of achieving a particular result could risk the 
integrity of the interpretation and/or the body interpreting the Articles.  
4.4 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
The first convincing evidence of horizontal effect in international legislation 
may be found in the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).28 As with the two examples above, 
the CERD does not contain an explicit reference to concrete human rights 
obligations of non-State actors. Nonetheless, it is more readily interpretable 
                                                 
24 See ibid Article 5. 
25 See ibid Article 8. 
26 See ibid Article 9. 
27 See ibid Article 11. 
28 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) UNTS vol. 660, 195. 
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as concerning such obligations, particularly in relation to one substantive 
provision – Article 5 CERD.  
 It is possible to interpret Article 5 as placing obligations on individuals 
and/or companies. Paragraph (e) of the provision includes the obligation of 
States to guarantee the right of everyone to: ‘(i) The right to work, free choice 
of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection 
against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable 
remuneration’. These rights are arguably the prerogative of employers to 
realise, albeit in conformity with the State’s domestic legislation, which must 
itself specify the behaviour expected of employers in this context. This 
recognises and emphasises the ability of employers as private actors to ensure 
that their employees are afforded, for example, just and favourable conditions 
of work and remuneration (of course this remains a vertical obligation in 
relation to public employers).29 Thus, although not explicitly mentioning 
non-State actors, through the logical application of this provision there are 
concrete standards for employers to meet. The same could be said regarding 
other rights included in Article 5(e) when the actual provision of a rights-
related service is provided by non-State actors (i.e. through privatised 
services). This would include the rights to health, housing, education30 and 
‘right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public, 
such as transport hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and parks’, which are all 
listed in Article 5 CERD.31 The elaboration of standards to be placed on non-
State actors through the General Comments and jurisprudence of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination will be assessed in 
Chapter 5.  
                                                 
29 Extensive standards for multinational enterprises regarding conditions of employment have 
been developed by the International Labour Organization in its ‘Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’ (5th edn, 2017) 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf> accessed 7 November 2017. 
30 Article 5(e)(iii)-(v) CERD. 




4.5 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict  
An even more convincing example of horizontal effect of international 
human rights law within international legislation can be found in the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict.32 As mentioned in Chapter 2, Article 4 of the 
Protocol explicitly subjects non-State armed groups to certain standards. The 
provision reads: 
1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State 
should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons 
under the age of 18 years. 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such 
recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures necessary 
to prohibit and criminalize such practices. 
3. The application of the present article shall not affect the legal status 
of any party to an armed conflict. 
 Article 4(1) thus refines the prohibition on the use and recruitment of 
child soldiers in Article 38 of the International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC) by changing the admissible age of recruitment into armed 
forces to 18 (rather than the 15 stipulated in Article 38(3) of the CRC itself).33 
Significantly, Article 4(1) also extends the application of the prohibition to 
‘armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State’ thereby 
removing the limits of the prohibition found in Article 38 CRC (which 
applied to States Parties’ armed forces only). This bolsters the protection to 
                                                 
32 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (adopted 25 May 2000, entered into force 12 February 2002). 
33 This was heavily negotiated during the drafting stages of the CRC, which was adopted on 
the basis of consensus. This meant that when the US repeatedly rejected the proposed 
threshold of 18 years rather than 15, the other drafters had to accept the younger age. See 
Cynthia Price Cohen, ‘The Role of the United States in the Drafting of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child’ (2006) 20 Emory International Law Review 185, 191. This adamant 
refusal by the US may seem somewhat unnecessary in view of their ultimate failure to ratify 
the CRC. 
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be afforded to children during times of armed conflicts. The extension could 
also reflect the recognition that during the gap between the drafting of the 
CRC in 1989 and the Protocol in 2000, the number of non-international (or 
internal) armed conflicts began to account for the vast majority of all armed 
conflicts worldwide34 and involved the widespread use of child soldiers. 
 However, there has been much skepticism as to the actual effect and 
practical import of Article 4. As non-signatories to the Protocol, the 
provisions within it cannot technically bind non-State armed groups. In 
addition, the wording of Article 4(1), that non-State armed groups ‘should 
not’, as opposed to ‘shall not’ recruit or use child soldiers is rather more 
suggestive and persuasive than the more obliging language found in Article 
1 of the Protocol. Article 1 states that the armed forces of States ‘shall take 
all feasible measures to ensure’ that they do not allow children to directly 
participate in hostilities.35 Article 4 could therefore be seen as placing more 
of a moral, rather than a strictly legal obligation on non-State armed groups 
and may not be intended to be legally binding on them, although it could be 
of relevance to support a finding of a violation of international criminal law.36 
An analogy with the wording of the Security Council in their resolutions 
supports the idea that the obligation in Article 4 may be moral rather than 
legal. The International Court of Justice has held that ‘the language of a 
resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a 
conclusion can be made as to its binding effect’37 (i.e. whether or not a 
                                                 
34 This can be seen in the International Institute for Strategic Studies ‘Armed Conflict 
Database’ 
<http://acd.iiss.org/en/conflicts?tags=CF582C41FE1847CF828694D51DE80C08> accessed 
29 August 2017. 
35 Emphasis added. It is very interesting to note at this point that Article 1 of the Protocol does 
not seem to prohibit States from recruiting children (perhaps since the CRC allows for the 
recruitment of children of 15 years or older), imposing a stricter standard on armed groups 
than States. 
36 The recruitment or use of child soldiers is considered to be a war crime under international 
criminal law, and could lead to the (international) individual criminal responsibility of a 
member of a non-State armed group. See Article (8)(2)(b)(xxvi) Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002). 




resolution should be considered as an instance of the Security Council 
exercising its power under Article 25 of the UN Charter to adopt decisions 
legally binding on all UN Member States).38 Another reason for viewing 
these obligations as not necessarily intended to be legally binding on armed 
groups directly is the fact that Article 4(2) explicitly requires States to 
criminalise the recruitment and use of child soldiers by these groups. This 
goes back to the opinion of Nigel Rodley that obligations would not need to 
be imposed on the groups directly since their actions could be effectively 
governed through domestic criminal law.39 Article 4(2) also reflects a State 
obligation to protect human rights and could be seen as an example of 
legislative indirect horizontal effect.  
 Even if Article 4(1) of the Protocol may not impose direct, legal 
obligations for non-State armed groups, Article 4(2) of the Protocol does 
impose direct obligations on States to take the necessary measures to prevent 
and punish the recruitment and use of child soldiers by non-State armed 
groups. Article 4(2) can therefore be considered an example of indirect 
horizontal effect. The State is directly required to take positive measures to 
                                                 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) 
1971 ICJ Rep 16 [53], cited in Michael C Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council 
Resolutions’ (1998) 2 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 73, 75. 
38 This power may even extend to obliging States to treat Security Council resolutions as 
hierarchically higher than other international norms. Michael Wood explains that this 
consequence comes not from Article 25 UN Charter taken on its own, but from a combination 
of Articles 25 and 103. Article 103 provides that when a Member State’s obligations under 
the Charter conflict with their obligations under other sources of international law, ‘their 
obligations under the Charter shall prevail’. As the Security Council power to bind Member 
States arises from the Charter (Article 25), Article 103 implicitly awards binding Security 
Council Resolutions precedence over other international obligations. See Michael Wood, ‘The 
UN Security Council and International Law: The Legal Framework of the Security Council’, 
Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures (7 November 2006) 
<http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/lectures/2006_hersch_lectur
e_1.pdf> accessed 29 August 2017. 
39 Nigel Rodley, ‘The Evolution of the International Prohibition of Torture’ in Amnesty 
International, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948-1988: Human Rights, the UN 
and Amnesty International, 63 in Clare McGlynn, ‘Rape, Torture and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2009) 58(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
565, 594. 
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protect individuals’ human rights from the harmful conduct of non-State 
armed groups, thus placing an indirect obligation on the groups themselves. 
 Ultimately, whichever view is taken on the nature of Article 4, the 
inclusion of the provision does constitute a promising move towards the 
explicit recognition of the responsibility of non-State armed groups for 
human rights violations, and towards an implicit suggestion that they are 
capable of fulfilling this obligation. Whether this capacity is restricted to 
negative obligations or extends to taking ‘positive’ obligations is 
unfortunately not dealt with by Article 4, as the nature of the obligation in 
question is inherently negative, merely prohibiting armed groups from acting 
in a particular way. The capacity of non-State actors, as mentioned in Chapter 
2, may be a contributing factor to the fact that non-State actors have not been 
so explicitly mentioned in other international instruments in relation to rights 
requiring the full scope of obligations (i.e. to respect, protect and fulfil rights) 
to be secured. 
4.6 Concluding reflections on the horizontal effect of international 
human rights in international legislation 
The analysis of ‘potential’ examples of horizontal effect of human rights 
found in international legislation has shown that for the most part, assertions 
that the various provisions amount to human rights obligations for non-State 
actors should be taken lightly. There does seem to be an interesting, albeit 
limited, (chronological) shift towards including non-State actors more 
explicitly in international human rights legislation. Nonetheless, we are still 
far away from seeing direct, binding obligations for non-State actors in 
international human rights treaties. Interestingly, the most promising 
example comes from a treaty containing provisions strongly (and 
traditionally) rooted in international humanitarian law, rather than human 
rights law – Article 4 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. As explained in Chapter 2, the nature of obligations owed in 
international humanitarian law (at least those pertaining to non-international 
armed conflicts) is horizontal, treating non-State and State parties to conflicts 




similar obligations relating to other specific human rights concerns (e.g. the 
treatment of women during armed conflict) could be an avenue for including 





Horizontal effect of international human 
rights in international jurisprudence1 
 
5.1. Preliminary remarks 
This chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the ways in which the United 
Nations human rights treaty monitoring bodies established in connection to 
five ‘core’ United Nations human rights treaties, have interpreted and applied 
human rights obligations in relation to non-State actors. Generally speaking, 
the bodies express their authoritative interpretations of various provisions of 
the respective human rights treaties through General Comments,2 and apply 
the provisions through their respective individual complaints procedures, in 
the form of ‘views’ (see below). General comments are one of the most well-
known outputs of human rights treaty bodies. While the source of 
Committees’ mandates may differ,3 the adoption of general comments is a 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of most parts of this chapter has been published in Lottie Lane, ‘The 
horizontal effect of international human rights law in practice: A comparative analysis of the 
general comments and jurisprudence of selected United Nations human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies’ (2018) 5(1) European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 5. 
2 Sometimes known as General Recommendations. 
3 Most treaty bodies are given the mandate to provide ‘General Comments’, or ‘General 
Recommendations’ through the ‘core’ human rights treaty itself (see, for example, Article 
40(4) ICCPR, which allows the Human Rights Committee to ‘transmit … such general 
comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties’. (See  Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Civil and Political Rights: The Human 
Rights Committee’, Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev 1) (2005) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf> accessed 30 




common practice of each of the bodies examined.4 General comments and 
views of the treaty bodies are not legally binding,5 but have been repeatedly 
found to be of high interpretative value.6 Not every State Party to the treaties 
takes this approach towards general comments and views.7 This does not 
negate their importance for the task at hand, however; the outputs of the 
bodies remain very important for determining how, at the international level 
(as opposed to the national level, at which the Committees’ views are 
sometimes rejected), the horizontal effect of human rights is (whether 
implicitly or explicitly) discussed and applied. 
 Views of the Committees regarding individual complaints are 
adopted by virtue of the individual complaints/communications procedures 
for each of the bodies examined. For the most part, the authority to hear 
                                                 
Rights (discussed below), which was not established until after the entry into force of the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see UN CteeESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure 
of the Committee’ (1 September 1993) E/C.12/1990/Rev.1, Rule 65). 
4 The UN OHCHR provides documents compiling the majority of general comments of all 
treaty bodies, the individual general comments of which may be found on the website of each 
body. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies - General Comments’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx> accessed 30 
August 2017.  
5 This view has been upheld, for example, by the Spanish Constitutional Court and the Irish 
Supreme Court. The latter Court found that although the decisions of treaty bodies are 
authoritative, their non-binding nature was supported by the fact that ‘neither the Covenant 
nor the Committee at any point purports to give any binding effect to the views expressed by 
the Committee’ (referring to the Human Rights Committee). See STC 70/2002, 3 April 2002, 
para 7; and Kavanagh v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2002] IESC 11 (1 March 2002), 
respectively, both cited in the International Law Association Committee on Accountability of 
International Organizations, ‘Final Conference Report Berlin 2004’ <http://www.ila-
hq.org/index.php/committees> accessed 29 August 2017. For a discussion of the legal status 
of general comments and views on individual communications, see Geir Ulfstein, ‘Law-
Making by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ in Rain Liivoja and Jarna Petman (eds) 
International Law-making. Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers (Routledge 2014). 
6 See for examples, Wayne Martin and others, ‘The Essex Autonomy Project Three 
Jurisdictions Report: Towards Compliance with CRPD Art. 12 in Capacity/Incapacity 
Legislation across the UK’ (2016) <https://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/EAP-3J-Final-Report-2016.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017, 55.  
7 ibid. 
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individual complaints derives not from the main human rights treaty itself, 
but from an additional (and optional) protocol.8 There is no system of 
precedence within the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies, which means that 
the scope and application of rights may change over time and the impact of 
the decisions could be affected.9 As with general comments, the Committees’ 
views are not legally binding, although they have been said to be of ‘great 
weight’ because the bodies are ‘established specifically to supervise the 
application’ of the relevant treaties.10  
The analysis in this chapter considers general comments from the 
establishment of the treaty bodies until 15 January 2018, and views on 
individual complaints from the time of activation of the individual complaints 
procedures until 15 January 2018.  
 The monitoring bodies chosen for the analysis are: (1) the Human 
Rights Committee; (2) the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; (3) the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women; (4) the Committee against Torture; and (5) the Committee on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Although by now there 
are nine ‘core’ human rights treaties,11 the five monitoring bodies examined 
                                                 
8 For example, the authority for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women to hear individual communications comes from the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 6 
October 1999, entered into force 22 December 2000) UNTS vol. 2131, 83. 
9 While the use of the term ‘jurisprudence’ may be controversial when referring to the views 
of the monitoring bodies (as they are indeed neither courts, nor bodies with legally binding 
authority), this is the term used by the UN OHCHR itself, and is sometimes used in this 
chapter. 
10 These comments were made by the International Court of Justice in relation to the Human 
Rights Committee (HRCtee) in the case of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v 
Democratic Republic of Congo) 2010-II ICJ Rep 692. See Ulfstein, ‘Law-Making by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies’ (n 5) 249. The comments can be extended by analogy to relate to the 
jurisprudence of each of the treaty bodies, which some scholars maintain are binding ‘in 
effect’ regardless of their formal status. See for discussion Geir Ulfstein, ‘Individual 
Complaints’ in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds) UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law 
and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2012) 92-94.  
11 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Core 
International Human Rights Instruments and their Monitoring Bodies’ 




were chosen for analysis due to their substantive contributions in the context 
of non-State actors and human rights obligations and on the nature of human 
rights obligations more generally (see, e.g. the CteeESCR12). Further, the 
HRCtee and the CteeESCR were chosen for the reason that they supervise 
the implementation of the ‘twin’ human rights Covenants – the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR Rights. As explained in Chapter 1, the Covenants were adopted 
at the same time, in 1966, and laid down what was then the full range of 
international human rights. The Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CteeEDAW) was chosen as a good example 
of bodies that monitor human rights treaties drafted and adopted for the 
protection of a particular vulnerable group – in this case, women.13 Finally, 
the Committee against Torture (CteeAT) and the Committee on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CteeERD) were chosen 
as examples of bodies that monitor the implementation of subject-specific 
human rights treaties – the subjects here being torture and racial 
discrimination. Including this range of bodies in the analysis should allow for 
a broad understanding of how horizontal effect is applied in practice within 
the international human rights system. For reasons of space, the output of the 
monitoring bodies in relation to State reporting procedures (i.e. concluding 
observations) have been excluded from the analysis in this chapter. The sheer 
volume of concluding observations makes it impractical to analyse them 
within the framework of this chapter, and the results obtained from the 
general comments and views of the Committees are considered to be 
substantive enough without the analysis of additional documents. 
 The examples analysed in the following sections were found using 
                                                 
August 2017. 
12 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CteeESCR), ‘General Comment 
No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para 1, of the Covenant)’ (14 
December 1990) E/1991/23. 
13 Another vulnerable group protected by a UN human rights treaty is children. An analysis 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (as well as a discussion of several other 
international human rights instruments), in light of theories on the horizontal effect of human 
rights has been conducted by Nuno Ferreira. See Nuno Ferreira, Fundamental Rights and 
Private Law in Europe: The Case of Tort Law and Children (Routledge 2011) 121-130. 
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two different methods. First, a database compiled by scholars, ‘Bayefsky’, 
was relied upon, which aims to ‘enhanc[e] the implementation of the human 
rights legal standards of the United Nations’.14 The database includes a large 
collection of documents containing references to particular subject-matters in 
the supervisory bodies’ application of human rights treaties. The document 
relied upon for this chapter lists (and contains extracts of) which general 
comments and views of the bodies include reference to ‘Public and Private 
Actors’.15 The document was used as a starting point to identify which 
general comments and individual communications would be relevant for the 
analysis. Each general comment or communication identified in the Bayefsky 
document was then searched manually, using the terms ‘non-State actor’, 
‘private actor’, and ‘positive obligations’. Where this led to information 
regarding how the relevant monitoring body viewed or applied human rights 
obligations vis-à-vis non-State actors, the general comment or individual 
communication was used in the analysis. In some cases, however, the 
reference was cursory and was not substantive or informative enough to 
contribute to the analysis, and was therefore excluded from the analysis. The 
database is not exhaustive, however, as it does not include general comments 
and views after 2005. For this reason, the individual general comments and 
jurisprudence of the relevant bodies from 2005-2018 were manually searched 
using the three terms above, to identify any new references to non-State 
actors. This search was conducted using the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights’ treaty body database.16 Given the 
nature of this method, it is possible that some views or general comments that 
                                                 
14 Bayefsky, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Treaties’ <http://www.bayefsky.com/> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
15 Bayefsky database, ‘Public and Private Actors - General’ 
<http://www.bayefsky.com//themes/public_general_general-comments.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2017. 
16 The UN OHCHR’s database regarding general comments can be found at Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Treaty Bodies - 
General Comments’. The OHCHR’s database for searching jurisprudence of the bodies can 
be found at Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 




have a less explicit (but perhaps still substantive) reference to non-State 
actors may have been missed. Nevertheless, it is believed that the documents 
discussed provide enough material to gain an overview of the way in which 
each of the five bodies deal with the horizontal effect of human rights.  
The analysis itself was conducted from the viewpoint of ‘horizontal 
effect’, and due to the findings, turned out to be exclusively focused on 
indirect horizontal effect. In particular, the State obligation to protect human 
rights (and the encompassed duty of due diligence) are frequently referred to 
in the analysis as a starting point (see Chapter 1.3.3). Other than this, the 
analysis has been made as ‘clean’ as possible, referring as much as possible 
to the language of the monitoring body itself and refraining from any 
categorisation of the type of approach used, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 8.  
The analysis also deals to some extent with State responsibility, in 
particular the International Law Commission’s ‘Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, discussed in 
Chapter 4.17 Published together with commentary on each article, the DASR 
specify under what circumstances a State can be held responsible for a 
violation of international law (that there is an act or omission that ‘(a) is 
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach 
of an international obligation of the State’).18 Chapter II DASR specifically 
details how/when conduct can be attributed to the State. The commentary to 
Chapter II DASR explains that although as a general rule, only the actions of 
State agents can be attributed to the State, it may also be ‘responsible for the 
effects of the conduct of private parties, if it failed to take necessary measures 
to prevent those effects.’19 In particular, the following conduct may be 
attributed to the State: (i) the conduct of ‘persons or entities exercising 
elements of governmental authority’ (e.g. privatised corporations that retain 
                                                 
17 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries’ (2001) Vol. II Part Two Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (as corrected) A/56/10, 30-143 (DASR). 
18 ibid Article 2. 
19 ibid Chapter II, paras 2 and 4. 
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public or regulatory functions);20 (ii) conduct ‘directed or controlled by a 
State’;21 (iii) conduct ‘carried out in the absence or default of the official 
authorities’;22 (iv) conduct of insurrectional or other movements;23 and (v) 
conduct ‘acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own’.24 While the 
analysis in this chapter does not focus on the DASR, it is certainly interesting 
to bear them in mind; some parallels can be drawn between the DASR and 
the reasoning of the human rights treaty monitoring bodies, which sometimes 
refer to the ‘attribution’ of non-State actor conduct to the State in their 
application of indirect horizontal effect. However, as will be shown below, 
the bodies rarely mention the DASR explicitly. 
A quick note must be made regarding the place of this chapter in 
academic literature. Some scholars, most notably Andrew Clapham, have 
published analyses of horizontal effect at the international level.25 This 
chapter seeks to both draw and build upon such literature, conducting a more 
thorough analysis in the practice of international human rights monitoring 
bodies. Clapham’s seminal book on ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors’, published in 2006, includes a chapter on ‘Selected human rights 
treaties’.26 Clapham’s study takes the treaties themselves as a starting point, 
looking into several pertinent examples of general comments and individual 
complaints that deal with the interpretation and application of the six treaties 
he analyses. However, a more comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the 
general comments and cases from human rights monitoring bodies has yet to 
be carried out. The present chapter seeks to fill this gap. 
The chapter’s analysis is structured by monitoring body. First, a 
Committee’s general comments are examined, before moving on to the 
Committee’s ‘views’. Brief critical reflections on the practice of each body 
                                                 
20 ibid Article 5 and commentary thereto, para 1. 
21 ibid Article 8. 
22 ibid Article 9. 
23 ibid Article 10. 
24 ibid Article 11. 
25 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (Oxford University Press 
2006). 




are made before moving on to the next monitoring body. Final conclusions 
are drawn in Section 5.8. The analysis itself was conducted from the 
viewpoint of ‘indirect horizontal effect. In particular, the State obligation to 
protect human rights (and the encompassed duty of due diligence) are 
frequently referred to in the analysis as a starting point (see Chapter 1).  
5.2 Human Rights Committee 
The UN HRCtee is the designated treaty monitoring body for the ICCPR.27 
The next sections will analyse first the Committee’s general comments, and 
then its views on individual complaints, to see whether and how it has dealt 
with situations in which non-State actors have interfered with the enjoyment 
of human rights (i.e. whether and how it engages with the horizontal effect 
of human rights). 
5.2.1 General Comments of the Human Rights Committee  
The HRCtee ‘takes its authority…from article 40, paragraph 4, of the 
Covenant, which provides that it may transmit “such general comments as it 
may consider appropriate” to all States parties’.28 The general comments of 
the HRCtee apply to all State Parties to the ICCPR. The HRCtee has referred 
to various types of horizontal effect in its general comments, the most 
pertinent examples of which will now be discussed. It should be mentioned 
at the outset that the HRCtee’s interpretations of the ICCPR have often been 
heavily criticised for its forthcoming and at times overreaching nature,29 
which ‘preclude[s] any claim that the assertions made […] represent an 
                                                 
27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) United Nations Treaty Series vol. 999, 171. 
28 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Civil and Political 
Rights: The Human Rights Committee’, Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev 1) (2005) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2017, 24. 
29 See, for example, the observations of the US and the UK to General Comment No. 24. 
‘Observations by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on Human 
Rights Committee General Comment No. 24 (52) relating to reservations’ in UN General 
Assembly, ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee Volume 1’ (1996) A/50/40, 126-134. 
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international consensus of any kind’.30 Although the Committee may at times 
appear to overstep the mark, its interpretations related to non-State actors and 
horizontal effect do not go beyond the scope of interpretation allowed by 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.31  
The most explicit discussion of horizontal effect in relation to the 
ICCPR by the HRCtee can be found in General Comment No. 31.32 The 
general comment focuses on the definition and scope of obligations found 
within the ICCPR. In the context of obligations for non-State actors, the 
Committee acknowledged that ‘as a matter of international law’, the 
obligations within the ICCPR ‘do not, as such, have direct horizontal 
effect’.33 However, it did go on to elaborate how indirect horizontal effect 
can be applied to obligations contained in the Covenant. Commenting upon 
Article 2(1) ICCPR (declaring the nature of State obligations), the HRCtee 
held that States do indeed have positive obligations which require them to 
protect individuals ‘against acts committed by private persons or entities that 
would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights’.34 Specifically, the 
Committee determined the positive obligations to mean that ‘State Parties’ 
permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence 
to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by 
                                                 
30 US Department of State, ‘Observations of the United States of America on the Human 
Rights Committee’s General Comment 33: The Obligations of States Parties under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 22 December 
2008 <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138852.pdf> accessed 30 August 
2017, para 2. This statement was made in the context of assertions of the Committee as to 
their legal authority, but the principal notion (that disagreement by State Parties affects the 
influence of the general comments) may be applied to other general comments by the 
Committee. 
31 In particular, the HRCtee seems to rely on Article 31(3)(b), which allows ‘any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation’ to be considered when interpreting a treaty, along with the context 
of the provision (stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 31). 
32 UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 31: General Legal Obligations Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) CPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. 





private persons or entities’ could result in a violation of a Covenant right.35 
This clearly reflects States’ obligations to protect human rights from 
interference by third parties, in particular the standard of due diligence 
introduced above.  
However, the statements in General Comment No. 31 were not 
positively received by some States. The Unites States of America (US), for 
example, published observations on the comment condemning the 
Committee’s assertions as ‘sweep[ing] too broadly and categorically’.36 
Rejecting the idea put forward by the Committee that all human rights within 
the Covenant contain positive obligations (drawn from the Committee’s use 
of Article 2(1) as the basis for positive obligations), the US believed that each 
right must be considered separately in order to determine whether, and to 
what extent, the State could be expected to take positive action to ensure its 
protected enjoyment.37 This more restrictive view of the US does not 
correspond very well with the views of other human rights bodies as to the 
positive obligations and the extent of the duty of due diligence under 
international human rights law (see below). The argument appears to value 
distinguishing rights from one another on the basis of rights, rather than 
obligations. This seems to clash with the tripartite typology of human rights 
(which by now has been widely accepted as applying equally to all human 
rights).38 The reluctance could stem from a (now outdated) belief that only 
                                                 
35 ibid. 
36 US Department of State, ‘Observations by the United States of America on Human Rights 
Committee General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant’, 27 December 2007 <http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112674.htm> accessed 23 April 2017, para 11. 
37 ibid paras 11 and 13. 
38 See Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003) (also for a discussion of the 
advantages of distinguishing between obligations, rather than rights); Fons Coomans, ‘The 
Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 749, 752-753; International Commission of 
Jurists, ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 26 
January 1997 <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html> accessed 19 
August 2017, Guideline 6. 
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economic, social and cultural rights require positive action by States, while 
civil and political rights should be equated with negative obligations only (i.e. 
an obligation to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights). The 
US objected, in particular, to the consequence of the general comment that 
States would have a positive obligation to protect individuals from torture by 
private actors (this does not preclude, however, that they would be willing to 
accept a positive obligation to protect individuals from torture by public 
actors).39 The US found it paradoxical that such an effect could be read into 
the prohibition of torture provided in Article 7 ICCPR, without the 
Convention against Torture (which was subsequently specifically adopted for 
combatting torture) explicitly including a positive obligation. The argument 
here referred to the requirement in Article 1 of the UN Convention against 
Torture (CAT) that torturous acts be done ‘by, at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official’, with no mention of non-
State actors.40 As will be explained in detail below, the Committee against 
Torture has itself interpreted Article 1 CAT in the same way as the HRCtee, 
allowing for some degree of indirect horizontal effect.  
Although at first sight the statement in General Comment No. 31 
seems to be quite far-reaching, the HRCtee may have curtailed its effect. The 
Committee restricted the extent of due diligence by stating that States’ 
positive obligations only apply to rights ‘so far as they are amenable to 
application between private persons or entities’.41 The lack of explanation of 
what is meant by this, however, dims the potential of this caveat to mollify 
States like the US. Because the HRCtee’s general comments are not legally 
binding, for the time being States may be able to evade (binding) legal 
responsibility42 for positive obligations under the ICCPR, especially for those 
                                                 
39 See US Department of State, ‘Observations by the United States of America on Human 
Rights Committee General Comment 31’ (n 36) paras 15-17. 
40 Emphasis added. See ibid para 17. The European Court of Human Rights has also 
interpreted the prohibition of torture in this way. 
41 UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 31’ (n 32) para 8. 
42 The US did openly acknowledge a moral and political responsibility of States to protect 
individuals from ‘private acts of extreme physical abuse by private individuals’, for example. 




rights in relation to which the text of the Covenant does not expressly place 
such an obligation on States (unless and until such time as this interpretation 
becomes a matter of customary international law).43 
General Comment No. 31 does give an important overview of the 
HRCtee’s interpretation of human rights obligations within the ICCPR as a 
whole. However, the Committee has also published general comments 
pertaining to specific rights, which also involve horizontal effect and actually 
pre-date General Comment No. 31. It may be possible, therefore, for the 
earlier comments of the Committee to clarify the meaning of its more general 
observations on Article 2. The following discussion will shed light on which 
rights the Committee seems to view as being ‘amenable to application 
between private persons or entities’. 
The rights-specific General Comments referring to horizontal effect 
of ICCPR rights include General Comment Nos. 7, 16, 18, 20, 27 and 28.44 
The comments in these documents range from direction as to what standards 
States are expected to meet in relation to the relevant rights in the Covenant, 
to how States should fulfil their obligation to protect individuals, or calls for 
States to improve and provide evidence of the measures they take to protect 
individuals. 
For example, General Comment No. 7 explicitly mentioned the State 
obligation to protect individuals from torturous acts, stating that ‘the scope 
                                                 
Committee General Comment 31’ (n 36) para 18. 
43 The obligations may be even less persuasive against the US as they have not ratified the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which would allow individuals to bring complaints against 
them before the Human Rights Committee. 
44 See respectively, UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 7: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture 
or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)’ (30 May 1982); UN 
HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of 
Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation’ (8 
April 1988); UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination’ (10 November 
1989); UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)’ (10 March 1992); UN HRCtee, 
‘General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement)’ (2 November 1999) 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9; and UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The 
Equality of Rights Between Men and Women)’ (29 March 2000) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10. 
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of protection required goes far beyond torture as normally understood’, and, 
significantly, that ‘it is also the duty of public authorities to ensure protection 
by the law against such treatment even when committed by persons acting 
outside or without any official authority’.45 This strong proclamation was 
superseded by more tempered wording by General Comment No. 20 which 
replaced No. 7. Nevertheless, General Comment No. 20 still requests that in 
their periodic reports to the Committee, State Parties provide information on 
the ‘criminal law which penalize[s] torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment’ by any actor, including by private persons.46 It 
further requires that complaints of torture ‘must be investigated promptly and 
impartially by competent authorities’.47 While there is no specific mention of 
this relating to complaints against private persons, it can be assumed from the 
previous quotation that this would be expected, since the Committee sees the 
State as being responsible for protecting individuals from torture by private 
actors.  
Regarding the right to privacy, the HRCtee stated in General 
Comment No. 16 that the ‘right is required to be guaranteed against all such 
interferences and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from 
natural or legal persons’48 – an implicit reference to the obligation to protect. 
The Committee went on to explain what kind of measures this required. In 
particular, it mentioned that States must regulate by law the ‘gathering and 
holding of personal information on computers, data banks and other devices’ 
by public and private actors, ensure that individuals can ‘ascertain which 
public authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may control their 
files’ and ‘have the right to request rectification or elimination’ of files 
collected or processed unlawfully or that contain incorrect personal data.49 
Here, the HRCtee has gone quite far, compared to its comments regarding 
other rights, in detailing how the right to privacy should be safeguarded 
                                                 
45 Emphasis added. UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 7’ (n 44) para 2. 
46 UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 20’ (n 44) para 13. 
47 ibid para 14. 





against interference by private actors. 
The HRCtee also mentions specific measures to be taken vis-à-vis 
non-State actors in General Comment No. 18 on the subject of non-
discrimination. The HRCtee required States to provide evidence of their 
‘legal provisions and administrative measures directed at diminishing or 
eliminating’ discrimination carried out by private actors.50 General Comment 
No. 28 on the equality of rights between men and women requests States to 
‘report on any laws and public or private actions that interfere with the equal 
enjoyment by women of the rights under article 17, and on the measures taken 
to eliminate such interference and to afford women protection from any such 
interference’.51 These comments clearly impose the obligation to protect 
upon States, requiring due diligence to be taken by implementing laws to 
prevent and punish interference with the enjoyment of (particularly women’s) 
rights by private actors. 
It is very interesting that the majority of the instances in which the 
Committee has spoken of or implicitly applied indirect horizontal effect of 
rights within the ICCPR have been in relation to groups that are generally 
considered to be ‘vulnerable’. In particular, the Committee has upheld the 
obligation to protect with regards to women and individuals deprived of their 
liberty or freedom of movement. Another example is General Comment No. 
27 on freedom of movement, which demonstrates the importance that the 
HRCtee places on the obligation to protect to women as a vulnerable group. 
In this comment, the Committee opined that individuals must be ‘protected 
not only from public but also from private interference’, the ‘obligation to 
protect [being] particularly pertinent’ in relation to women.52  
It could be argued that General Comment No. 31 attempts to take this 
obligation out of the realm of the enjoyment of specific rights by particular 
groups by upholding indirect horizontal effect more generally. To identify 
                                                 
50 UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 18’ (n 44).  
51 Emphasis added. UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 28’ (n 44) para 20. 
52 UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement)’ (2 November 
1999) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, para 6. 
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the Committee’s approach to horizontal effect in a more holistic manner, the 
jurisprudence resulting from its individual complaints procedure under 
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR will also be briefly assessed, 
in so far as it adds value to the findings of the General Comments. 
5.2.2 Views of the Human Rights Committee  
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the HRCtee can 
hear individual communications ‘from individuals subject to [a State Party’s] 
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party’.53 The 
Optional Protocol entered into force in 1976, and has resulted in almost 3,000 
communications being brought before the Committee.54 Of those cases in 
which a ‘view’ was adopted, it is possible to see evidence of indirect 
horizontal effect. 
For example, the case of B. d. B. v The Netherlands concerned non-
discrimination under Article 26 ICCPR.55 The communication was actually 
declared inadmissible by the Human Rights Committee, but remains 
interesting due to the Committee’s comments regarding the author of the 
alleged human rights violation. The claimants alleged that a non-State actor, 
the Industrial Insurance Board for Health and for Mental and Social Interests, 
had discriminated against them in relation to social security contributions.56 
The Netherlands wished to rely on the fact that the Board is a non-State actor 
as one of its arguments against admissibility of the complaint. The main 
argument was that because the Board is an independent body (established 
                                                 
53 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) UNTS vol. 999, 171. To date, there are 
115 State Parties to the Optional Protocol. See the UN Treaty Collection database 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
5&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 30 August 2017. 
54 A statistical survey of the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee is available via 
the website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx> accessed 30 August 
2017. 
55 UN HRCtee, B. d. B. et al. v The Netherlands (273/1989) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) 
286 (30 March 1989). 




merely to ‘implement social security legislation’),57 the Dutch State could not 
‘influence concrete decisions’ of the Board.58 Because of this, the 
Netherlands argued that it could not be held responsible for discrimination 
on behalf of the Board. The HRCtee, however, had a different point of view. 
It observed that the Dutch State was ‘not relieved of its obligations under the 
Covenant when some of its functions are delegated to other autonomous 
organs’.59 Through this statement, the Committee seems to imply that the 
Netherlands remains responsible here because the conduct of the non-State 
actor could be attributed to the State. Although the State was not directly 
controlling the Board, it had delegated traditionally ‘public’ functions to it, 
and thus would have retained responsibility for any discrimination that would 
have arisen from the Board’s decisions (had the case been assessed on its 
merits).  
The reasoning in B. d. B. v The Netherlands was later reiterated and 
to some extent also clarified by the Committee in Cabal and Pasini v 
Australia. 60 The latter communication was brought in relation to alleged 
discrimination by a privatised prison. The HRCtee again held that 
‘contracting out to the private commercial sector of core State activities 
which involve the use of force and the detention of persons’ does not diminish 
the responsibility of the State; it remains an obligation of the State to ensure 
that the rights of individuals are protected vis-à-vis these private actors, the 
conduct of whom could be attributed to the State. 
The HRCtee has discussed the obligation to protect in other cases that 
take place in a ‘quasi-public sphere’. In discussing the admissibility of the 
case of Nahlik v Austria, for example, the HRCtee explicitly referred to the 
State’s obligation to protect individuals from discrimination ‘among private 
parties’.61 This seems to reiterate General Comment No. 31, but its 
                                                 
57 ibid para 4.7. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid para 6.5. 
60 UN HRCtee, Mr. Carlos Cabal and Mr. Marco Pasini Bertran v Australia (1020/2001) UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001 (19 September 2003). 
61 UN HRCtee, Franz Nahlik v Austria (608/1995) UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/608/1995 (22 July 
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significance for horizontal effect is weakened due to the ‘quasi-public’ 
context. The case concerned alleged discrimination that had occurred through 
a private agreement. The Austrian State tried to rely on this fact to have the 
communication declared inadmissible. However, the HRCtee reaffirmed that 
States must protect individuals from discrimination ‘within the public sphere 
or among private parties in the quasi-public sector of, for example, 
employment’.62 Additionally, because agreement had to be confirmed by a 
public body before it could enter into force, the State was deemed to be in a 
position to protect the individual from discrimination through the agreement. 
Ultimately, the case was declared inadmissible on other grounds. 
Nevertheless, the statement made about private parties does demonstrate that 
the HRCtee believes non-discrimination to be one of the rights ‘amenable to 
application’ between private actors.  
In contrast, the right to participation in the public life of the nation 
(protected by Article 25 ICCPR) does not seem to be considered as amenable 
in the same way. In the case of Karakurt v Austria the HRCtee emphasised 
that Article 25 could ‘not extend to cover private employment matters’.63 
Interestingly, in another case involving Article 25 (Arenz v Germany), the 
Committee did suggest that the right to freedom of religion was subject to the 
‘obligation to ensure’ all rights in the ICCPR, including Article 25, and in 
relation to private associations as well as State actors.64 The complaint 
centred on the fact that a religiously-founded political party had denied the 
claimants membership of the party due to their membership of a different 
ideological organisation. The claimants argued that through upholding this 
decision, the German national courts had interfered with their right to take 
part in public affairs. The Committee rejected this argument, however, on the 
                                                 
1996). 
62 ibid para 8.2. 
63 UN HRCtee, Karakurt v Austria (965/2000) UN Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/965/2000 (4 April 
2002) para 8.2. 
64 Emphasis added. The use of the word ‘ensure’ rather than ‘protect’ is interesting here. 
Whether the same meaning was intended by the HRCtee is unclear, as no explanation of what 
the obligation entails was provided. UN HRCtee, Arenz v Germany (1138/2002) UN Doc. 




grounds that it was not the function of the Committee (not being an appeals 
court) to re-evaluate the German national courts’ application of German 
domestic law, as long as there was no arbitrariness or denial of justice.65 
Despite not going to the merits, this case does show, to a limited degree, that 
a right so inherently linked to the public sphere can also be amenable to 
relationships between private actors. Because the applicants did not focus on 
this in their communication, however, the HRCtee restrained itself from 
‘address[ing] the broader issue of what legislative and administrative 
measures’ must be taken to ensure the enjoyment of Article 25.66 
5.2.3 Critical remarks on the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee 
It may be concluded from the above examples that the HRCtee does indeed 
engage with the idea that non-State actors could cause infringements of 
human rights. So far, the Committee has not been particularly radical in its 
application of the obligation to protect human rights. Despite the backlash 
surrounding General Comment No. 31, it appears to have been based on a 
line of previous general comments within which the Committee elaborated 
on States’ positive obligations to protect human rights from both public and 
private actors. It cannot be said, however, that the Committee has been as 
extensive in its views on individual communications. It is likely that this is 
because of the restrictions of what the Committee could discuss imposed by 
the subject matter of the complaint itself (e.g. in Arenz v Germany) or simply 
because the cases in which issues of horizontal effect have arisen have tended 
to be declared inadmissible, thus not warranting a detailed examination or 
application of the relevant provisions vis-à-vis non-State actors.  
What is clear is that when the HRCtee engages with the obligation to 
protect, it requires certain measures to be taken by States to ensure that human 
rights protection is engrained on an institutional level within States (i.e. 
within their legal or administrative frameworks). As with other human rights 
monitoring bodies, when faced with human rights interference by a privatised 
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actor or with a situation where the State has delegated certain ‘public’ tasks, 
the HRCtee has not hesitated to attribute the actions to the State. It also has 
not shied away from applying States’ obligation to protect in relation to rights 
that are often affected within private relationships, such as privacy and non-
discrimination, although the HRCtee seems to tread more carefully with 
rights that are of a more public nature (e.g. Article 25 ICCPR). In terms of 
concrete indirect obligations for non-State actors at the international level 
(through direct obligations imposed by domestic law), the HRCtee has 
remained quite general. The actual standards that States are expected to hold 
non-State actors to prevent them from interfering with human rights are very 
vague. Most aspects of the obligation to protect that are discussed by the 
Committee go either to procedural obligations (i.e. due diligence), or simply 
state that, for example, non-State actors should not be permitted to 
discriminate. The HRCtee therefore predominantly stays within the realm of 
State’s direct obligations rather than non-State actors’ indirect ones. 
Ultimately, whatever approach the HRCtee takes in its interpretation 
and application of the ICCPR, it remains limited by the international human 
rights framework, the non-binding nature of the HRCtee’s general comments 
and views on individual communications, and, regarding the individual 
communications procedures, the very cases that appear before it.  
5.3 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The UN CteeESCR has made quite widespread implicit references to indirect 
horizontal effect in relation to the ICESCR.67 As with the HRCtee, the 
CteeESCR’s general comments will be addressed before moving on to its 
jurisprudence.68 The CteeESCR is not technically a ‘UN treaty body’ in the 
same sense as the other bodies discussed here, but will be treated as an 
                                                 
67 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS vol. 999, 3. 
68 Although the use of this term may be controversial as the supervisory bodies cannot deliver 
binding judgments, this is the wording used by the Office of the United Nations High 




equivalent body.69  
5.3.1 General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
The CteeESCR has consistently applied the tripartite typology of human 
rights, and focuses most of its consideration of indirect horizontal effect on 
the State obligation to protect.70 
Even before the CteeESCR engaged with the full typology explicitly, 
it was applying some degree of indirect horizontal effect by applying States’ 
protective obligations regarding human rights. For example, in General 
Comment No. 5 on persons with disabilities, the CteeESCR emphasised that 
the private sphere must be appropriately regulated by the State to ensure the 
protection of people with disabilities from inequitable treatment.71 This could 
(and indeed has by some scholars) be seen as an ‘obligation to regulate’ 
private actors.72 Going into more detail, CteeESCR explicitly mentioned that 
‘it is essential that private employers, private suppliers of goods and services, 
and other non-public entities be subject to both non-discrimination and 
equality norms in relation to persons with disabilities’ – an idea that was 
reaffirmed in General Comment No. 14 on the right to health.73 The statement 
in General Comment No. 5 cannot be read as implying that the CteeESCR is 
                                                 
69 The CteeESCR was established not by the relevant core human rights treaty (in this case 
the ICESCR) as the other monitoring bodies were, but rather at a later point by the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Resolution 1985/17, ‘Review of the composition, organization and administrative 
arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (28 
May 1985) E/RES/1985/17. 
70 For a discussion of the UN CteeESCR’s use of the typology, see Ida E Koch, ‘Dichotomies, 
Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?’ (2005) 5(1) Human Rights Law Review 81. 
71 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 5: Persons with Disabilities’ (9 December 1994) 
E/1995/22, para 11. 
72 See Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with Human Rights (Intersentia 
2011); see also Marlies Hesselman and Lottie Lane, ‘Disaster and non-State actors – Human 
rights-based approaches’ (2017) 26(5) Disaster Prevention and Management 526. 
73 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2000) E/C.12/2000/4, para 26. 
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in favour of subjecting private actors directly to international human rights 
law. Rather, it requires States to adopt national norms concerning economic, 
social and cultural rights which must be applied within the private sphere (i.e. 
in private relationships). Indeed, the CteeESCR emphasised that the ‘ultimate 
responsibility’ for ensuring that people with disabilities’ Covenant rights are 
complied with lies with the State.74 The CteeESCR appeared to be 
particularly concerned that this was the case in relation to privatised public 
services – a concern consistent with that expressed by the HRCtee above. 
Indeed, very similar language was used by the CteeESCR here as by the 
HRCtee in B. d. B. v The Netherlands; the CteeESCR pointed out that 
delegation of activities by the State to private actors does not ‘absolve’ the 
State of its international obligations, whereas the HRCtee explained that the 
same did not ‘relieve’ a State of its obligations.75  
In the context of the right to food, the CteeESCR made similar claims 
regarding States’ obligation to protect and the fact that this necessitates State 
regulation of the private sphere, in General Comment No. 12.76 Here, the 
CteeESCR reiterated that ‘[v]iolations of the right to food can occur through 
the direct action of States or other entities insufficiently regulated by States’, 
confirming that violations can occur when the harm is directly caused by non-
State actors.77 A subsequent general comment on the right to water extended 
the requirement of a regulatory regime of private providers of public services 
to include a punitive aspect in case of non-compliance by the private actor.78 
                                                 
74 ibid para 12, ‘ultimate responsibility’ being a quotation by UN CteeESCR of the World 
Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons, adopted by the General Assembly 
through resolution 37/52 of 3 December 1982 (para 1), para 165. 
75 See B. d. B. v The Netherlands (n 55) para 6.5. See also UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment 
No. 5’ (n 71) para 12. 
76 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the 
Covenant)’ (12 May 1999) E/C.12/1999/5. This was reiterated in other General Comments 
(see below), including General Comment No. 16. See UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 
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Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2005) E/C.12/2005/4, para 20. 
77 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12’ (n 76) para 19. 
78 See UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the 




Failing to adopt an effective regulatory system would, according to the 
Committee, result in a violation of the obligation to protect, and therefore of 
Covenant rights.79 A similar statement can be found again in General 
Comment No. 23 on the right to just and favourable conditions of work. In 
the context of States’ obligation to protect human rights, the CteeESCR 
emphasised that States must ‘tak[e] steps to prevent, investigate, punish and 
redress abuse through effective laws and policies and adjudication.’80 Taken 
together, these general comments not only create a framework for the 
obligation to regulate private actors, but also expound the Committee’s view 
of what the duty of due diligence requires of States. Curiously, the CteeESCR 
did not mention an explicit duty of ‘due diligence’ until General Comment 
No. 16, and since then, it has not been consistent in using the term. This is 
not necessarily significant, as it can be argued that by providing States with 
guidance as to how they can fulfil the obligation to protect individuals, and 
what measures they should take for the prevention and punishment of non-
State actors for certain conduct (such as the inclusion of the punitive aspect 
of regulatory regimes), the Committee is implicitly referring to due diligence, 
or at least leads to comparable obligations. This is particularly persuasive 
when the explicit language in different general comments is compared. 
Explicit reference was made in General Comment No. 16, in which the 
CteeESCR calls upon States to ‘act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, 
mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against them by private actors’.81 
This is almost identical to the language of General Comment No. 23, quoted 
above. The reason for the inconsistency is unclear, although an explicit use 
of ‘due diligence’ returns repeatedly in the Committee’s most recent general 
comment on business and human rights (see below). As with the HRCtee, the 
CteeESCR’s treatment of non-State actors so far does not contain concrete or 
                                                 
79 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’ (n 73) para 51; UN CteeESCR, ‘General 
Comment No. 15’ (n 78) para 44(b). 
80 UN CteeESCR, ‘General comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work (article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights)’ (27 April 2016) E/C.12/GC/23, para 59. 
81 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 16’ (n 76) para 27. 
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detailed standards against which they should be held, even at the national 
level. Rather, because of the focus on due diligence and regulation, there is 
again an emphasis on States’ procedural obligations. It could be assumed that 
the substantive standards to which non-State actors should be held therefore 
match those of the State (at least in terms of defining particular terms, such 
as ‘access’ to certain services, or in determining whether, for example, 
discrimination has occurred). On the other hand, it could also be assumed that 
the standards fall within States’ margin of appreciation. 
The CteeESCR has also discussed potential responsibilities of non-
State actors themselves, for example in General Comment No. 12 on the right 
to adequate food. The CteeESCR emphasised (again) the fact that only States 
retain ultimate accountability for ensuring the right to food.82 Significantly, 
though, it also highlighted that all members of society have a role to play in 
the realisation of this right.83 This would seem to go further than the 
(generally accepted) assertion that non-State actors may have an international 
responsibility (although not a legal obligation) to respect human rights. The 
statement suggests that private actors may have a more ‘positive’ role vis-à-
vis the right to food. While this is suggested by the wording of the comment, 
the CteeESCR has not made it explicit. In fact, in General Comment No. 12 
the CteeESCR seemed to be more concerned with the actions of private 
businesses interfering with human rights and the State’s obligation to prevent 
this, rather than any positive action that private businesses themselves could 
or should be making to contribute to the realisation of the right to food. 
Although not going into the positive actions of business vis-à-vis human 
rights realisation, the CteeESCR has gone so far as to explain how businesses 
should act so as to avoid interfering with the right to food (i.e. by operating 
‘within the framework of a code of conduct conducive to respect of the right 
to adequate food, agreed upon jointly with the Government and civil 
society’).84 This goes further than the comments discussed until this point, as 
                                                 
82 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12’ (n 76).   





it makes explicit reference to the possibility that non-State actors could have 
some responsibilities to take action, at least in terms of a responsibility to 
respect the right. The CteeESCR repeated the relevant passage almost 
verbatim in its General Comment No. 14 on the right to health.85 The mention 
of a collaboration between a business and the State, and of the ultimate 
responsibility of the State, does temper the horizontal effect within the 
general comments to some extent though, and (as with General Comment No. 
5) cannot be read as imposing direct (and in any case not binding) 
international obligations on non-State actors. Thus, this Comment remains an 
example of indirect horizontal effect.  
Although the comments thus far have actually been relatively 
extensive in dealing with non-State actors, a noticeable shift occurred in 
General Comment Nos. 14 and 15, which include a section specifically 
entitled ‘Obligations of actors other than States’. This suggests that the 
CteeESCR does in fact envisage more direct, and possibly even binding, 
human rights obligations for non-State actors. In the two comments the 
Committee mentions, for example, obligations of international organisations 
that have ties with the right to health and water, respectively (naming, for 
example, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization and UNICEF).86 The obligations included mostly involve 
giving support and aid to States in the implementation of their Covenant 
rights, although international organisations (including international financial 
institutions) should also incorporate ‘human rights law and principles in 
the[ir] programmes and policies’.87 Although the Committee does actually 
say that the obligations of the international organisations fall under the scope 
of human rights obligations, it is significant that in General Comment No. 15 
the CteeESCR notes that that the cooperation and support of the international 
organisations will be considered when assessing how capable States are of 
                                                 
85 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’ (n 73) para 42. 
86 ibid, Section 5; UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15’ (n 78) Section VI. 
87 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’ (n 73) Section 5; UN CteeESCR, ‘General 
Comment No. 15’ (n 78) Section VI. 
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realising rights within their jurisdiction,88 thereby implying that the 
obligations of the international organisations are related to the realisation of 
human rights, and could have a bearing on the standards expected of states in 
terms of their obligation to fulfil human rights. The fact that these obligations 
are only mentioned as existing for international organisations could be telling 
here, especially as other non-State actors (e.g. privatised companies) often 
contribute to the obligation to fulfil human rights by providing certain 
services without having an obligation to do so.89 We normally assume that 
non-State actors are dealt with within national legal frameworks. However, 
international organisations, by their nature, operate in the international 
sphere, and are directly subject to some international laws (although not to 
date those found in human rights treaties). This makes it less of a stretch to 
imagine that the CteeESCR was directly involving international 
organisations in human rights realisation, particularly when the operations of 
many international organisations are connected to human rights in some way 
(e.g. the World Bank, or even the UN itself).  
Significantly, though, in more recent general comments, the 
CteeESCR has even taken one step further to say that private actors do 
actually have an ‘obligation’ (rather than a responsibility) to respect certain 
human rights. In General Comment No. 22 on the right to sexual and 
reproductive health, the CteeESCR requires State Parties to avoid taking 
retrogressive measures that could, inter alia, ‘reduce oversight by States of 
the obligation of private actors to respect the right of individuals to access 
sexual and reproductive health services’.90 The language used here is 
significant, although admittedly it is not clear whether the ‘obligations’ 
envisaged for private actors exist at the national or international level (the 
assertion having been made in the context of the State’s obligation to protect 
human rights). Although the statement is quite narrow in terms of substance, 
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89 See Hesselman and Lane (n 72).  
90 UN CteeESCR, ‘General comment No. 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health 
(article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2 May 




the broad term ‘private actors’ suggests that all private actors have an 
obligation not to interfere with access to sexual and reproductive health 
services. Whether or not the statements can really be read as an understanding 
that non-State actors do have human rights obligations, they still cannot result 
in legally binding obligations at the international level. As explained, general 
comments do not have a legally binding nature and cannot create obligations 
themselves, but rather constitute the (arguably authoritative) opinion of the 
CteeESCR as to what standards the Covenant rights demand. 
The CteeESCR has recently adopted a general comment on business 
and human rights (General Comment No. 24),91 in which it explains in more 
detail what obligations States have regarding human rights interference by 
businesses. Interestingly, the comment includes measures under the 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, rather than just the 
obligation to protect. Although the document is directed predominantly at 
States, its relevance for ‘the corporate sector’ is also emphasised, as it seeks 
to help them ‘in discharging their human rights obligations and assuming 
their responsibilities’.92 Although the language of ‘obligations’ as well as 
responsibilities here is striking, it is unclear whether the CteeESCR is 
referring to obligations of businesses at the national or international level, 
and the CteeESCR later clarifies that it ‘only deals with the conduct of private 
actors…indirectly.’93 Of course, the comment is also of interest to individuals 
seeking redress against States for human rights interference by businesses.  
In terms of the obligation to respect human rights, the CteeESCR 
explains that States could be responsible for violating this obligation due to 
the ‘action or inaction of business actors’, which can (following the rules on 
                                                 
91 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24 on State Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities’ (10 
August 2017) E/C.12/GC/24. 
92 ibid, para 5. Interestingly, in an earlier draft of the general comment, the CteeESCR had 
referred to ‘non-State actors’ rather than the corporate sector, going against its previous trend 
of referring to ‘private actors’. See UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment on State Obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of 
Business Activities’ (draft of 17 October 2016) E/C.12/6-/R.1, paras 5-6. 
93 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24’ (n 91) para 11. 
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attribution found in the DASR94) be attributed to States in certain 
circumstances, namely:  
(a) if the entity concerned is in fact acting on that State party’s 
instructions or is under its control or direction in carrying out the 
particular conduct at issue, as may be the case in the context of public 
contracts; (b) when a business entity is empowered under the State 
party’s legislation to exercise elements of governmental authority or if 
the circumstances call for such exercise of governmental functions in 
the absence or default of the official authorities; or (c) if and to the 
extent that the State party acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its 
own.95 
This is the first time that the Committee has explicitly referred to the DASR. 
It seems that for the most part, the monitoring body seems to mention 
attribution in connection with the obligation to protect human rights, but 
without explaining how this fits within the framework of the DASR (or 
indeed whether it actually needs to). The fact that they are quoted in the 
general comment is therefore significant, and it will be interesting to see 
whether reference is also made in future general comments. 
Following the tripartite typology of human rights, the CteeESCR 
details what States should do under each category of obligation. Under the 
obligation to protect human rights, this includes: 
- ‘prevent effectively infringements of economic, social and cultural 
rights in the context of business activities’;96  
- ‘adopt legislative, administrative, educational, as well as other 
appropriate measures to ensure effective protection against 
Covenant rights violations linked to business activities’97 (e.g. the 
adoption of criminal sanctions, imposing due diligence standards on 
                                                 
94 Articles 8, 5 and 9 DASR (n 17). 
95 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24’ (n 91) para 11. 





businesses and conducting ‘direct regulation and intervention’ 
where necessary);98 and  
- to put in place ‘effective monitoring, investigation and 
accountability mechanisms’ to enable ‘those whose Covenant rights 
have been violated in the context of business activities’ access to 
effective remedy.99 
The CteeESCR is explicit in laying down its general understanding of the 
obligation to protect, which it understands as being violated by ‘a failure by 
the State to take reasonable measures that could have prevented the 
occurrence’ of a violation caused by a private actor, even when the private 
actor was not the sole cause of the violation and even (as long as it was 
reasonably foreseeable) when the State did not foresee the violation.100 The 
comment also provides considerable detail regarding precise legislative, 
administrative and other measures that could or should be adopted (and 
enforced) by States to regulate and monitor businesses’ effects on economic, 
social and cultural rights in certain contexts (e.g. in relation to the tobacco 
industry, the housing market, the education and employment sectors, among 
others).101 In this regard the CteeESCR also reiterates the obligation to 
regulate non-State actors, especially in the context of privatisation and the 
private provision of public services.102 As well as explaining the obligations 
of States the CteeESCR elaborates on the due diligence standards that States 
should hold businesses to, including to ‘act with due diligence to identify, 
prevent and address abuses to covenant rights’ by their subsidiaries and 
business partners.103  
 Significantly, General Comment No. 24 also mentions that in some 
domestic legal systems, namely South Africa, individuals can bring a claim 
                                                 
98 See ibid paras 14-22. 
99 ibid para 38. 
100 ibid para 11. 
101 See ibid para 19. 
102 ibid paras 21-22. For example, the CteeESCR states that ‘[p]rivate providers should [...] 
be subject to strict regulations that impose on them so-called “public service obligations”’. 
ibid para 21. 
103 ibid para 33. 
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directly against businesses in order ‘to impose (positive) duties to adopt 
certain measures or to contribute to the fulfilment of such rights’.104 This goes 
further than any other Committee to date in recognising the potential role of 
non-State actors regarding positive aspects of the realisation of human rights. 
However, the comment was made in laying down the context and scope of 
the general comment and was merely illustrating the practice of South Africa 
regarding businesses. It cannot therefore be read as an understanding of the 
CteeESCR that businesses have, or should have, such responsibilities. What 
can be seen from the general comment overall is that the CteeESCR applies 
indirect horizontal effect predominantly through States’ obligation to protect 
human rights (including due diligence), but also by attributing non-State 
conduct to States in certain situations. Interestingly, the other monitoring 
bodies also tend to mention (without explaining in legal terms) attribution in 
the context of the obligation to protect.  
5.3.2 Views of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
The CteeESCR has the competence to hear individual complaints pursuant to 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.105 However, as the Optional Protocol only entered into force 
in 2013, there is relatively little jurisprudence from the body as compared to 
the other UN human rights monitoring bodies.106 The communications that 
have been considered by the Committee so far have not dealt with the 
horizontal effect of human rights, and will therefore not be discussed here.  
                                                 
104 ibid para 4, citing the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Daniels v Scribante and Others, 
case CCT 50/16 (judgment of 11 May 2017) paras 37-39 (leading judgment by J Madlanga). 
105 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
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2013) A/RES/63/117. 
106 ibid. Despite being adopted in 2009, the Protocol lacked sufficient ratifications to enter 
into force until 5 May 2013. See the website of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Monitoring the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 





5.3.3 Critical remarks on the jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights  
Overall, the CteeESCR’s general comments are quite telling of its attitude 
towards indirect horizontal effect. It has repeatedly referred to the State 
obligation to protect human rights, requiring specific action to be taken to 
regulate and control the actions of non-State actors, particularly those with a 
connection to the State (i.e. privatised companies) and actors that have been 
delegated certain public tasks. The fact that the Committee has adopted 
comment specifically on business and human rights is significant. Regarding 
the CteeESCR’s interpretation and application of the obligation to protect, 
the same can be said as for the HRCtee – although there are now detailed 
recommendations for States to take certain action to protect human rights, it 
is not clear to which standards exactly non-State actors must be upheld at the 
national level. What is clear from its general comments is that the CteeESCR 
has a strong belief that non-State actors do have at least a role, and perhaps 
even obligations, within the international human rights framework. Thus, 
while the Committee has mostly confined itself to interpreting the ICESCR 
in a way that results in indirect horizontal effect, it has gone further than the 
HRCtee in alluding to direct horizontal effect.  
Significantly, the Committee has even suggested that some non-State 
actors have a more active or positive role to play in the realisation of rights, 
with an obligation to help States with their own implementation. This already 
pushes the boundaries of the international human rights framework, which 
does not envisage human rights obligations for non-State actors. Getting to 
the point where the Committee could legitimately (i.e. within its mandate) 
and explicitly detail human rights obligations for non-State actors (beyond 
those to be imposed within domestic law) would require a change of the 
international legal framework. For such statements to have a practical effect, 
State Parties to the ICESCR would then need to act upon them. Of course, in 
theory, the Committee could choose to go down this road without a change 
in the framework or its mandate, but this is likely to be met with much 
resistance from disgruntled States that could choose to simply ignore the 
CteeESCR. Until the international human rights framework is expanded from 
HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
147 
a State-centric system, or alternatives are found outside of the legal 
framework, it is unlikely that more horizontal effect will be achieved in 
relation to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
5.4 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women  
The UN CteeEDAW has also faced situations necessitating an application of 
horizontal effect of human rights. The following sections will assess the 
extent to which the CteeEDAW has applied this obligation in practice, 
looking first at its general recommendations before discussing its relevant 
jurisprudence. 
5.4.1 General Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women  
Significantly, non-State actors are mentioned explicitly in the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
itself. Article 2(e) of the Convention imposes a general obligation on State 
Parties to ‘take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women by any person, organization or enterprise’.107 General 
Recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of State parties under Article 
2 affirmed that the provision embodies a positive obligation for States to 
ensure that women are not subject to discrimination by non-State actors, 
including by ‘national corporations operating extraterritorially’ (i.e. similarly 
to the standards upheld in the Trail Smelter case regarding transboundary 
harm).108 In this Recommendation, the CteeEDAW also mentioned the 
attribution of non-State actors’ conduct to the State in some situations, 
although it did not explain when this would be the case or refer to the DASR. 
                                                 
107 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 
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2014) para 9.6. 
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Rather, it simply noted that States are ‘thus’ obliged to take ‘appropriate 
measures’, including ‘the regulation of the activities of private actors with 
regard to education, employment and health policies and practices, working 
conditions and work standards, and other areas in which private actors 
provide services or facilities, such as banking and housing’.109 Again, this 
seems to either conflate ‘attribution’ as a concept within public international 
law with the obligation to protect, or to use it as a separate term. The approach 
of the CteeEDAW in this respect is unclear. As with the CteeESCR, the 
obligation to regulate is clear here, and seems to apply to all private actors 
that are providing services of a public nature.  
Similar obligations were mentioned in CteeEDAW’s General 
Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women. In this 
recommendation the CteeEDAW emphasised the importance of States 
‘tak[ing] appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-
based violence, whether by public or private acts’.110 It had previously 
emphasised that discrimination against women ‘is not restricted to action’ by 
State actors, but that ‘States may also be responsible for private acts’ if they 
do not act with due diligence.111 Indeed, the general recommendation lists 
instances in which violence against women can ‘result from the acts or 
omissions of State or non-State actors’, including, inter alia, where a State 
has delegated public tasks, e.g. security within places of detention, to private 
actors.112 In specific recommendations, the Committee suggested action that 
States should take relating to particular non-State actors, such as the media, 
people in the workplace and family members. The measures to be taken 
included the adoption and implementation of legislation, provision of 
services, and other ‘preventive, punitive and remedial measures’ which States 
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110 UN CteeEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women’, in UN 
CteeEDAW, ‘General Recommendations Nos. 19 and 20, adopted at the Eleventh Session, 
1992 (contained in Document A/47/38)’ 1992, para 24(a). 
111 ibid para 9. 
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should report to the Committee about.113 The wording here suggests that 
taken together, the measures in the recommendations would constitute the 
precise standards of due diligence expected by the CteeEDAW. The 
Committee also mentioned due diligence in Recommendation No. 19 in its 
explanation of how the State could be held responsible for the conduct of 
non-State actors (i.e. when they fail to ‘act with due diligence to prevent 
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for 
providing compensation’114). Interestingly, in this instance, the CteeEDAW 
explained such responsibility without mentioning attribution. 
In General Recommendation No. 24, the CteeEDAW (like the 
HRCtee and the CteeESCR), expressed concern about States trying to pass 
their human rights obligations to private actors when States delegate what are 
traditionally public functions to these actors.115 The CteeEDAW reiterated 
the opinion of the HRCtee and the CteeESCR that States ‘cannot absolve 
themselves of responsibilities’ by delegating public tasks.116 This has the 
effect of ruling out any direct horizontal effect of human rights contained 
within CEDAW that would occur if responsibility could be passed onto the 
non-State actors. However, the widespread concern of harmful actions of 
private actors operating in the ‘public’ sphere also serves to emphasise and 
recognise the impact that such non-State actors can have on human rights. 
Still, though, there is no explanation of what substantive obligations States 
should impose on non-State actors in order to ensure that they do not cause 
harm to individuals’ human rights. The CteeEDAW’s unease also reflects 
qualms regarding the attitude of States (although no examples were provided 
by CEDAW), that delegating functions to private actors would mean that the 
State no longer has to deal with the human rights aspects related to that 
function. What is not addressed by the CteeEDAW, or indeed the other 
monitoring bodies addressed so far, is the possibility of concurrent or shared 
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responsibility for non-State actors that are delegated State functions – it could 
be possible for both the State to retain responsibility as well as confer a degree 
of responsibility on the non-State actor.117 So far, as we have seen with the 
two previous treaty bodies discussed, this has only been deemed to be 
appropriate at the national, and not the international, level. Indeed, at the 
international level it is not considered possible for States to ‘replac[e], legally 
delegat[e] or chang[e]’ their de jure responsibility when they outsource 
certain tasks to non-State actors.118 
 Further explanation of the State obligation to protect women was 
provided in General Recommendation No. 34.119 The CteeEDAW adopted 
the same approach as the CteeESCR by imposing an obligation to ‘regulate 
the activities of domestic non-State actors within their jurisdiction, including 
when they operate extraterritorially.’120 Specifically, reiterating its General 
Recommendation No. 28, the CteeEDAW requests States to ‘prevent any 
actor under their jurisdiction, including private individuals, companies and 
public entities, from infringing or abusing the rights of rural women outside 
their territory’.121 General Recommendation No. 28 is also reiterated in the 
CteeEDAW’s ‘Draft General Recommendation No. 37 on the Gender-related 
dimensions of Disaster Risk Reduction in a Changing Climate’. The draft 
contains a separate section detailing recommendations for States in relation 
                                                 
117 A discussion of ‘shared responsibility’ of international legal obligations falls outside of the 
scope of the present book. In-depth research into this notion has been carried out by the 
Research Project on Shared Responsibility in International Law (SHARES project) 
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118 See Lottie Lane and Marlies Hesselman, ‘Governing Disasters: Embracing Human Rights 
in a Multi-Level, Multi-Duty Bearer, Disaster Governance Landscape’ (2017) 5(2) Politics 
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und Politischer Realität (Duncker & Humblot 1994) 300-330; and Lottie Lane, ‘Private 
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Marlies Hesselman, Brigit Toebes and Antenor Hallo de Wolf (eds), Socio-Economic Human 
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to business enterprises operating both nationally and extra-territorially, 
including that States ‘should regulate the activities of non-state actors within 
their jurisdiction’.122 As well as the obligation to regulate, however, General 
Recommendation No. 34 includes implicit reference to due diligence vis-à-
vis non-State actors, requiring States to ‘[t]ake effective measures aimed at 
preventing, investigating, prosecuting and punishing acts of violence against 
rural women and girls, including migrant rural women and girls, whether 
perpetrated by the State, non-State actors or private persons’.123 Similar to its 
approach in Recommendation No. 19, the CteeEDAW goes on to elaborate 
more precise recommendations to protect human rights and uphold due 
diligence (this time, in relation to different subject areas, e.g. ‘adequate living 
conditions’).124 
While the obligation to protect is paramount in situations where 
private actors carry out State functions (and indeed more generally in the 
purely ‘private’ sphere as well), the indirect horizontal effect being applied 
unfortunately does not go very far in preventing human rights interference by 
actors outside of the control of the State, in situations where domestic law 
and policies are not effective in manipulating the behaviour of private actors 
(as explained in Chapter 1.3.3 due diligence is an obligation of conduct, not 
result). Interestingly though, in General Recommendation No. 25, the 
CteeEDAW noted that merely averring ‘powerlessness’ or succumbing to 
‘predominant market or political forces’ is not enough for States to justify a 
failure to fulfil their obligation to protect women’s rights from the actions of 
private actors.125 In doing so, the Committee reaffirms that CEDAW holds 
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States accountable for the actions of private actors such as businesses, which 
are in a position to assert influence over the State.126 
Further reiteration of this, provided in some detail, can be found in 
the CteeEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 30.127 This 
Recommendation deals with the treatment of women during and after armed 
conflicts, and goes quite far in detailing the obligations of States to act with 
due diligence as well as (crucially) the behaviour expected of non-State actors 
towards women during these times.128 Such recommended action includes 
refusing to reduce the protection afforded to women in order to mollify non-
State actors,129 engaging with non-State actors,130 and helping non-State 
actors to act in a manner consistent with the Convention, in particular to 
‘address and assess’ risks of human rights violations.131 This standard could 
also be included, for example, in the codes of conduct of businesses alluded 
to by the CteeESCR above. General Recommendation No. 30 has recently 
been referred to in the CteeEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 36, 
which recommends, in relation to the right to education, legislative, military 
and training activities that States should take vis-à-vis non-State actors during 
times of conflict and disaster.132 
The context of armed conflict here arguably allows the CteeEDAW 
to go further in describing the obligations of non-State actors, because under 
                                                 
126 ibid. Referring here to Article 2 of the Convention, which deals with the nature of States’ 
obligation under the treaty. 
127 UN CteeEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, 
conflict and post-conflict situations’ (1 November 2013) CEDAW/C/GC/30. 
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132 UN CteeEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 36 on the right of girls and women to 
education’ (16 November 2017) CEDAW/C/GC/36 paras 47 and 50. The Recommendation 
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international humanitarian law non-State actors are subject to direct 
obligations.133 Breaches of some of these obligations, as well as ‘gross 
violations of human rights’ by non-State actors (an anomaly in terms of 
language), can result in these actors being held individually criminally 
responsible at the international level.134 By mentioning these obligations and 
the connections that can be made between international humanitarian and 
human rights law during armed conflicts, the CteeEDAW allowed itself space 
to mention the human rights obligations of non-State actors during (or after) 
armed conflicts in their own right. The actors specifically targeted by the 
Recommendation were non-State armed groups,135 which the CteeEDAW 
explicitly noted as having an obligation to respect human rights (particularly 
when they have an ‘identifiable political structure’ and ‘significant control 
over territory and population’).136 Notably, this assertion was made after the 
CteeEDAW acknowledged the fact that non-State actors cannot become party 
to international human rights treaties.137 Unfortunately though, the strength 
of the comments is diminished by the lack of legal basis provided by the 
CteeEDAW to justify how non-State actors could be said to hold these 
obligations. Nevertheless, the Committee continued not only to make 
recommendations to States in the general recommendation, but also directly 
to non-State actors. For example, besides calling on non-State armed groups 
to respect women’s rights,138 the CteeEDAW (like the CteeESCR did in 
relation to private providers of public services),139 suggested that the groups 
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134 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘International 
Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ (2011) HR/PUB/11/01, 26 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf> accessed 7 
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‘commit themselves to abide by codes of conduct on human rights’.140 Again, 
the common downfall of treaty bodies’ documents comes into play here, and 
the non-binding nature of General Recommendation No. 30 significantly 
reduces the impact that the recommendations may have in practice. Yet, the 
statements clearly show that the CteeEDAW is willing to entertain the notion 
of at least human rights responsibilities for certain non-State actors.  
5.4.2 Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women decisions 
Many of the complaints filed with the CteeEDAW involve action taken by 
non-State actors as well as (inaction) by State actors. For reasons of space, 
some examples will be chosen which show clearly the ways in which the 
CteeEDAW engages with the private sphere and interference with human 
rights by non-State actors. The cases used rely to some extent on the provision 
in Article 2(e) CEDAW, which requires States to eliminate discrimination 
against women by private as well as public actors.  
First, the application of due diligence by the CteeEDAW can be 
clearly seen in its jurisprudence relating to domestic violence suffered by 
women at the hands of private actors. The vast majority of the cases before 
the CteeEDAW involving horizontal effect concern instances of domestic 
violence, and failures of the State Party to provide effective protection for 
women from (for example) their partners. An oft-quoted example of this is 
the case of A. T. v Hungary.141 In this case the Committee explicitly adopted 
the tripartite typology of human rights and the duty of due diligence.142 The 
author of the complaint had repeatedly suffered domestic abuse and threats 
had been made against her children by her former partner. Despite the author 
bringing several civil and criminal proceedings against the husband, the 
Hungarian State had failed to protect both her and her children.143 Quoting 
its comments in General Recommendation No. 19 on due diligence, the 
                                                 
140 UN CteeEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 30’ (n 127) para 18(b). 
141 A. T. v Hungary (2/2003) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/36/D/2/2003 (26 January 2005). 
142 ibid paras II (a) and II (b), respectively. 
143 ibid paras 2.1-2.7; 9.4-9.5. 
HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
155 
Committee found Hungary to have violated the woman’s rights due to its 
failure to effectively protect her from her former common law husband.144  
A similar conclusion was reached by the CteeEDAW in the recent 
decision of Angela González Carreño v Spain,145 in which the author had also 
suffered repeated abuse at the hands of her partner, culminating in the murder 
of her daughter by him.146 The Committee’s focus in this case was also on 
due diligence, looking specifically at Spain’s failure to conduct an 
investigation or inquiry into the situation being suffered by the author and her 
daughter and failing to provide adequate supervision, despite over thirty 
complaints and requests made by the author to the State asking for 
protection.147 Rather than fulfilling its duty of due diligence, the CteeEDAW 
found that Spain had made assumptions without analysing the specific 
situation of the author. In the context of the complaints made by the author 
in this case, the Committee’s approach could be compared to the aspect of 
‘foreseeability’ of harm by a non-State actor, as explained in Chapter 1. For 
example, the murder of the child occurred during an unsupervised visit of the 
abusive partner, which the domestic court had granted following its 
assumption that it was always better for children to have contact with their 
father, ignoring (or deeming irrelevant) the abusive history of this particular 
father. In this case, as well as previous cases, the CteeEDAW went on to 
provide specific action that should be taken by the respondent State in order 
to fulfil its positive obligations under the Convention in the future (as well as 
measures to provide the author with redress). For example, the Committee 
requested that Spain ‘[s]trengthen application of the legal framework to 
ensure that the competent authorities exercise due diligence’  and 
‘[c]onduct an exhaustive and impartial investigation’. This emphasis on 
investigations was also apparent in A. T. v Hungary, with CteeEDAW 
requesting Hungary to ‘[i]nvestigate promptly, thoroughly, impartially and 
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seriously all allegations of domestic violence and bring the offenders to 
justice’.148 As the HRCtee and CteeESCR, the CteeEDAW appears to focus 
mostly on the State’s procedural obligations under the obligation to protect, 
again limiting the extent to which its approach can really be considered to be 
one of ‘indirect horizontal effect’. 
 The CteeEDAW has also applied a duty of due diligence outside of 
the context of domestic violence. In the case of Reyna Trujillo Reyes and 
Pedro Arguello Morales v Mexico, the CteeEDAW upheld the due diligence 
obligation of Mexico to ‘prevent, investigate and punish acts of gender-based 
violence’ in relation to a young woman who had allegedly been murdered by 
a private actor.149 As well as emphasising the investigative obligation in this 
case, the CteeEDAW also highlighted the obligation to punish private actors 
for discriminating against women, particularly (in line with general 
Recommendation No. 28) when this constituted an abuse of other human 
rights, such as the right to life. 
Further, similar to the HRCtee and the CteeESCR, the CteeEDAW has 
used the duty of due diligence to attribute the actions of private providers of 
public services to the State and find a violation of rights within CEDAW. In 
Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira (deceased) v Brazil, for example, a 
complaint was brought on behalf of a woman who had died in a private health 
institution during her pregnancy. The Brazilian State tried to argue that 
because the health institution was a private actor, its ‘professional negligence, 
inadequate infrastructure and lack of professional preparedness’ could not be 
attributed to the State.150 However, Brazil did acknowledge ‘shortcomings in 
the system used to contract private health services and, by extension, the 
inspection and control thereof’. The Committee used this to find that Brazil 
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had failed to fulfil its duty of due diligence in line with Article 2 CEDAW.151 
The CteeEDAW also reiterated its position taken in previous decisions and 
general recommendations that ‘the State is directly responsible for the action 
of private institutions when it outsources its medical services’ and ‘always 
maintains the duty to regulate and monitor private health-care institutions’.152 
In other words, Brazil could not delegate its legal responsibility for the 
protection of human rights through the act of delegating certain public 
services (i.e. healthcare) to private institutions. Again, we see here reference 
to an obligation to regulate privatised services. 
5.4.3 Critical remarks on the jurisprudence of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
We can see from the above examples that the approach of the CteeEDAW in 
its views on individual complaints mirrors its approach taken in General 
Recommendations. Perhaps because of the wording of Article 2 of the 
Convention, the CteeEDAW has not wavered in States’ positive obligations 
in order to lend more protection to women, particularly from situations of 
domestic violence. Further, it has repeatedly stressed the appropriate 
measures that State Parties must take to observe its duty of due diligence for 
what concerns ‘purely’ private relationships (e.g. between two or more 
individuals) and ‘quasi-public’ relationships (e.g. between an individual and 
a private public service provider). As did the CteeESCR, the CteeEDAW also 
examined, to a limited extent, more direct obligations of non-State actors. Its 
comments on non-State armed groups in General Recommendation No. 30 
show that in some situations (primarily, when a group has effective control 
over some territory), non-State armed groups may have direct responsibilities 
to at least respect human rights both during and after armed conflicts. 
5.5 Committee against Torture 
The fact that the UN CteeAT has given any attention to the application of the 
UN CAT between non-State actors is extremely interesting in light of the 
                                                 





definition of torture provided in the CAT.153 Article 1 CAT appears to 
explicitly rule out the possibility that torture could be committed by a private 
person without any involvement of the State. The definition includes as a 
criterion that an act be committed ‘at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity’ 
for it to be torture. The same criterion applies in relation to acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, which is prohibited by Article 16 CAT.154  
From this wording, we could assume that the direct horizontal effect 
of torture can be prima facie ruled out (as suggested by Alice Edwards).155 
However, it does not seem to preclude the possibility of some forms of 
indirect horizontal effect, relying on State’s positive obligations and 
attributing the actions of a non-State actor to the State. In the context of 
Articles 1 and 16 CAT this would most obviously be through a private actor 
acting under the instruction of, with the consent of, or at the acquiescence of 
a public actor. As Article 1 is prohibitive and therefore inherently negative in 
nature, it may be argued that Article 1 CAT also does not, prima facie, give 
rise to a positive State obligation to protect which would allow the CteeAT to 
invoke indirect horizontal effects in its views on individual 
communications.156 Additionally, as a civil and political, rather than an 
economic, social or cultural right, some may try to argue that the tripartite 
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typology of human rights does not apply to the prohibition of torture, as it 
only concerned negative obligations. A related argument was made above by 
the US regarding positive obligations under the prohibition of torture in the 
ICCPR (Section 5.2.1). The likely success of such an argument is now very 
low. As Magdalena Sepùlveda notes, ‘[t]oday it is beyond doubt that civil and 
political rights instruments […] also impose “positive obligations” on the part 
of States Parties which are often not explicitly contained in the text’157 – 
‘attempting to classify every right as either flatly negative or positive, is an 
“artificial, simplistic and arid exercise”’.158 
Indeed, the Committee has been willing to openly apply Article 1 in 
such a way as to allow indirect horizontal effect of the prohibition using the 
State’s responsibility to protect individuals from harmful actions by non-state 
actors. The Committee has also allowed for indirect horizontal effect by 
treating some non-State actors as State actors by virtue of them carrying out 
particular ‘governmental’ functions. As was the case with the treaty 
monitoring bodies examined above, the following examination will look 
firstly at the Committee’s general comments and then the jurisprudence 
arising from its views on individual complaints, to determine how the CteeAT 
understands the obligations in the CAT vis-à-vis non-State actors. 
5.5.1 General Comments of the Committee against Torture 
The attitude of the CteeAT towards horizontal effect initially appeared quite 
limited. In its first general comment adopted in 1998, the CteeAT emphasised 
the importance of the public official criterion, and did not mention private 
actors.159 In its second comment, however, the Committee paid more 
attention to the acts of non-State actors, in particular the due diligence 
obligations of States. The CteeAT held the due diligence obligation to apply 
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in instances where States ‘know or have reasonable grounds for believing’ 
that non-State actors are committing torture or acts of ill-treatment.160 The 
rationale of the Committee here is that because of the wording of Article 1, 
States must be under a positive obligation to protect individuals from 
torturous acts by non-State actors. The ‘consent or acquiescence’ of the State 
essentially means that if a State fails to take positive measures to protect 
individuals, it is implicitly permitting, or acquiescing to the harm by the non-
State actor.161 This interpretation has vastly changed the landscape of the 
prohibition of torture within international law, and is also applied by other 
human rights monitoring bodies (in particular regional human rights 
courts).162  
5.5.2 Views of the Committee against Torture 
The interpretation and its application by the CteeAT in its own views on 
individual complaints undoubtedly affords broader protection to individuals. 
However, the CteeAT has not actually applied horizontal effect to the full 
potential allowed by Article 1. Certainly, it is positive that the Committee has 
addressed the duty of due diligence explicitly, but its interpretation of State 
‘consent or acquiescence’ is actually relatively limited.163 For example, in the 
case of S. V. et al. v Canada,164 the Committee dealt with complaints relating 
to torture by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The 
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author feared that if he were to return to Sri Lanka, he would be subjected to 
torture either by the LTTE, or by the State (whom he argued had caused him 
brain damage on an earlier occasion following allegations by the State that 
he was actually a member of LTTE). The Committee clearly held any 
consideration of torture by the LTTE with no consent or acquiescence of the 
State to fall outside of the scope of the CAT.165 However, it did not provide 
indications as to what actions they believed could constitute consent or 
acquiescence. Nevertheless, Edwards has deducted from this case, along with 
that of G.R.B v Sweden (below, also dealing with torture by non-State actors) 
that the CteeAT sees ‘consent and acquiescence’ as amounting to either some 
knowledge on behalf of the State of the actions by the non-State actor, the 
State being in ‘general agreement’ with them, or purposefully refusing to act 
against them.166 This seems to be consistent with the application of due 
diligence by the previous bodies discussed, although narrower than the 
obligation to protect more generally. It is unclear whether the knowledge on 
behalf of the State would also require State investigations into the actions of 
non-State actors (as is the case with due diligence under other bodies), or 
refers solely to information provided to the State by the non-State actors 
themselves.  
One major issue that surfaces repeatedly in individual complaints 
relating to torture is that of women being raped by private individuals. 
Interestingly, the cases in relation to which these comments have been made 
do not usually include any involvement of public officials, making them 
noteworthy studies of whether and how horizontal effect has been applied in 
practice. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate the limitations in the way that 
the CteeAT looks upon due diligence. 
Since 1986, UN special rapporteurs have defined rape as constituting 
torture.167 The UN has also noted that in the last few decades, ‘significant 
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efforts’ have been made to ‘redefine the meaning of human rights’168 in order 
to answer the feminist critique of those such as Hilary Charlesworth, 
Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright that the prohibition of torture is 
inherently biased against women.169 This is largely due to the fact that the 
majority of rapes of women happen within private relationships (being, for 
example, aspects of situations of domestic violence).170 In consequence, 
several bodies have now held that rape may constitute torture ‘per se’,171 and 
will always meet the ‘minimum threshold’ required to engage provisions 
prohibiting torture.172  
In the case of G. R. B. v Sweden,173 the author of the complaint feared 
being subjected to torture by both State and non-State officials upon her 
return to Peru after having three applications for asylum in Sweden rejected. 
The fear stemmed from previous instances in which the author was kidnapped 
and raped by a terrorist organisation in Peru, and the fact that she and her 
family had been politically active against the Peruvian State in the past, with 
her father already having been tortured by State authorities. The CteeAT held 
that the fact that an individual ‘might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-
governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, 
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falls outside the scope of […] the Convention’.174 The risk of torture by the 
Peruvian State itself was ruled out by the Committee, mainly because the 
author had not been politically active for 13 years, and she had never been 
subjected to torture by the Peruvian authorities in the past.175 The author’s 
complaint was therefore unsuccessful. Unfortunately, the CteeAT did not 
assess Peru’s investigations into the occurrence of rape that the victim 
suffered at the hands of the non-State actor, having failed to detail what 
standards the Peruvian State would have to fulfil to be acting with due 
diligence. This could imply that the CteeAT does not understand the CAT as 
meaning that States Parties are obligated to perform investigations into harm 
caused by non-State actors.176 Indeed, on a literal reading of the Convention 
and combined with the State actor requirement in Articles 1 and 16, this is 
understandable, particularly in light of Article 12 CAT. Article 12 places a 
duty on States to ensure ‘prompt and impartial’ investigations by ‘competent 
authorities’ when an act or torture can reasonably be believed to have been 
committed within their jurisdiction. Taking this on face value, it does not 
appear to place any obligations on States to investigate acts conducted by 
private individuals. Reading Article 12 consistently with CteeAT’s 
interpretation of Article 1, however, the obligation to investigate would 
equally apply where the act of torture reasonably believed to have been 
committed would be by a private actor, as well as a public official. Indeed, as 
we have already seen, other human rights bodies have used the duty of due 
diligence to impose investigative obligations on States without explicit 
mention of private actors in the relevant treaty provisions. This is also true 
specifically in relation to the prohibition of torture, which the European Court 
of Human Rights understands as requiring States to investigate private acts 
of torture.177  
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One case in which the relevant State Party (Serbia and Montenegro) 
was found responsible for not protecting an individual from inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment by private actors was Hajrizi Dzemajl et 
al. v Serbia and Montenegro.178 The complaint concerned a group of Romani 
individuals who, following an incident in which a non-Roma girl had been 
raped by other Romani individuals, were subject to severe violence by a large 
group of non-Romani citizens. The group of individuals made threats to the 
Romani, who were advised by police to leave their homes. After the group 
began setting the Romani homes on fire and hazing them to the ground, the 
complainants managed to escape, although some of them had been hiding in 
the basement of their houses when the violence began. The State authorities 
had been informed of the action being taken, but ‘did not take any appropriate 
steps in order to protect the complainants, thus implying “acquiescence”’ of 
the State.179 In its finding of a violation of Article 16 CAT, the CteeAT 
explicitly stated that ‘[a]lthough the acts referred to by the complainants were 
not committed by public officials themselves, the Committee considers that 
they were committed with their acquiescence’.180 The CteeAT did not go so 
far as to explain in general what suffices for actions of non-State actors to be 
attributed to the State due to the latter’s ‘consent or acquiescence’ – does it 
require that the State actually knew about the risk to the complainants, as in 
this case, or is it sufficient that the State should have known, as is the standard 
followed by the European Court of Human Rights?181  
A second approach towards horizontal effect can be found in the 
CteeAT’s jurisprudence, this time treating some non-State actors as public 
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actors according to the functions that they are fulfilling within a State. This 
approach was famously taken in the case of Sadiq Shek Elmi v Australia.182 
The claimant in this case was a Somali national at risk of being transferred to 
Somalia by the Australian Government. He argued that by transferring him 
to Somalia, Australia would be breaching the rule of non-refoulement 
enshrined in Article 3 CAT.183 This rule stipulates that individuals may not be 
extradited or transferred to a country where they would be at ‘real risk’ of 
being subjected to torture. A pivotal factor in this case was that the actor at 
whose hands the claimant feared being subjected to torture upon his return to 
Somalia was the Somali Hawiye clan, a non-State armed group.184 The nature 
of cases of non-refoulement is rather special, in that to find a violation of 
torture by the responding State does not require this State to actually commit 
acts of torture. Simply putting the claimant in a situation where he is at risk 
of being subject to torture by transferring him to a second State is enough for 
the respondent State to violate the prohibition. If torture were to be committed 
within the destination State, that State could then also be held responsible 
(assuming that State is also party to the CAT). The consequence for horizontal 
effect in cases like Elmi is not a finding that a non-State actor did/not violate 
the prohibition of torture itself, but can result in a finding that the acts of a 
non-State actor could amount to torture, were they to be committed against 
the claimant after their arrival in the destination State.  
The Elmi case is very important here because, despite not involving a 
claim of torture directly against a non-State actor, the CteeAT acknowledged 
that actions by non-State armed groups could amount to torture, fulfilling the 
requirement of State involvement. This was because the non-State armed 
group in question was ‘exercising certain prerogatives that [were] 
comparable to those normally exercised by legitimate governments’.185 This 
seems quite a progressive move by the Committee. Indeed, treating a non-
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State armed group as a State actor goes further than any of the approaches 
seen thus far, but the special circumstances of the case demonstrate that in 
order to protect the applicant, the CteeAT did not have much choice in its 
approach. At the time, there were several clans in Somalia vying for State 
control, each having ‘prescribed its own laws and law enforcement 
mechanisms and [having] provided their own education, health and taxation 
system’.186 The ultimate lack of control by the State itself over these 
established groups seems to have been instrumental in the CteeAT’s decision. 
In contrast, even the abovementioned cases that considered the public 
function of a non-State actor to be decisive in attributing their actions to the 
State relied (at least partially) on the fact that the functions had been 
delegated to the non-State actor in order to find a human rights violation. 
However, in the Elmi case, it was not a public function that the non-State 
actor was fulfilling on behalf of the State (as in the cases concerning 
privatised public services), but a wide range of public activities that the group 
had taken upon itself in the context of a failed State. The lack of a stable State 
authority meant that indirect horizontal effect through Somalia’s obligation 
to protect human rights was not possible; the only avenue open to the CteeAT 
to prevent the transferral was to find a way to categorise the non-State actor 
as a State actor for the purposes of the case. Had the Committee disregarded 
the case based on the non-State identity of the potential torturing entity, it 
would have resulted in a gap in human rights protection solely because the 
actors perpetrating the violations could not be held directly to the norms 
under international human rights treaties. 
It is certainly an interesting outcome when compared to other cases 
heard by the Committee dealing with potential torturous acts being 
committed by other non-State armed groups, such as S. V. et al. v Canada, in 
which the Committee took the approach of upholding the State’s positive 
obligation to protect human rights. In that case, however, the relevant non-
State armed group (the LTTE) did not have effective control over an area of 
territory within Sri Lanka, which had not itself failed as a State. The extreme 
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rarity of the circumstances of a failed State in Elmi has indeed prevented the 
CteeAT from applying this kind of indirect horizontal effect again. Even in a 
subsequent case regarding extradition to Somalia of an individual who 
believed himself to be at a real risk of torture by a non-State armed group, 
the CteeAT distinguished the case on the grounds that Somalia had by then 
regained a State authority acting as central Government in the international 
community.187 The fact that the group in question still controlled a portion of 
Somalian territory was not considered enough to treat it as a State actor. 
Curiously, though, in a latter case concerning the LTTE, the CteeAT did 
consider that in cases where ‘the non-governmental entity occupies and 
exercises governmental authority over the territory to which the complainant 
would be returned’, it was not necessary to ascertain State consent or 
acquiescence in future acts of torture by that actor.188 The distinguishing 
factor for the Committee here seems to be whether the individual will be 
returned to the territory controlled by the LTTE. Further evidence that the 
CteeAT is not willing to broaden the application of Elmi to non-State actors 
more generally can be found in the case of V. X. N. and H. N. v Sweden. The 
Committee explicitly stated that whether non-refoulement extends to a ‘risk 
[of] pain or suffering inflicted by a private person, without the consent or 
acquiescence of the State, falls outside the scope of article 3’.189 
It is clear, then, that while the CteeAT will take a case-by-case 
approach, in general it is not actually willing to apply indirect horizontal 
effect beyond invoking States’ consent or acquiescence. 
5.5.3 Critical remarks on the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture 
The CteeAT has engaged to a considerable degree with the horizontal effect 
of human rights within the CAT. On the one hand, the definition of torture it 
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has adopted through general comments and views on individual 
communications is broad, in that the CteeAT has understood it to include a 
positive obligation on States to protect individuals from torture by non-State 
actors. On the other hand, the Committee’s application of the requirement 
that torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment be done at least 
with the ‘consent and acquiescence’ of a State actor has so far been restricted 
to cases in which the State had concrete knowledge of a risk of an individual 
being subject to this treatment. While this appears stricter than the 
‘foreseeability’ standard applied by the CteeEDAW, it could simply be due 
to the facts of the cases brought before the Committee.  
In the case of Sadiq Shek Elmi v Australia, the CteeAT has certainly 
shown that in extreme circumstances it is willing to go beyond an application 
of indirect horizontal effect through States’ obligation to protect, to treat 
certain non-State actors as State actors to prevent torture. By no means, 
though, can this be considered a general rule for the Committee. The special 
circumstances of the case must be borne in mind. Specifically, the context of 
the failed State, the governmental authority being exercised by the non-State 
actor and the fact that it was not actually the non-State actor, but rather the 
State wishing to extradite the applicant, who was being held responsible for 
a potential violation of human rights. These circumstances considerably 
temper the possible significance of the decision.  
5.6 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination includes a 
potential exception to the vertical nature of the human rights obligations 
contained within it.190 This can be found in Article 5(e) of the Convention, 
dealing with economic, social and cultural rights, which has been the subject 
of a brief General Recommendation (No. 20) by the UN CteeERD. It is also 
interesting that reference to the positive obligations of State Parties to the 
Convention can be found in Article 4. This provision requires States to take 
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‘immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or 
acts of’ racial discrimination. Significantly, reference is also made here to the 
possible exception of vertical obligations found in the UDHR,191 the 
principles embodied within this instrument having to be taken into account 
by States in the taking of the aforementioned measures.192 Although no 
mention of a specific provision from the UDHR is given in Article 4, it can 
be inferred that the principles mentioned are those found in Article 29(2)193 – 
an inference made explicit by the CteeERD in its General Recommendation 
No. 15 on Article 4.194 The CteeERD’s recommendations and jurisprudence 
dealing with potential horizontal effect of the Convention will now be 
assessed. 
5.6.1 General Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination 
As stated, Article 5 CERD was briefly discussed by the CteeERD in General 
Recommendation No. 20, with explicit reference to non-State actors. The 
recommendation seems to suggest that private actors themselves could be 
(partially) responsible for protecting the rights contained in Article 5 ‘and 
any similar rights’. The CteeERD states that ‘protection may be achieved in 
different ways, be it by the use of public institutions or through the activities 
of private institutions’.195 While this may emphasise the private actor’s 
potential role in protecting human rights, the Committee does not go so far 
                                                 
191 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A 
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as to say that private institutions should actually be responsible for ensuring 
protection. Indeed, the CteeERD goes on to identify the obligation to ensure 
human rights protection as a State obligation, which covers the actions of 
private actors: where ‘private institutions influence the exercise of 
rights…the State party must ensure that the result has neither the purpose nor 
the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination.’196 In another 
recommendation, the CteeERD has reiterated the fact that States’ obligation 
to protect human rights refers to the actions of non-State actors as well as 
public actors. In its General Recommendation No. 30 on the rights of non-
citizens, the CteeERD identified such actors as including ‘politicians, 
officials, educators and the media, on the Internet and other electronic 
communications networks and in society at large’,197 in relation to whom 
States must (again under their obligation to protect) take ‘resolute action’ to 
protect individuals from racial discrimination.198  
Earlier inference to States’ positive obligation to protect human rights 
from non-State actors can be found in General Recommendation No. 15, 
dedicated to Article 4 of the Convention.199 The recommendation does not 
elaborate much on the meaning of the ‘positive measures’ mentioned in the 
article. Interestingly, General Recommendation No. 32 did elaborate on what 
kinds of measures States are obliged to take in this context, including, inter 
alia, the adoption of ‘legislative, executive, administrative, budgetary and 
regulatory instruments’.200 The underlying goal of Article 4 must be to protect 
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individuals from propaganda involving racial discrimination by all actors 
(reflected in the requirement that States ‘declare an offence punishable by 
law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority’).201 Nevertheless, 
there was no reference either in the Convention itself, or in the General 
Recommendation, to the obligation to protect, or to the due diligence duty of 
States. Indeed, the Recommendations only mention an investigative 
requirement of States in relation to the ‘national law and its 
implementation’202 – inherently public matters. This seemingly rendered 
investigation into private acts outside of the scope of the positive measures 
to be taken unless this can be read into the implementation aspect. However, 
in a later General Recommendation also dealing with Article 4 (No. 35), the 
CteeERD suggested that obliging States to conduct such investigations could 
be read into the obligation that States make certain conduct ‘punishable by 
law’.203 This is because simply making certain conduct constitute a criminal 
offence is not sufficient without its effective implementation.204 This 
implementation, the CteeERD states, requires investigations of potential 
offences to be carried out, leading to prosecution when appropriate.205 Taken 
together with the wording of Article 4, the provision could be seen as 
reflecting (or being part of) a duty of due diligence to be fulfilled by State 
Parties. 
This assertion is supported by a comparable obligation to that in 
Article 4, found in Article 3 CERD. This provision requires State Parties to 
‘prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of racial segregation’. In its 
General Recommendation No. 19, the CteeERD has read this as placing 
positive obligations on States, emphasising the possibility that partial 
segregation arise as an ‘unintended by-product of private persons’.206 The 
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consequence of this – that racial segregation can occur ‘without any initiative 
or direct involvement by the public authorities’207 – prompted the CteeERD 
to recommend that States Parties monitor the kinds of situations that could 
lead to racial segregation.208 Again, despite no allusion to due diligence by 
the Convention or the CteeERD, this reflects very similar principles to those 
referred to by the other treaty bodies in their discussions of due diligence. It 
is curious that the CteeERD has chosen not to follow suit in using the same 
terminology as other treaty bodies, but this also shows that assumptions 
cannot necessarily be made as to the effect of bodies’ decisions from the fact 
that they do not refer directly (or even indirectly) to the horizontal effect of 
the rights within their jurisdiction. To avoid speculating, it suffices to say that 
the CteeERD has in effect applied indirect horizontal effect by fleshing out 
States’ positive obligations and making concrete recommendations as to how 
they could be fulfilled. These recommendations have, as they did with the 
other bodies discussed above, been restricted mostly to procedural 
obligations of States rather than laying down concrete standards against 
which to hold non-State actors (other than the general terms used). The 
question therefore remains whether the State should impose obligations or 
responsibilities at the national level holding non-State actors to the same 
standards as the State in terms of the substance/content of human rights. 
5.6.2 Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
Pursuant to Article 14 CERD, the CteeERD can hear individual complaints 
from individuals regarding alleged violations of the Convention by States that 
have adopted a declaration accepting its competence to do so. The CteeERD 
has dealt with horizontal effect on quite a few occasions. This is to be 
expected, since racial discrimination is something that often happens in 
private relationships rather than by the State itself. Several examples will be 
focused on in the following discussion.  
The CteeERD made several references to States’ obligation to protect 
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vis-à-vis non-State actors in the case of L. K. v The Netherlands.209 The 
applicant, a Moroccan citizen residing in the Netherlands was subject to 
verbal abuse and threats from a group of Dutch citizens who refused to accept 
him as a resident on their street, going so far as to sign a petition refusing his 
acceptance. The applicant complained to the police, who he alleged failed to 
conduct a thorough or complete investigation into the events. In its opinion, 
the CteeERD agreed with the applicant that the words and actions of the 
Dutch citizens constituted ‘incitement to racial discrimination and to acts of 
violence against persons of another colour or ethnic origin’ under Article 4 
CERD, which the State had violated through its lack of an adequate 
investigation.210 In particular, the CteeERD stated that ‘[w]hen threats of 
racial violence are made, especially when they are made in public and by a 
group, it is incumbent upon the State to investigate with due diligence and 
expedition.’211 The explicit references to non-State actors and due diligence 
in the context of a State’s obligation to protect human rights suggest an 
application of indirect horizontal effect by the CteeERD based on procedural 
obligations of the Dutch State (i.e. to investigate and punish non-State actors 
accused of racial discrimination). The reasoning of the CteeERD in this case 
mirrors that in its General Recommendations on Article 4, discussed above.  
 The obligation of States to conduct a thorough investigation into 
instances of racial discrimination by non-State actors was also discussed in 
the case of Habassi v Denmark.212 The author of the complaint, a Tunisian 
man with permanent residence in Denmark, had applied for a loan from a 
private bank, which required him (‘motivated by the need to ensure that the 
loan was repaid’213) to provide evidence of his Danish nationality before 
approving the loan (after previously stating that they would accept loan 
requests from individuals with permanent residence). After his loan 
                                                 
209 UN CteeERD, L.K. v The Netherlands (4/1991) UN Doc. A/48/18 at 131 (16 March 1993). 
210 ibid para 6.3. 
211 ibid para 6.6. 
212 UN CteeERD, Habassi v Denmark (10/1997) UN Doc. CERD/C/54/D/10/1997 (17 March 
1999). 




application was rejected, with the help of an antidiscrimination organisation 
the applicant complained to the Danish police, who did not pursue an 
investigation. The State’s argument was that there was insufficient evidence 
that an unlawful act had taken place. The CteeERD, however, agreed with 
the applicant that a human rights violation had occurred. It based its decision 
on the need for States to investigate whether or not racial discrimination had 
occurred (whether directly or indirectly), which requires a ‘proper 
investigation’ into the facts.214 Here, the basis upon which the bank required 
an individual to prove Danish nationality before granting a loan was in 
question – although nationality is not an issue of racial discrimination as such, 
it may have an unintended, indirect effect of racial discrimination.215 Since 
the police had accepted the bank’s reasons on face value and had not 
conducted such an investigation, it was found to be in violation of Article 6 
CERD (the right to an effective remedy) in connection with Article 2(d) (the 
definition of racial discrimination). The case therefore goes quite far in 
requiring States to protect individuals from non-State actors (albeit focusing 
on procedural requirements). A very similar reasoning and findings were 
applied by the CteeERD in its opinion on Kashif Ahmad v Denmark.216 In this 
case, the applicant alleged that he had been racially discriminated against by 
a teacher and a headmaster of a school, on school property. He complained 
that the Danish authorities refused to prosecute the individuals or conduct a 
thorough investigation into what happened. After a cursory investigation into 
the facts, the authorities stated that the offensive statements made to the 
applicant fell outside of the scope of Danish criminal law, and that the 
applicant could only seek redress through civil law – a finding that the 
applicant was unable to appeal.217 The CteeERD opined that had a thorough 
investigation been undertaken, the authorities would have been able to 
establish whether the applicant was subject to racial discrimination within the 
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meaning of Article 2(1)(d) CERD.218 The CteeERD ultimately found that 
because of the lack of investigation and ability of the applicant to find out 
whether his rights had been violated at the national level, the State had failed 
to effectively protect him from racial discrimination.219  
 As well as an obligation to investigate instances of racial 
discrimination by private actors (in a timely manner), the CteeERD has made 
recommendations that States ‘complete’ their legislation protecting 
individuals from racial discrimination by private actors. In the case of Lacko 
v Slovakia, for example, the Committee recommended such legislative action 
to ‘guarantee the right of access to public places in conformity with article 5 
(f) of the Convention and to sanction the refusal of access to such places for 
reason of racial discrimination.’220 The case had involved a Roma individual 
being refused service in a restaurant at a railway station on the basis that he 
was Roma. The State investigated the situation and prosecuted the culprit, 
which led the CteeERD to find no violation of the Convention. However, it 
did not refrain from giving this extra counsel to Slovakia to strengthen its 
performance of the duty of due diligence.221 
5.6.3 Critical remarks on the jurisprudence of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
In light of the specific references made within the CERD to various non-State 
actors, the CteeERD has not actually gone very far in applying the 
Convention horizontally. This is odd in light of the mention of private actors 
in the Convention itself – the clear obligation to protect individuals from 
racial discrimination in the private, as well as in the public sphere could seem 
to render further consideration of private actors even more necessary. 
However, it could also be said that there are not as many substantive human 
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rights contained in the CERD that could be upheld vis-à-vis non-State actors, 
other than those in Articles 4 and 5. Most of the cases that involved a non-
State actor found violations of the State of these two provisions, as well as 
Article 6 which provides the right to effective remedy. Taken together, the 
clear obligation to conduct thorough investigations into alleged incidents of 
racial discrimination by private parties, and the obligation to have a legal 
framework in place to punish such parties when found responsible, strongly 
reflect at least two elements generally considered to constitute a duty of due 
diligence (together with the duty to prevent interference by non-State actors). 
Indeed, the CteeERD has made explicit reference to this duty, although not 
on a regular basis.  
5.7 Critical reflections on the treaty bodies’ reasoning 
Before drawing conclusions on the application of horizontal effect by the 
treaty bodies examined, a few comments on the bodies’ reasoning will be 
made. Although it did not form part of the research of this chapter per se and 
will thus not be discussed in detail, it was very interesting to see how the 
Committees made their decisions in relation to individual complaints, and 
how they framed their comments in general recommendations and comments. 
The following comments are made only in relation to the practice included 
in the analysis, and should not be read as applying to the practice of the treaty 
bodies generally.222 
Each of the five bodies regularly relied upon their own previous 
practice, both in general comments and views on individual communications. 
They did refer to each other’s practice as well, although not particularly 
often.223 The analysis nonetheless showed that at least in relation to those 
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aspects of the bodies’ practice relating to horizontal effect, the interpretations 
of the bodies have converged to a large extent (notwithstanding the 
inconsistencies in the use of language).  
They also regularly mentioned other international treaties in general 
comments (particularly the other ‘core’ human rights treaties) as well as, to a 
lesser degree, the output of international organisations, particularly UN 
agencies and subsidiary organs. However, it was striking to see how rarely 
most of the bodies relied on sources of international law other than 
international treaties when interpreting the human rights treaties.224 Indeed, 
even in instances where one of the parties to an individual communication 
relied upon the jurisprudence of judicial bodies (e.g. the European Court of 
Human Rights) or customary international law, the treaty bodies most often 
declined to mention the sources in their own reasoning.225 It was very rare 
indeed that a treaty body referred to customary international law. Although 
several references were made,226 on most occasions the reference was simply 
to the fact that as well as being bound by the relevant treaty, States were also 
bound by customary international law that covered the same material. An 
exception to this was the CteeESCR’s General Comment No. 24, which 
referred more substantively to customary international law,227 as well as to 
the DASR,228 which have customary status. In fact, in both its general 
comments and views on individual communications, the CteeESCR 
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consistently took into account a broader range of sources than the other treaty 
bodies.229 Perhaps General Comment No. 24 will prove to be part of a broader 
trend to take into account other sources of law, although it does not seem as 
though the other bodies have considerably altered their approach to this over 
the years. 
 Overall, as also suggested by the previous comments in relation to 
attribution and the DASR, the reasoning of the human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies in the practice analysed was sometimes lacking in terms 
of grounding outcomes in a legal basis. While the treaties being applied were 
always discussed, the legal reasoning which led to a particular interpretation 
of the provisions was sometimes extremely minimal. For example, it is 
unclear whether the treaty bodies follow the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties’ rules on interpretation – something that has been discussed more 
generally.230 This may cause problems concerning the legitimacy of the 
bodies’ jurisprudence and the willingness of States to implement changes 
pursuant to general comments and/or views, both of which have already been 
called into question.231 
 In turn, such problems may affect the role and impact of the treaty 
bodies within international law more generally, as well as their place within 
the community of international courts, tribunals and other adjudicatory 
bodies. These aspects should also be considered when looking at the 
significance of the treaty bodies’ practice for what concerns the horizontal 
effect of human rights. It is important to remember, for example, that unlike 
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other human rights adjudicatory bodies such as the European Court of Human 
Rights, the treaty bodies do not have binding authority.232 Nonetheless, their 
practice has been relied upon by binding regional and international 
adjudicatory bodies (e.g. the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively),233 although to a lesser 
degree than by other non-binding bodies (the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, for Example, has referred to the practice on many occasions). 
Together with the prevalent reference to the practice of treaty bodies in the 
national context (both in jurisprudence and in the development of new 
legislation), this gives the findings of the bodies more significance than may 
be initially expected; the practice may not constitute formal (international) 
law, but certainly constitutes important guidance for those bodies (whether 
national, regional or international) that are able to make binding decisions on 
the same or related matters. 
 Bearing this in mind, it is a shame that the treaty bodies are not more 
candid in their reasoning, which currently makes it harder to evaluate whether 
or not they do justice to the topic of non-State actors and human rights. In 
particular, a lack of precise explanation of the legal bases for conclusions 
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within general comments (although this may be changing) sometimes 
obscures the Committees’ views on horizontal effect. This could be clarified 
through more reference to and engagement with rules and sources of 
international law and theories of horizontal effect in those instances where 
the Committees do indeed apply it, as well as more consistent use of 
terminology. As it stands, the Committees very rarely actually consider 
‘horizontal effect’ as a concept, preferring to move directly to the practical 
measures that should be taken by (predominantly) States to protect human 
rights. That being said, the bodies have applied horizontal effect to the extent 
that their mandates and the international legal framework allow. In this 
respect, the findings of the analysis fit within the prevalent approach in legal 
science towards horizontal effect – that within the legal framework as it is, 
there is no possibility of direct horizontal effect. In this respect, the findings 
do not seem to fit within new theories of horizontal effect being developed in 
literature (e.g. those briefly discussed in Chapter 3.2 that rely on a 
reconceptualization of human rights). However, the adoption and content of 
General Comment No. 24 regarding business activities suggests that at least 
the CteeESCR is willing to keep pace with the international community as it 
moves towards the elaboration of duties and obligations for business 
enterprises. 
5.8 Concluding reflections on the horizontal effect of international 
human rights in international jurisprudence 
The above discussions show widespread and varied acknowledgements of the 
considerable role that non-State actors have to play in the enjoyment of 
human rights. While the international legal framework does not allow for 
non-State actors to be directly burdened with international legal obligations, 
the UN human rights treaty bodies have on many occasions upheld the 
standards within international human rights law against the actions of non-
State actors. This has been done primarily through applying States’ obligation 
to protect human rights, focusing on the duties of States to act effectively 
when a non-State actor interferes with the enjoyment of human rights. This 
does not appear to have changed much over time, although the Committees 
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seem more willing to discuss the conduct of non-State actors themselves in 
general comments rather than views on individual communications. 
Interestingly, the requirements of the obligation to protect seem to differ 
somewhat depending on what kind of non-State actor has interfered with the 
enjoyment of human rights, and the relationship they have with the victim of 
human rights violations also appears to play a role in the way in which treaty 
bodies apply indirect horizontal effect. 
First, the bodies, both in their general comments and views on 
individual communications, have upheld States’ obligation to protect 
individuals from harmful acts by other individuals. This would include, for 
example, other family members (e.g. CteeEDAW, General Recommendation 
No. 19; A. T. v Hungary), neighbours (e.g. L. K. v The Netherlands), and 
employers (e.g. CteeESCR General Comment Nos. 5 and 14). In cases where 
such actors were involved, the focus of the treaty bodies was mostly on due 
diligence obligations of the State. An emphasis has certainly been placed on 
the obligations to investigate interference with human rights by non-State 
actors, as well as to prevent and punish the actions, especially where the State 
is aware of a risk to the individual. In one sense, the cases show a stronger 
application of horizontal effect, as the relationships between the individuals 
is often exclusively in the private sphere (e.g. between spouses). However, 
the actions of the non-State actors themselves are not the subject of much 
discussion by the Committees, except to the extent that they show that a 
particular right is engaged. Rather, the focus is (as it should be, according to 
the international human rights law framework) on the action or inaction of 
States either to prevent the harm occurring, or in reaction to the harm that 
occurred, which allows the private actor’s conduct to be attributed to the 
State. Interestingly, because of the wording of Article 1 CAT requiring at least 
the ‘consent or acquiescence’ of the State for an act to fall within the scope 
of the Convention against Torture, the CteeAT has seemed to take a strict 
stance as to when acts of torture by private actors can lead to a violation of 
the Convention. It seems to be that only when the State knew of a risk of 
torture would the actions be imputable to the State. This contrasts with the 




the approach of other bodies with jurisdiction over the prohibition of torture, 
which are comparatively broader.  
Second, the treaty bodies have applied States’ positive obligation to 
protect human rights from private businesses (CteeESCR, General Comment 
Nos. 5 and 12) and entities such as banks (e.g. Habassi v Denmark) and 
insurance boards (e.g. B. d. B. v The Netherlands). The horizontal effect here 
is very similar to that found in the jurisprudence concerning relationships 
between individuals. 
 Third, the treaty bodies have applied indirect horizontal effect in 
relation to private companies or institutions that are carrying out public 
functions that have been delegated to them by the State. This category of actor 
has included, for example, privately run prisons (e.g. Cabal and Pasini v 
Australia) and private healthcare institutions (e.g. Alyne da Silva Pimentel 
Teixeira (deceased) v Brazil). In their discussions of these actors, the treaty 
bodies have focused on attributing the actions of the non-State actors to the 
State because of the public nature of the functions that the actors are carrying 
out and because they were delegated these activities by the State. Here, the 
main argument appears to be that States cannot give up their own 
international responsibility by delegating certain functions to non-State 
actors. The treaty bodies have upheld (within the obligation to protect) an 
obligation to regulate and supervise the privatised companies, using a failure 
to do so as the basis for a State violation of a particular right. As well as the 
obligation to regulate, the treaty bodies have also applied the duty of due 
diligence to these actors (indeed, it appears to be applied in some form in 
relation to every kind of actor). The result of the obligation to regulate and 
supervise privatised companies is that the private actors providing the 
relevant service will be held, by the State, to the same standards as the State 
would by the human rights monitoring bodies. This is one of the few instances 
in which the practice of the treaty monitoring bodies can really be said to 
stipulate the standards expected of non-State actors. 
 Fourthly, cases of indirect horizontal effect have also occurred where 
the actor interfering with human rights is a non-State armed group. Here, the 
Committee against Torture has taken different approaches to horizontal 
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effect. In the case of S. V. et al. v Canada, the State’s obligation to protect 
was upheld. In Sadiq Shek Elmi v Australia, though, the approach taken was 
to treat the non-State actor as a State actor. This seems only to apply when 
the group as effective control over the area of land to which an individual is 
going to be extradited, and/or when there is no effective central State 
authority within the receiving State. In these cases, it does not appear that 
there actually has to be any attribution to the State. The CteeEDAW has also 
dealt with these actors in General Recommendation No. 30, stating non-State 
armed groups’ obligation to respect human rights during armed conflict (also 
placing emphasis on those groups with effective control over an area of 
territory). 
 Fifthly, suggestions have been made, at least by the CteeESCR 
(General Comment Nos. 14 and 15), that international organisations may 
have human rights obligations. However, no legal basis was provided by the 
CteeESCR and there are no examples of treaty bodies applying human rights 
treaties to international organisations in individual communications. The 
obligations could therefore be read as being moral, but not yet legal, in nature.  
 It is possible to conclude that the vast majority of the jurisprudence 
of the UN human rights treaty bodies involves a connection being made 
between the State and the private actor concerned. The basis on which to 
make this connection and attribute the private acts to the State differs slightly 
between different bodies and depending on the non-State actor involved. The 
bases remain significantly limited by the current international legal 
framework. So far, with the exception of the unique case of Sadiq Shek Elmi 
v Australia (which, it must be remembered, did not actually apply the 
Convention obligations to a non-State actor), treaty bodies seem reluctant to 
push the boundaries too far, at least in their views on individual 
communications, in which they are careful to invoke a legitimate legal basis. 
In order to fill gaps in human rights protection arising from situations falling 
outside of the State’s obligation to protect human rights, either the 
international human rights framework will have to evolve to cover certain 
non-State actors, or ways of protecting individuals outside of the confines of 




 Overall, in relation to the kinds of actors that are treated differently, 
perhaps what is not present in the documents analysed is more telling than 
what is – the application of the law seems to allow individuals to be protected 
from other individuals and from private companies (especially privatised 
ones) but there are some non-State actors that fall (sometimes completely) 
out of the mix. The more ‘public’ non-State armed groups and international 
organisations have been dealt with to a limited degree, which has been 
particularly significant for the potential direct horizontal effect of human 
rights. Their treatment has been more direct within general comments, whilst 
in views on individual communications it has at most been said that these 
actors could be capable of violating human rights, or have responsibilities to 
help States in the implementation of their rights.  
 In general, and as repeatedly noted during the analysis, the monitoring 
bodies examined in this chapter primarily address the concrete standards 
expected of States vis-à-vis non-State actors, but not the standards of 
behaviour expected of the non-State actors themselves. While this does not 
actually limit the contribution of the practice to the study of ‘horizontal 
effect’, it does significantly limit the usefulness of the practice in identifying 
how international human rights law expects non-State actors to behave. The 
corollary of this is that the identification of these standards will have to be 
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Horizontal effect of international human 
rights at the regional level 
 
6.1 Preliminary remarks  
This chapter provides an analysis of the horizontal effect of international 
human rights within three regional human rights systems: (1) the Council of 
Europe (CoE) human rights system (Section 6.2); (2) the African human 
rights system (Section 6.3); and (3) the Inter-American human rights system 
(Section 6.4). The human rights protection systems under the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and the League of Arab States will not be included 
in the discussion, for reasons of space and relevance.1 The three systems 
discussed differ somewhat from each other and from the international (UN) 
system for the protection of human rights,2 but have each dealt, in their own 
way, with horizontal effect.  
The aims of this chapter are threefold and dictate the structure of 
Sections 6.2-6.4. First, it aims to analyse whether, and if so, how, the human 
rights treaties under each regional system allow for the (direct) horizontal 
                                                 
1 For information on these systems, see respectively Human Rights in ASEAN Online 
Platform <www.humanrightsinasean.info/> accessed 18 March 2017; and Mervat Rishmawi, 
‘The League of Arab States: Human Rights Standards and Mechanisms’ (2015) 
<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/league-arab-states-human-rights-
standards-and-mechanisms> accessed 31 August 2017. 
2 A major difference here being that the Courts of the regional human rights systems have the 
authority to adopt decisions legally binding Member States, whereas the outcome of 




effect of human rights; second, it aims to conduct an analysis of the ways in 
which regional bodies have applied indirect horizontal effect in their 
jurisprudence; and third, it seeks to provide an overview of some of the main 
contributions to the academic debate concerning the application of horizontal 
effect within the three regional human rights systems examined. Due to 
restraints of time and space, the chapter will not attempt an exhaustive 
analysis of scholarly works or the systems’ treaties and jurisprudence. 
Instead, examples of each will be used to identify the different ways in which 
horizontal effect is discussed and applied, and trends in application. 
Comparison amongst and between the three systems, and with the 
international human rights system, is made throughout Sections 6.2-6.4, and 
a brief overview of significant differences and similarities is provided in 
Section 6.5. 
6.2 Examples of horizontal effect of human rights in the Council of 
Europe human rights system 
The CoE is an inter-governmental organisation composed of 47 Member 
States.3 Based in Strasbourg, France, the CoE is the body responsible for the 
ECHR.4 The ECHR, adopted in 1950, has served as the main instrument for 
the protection and safeguarding of human rights within Europe for over 60 
years. Alongside the ECHR, the CoE has now adopted several Protocols to 
the treaty which protect rights additional to those found in the original 
Convention.5 The body responsible for overseeing the implementation of the 
CoE human rights treaties is the ECtHR.  
                                                 
3 For more information, see Council of Europe, ‘Who We Are’ 
<http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are> accessed 31 August 2017. 
4 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14 (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 1 January 
1990) ETS 5. 
5 For a list of Protocols to the ECHR, see Council of Europe Treaty Office, ‘Search on 
Treaties’ <http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-
/conventions/treaty/results/subject/3> accessed 31 August 2017. 
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6.2.1 The Council of Europe human rights system: legislation 
The CoE system of human rights contains only scant reference to any 
responsibilities or duties of non-State actors. Indeed, the sole reference in the 
ECHR is rather vague and cannot really be said to place any concrete 
obligations on private actors. Article 10(2) provides that the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression ‘carries with it duties and responsibilities’. It 
could be inferred from the subsequent text in the provision, which lays down 
the limitations that States may impose on freedom of expression, that 
individuals have a responsibility to be considerate in the way that they 
exercise freedom of expression.6 However, Gavin Phillipson and Alexander 
Williams have argued against such an interpretation, stating that the provision 
does not ‘creat[e] correlative duties on speakers not to interfere with the 
Convention rights of others; rather it simply recognises the fact that, at the 
time the Convention was drafted…various contracting states already laid 
numerous duties on speakers’.7 The statement in Article 10(2) therefore 
seems to act as an extension of, or perhaps the rationale behind, the 
subsequent limitations that can be placed on individuals by the State when 
they are enjoying their rights. Such limitations are also found in other 
provisions within the ECHR, and often require individuals’ rights to be 
balanced against one another. The ECtHR’s practice in this respect will be 
briefly discussed in the following section. 
6.2.2 The Council of Europe human rights system: jurisprudence 
In many ways, the European Court of Human Rights is seen as a role model 
in international human rights law. It is known for its often progressive 
judgments and willingness to treat the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’;8 the 
                                                 
6 This is supported by the case of Von Hannover v Germany, App No. 59320/00 (24 June 
2004), which essentially upheld a state obligation to ensure one private actor’s ‘proper 
consideration’ for the rights of an individual. See Beate Rudolf, ‘Council of Europe: Von 
Hannover v Germany’ (2006) 4(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 533, 534 (see 
below, Section 6.2.2). 
7 Gavin Phillipson and Alexander Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional 
Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) Modern Law Review 878, 883. 




Court understands that the ECHR should be interpreted in a way that allows 
modern-day circumstances to be taken into account, rather than restricting 
interpretation to the original understanding or intention of those who drafted 
the Convention in a different social and legal environment. This approach of 
the Court has certainly allowed it to apply indirect horizontal effect to various 
degrees. Indeed, Olha Cherednychenko has noted that ‘the Court avails itself 
of broad possibilities to exert an impact on the relationships between private 
parties’.9 In this section, examples of the Court’s case law will be discussed 
to provide an overview of how the Court has applied the ECHR in cases 
concerning human rights interference by non-State actors. 
An illustrative and well-cited example of horizontal effect before the 
ECtHR is the case of Costello Roberts v United Kingdom.10 In this case, 
children in a private school (hence a non-State actor) were being whipped 
with a cane as a form of discipline. The father of one of the children tried to 
bring a claim directly against the school, arguing that this corporal 
punishment qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 
ECHR. This claim was unsuccessful, given the nature of the school as a non-
State actor, but the father was able to successfully bring a complaint against 
the UK State itself. The ECtHR held the UK responsible for failing to protect 
the children by effectively enacting laws to criminalise such behaviour. In a 
similar statement to that of several international monitoring bodies seen in 
Chapter 5, the Court noted that ‘the State cannot absolve itself from 
responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or individual’.11 
This ensures that States cannot delegate their legal human rights 
                                                 
March 1978) para 31. See for discussion George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: 
Its Meaning and Its Legitimacy’ in Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), 
The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). 
9 Olha Cherednychenko, ‘Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of 
Human Rights?’ (2009) 13(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 195, 
197. 
10 Costello Roberts v United Kingdom, App No. 13134/87 (25 March 1993) para 26. 
11 ibid para 27, cited in Andrea Bianchi (ed), Non-State Actors and International Law 
(Routledge 2009) 454. 
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responsibility along with the delegation of public tasks to non-State actors,12 
following the findings of previous case law before the ECtHR, namely Van 
der Mussele v Belgium.13  
Another case in which responsibility for interfering with the 
enjoyment of human rights was attributed to the State (although the 
interference was caused directly by a non-State actor) is that of López Ostra 
v Spain.14 In this case, a waste treatment plant had not been regulated by the 
State to prevent it from polluting nearby homes. The Court stated in this case 
that whether the dispute concerned positive obligations or ‘direct interference 
by a public authority’ justified under Article 8(2), ‘regard must be had to the 
fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the 
individual and of the community as a whole, and, in any case, the state enjoys 
a certain margin of appreciation’.15 This suggests that whatever source is used 
to indirectly place standards of behaviour on non-State actors to protect 
human rights (i.e. the obligation to protect itself, or the legitimate limitations 
of human rights – see Chapter 3), the interests and possibly the rights of 
others will be weighed against those of the complainant, allowing the State 
certain leeway to decide how to achieve this balance.16 
                                                 
12 Bianchi (n 11) 455. 
13 Van der Mussele v Belgium, App No. 8918/80 (23 November 1983); see also Casado Coca 
v Spain, App No. 15450/89 (26 February 1994), discussed in Antenor Hallo de Wolf, 
Reconciling Privatization with Human Rights (Intersentia 2011) 248-251. 
14 López Ostra v Spain, App No. 16798/90 (9 December 1994). 
15 Aoife Nolan, ‘Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-State Actors 
Through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the Obligation to 
Protect’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 225, 246. 
16 For further examples of a case in which the ECtHR balanced competing interests and 
afforded States a relatively wide margin of appreciation, see e.g. Hatton and Others v United 
Kingdom, App No. 36022/97 (8 July 2003); Pla and Puncernau v Andorra, App No. 69498/01 
(13 July 2004); and J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J. A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v United Kingdom, 
App No. 44302/02 (30 August 2007). See for discussion, Ineta Ziemele, ‘Human Rights 
Violations by Private Persons and Entities: The Case-Law of International Human Rights 
Courts and Monitoring Bodies’ (EUI Working Papers 2009) AEL 2009/8, and on Pla and 
Puncernau v Andorra specifically, Cherednychenko, ‘Towards the Control of Private Acts by 




A later case of Fadeyeva v Russia17 also involved a State failure to 
regulate a private actor. A family living near a private steel plant argued that 
the pollution from the plant interfered with their right to private and family 
life under Article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR held that the Russian State had a 
positive obligation to regulate the private industry,18 and to approach the 
problem with due diligence.19 According to the Court, in this specific instance 
it would require the State to ensure that Ms. Fadeyeva and her family were 
resettled to housing outside of the area affected by the pollution. In rendering 
its judgment, the Court stated that the ‘steel plant was not owned, controlled, 
or operated by the State’, but that ‘the State’s responsibility in environmental 
cases may arise from a failure to regulate private industry.’20 One of the 
contributing factors to this conclusion appears to be the fact that prior to it 
being controlled and operated by private actors, the plant had been owned by 
the State, which still imposed certain operating conditions on the plant. This, 
taken together with the fact that the State was well aware of the long-standing 
pollution being caused by the plant (which could be easily established as the 
source of the pollution) and calls for it to be reduced, ‘show[ed] a sufficient 
nexus between the pollutant emissions and the State to raise an issue of the 
State’s positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention.’21 The 
importance of the State being in a position to do something to regulate the 
private steel plant was central to being able to attribute the harm to the 
Russian State and allowed a broader application of Article 8 even though the 
‘State could not be said to have directly interfered with the applicant’s private 
life or home’.22 This case thus brought privatised companies squarely within 
the CoE human rights regime as a form of indirect attribution to the State. 
The notion of an ‘obligation to regulate’ non-State actors, particularly private 
or privatised companies, is now widely applied by different human rights 
                                                 
17 Fadeyeva v Russia, App No. 55723/00 (2005). 
18 ibid para 89. 
19 ibid para 128. 
20 ibid para 89. 
21 ibid para 92 (see also paras 89-92). 
22 ibid para 92. 
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monitoring bodies (including at the international level) falling within States’ 
obligation to protect human rights.23  
In the case of Storck v Germany,24 the ECtHR similarly attributed a 
private actor’s conduct to the State, in this case to find a violation of the right 
to liberty under Article 5(1) ECHR. The applicant was a German woman who 
had been detained in psychiatric institutions and hospitals for almost 20 years 
of her life. After becoming an adult, the applicant was detained for some time 
in a private clinic against her will, and without any legal mandate requiring 
that she stay at the clinic. Indeed, the woman tried to escape the clinic on 
several occasions. In determining whether there were any violations by the 
German State in relation to this detention, the Court considered that to 
interpret Article 5(1) as not encompassing a positive obligation would ‘leave 
a sizeable gap in the protection from arbitrary detention, which would be 
inconsistent with the importance of personal liberty in a democratic 
society.’25 The Court explained that the positive obligation applicable here 
was that the State must take ‘reasonable steps to prevent’ an individual’s 
liberty being deprived where the ‘authorities have or ought to have 
knowledge’ of the potential deprivation.26 The Court relied on the fact that 
on one of the occasions that the applicant had tried to escape the private 
clinic, she was taken back by police officers. This fact (which established a 
connection between the private clinic and the public authorities) was enough 
for the Court to conclude that the State knew or should have known about the 
unlawful detention, which the Court suggested should have led to a legal 
                                                 
23 See e.g. Chapter 5; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General 
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the 
Covenant)’ (2000) E/C.12/2000/4. Other cases before the ECtHR have dealt with the 
interference with individuals’ right to private and family life caused by pollution. In the case 
of Guerra v Italy, App No. 14967/89 (19 February1998) also concerning pollution by a private 
plant, the ECtHR required that States must efficiently protect private and family life in such 
situations, thereby seeming to take the obligation to protect a step towards becoming an 
obligation of result.  
24 Storck v Germany, App No. 61603/00 (6 June 2005). 





review of the legality of her detention.27 Ultimately, the lack of action by the 
State led the Court to hold that the supervision of private clinics by the State 
was not sufficient to protect individuals’ right to liberty under Article 5(1). 
This decision goes a step further than Fadeyeva v Russia as it entailed a less 
significant nexus between the State and the actions of the non-State actor 
involved. Indeed, the judgment of Storck v Germany extended the scope of 
indirect horizontal effect to cover truly private institutions as well as 
privatised bodies, as seen in Fadeyeva v Russia. 
As Clapham has noted, however, the ECtHR has sometimes refrained 
from separating those violations of the Convention that are the direct 
responsibility of the State (i.e. with a direct link to State action) from those 
occurring as a result of the State neglecting to protect individuals from the 
harmful actions of non-State actors (i.e. fulfilling the obligation to protect).28 
For example, rather than trying to attribute the conduct of non-State actors to 
the State, in the case of Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom the 
ECtHR based its finding of a violation of the positive obligations within 
Article 1 ECHR solely on the fact that the State had not taken appropriate 
legislative action to protect individuals.29 This is a violation by omission, 
which would have been found regardless of whether the actor who directly 
interfered with the individual’s rights was a State or non-State actor.30 This 
contrasts with the approach of the same Court in Fadeyeva v Russia in which 
the Court looked specifically at attribution.31 The reasoning in Young, James 
and Webster could represent an understanding of the Court that the positive 
obligation to protect is an intrinsic aspect of the Convention obligations 
generally, which may in part be due to the fact that the doctrine of positive 
obligations under the ECHR is seen not only in terms of inducing indirect 
                                                 
27 ibid para 106. 
28 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (Oxford University Press 
2006). 
29 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom, App Nos. 7601/76 and 7806/7 (18 October 
1982). 
30 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (n 28) 353, in footnote 22. See 
also Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Clarendon Press 1993) 234-236. 
31 Fadeyeva v Russia, App No. 55723/00 (9 June 2005). 
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horizontal effect, but also positive obligations relating to protection from 
State action.32  
The ECtHR has also held the State responsible for the actions of 
private individuals, as well as companies and institutions. For example, in the 
case of M. C. v Bulgaria, the Court held that that the Bulgarian State had 
violated Articles 3 and 8 ECHR by failing to ‘establish and apply effectively 
a criminal-law system punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse’.33 The 
applicant in the case was a 14-year-old girl, who had claimed to have been 
raped by two private individuals. The positive obligations that the Court read 
into Articles 3 and 8 ECHR required, as part of the criminal law system, that 
the State conduct a thorough investigation into allegations of rape. In the 
present case, the Court (relying on standards found within international law 
and other States’ domestic laws) found that the investigation conducted by 
the Bulgarian authorities was not sufficient, as it did not look at the coercive 
circumstances in which the girl had been placed, but was rather limited to the 
existence of evidence that physical force had been used against the girl. The 
approach taken here by the ECtHR that States’ positive obligations under the 
ECHR can include an obligation to investigate interference with rights by 
private actors corresponds with the approach taken by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, discussed below, and to a limited extent, with that of 
the UN HRCtee in the case of Herrera Rubio (on behalf of Herrera and Rubio 
de Herrera) v Colombia.34 
The application of horizontal effect of human rights in play here is 
                                                 
32 See generally, Hugh Tomlinson, QC, ‘Positive obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, paper presented at the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar 
Association Summer Conference 2012 
<www.adminlaw.org.uk/events_consultations/event_2012_07_24.php> accessed 17 
November 2014. 
33 M. C. v Bulgaria, App No. 39272/98 (3 December 2003) para 185. 
34 UN HRCtee, Herrera Rubio (on behalf of Herrera and Rubio de Herrera) v Colombia 
(161/1983) UN Doc. CCPR/C/31/D/161/1983 (2 November 1987) para 6.2 (see Chapter 5 of 
this book). This case involved the enforced disappearance and murder of the claimant’s 
parents by members of an unidentifiable group. The HRCtee held the Colombian State to be 
responsible regardless of the absence of State involvement in the actions, because of their 




similar to the obligation to regulate/supervise found in the cases of Fadeyeva 
and Storck – the Court found a positive obligation on the State to take 
measures to effectively protect the individual’s rights. Most significantly in 
M. C. v Bulgaria, the Court found a violation of Article 3, which prohibits 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Under the 
authoritative definition of torture (applied repeatedly by the ECtHR) found 
in the Convention against Torture, an act constitutes torture if ‘inflicted by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity.’35 The fact, then, that in M. C. v 
Bulgaria the ECtHR explicitly reiterated previous decisions that understood 
‘ill-treatment’ as ‘including ill-treatment administered by private individuals’ 
allowed the positive obligation of the State under Article 3 ECHR to be 
applied in a manner which resulted in (a limited degree of) horizontal effect.36  
A similar conclusion to M. C. v Bulgaria was reached by the Court in 
X and Y v The Netherlands, although with respect to Article 8 ECHR. Again, 
the case dealt with the treatment of a minor by private individuals, this time 
a mentally disabled girl of 16 years who lived in a private home for mentally 
disabled children and was raped by the director of the home’s son-in-law. The 
public prosecutor had chosen not to prosecute the son-in-law, and the Dutch 
criminal law system required that children above the age of 16 must institute 
criminal proceedings on their own, as it ‘requires a complaint by the actual 
victim before criminal proceedings can be instituted against someone who 
has contravened this provision’. The girl was unable to do this because of her 
disabilities, which meant that she could not avail herself of the protections 
offered by the Dutch criminal law system. Because of this lack of protection, 
the Court found a violation of Article 8 ECHR, the obligations under which 
                                                 
35 Emphasis added. 
36 Previous decisions reaching this conclusion, referred to by the Court in M. C. v Bulgaria (n 
33) para 149, include A. v United Kingdom, App. No. 100/1997/884/1096 (23 September 
1998), para 22; Z. and Others v United Kingdom App No. 29392/95 (10 May 2001), paras 73-
75; and E. and Others v United Kingdom, App No. 33218/96 (26 November 2002). 
Interestingly, as with M. C. v Bulgaria, the other cases relied on by the Court which found a 
positive obligation to protect individuals from torture/ill-treatment by private actors have all 
concerned children. 
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require States to take ‘measures designed to secure respect for private life 
even in the sphere of relations of individuals between themselves’;37 the 
applicable criminal laws in the Netherlands did not effectively and practically 
protect the girl.38  
Article 8 ECHR has been at the centre of many cases concerning 
horizontal effect at the ECtHR. In the case of Glaser v United Kingdom,39 for 
example, the ECtHR laid down the general requirements of the obligation to 
protect the ‘respect for family life’ guaranteed by Article 8. The applicant in 
the case was an individual who complained that contact orders between 
himself and his children’s mother, to allow him access to the children, had 
failed to be enforced by the UK authorities. He therefore claimed a breach of 
Article 8 ECHR.40 The ECtHR ultimately found that there had been no 
violation of Article 8, since the failure to enforce the contact orders was due 
to the mother’s opposition thereto, rather than the authorities’ conduct. The 
Court found that the UK authorities had struck a ‘fair balance between the 
competing interests and did not fail in their responsibilities to protect the 
applicant’s right to family life’.41 However, in explaining the positive 
obligations owed under Article 8, the ECtHR stated that  
[t]he essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against 
arbitrary interference by public authorities. There may however be 
positive obligations inherent in an effective “respect” for family life. 
These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to 
secure respect for family life even in the sphere of relations between 
individuals, including both the provision of a regulatory framework of 
adjudicatory and enforcement machinery protecting individuals’ rights 
and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific steps.42  
                                                 
37 X and Y v The Netherlands, App No. 8978/80 (26 March 1985) para 23. 
38 ibid para 30. 
39 Glaser v United Kingdom, App No. 32346/96 (19 September 2000). 
40 The applicant also claimed a violation of Article 6 ECHR in relation to the length of 
domestic proceedings and the fact that he had not been provided with legal assistance. 
41 Glaser v United Kingdom (n 39) para 87. 




The findings here clearly show that Article 8 can certainly be applicable 
between private actors, but the Court has been criticised for having 
‘consistently refused to develop “any general theory of positive obligations 
which may flow from the Convention”’.43 Instead, the Court seems to have 
developed different strands of case law in relation to certain rights. Since 
Glaser v United Kingdom, the case law regarding the application of Article 8 
ECHR has been considerably developed. A notable development occurred 
through the landmark case of Von Hannover v Germany,44 in which the Court 
‘finally provided comprehensive guidance’ as to the (scope of) applicability 
of Article 8 between private actors.45 The case involved a claim by the 
Princess of Monaco that Germany had violated her right to private life when 
the national courts had not awarded her damages for photographs taken by 
the press of her in her private life (e.g. at a private beach).46 The case is a 
classic example of the balancing act that is required when limitations on 
rights allowed for under the ECHR come into play. Ultimately, Princess 
Caroline Von Hannover’s right to private life (Article 8 ECHR) was not 
found to have been correctly balanced by the German courts against the 
                                                 
privacy and the Human Rights Act’ (2001) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 526, 535. 
43 Hare (n 42) 536, citing Plattform “Artze fur das Leben” v Austria, App No. 10126/82 (21 
June 1988) para 30. Certainly, the case of Appleby and Others v United Kingdom (n 48) 
demonstrates that while the ECtHR may interpret the ECHR as giving rise to positive State 
obligations, it does not uphold them on every occasion. See Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘Private Law 
and the New European Constitutional Settlement’ (2004) 10(6) European Law Journal 776-
779; and Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘What Constitutions Can Do (but Courts Sometimes Don’t): 
Property, Speech, and the Influence of Constitutional Norms on Private Law’ (2004) 17 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 61, 70-74. 
44 Von Hannover v Germany (n 6).  
45 Gavin Phillipson, ‘Privacy: The Development of Breach of Confidence – The Clearest Case 
of Horizontal Effect?’ in David Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 142. As Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi notes, the Court 
laid down the balance that must be struck between freedom of expression and the privacy of 
celebrities, but left the manner in which this is achieved to the discretion of States. Aurelia 
Colombi Ciacchi, ‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights, Privacy and Social Justice’ in 
Katja Ziegler (ed), Human Rights and Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy (Hart Publishing 
2007) 63-64. 
46 For a summary and discussion of the case, see Beate Rudolf, ‘Council of Europe: Von 
Hannover v Germany’ (2006) 4(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 533. 
HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS – REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
199 
freedom of the press (and the interests of the public in having access to the 
information portrayed through the photographs) under Article 10 ECHR. In 
coming to this conclusion, the ECtHR ‘recognised an obligation on member 
states to protect one individual from an unjustified invasion of private life by 
another individual and an obligation on the courts of a member state to 
interpret legislation in a way which will achieve that result’.47 The ECtHR 
therefore applied the State’s obligation to protect human rights, and in doing 
so required Germany to ensure that the press be prevented from publishing 
photos of Princess Von Hannover that would infringe her (considerably 
broad) right to privacy. In effect, this would require the State to impose 
human rights-related standards of behaviour on non-State actors at the 
national level.  
Another well-known case concerning a balance between the rights of 
individuals is Appleby and Others v United Kingdom.48 In this context, the 
ECtHR has refused to accept that positive obligations could be placed on 
private owners of publicly accessible spaces (such as shopping malls) in order 
to allow individuals to enjoy their right to freedom of expression. In the case, 
a balance of the claimants’ right to freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR) 
against the private owner’s right to property (Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR49) 
was conducted. The dispute involved an environmental group, led by a Mrs. 
Appleby, that wished to use a privately-owned shopping centre in the town 
of Washington, UK, to set up stalls and distribute leaflets against preliminary 
planning permission which had been granted to a local college to build on the 
only playing field that local residents were able to use.50 At the time of the 
                                                 
47 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No. 3) [2006] QB 125, discussing Von Hannover v Germany (n 6), 
cited in Gavin Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed: Horizontal Effect after Campbell’ in Helen 
Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK 
Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press 2007) 170. 
48 Appleby and Others v United Kingdom, App No. 44306/98 (6 May 2003). 
49 Council of Europe, Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 May 
1954) ETS 9. 
50 Appleby and Others v United Kingdom (n 48) para 16, as discussed in MA Sanderson, ‘Free 




group’s request to use the shopping centre, it was publicly owned, and the 
permission was granted. After the property was transferred to a private 
company, however, the permission was rescinded by the new owner on the 
grounds that their ‘stance on all political and religious issues [was] one of 
strict neutrality’.51  
In the first place, the ECtHR opined that there was no element of 
direct State responsibility arising from the fact that the shopping centre used 
to be publicly owned. Unable to directly impose ECHR obligations on private 
actors, the Court then addressed whether indirect obligations could and 
should be imposed via the State to regulate the conduct of the private owners, 
invoking the UK’s positive obligation to protect human rights.52 The 
claimants argued that this obligation required the UK to change the legal 
framework pertaining to private owners of publicly accessible spaces, but the 
Court rejected this argument. It held that despite an ‘interesting trend in 
accommodating freedom of expression to privately owned property open to 
the public’53 that had emerged in other jurisdictions, this did not equate to 
individuals’ rights being equally applicable in relation to private, as well as 
public actors.54 Had the actions of the private owner sufficiently barred the 
effective exercise of the claimants’ Article 10 right, the Court would have 
required the UK to take action to protect the individuals.55 Since there were 
other publicly accessible locations that could have been used for the petition, 
this threshold was not met.56 The autonomy of the private owner in relation 
                                                 
Kings Law Journal 159, 160. 
51 ibid. 
52 This obligation requires States to take immediate steps to ensure that violations by the State, 
its agents, and NSA are prevented. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Handbook for National Human Rights 
Institutions, Professional Training Series No. 12’, United Nations, New York and Geneva 
(2005)17-18 <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training12en.pdf> accessed 28 
May 2014. 
53 Appleby and Others v United Kingdom (n 48) para 46. 
54 ibid para 44. 
55 ibid para 47. 
56 The dissenting opinion of Judge Maruste on this point raises questions regarding the Court’s 
reasoning – although the area that the claimants wanted to use for their petition was privately 
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to their property was such that the limitation of their right, which would arise 
from obliging them to allow the environmental group to use it for the 
proposed purpose, would be disproportionate. The result of this finding by 
the ECtHR, unlike the other cases discussed in the present chapter so far, was 
that there was ‘no “protective function” of the State’ for what concerned the 
claimant’s freedom of expression. The decision has been criticised on this 
ground, in particular for failing to consider why the freedom of speech is 
important in a functioning society and the role that the town centre may play 
as an institutional setting, or ‘civic common’.57 Despite the criticisms that can 
be levelled against the case, the approach of the European Court in Appleby 
and Others v United Kingdom is exemplary of the balancing act that the Court 
typically employs in cases dealing with interference with ECHR rights.  
In other cases, the ECtHR has substantially developed its approach to 
States’ positive obligations to protect human rights. One such case is that of 
Osman v United Kingdom.58 The case concerned the right to life under Article 
2 ECHR and the measures that could be expected of States to protect an 
individual’s right to life from another private actor. Article 2(1) is particularly 
interesting because it includes a positive obligation for States to protect 
individuals’ right to life through law.59 The Osman case involved a high 
                                                 
owned, it still functioned as a public forum, where individuals could publicly discuss matters 
of a public nature. For this reason, Maruste was of the opinion that ‘it cannot be the case that 
through privatisation the public authorities can divest themselves of any responsibility to 
protect rights and freedoms other than property rights’, thus bringing in similar reasoning as 
in the case of Costello Roberts v United Kingdom (n 10), for example. See Appleby and Others 
v United Kingdom (n 48) Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Maruste, cited in Gerstenberg, 
‘Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement’ (n 43) 768 and 778; and 
Gerstenberg, ‘What Constitutions Can Do (but Courts Sometimes Don’t)’ (n 43) 73. The 
reasoning of the majority that alternative locations were open to the claimants reflects, 
according to Gerstenberg, ‘a partisan and narrow conception of the value of political speech’: 
Gerstenberg, ‘What Constitutions Can Do (but Courts Sometimes Don’t) at 74; and 
Gerstenberg, ‘Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement’ at 779. 
57 Gerstenberg, ‘What Constitutions Can Do (but Courts Sometimes Don’t) (n 43) 74; and 
Gerstenberg, ‘Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement’ (n 43) 779. 
58 Osman v United Kingdom, App No. 87/1997/871/1083 (28 October 1998). 
59 The text of Article 2(1) ECHR reads: ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No 




school teacher, Mr Paget-Lewis, who had developed a ‘disturbing 
attachment’ to one of his pupils, Ahmet Osman.60 The Osman family and 
Ahmed’s school informed the police on several occasions about instances 
that they knew or believed to concern Mr. Paget-Lewis. This included activity 
such as the threatening of one of Ahmet Osman’s friends, stealing school 
records, vandalising the Osman family home with graffiti and ‘ramming’ a 
van in which Ahmet Osman’s friend was a passenger.61 The situation 
culminated in the murder of Ahmet Osman’s father by Mr. Paget-Lewis, who 
also seriously wounded Ahmet himself. This took place at the Osman family 
home, after neighbours had reported to the police that they had seen the 
perpetrator in the vicinity with a gun. The claimants (Ahmed and his mother) 
argued that the State authorities, which had been repeatedly informed of the 
teacher’s behaviour, failed to take ‘adequate and appropriate steps to protect 
the lives’ of Ahmed and his father ‘from the real and known danger posed’ 
by Mr. Paget-Lewis, leading to a violation of Article 2(1) ECHR.  
In assessing the case, the ECtHR took the opportunity in the Osman 
case to clarify that the scope of positive obligations under Article 2 extended 
to protection from the taking of life by private actors. In this respect, the Court 
stated that the positive obligation in Article 2 may ‘imply in certain well-
defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take 
preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk 
from the criminal acts of another individual.’62 The Court further lay down 
the test for determining whether a State has fulfilled its obligation to protect 
the right to life from third (private) parties. Accordingly, the Court will 
consider there to be a violation where:  
                                                 
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.’ See Jean-
François Akandji-Kombe, ‘Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: A guide to the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2007) 
Human Rights Handbooks No. 7, 21. 
60 Osman v United Kingdom (n 58) para 68. 
61 ibid para 38; Ziemele (n 16) 13; and Akandji-Kombe (n 59) 26. 
62 Osman v United Kingdom (n 58) para 115. 
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the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence 
of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or 
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to 
take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.63 
The Court therefore employed a test of foreseeability, akin to that often found 
in the context of due diligence in international law, mentioned in Chapter 1 
and seen in the practice of the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women in the case of Angela González Carreño v 
Spain.64 Ultimately, the ECtHR did not find a violation of the State’s positive 
obligation to protect, holding that although the authorities had been informed 
about the conduct of Mr. Paget-Lewis, his behaviour was not such as to imply 
that he posed a ‘real or immediate’ threat to the life of Ahmed or his family 
members. In other words, the applicants had failed to show that there was a 
‘decisive stage’ in the events before the murder ‘when it could be said that 
the police knew or ought to have known that the lives of the Osman family 
were at real and immediate risk’.65  
The Osman case shows that the ECtHR engages with a duty of due 
diligence in relation to the right to life (although it may not label it as such) 
and follows the premise that the obligation to protect is one of conduct, not 
of result. The concrete standards established in Osman v United Kingdom to 
assess whether a State has fulfilled its obligation to protect have been 
subsequently applied by the ECtHR in a number of cases concerning the right 
                                                 
63 ibid para 116. 
64 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Angela González 
Carreño v Spain (47/2012) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 (16 July 2014). 




to life.66 A recent case is that of Özel and Others v Turkey,67 which involved 
the death of several individuals after the collapse of their apartment buildings 
following an earthquake. It emerged that the buildings had not been built in 
full compliance with special regulations that applied because of the ‘high risk 
zone’ in which the buildings were placed. At the national level, two 
employees of the construction company that had built the buildings were 
convicted under criminal law, whilst no prosecution of government officials 
that had failed to enforce the relevant regulations were authorised.68 
Assessing the applicant’s claim under Article 2 ECHR, the ECtHR re-
examined the scope and application of positive obligations under the right to 
life. Reiterating its findings in Budayeva and Others v Russia,69 the Court 
stated that the obligation  
not only to refrain from intentionally causing deaths but also to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their 
jurisdiction… must be construed as applying in the context of any 
activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake, 
but it also applies where the right to life is threatened by a natural 
disaster.70  
This makes it clear that the Court (still) understands positive obligations to 
                                                 
66 See e.g. Denizci and Others v Cyprus, App Nos. 25316-25321/94 and 27207/95 (23 May 
2001); Kontrová v Slovakia, App No. 7510/04 (31 May 2007); Yasa v Turkey, App No. 
63/1997/847/1054 (2 September 1998). Ziemele (n 16) 15, further notes that in several cases 
against Turkey, the ECtHR has applied the crtieria from the Osman case where the risk to an 
individual’s life came from an unkown person. See Mahmut Kaya v Turkey, App No. 
22535/93 (28 March 2000); Akkoç v Turkey, App Nos. 22947 and 8/93 (10 October 2000); 
and Killiç v Turkey, App No. 22492/93 (2000). Akandji-Kombe (n 59) 26 also briefly 
mentions in this context the cases of Çakici v Turkey, App No. 23657/94 (8 July 1999); and 
Tanrıkulu v Turkey, App No. 23763/94 (8 July 1999). 
67 Özel and Others v Turkey, App Nos. 14350/05, 15245/05 and 16051/05 (17 November 
2015). 
68 See for discussion Lieselot Verdonck, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights evaded 
the Business and Human Rights Debate in Özel v. Turkey’ (2016) 2(1) Turkish Commercial 
Law Review 111, 113. 
69 Budayeva and Others v Russia, App No. 15339/02 (30 March 2007). 
70 Özel and Others v Turkey (n 67) para 170 [emphasis added]. See also Verdonck (n 68) 113. 
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be applicable vis-à-vis non-State actors and during natural disasters, which 
by their nature fall outside the full control of the State. In finding a violation 
of the procedural aspect of Article 2 ECHR (declaring the substantive aspect 
inadmissible) the Court upheld that States should ‘preven[t] any appearance 
of tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts’,71 which required them to 
‘establish the circumstances in which the disaster occurred, investigate 
whether there were deficiencies in (the implementation of) the regulatory 
framework, and identify all state actors who may be implicated in the chain 
of events.’72 These obligations seem to correspond with the duty of due 
diligence upheld by the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies at the 
international level, at least with regards to investigative obligations. 
Similar (arguably due diligence) standards have also been applied by 
the ECtHR in the context of the prohibition of torture under Article 3 ECHR. 
For example, in the case of Z. and Others v United Kingdom, the Court 
referred to Osman v United Kingdom when it stated that the measures 
required by the State to comply with its positive obligation to protect 
individuals from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment by non-State 
actors (held to be an obligation in itself in the case of A. and Others v United 
Kingdom at around the same time as the Osman case73) ‘include reasonable 
steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have 
had knowledge’.74 This standard seems to mirror that of foreseeability 
discussed in relation to due diligence in Chapter 1 and seen in Chapter 5 of 
the present book in the practice of the UN CteeESCR.  
Finally, the case of llascu and Others v Moldova and Russia75 
deserves some consideration. Although this case did not deal directly with 
the question of horizontal effect, nor even involve a non-State actor that had 
interfered with individuals’ rights, the findings of the Court could be used to 
                                                 
71 Özel and Others v Turkey (n 67) para 189. 
72 Verdonck (n 68) 113. 
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argue for the application of indirect horizontal effect. The case dealt with a 
situation that occurred in the Transdniestria, which although being in 
Moldovan territory was under de facto control of Russia. Despite not having 
effective control over the territory, the Court held Moldova to an obligation 
to take all appropriate measures ‘still within its power to take’.76 The Court 
further concluded that ‘where a Contracting State is prevented from 
exercising its authority over the whole of its territory by a constraining de 
facto situation…it does not thereby cease to have jurisdiction’, and the State 
‘must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it…to 
continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights’.77 As well as applying in 
situations of occupation or control by another State, this could also apply to 
situations where a particularly powerful non-State actor (such as a non-State 
armed group) has taken control over an area of a State’s territory. It could 
therefore be argued that the ECHR would require States to continue to uphold 
and fulfil their duty of due diligence in such situations.  
On limited occasions, the ECtHR has looked at horizontal effect 
outside of the context of positive obligations. This occurred in the case of Pla 
and Puncernau v Andorra which concerned the State’s interpretation of a will 
(a typically private act and regulated by private law) concerning an estate.78 
The national court had, in its interpretation of the will, distinguished between 
adopted and biological children, despite no distinction having been made by 
the testatrix. The testatrix herself had required that her son, ‘future heir to the 
estate must leave it to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage’.79 
However, the result of the national court’s interpretation of the will was that 
the adopted son of the original heir, who had been left the estate by his late 
father, was barred from inheriting the estate. In its assessment of the case, the 
ECtHR opined that while ‘in theory’ it is not for the Court to settle purely 
private disputes, when a national court interprets a legal act (of whatever 
                                                 
76 ibid para 313. 
77 Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia (n 75) para 333. 
78 Pla and Puncernau v Andorra (n 16). 
79 ibid para 12. 
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nature) in a way that is ‘blatantly inconsistent with the prohibition of 
discrimination as established by Article 14 and more broadly with the 
principles underlying the Convention’, the Court could not ‘remain 
passive’.80 As such, the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together 
with Article 8 ECHR. 
According to Cherednychenko, the ECtHR’s approach of assessing 
the national court’s interpretation of the will must be distinguished from an 
approach of ‘horizontal effect’ per se, which would involve the Court 
considering whether private parties are able to discriminate in their wills and 
whether a State would violate the ECHR by upholding a discriminatory 
will.81 In other words, if the case were to involve horizontal effect as such, it 
would have involved a ruling of the ECtHR as to the obligations of the State 
‘either to prohibit or refuse to give effect to private action which interfered 
with’ an individual’s ECHR rights.82 This is the question that dissenting 
Jugde Garlicki argued to be at stake in the case,83 and as Cherednychenko 
correctly underlines, would bring the case within the scope of State’s positive 
obligations vis-à-vis non-State actors. Although Cherednychenko does not 
seem to categorise this case as one of horizontal effect, she does consider it 
an example of how the ECHR, through the Court’s review of a State’s 
national (private law) decision, influence the relationship between private 
parties.84 The effect of this approach is somewhat similar to that taken by the 
national courts in private law disputes in the United Kingdom, which will be 
                                                 
80 Pla and Puncernau v Andorra (n 16) para 46, cited by Cherednychenko, ‘Towards the 
Control of Private Acts by the European Court of Human Rights?’ (n 9) 205; and Ziemele (n 
16) 20. 
81 Cherednychenko, ‘Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of Human 
Rights?’ (n 9) 205. 
82 ibid 206. 
83 Indeed, Judge Garlicki explicitly used the term ‘horizontal effect’ in his argument, stating 
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effect, i.e. an effect prohibiting private parties from taking action which interferes with the 
rights and liberties of other private parties.’ Pla and Puncernau v Andorra (n 16) Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Garlicki. 
84 Cherednychenko, ‘Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of Human 




discussed in Chapter 7. 
Without wishing to categorise the types of horizontal effect found in 
the ECtHR’s practice at this stage, a comment must be made regarding the 
legal bases that the Court uses for applying the ECHR in cases concerning 
human rights interference by non-State actors. As with the UN human rights 
treaty monitoring bodies at the international level, the legal source and basis 
for the ECtHR to apply the ECHR in cases concerning non-State actors is a 
matter for discussion. Akandji-Kombe points out that in the context of 
positive obligations the Court has used a combination of individual 
substantive provisions in the ECHR together with Article 1 ECHR as the 
basis for applying the Convention in cases of horizontal effect.85 Article 1 
ECHR provides that: ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention.’86 Akandji-Kombe further observes that the use of Article 1 as 
a basis has allowed the ECtHR to apply (at least the procedural element of) 
the doctrine of positive obligations to cases concerning all rights in the 
Convention (as opposed to only those in provisions such as Article 2(1) 
which already include positive obligations).87 However, Cherednychenko has 
                                                 
85 Akandji-Kombe (n 59) 8. 
86 Emphasis added. Cherednychenko observes that scholars such as David Harris, Michael 
O’Boyle, Colin Warbrick and Andrew Drzemczewski hold this view, which can be seen in 
the case of Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (n 29). See Cherednychenko, 
‘Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of Human Rights?’ (n 9) 200, 
citing David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Colin Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Butterworths 1995) 19-22; and Andrew Drzemczewski, ‘The European 
Human Rights Convention and Relations between Private Parties’ (1979) 2 Netherlands 
International Law Review 163, 176-177. 
87 ibid. Article 2(1) ECHR states that ‘[e]veryone’s life shall be protected by law’ and has 
been regarded as comprising a positive obligation, e.g. in the case of Osman v United Kingdom 
(n 58). Originally, the Court used different bases depending on whether it was imposing 
substantive or procedural obligations on the State vis-à-vis the actions of a non-State actor. 
Substantive obligations are those ‘basic measures needed for full enjoyment of the rights 
guaranteed’ in the legislation, for example ‘laying down proper rules governing intervention 
by the police, prohibiting ill-treatment or forced labour, equipping prisons’ etc. The basis for 
substantive positive obligations was initially the provision containing the right itself. 
Procedural obligations, however, are those that ‘call for the organisation of domestic 
procedures to ensure better protection of peoples’ (e.g. obligations to investigate, as seen in 
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highlighted that other possible bases that have been put forward are Article 
17 ECHR regarding the prohibition on the abuse of rights (as discussed in 
Chapter 3) and Article 13 ECHR, which contains the right to an effective 
remedy in the event that an individual’s rights are violated.88  
 Overall, the practice of the ECtHR shows that it is very willing to 
apply some degree of horizontal effect. The specific type used will be 
explained and discussed in Chapter 8, but it is interesting to note here that the 
Court seems to rely almost exclusively on the positive obligations of States 
to impose standards of behaviour on non-State actors. Because of the focus 
on the State, the same issue arises as at the international level – that although 
it is clear from the jurisprudence that States must act to regulate the activities 
of non-State actors and take measures to prevent them from interfering with 
the rights of others, the actual behaviour of non-State actors regarding human 
rights is less clear. The focus on State obligations is certainly valid in the light 
of the European human rights law framework, but the Court has been 
criticised for not engaging with the discussion of (for example) business and 
human rights in recent cases such as Özel and Others v Turkey. Lieselot 
Verdonck, for instance, considers the case to be a missed opportunity for the 
Court to discuss whether it is possible for businesses to violate human rights 
and how domestic courts could or should enforce corporate accountability.89 
While the opinion of an institution such as the Court on this matter would 
certainly be welcome and would carry a certain authority, Verdonck herself 
notes that ‘from a legal point of view’ the Court’s State-oriented approach is 
appropriate.90 To require more of the Court in this respect within its 
judgments could expect it to go beyond the confines of its mandate. We 
                                                 
many cases concerning the right to life and the prohibition of torture). The basis for procedural 
obligations has been the individual provisions taken together with Article 1 ECHR. Most 
recently, Akandji-Kombe has identified a trend of the ECtHR to ‘infer positive obligations 
from a combination of standard-setting provisions and the general principle of “the rule of 
law” or “state governed by the rule of law”’. See Akandji-Kombe (n 59) 8, 9 and 16. 
88 Cherednychenko, ‘Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of Human 
Rights?’ (n 9) 200. 





therefore come across the same obstacle as in Chapter 5 with regards the 
limits of the application and discussion of horizontal effect by human rights 
adjudicatory bodies. 
6.2.3 The Council of Europe human rights system: scholarly works 
One of the most substantive analyses of horizontal effect in the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR can be found in Andrew Clapham’s book entitled Non-State 
Actors and Human Rights Obligations.91 His chapter on the regional systems 
consists of a 90-page analysis of the horizontal effect in the case law of the 
ECtHR, and the Inter-American and African systems more broadly. Clapham 
makes some extremely interesting observations regarding the potential of the 
ECHR to create new obligations for non-State actors. In particular, he notes 
that although it is not possible for individuals to file a complaint against 
another non-State actor before the Court, it is possible for the ECHR to be 
applied with direct horizontal effect at the national level, by national judges.92 
                                                 
91 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (n 28). For further examples, see 
Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European Fundamental Rights and Private Law: The Dutch System 
in the Context of Different Legal Families’ in Bettina Heiderhoff, Sebastian Lohsse and 
Reiner Schulze (eds), EU-Grundrechte und Privatrecht: EU Fundamental Rights and Private 
Law (Nomos 2016); and Olha Cherednychenko, ‘The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Dutch 
Private Law: Revolution or Evolution?’ in Verica Trstenjak and Petra Weingerl (eds), The 
Influence of Human Rights and Basic Rights in Private Law, Ius Comparatum - Global Studies 
in Comparative Law; Vol. 15 (Springer 2016). 
92 This happens in countries that follow the monist theory for incorporating international law 
into a domestic legal order, such as the Netherlands and France. Article 93 of the Constitution 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2002, for example, provides that treaties and decisions of 
international organisations that are binding become legally binding within the Netherlands 
after their publication. For a discussion of the way in which horizontal effect is applied in the 
Netherlands, and a discussion of the horizontal effect of human rights in different national 
legal systems, see Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and 
Judicial Governance’ in Hans Micklitz (ed) Constitutionalization of European Private Law 
(Oxford University Press 2014); Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European Fundamental Rights and Private 
Law’ (n 91); and Olha Cherednychenko, ‘The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Dutch Private 
Law: Revolution or Evolution?’ (n 91). For a discussion of the situation in France, see Frédéric 
Sudré, ‘Les “obligations positives” dans la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l’homme’ 
in Paul Mahoney and others (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective – 
Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns 2000) 1369, quoted in Clapham, Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (n 28) 349. In contrast, in countries such as the United 
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This depends on the extent to which a particular State has integrated the 
ECHR into its domestic legal order, and touches upon a huge field of 
academic studies into the horizontal effect of human rights within national 
legal systems, and in particular private law cases.93 An example of horizontal 
effect of the ECHR in national legal systems (the United Kingdom) will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  
In his examination of the application of the ECHR by the ECtHR 
itself, Clapham takes a right-by-right approach, looking at the way in which 
the Court has applied some degree of horizontal effect in relation to each 
substantive article of the Convention. Through his analysis, Clapham 
identifies three different applications of horizontal effect by the ECtHR. First, 
he finds that the ECtHR has sometimes refrained from separating those 
violations of the Convention that are the direct responsibility of the State (i.e. 
with a direct link to State action) and those occurring as a result of the State 
neglecting to protect individuals from the harmful actions of non-State actors 
(i.e. fulfilling the obligation to protect).94 This was discussed in relation to 
the case of Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom in Section 6.2.2.  
Second, under States’ positive obligation to protect human rights, 
Clapham identifies and examined the balancing of individuals’ rights against 
each other by regional human rights courts, introduced in Chapter 3 of the 
present book and discussed in Section 6.2.2 above. Again, this dovetails the 
large amount of literature on horizontal effect in domestic private law 
throughout Europe.  
Finally, Clapham identifies that the ECtHR has applied horizontal 
effect with regard to the right to an effective remedy protected by Article 13, 
                                                 
Kingdom which take a dualist approach international law must be incorporated into the 
national legal system through domestic legislation. The approach of the United Kingdom will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of the present book. 
93 See e.g. Hans Micklitz (ed), The Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford 
University Press 2014); Olha Cherednychenko, ‘Fundamental Rights and Private Law: A 
Relationship of Subordination or Complementarity?’ (2007) 3(2) Utrecht Law Review 1; 
Mark Tushnet, ‘The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional 
Law’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 79. 




even if a threat to the right was caused by a non-State actor (as was the case 
in Hatton and Others v United Kingdom and Costello-Roberts v United 
Kingdom).95 It is therefore clear from Clapham’s chapter that he believes 
there to be three different strands of indirect horizontal effect within the case 
law of the ECtHR, although he does not label these strands, as other authors 
have done and as will be done in Chapter 8 of the present book.  
Another significant analysis of the ECtHR’s case law concerning 
private actors has been conducted by Jean-François Akandji-Kombe.96 The 
analysis, like Clapham’s, takes a thematic approach and addresses case law 
concerning a wide range of rights protected by the Council of Europe’s 
human rights legislation. However, Akandji-Kombe starts from the 
perspective of ‘positive obligations’ within the European human rights 
system, rather than horizontal effect per se. Thus, although he indeed 
examines the ‘horizontal effect’ of human rights within the ECtHR’s case 
law and his study contributes to literature on horizontal effect, the focus of 
the study is not actually on the application of the ECHR between private 
parties, but on positive obligations regarding State actors as well.  
6.3 Examples of horizontal effect of international human rights in the 
African human rights system  
The African system for the protection of human rights exists as part of the 
African Union. The rights protected by the system can be found in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) as well as several other 
human rights instruments.97 The bodies responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the ACHPR are the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which 
may both hear individual communications against States.98  
                                                 
95 Hatton and Others v United Kingdom, App No. 36022/97 (8 July 2003); and Costello 
Roberts v United Kingdom (n 10)see Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-
Actors (n 28) 420. 
96 Akandji-Kombe (n 59). 
97 For a list of the relevant instruments, see African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, ‘Legal Instruments’ <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/> accessed 31 August 2017. 
98 See respectively African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”) 
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6.3.1 The African human rights system: legislation  
The ACHPR directly specifies certain duties for individuals.99 Similar to 
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides that 
‘[e]veryone has duties to the community’ (see Chapter 4 of this book), some 
of the duties proposed by the ACHPR are predominantly owed by individuals 
towards their community. Unlike the UDHR, however, Articles 27-29 
ACHPR detail duties to be owed by individuals to specific members of 
society (namely their parents and families) as well as the State itself.  
Article 27 lays down the very fact that individuals are subject to duties 
under the Charter, with Articles 28 and 29 offering more detail on the precise 
behaviour expected. Article 28 focuses on non-discrimination, stating that 
‘[e]very individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow 
beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, 
safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.’ Although more 
specific than Article 27, this duty still remains vague and subject to 
interpretation. Article 29 can be said to contain the most concrete duties for 
individuals, listing the following eight duties: 
 1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work 
for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all 
times, to maintain them in case of need;  
2. To serve his national community by placing his physical and 
intellectual abilities at its service; 
3. Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or 
resident he is; 
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly 
when the latter is threatened;  
5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the 
                                                 
(adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 
58; and Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights (adopted 10 June 1998, entered into force 





territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its defense in 
accordance with the law;  
6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes 
imposed by law in the interest of the society;  
7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his 
relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, 
dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion 
of the moral well being of society;  
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, 
to the promotion and achievement of African unity.  
Although fairly extensive, the duties are imposed by Articles 27-29 
have a limited impact. As with any human rights treaty, only States can 
become party to the ACHPR and only States may be the subject of complaints 
before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This means that in 
practice, it would not create a benefit for individuals so much as for the State 
itself – the fact that a State has ratified the ACHPR may allow it, at the 
national level, to rely on non-compliance with Articles 27-29 to limit the 
enjoyment of an individual’s rights under the same instrument. This is 
particularly evident in light of Article 27(2), which provides that ‘[t]he rights 
and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the 
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’ This 
provision is commonly referred to as a ‘clawback clause’, allowing State 
Parties to claw back the protection of human rights and shirk some of their 
own duties by shifting the burden onto individuals.100 In light of the lack of a 
‘legitimate limitations’ clause in the Charter, as is found in other regional and 
international human rights instruments, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights has sought to place restrictions on States’ use of Article 
27. The Commission has invoked its authority (under Article 60 ACHPR) to 
                                                 
100 Christof Heyns, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: In Need of Reform?’ (2001) 
1(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 155. 
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‘draw inspiration’ from general international human rights law.101 In doing 
so, it has proclaimed that the rights in the Charter may only be limited for the 
‘legitimate’ reason of protecting a State interest, and that such limitations 
must at all times remain proportional and be restricted to what is ‘absolutely 
necessary for the advantages’ at stake.102 
 As John H Knox has commented, it is likely that State Parties to the 
treaty endorsed the idea of converse duties for individuals in order to place 
greater limitations on the enjoyment of rights, to prevent individuals 
exercising rights in a way that could make a national government feel 
threatened.103 Given the object of some of the duties, it is possible to argue 
that the ACHPR does not in fact allow for such a great deal of horizontal 
effect of human rights as one may assume. As with the vertical (State) duties 
in the ACHPR, the duties that are owed by individuals to the State, or to a 
community or society as a whole, could not be directly invoked against an 
individual (or another State actor interfering with human rights). This is 
because under the African human rights system (as with the other regional 
and international systems), only States can be the subject of complaints of 
alleged violations of the ACHPR, either before the African Commission on 
Human Rights or the African Court of Human Rights.104 This means that in 
effect, whatever impact Articles 27-29 have, and how compliance with the 
duties of individuals is monitored, will be a decision for States at the national 
level.  
                                                 
101 John H Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102(1) The American Journal of 
International Law 1, 17. 
102 Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, Communication Nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96 (31 
October 1998) paras 66-70. 
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6.3.2 The African human rights system: jurisprudence 
A landmark case concerning horizontal effect of human rights is that of The 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria (the Ogoni case).105 The case drew much attention 
across the globe, the facts resulting in cases being brought in two other 
(national) jurisdictions (namely the United States and the Netherlands).106 
One of the reasons for the publicity behind the cases is that the interferences 
with the applicants’ human rights were done by the National Nigerian 
Petroleum Company, the majority shareholder in a consortium with Shell 
Petroleum Development Corporation. The Ogoni case was the first time that 
a case concerning a major multinational corporation (Shell) had been brought 
before a regional or international human rights monitoring body. The claims 
brought against the Nigerian Government accused the military government 
of being directly involved in and failing to protect the indigenous people of 
Ogoniland from the harmful actions of the corporations.107 The harm incurred 
included ‘skin infections, gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, and 
increased risk of cancers, and neurological and reproductive problems’ 
caused by contaminated water, soil and air as a consequence of the 
corporations ‘exploit[ing] oil reserves in Ogoniland with no regard for the 
health or environment of the local communities, [and] disposing toxic wastes 
into the environment and local waterways. The applicants alleged that the 
government had ‘condoned and facilitated’ the actions as it allowed the 
corporations to make use of Nigerian legal and military powers and failed to 
regulate the corporations’ activities.108 A second claim by the applicant 
alleged that further harm was then caused by violent attacks on the Ogoni 
people, who had challenged the corporations through a non-violent 
                                                 
105 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v Nigeria, Communication No.155/96 (27 October 2001). 
106 Including cases at the US Supreme Court of the United States, Kiobel et al. v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum et al, Case No. 10-1491 (2013); and the Netherlands, Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell, 
LJN BY9854, C/09/337050 HA ZA 09-1580. 
107 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v Nigeria (n 105) para 1. 
108 ibid para 3. 
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campaign. The attacks, conducted with weapons and armoured tanks, 
involved some Ogoni people being killed, and left thousands of people 
homeless.109  
In its decision, the Commission took an ‘obligations’ approach which 
can be likened to the tripartite typology of human rights,110 although going 
slightly further to envisage four types of obligations (seeing the obligation to 
promote as a distinct obligation from the obligation to fulfil).111 Those issues 
regarding the actions of the corporations were dealt with under the rubric of 
the ‘obligation to protect’, which the Commission understood as ‘generally 
entail[ing] the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere or framework by 
an effective interplay of laws and regulations so that individuals will be able 
to freely realize their rights and freedoms.’112 In explaining this obligation in 
more detail, the Commission relied on the cases of Velásquez Rodriguez 
before the IACtHR113 (see Section 6.4.2) and X and Y v The Netherlands 
before the ECtHR. In particular, the Commission noted that pursuant to these 
cases the obligation to protect human rights obligates States to prevent 
individuals from ‘act[ing] freely and with impunity to the detriment’ of 
human rights, and ‘to take steps to make sure that the enjoyment of the rights 
is not interfered with by any other private person.’114 Applying these 
standards to the actions of Nigeria and the NPPC Shell consortium, the 
Commission held that ‘the Nigerian Government has given the green light to 
private actors, and the oil companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the 
well-being of the Ogonis’ and had therefore violated Article 21 ACHPR 
providing individuals a right to ‘freely dispose of their wealth and natural 
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110 This was done by, for example, Fons Coomans in his discussion of the Ogoni case. Fons 
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resources’.115 Beyond this, however, the Commission did not elaborate how 
precisely the Nigerian government should have acted. Although it referred to 
the applicants’ argument that the government had ‘did not monitor or regulate 
the operations of the oil companies and in so doing paved a way for the Oil 
Consortiums to exploit oil reserves in Ogoniland’, the Commission did not 
go so far as to say that the obligation to protect human rights includes a duty 
to regulate private companies (unlike the IACtHR and ECtHR). Perhaps, 
because the violation of the obligation to protect was so clearly caused by the 
government’s facilitation of the oil companies (the government thus being 
more directly involved in the actions interfering with the enjoyment of human 
rights) the Commission did not feel the need to look at the issue of regulation 
in relation to Article 21. Indeed, those cases of the IACtHR and ECtHR 
regarding the obligation to regulate deal more with cases where the State has 
taken a slightly laxer approach, failing to take action to supervise private 
bodies, rather than situations where the State is actively contributing to the 
actions of the private actor (even though in the first cases the State knew or 
should have known about the risk of harm to individuals).  
With regards to the applicants’ other complaints, the Commission was 
more direct about interference with rights by non-State actors. For example, 
the Commission explicitly mentioned human rights interference by non-State 
actors when discussing the applicants’ rights to housing, food and life.116 
Significantly, the Commission stated that ‘wide spread violations perpetrated 
by the Government of Nigeria and by private actors’ had led to a violation of 
the right to life,117 suggesting that the Commission believes private actors to 
be capable of violating, as well as interfering with, human rights. Tying its 
findings together in a conclusive recommendation, the Commission focused 
again on the State’s obligation to protect and suggested that Nigeria 
undertake ‘appropriate environmental and social impact assessments’ by 
                                                 
115 Article 21(1) ACHPR. 
116 See Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (n 28) 434-435. 
117 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v Nigeria (n 105) para 67, emphasis added. Cited in Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State-Actors (n 28) 435. 
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‘effective and independent oversight bodies’ which should guarantee the safe 
operation of future oil development.118 It further urged Nigeria to ‘provid[e] 
information on health and environmental risks and meaningful access to 
regulatory and decision-making bodies’.119 The conclusions reached by the 
Commission as to the actions that should be taken to protect individuals from 
the harm caused by the Consortium is thus comparable to the conclusions of 
the ECtHR and IACtHR regarding the obligation to regulate, although did 
not frame its conclusions as such.  
The findings of the Commission in the Ogoni case also, as Fons Coomans 
has highlighted, reveal a lack of due diligence of the Nigerian State, although 
the Commission did not use this language itself.120 Implying how the 
Commission’s approach fits into this duty (due diligence) and the conceptual 
framework of the tripartite typology is very helpful in allowing the reader to 
see how the Commission’s approach generally fits with that of other 
international and regional bodies. This shows, as Clapham also emphasises, 
that the degree of horizontal effect within a regional human rights system 
does not necessarily depend on the language of the relevant regional human 
rights treaties or the extent to which human rights obligations/duties for non-
State actors appear to be incorporated into them.121  
Regarding the Commission’s discussion of Article 21 ACHPR, it 
could be said that the horizontal effect is not as evident as in the cases before 
the other regional human rights monitoring bodies (or even as in the 
discussion of the rights to housing, food and life in the same case), as it was 
not as clear that the human rights interferences were caused by an actor that 
could not normally be attributed to the State. Nonetheless, the Commission 
was explicit in its treatment of the Consortium’s actions under the rights to 
food, housing and life, and consistently relied on the State obligations theory. 
Taken as a whole, the case is a good example of how the African Commission 
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views the role of the State in protecting (and indeed also preventing) human 
rights violations caused by non-State actors. Additionally, the widespread 
attention attracted by the case brought a wide condemnation of the Shell 
Corporation and an increased awareness of the importance of monitoring the 
actions of multinational corporations and the impact of their operations on 
human rights. 
6.3.3 The African human rights system: scholarly works 
The African human rights system has been the subject of much academic 
literature, which often discusses the inclusion of duties within the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.122 However, an in-depth analysis of 
the horizontal effect of human rights in the system has not been undertaken 
by many scholars, as focus is generally placed on the Ogoni case, discussed 
above.  
One scholar that has contributed to the debate on horizontal effect has 
done so through the lens of the ‘public-private divide’. In her book examining 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Rachel Murray 
discusses the way in which traditionally, international human rights law has 
distinguished public (State) actors from private (non-State) actors.123 She 
deems this dichotomy to be inappropriate in the African context, in which 
‘the notion of a state does not, to the same extent, presume such a 
dichotomy’.124 Murray suggests that this may have stemmed from the pre-
colonial structure in African States, which did not distinguish between 
                                                 
122 See e.g. Kofi Quashigah, ‘Scope of Individual Duties in the African Charter’ in Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo, The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years After the African Charter 
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individuals and the State, but rather emphasised the community.125 Even now, 
the importance of the community can be seen reflected in the duties included 
in the ACHPR, which, as shown above, are owed predominantly to the 
community (or to the State) rather than necessarily to other individuals. 
Murray suggests that because of this lack of focus on the dichotomy by the 
African system, it ‘may take into account a wider range of violations 
involving non-state actors.’126 Clapham, who has undertaken a review of the 
practice of the African Commission vis-à-vis horizontal effect, has discussed 
how this has come to play out in practice.127 His findings, however, do not 
show that the Commission has placed any more emphasis on the actions of 
non-State actors than the other regional systems. One significant finding 
(although Clapham does not flag this as such) is that the Commission does, 
in one instance, frame the actions of a non-State actor as a ‘violation’ of 
human rights rather than an interference.128 Nonetheless, in light of the 
discussion of the Ogoni case, it does not appear that either the text of the 
ACHPR itself nor the practice of the monitoring bodies within the African 
system have led to an increased level of horizontal effect within the African 
human rights system, compared to that within the other regional systems 
discussed in the present chapter. This supports the finding in Section 6.3.2 
that the extent to which horizontal effect is applied within a regional system 
does not necessarily depend on the inclusion of duties for non-State actors 
within the system’s human rights instruments. 
6.4 Examples of horizontal effect of international human rights in the 
Inter-American human rights system  
The Inter-American human rights system exists within the umbrella body of 
the Organization of American States (OAS). The rights protected by the 
system can be found in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
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of Man (ADHR)129 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR 
– the legally binding human rights treaty under the Inter-American 
system),130 as well as several more specialised instruments.131 
Implementation of rights protected under the Inter-American human rights 
system is monitored by both the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the IACtHR.  
6.4.1 The Inter-American human rights system: legislation 
The Inter-American human rights system explicitly refers to human rights 
duties for individuals in legal instruments, providing more extensive 
individual duties than the ACHPR. The ADHR contains in its preamble the 
rationale behind individual duties and the relationship between individuals’ 
rights and duties: ‘[t]he fulfillment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite 
to the rights of all. Rights and duties are interrelated in every social and 
political activity of man. While rights exalt individual liberty, duties express 
the dignity of that liberty.’ Chapter 2 ADHR contains a list of ten duties owed 
by individuals, some of which correspond to the rights laid down in Chapter 
1. For example, Article XII, in Chapter 1, provides a right to education, 
whereas Article XXXI, in Chapter 2, stipulates a duty to ‘receive instruction’, 
which is equated in the provision to a duty to ‘acquire at least an elementary 
education.’132 This appears to place an obligation on individuals to exercise 
the right to education.133 Other duties in Chapter 2 ADHR are owed more 
clearly to the State, community or society as a whole, much in the same way 
as those duties in the ACHPR. Similar to the ACHPR duties, then, it may not 
be possible to say that the ADHR actually includes direct horizontal effect, 
as presumably the duties owed to society cannot be claimed by a single 
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individual. Knox suggests that (as he identified with the duties in the 
ACHPR), most of the duties in the ADHR are intended to be used more as 
limitations on the enjoyment of individuals’ rights, most relevant in situations 
of conflict between two individuals’ rights. This is also reminiscent of the 
‘balancing’ of individuals’ rights through legitimate limitations discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this book. This connection between duties and the limitation of 
human rights within the ADHR is also evidenced by the fact that Article 
XXVIII (the ADHR’s ‘limitations clause’) is placed directly before the list of 
duties.134  
 Again, as with the ACHPR, the potential consequence of the duties in 
the ADHR for the horizontal effect of human rights has to be considered with 
some degree of caution, due to the fact that, firstly, the Declaration itself is 
not a legally binding treaty. However, this may not have as significant an 
effect on the application of the Declaration as may be expected. The fact that 
the Declaration does not have the status of a legal treaty has not prevented 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from applying it as a ‘the relevant 
text for assessing human rights within the OAS member states’,135 reflected 
in the Court’s assertion in an advisory opinion in 1989 that ‘for the member 
states of the Organization, the Declaration is the text that define the human 
rights referred to in the Charter.’136 Indeed, the Court also emphasised in the 
advisory opinion that the ADHR has been ‘repeatedly recognized’ by the 
OAS General Assembly as a source of international obligations for OAS 
Member States and that its lack of status as a treaty cannot be equated to a 
lack of legal effect.137 Further, Article 29(d) American Convention on Human 
                                                 
134 ibid. 
135 See Dinah Shelton, ‘The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
(1994) 10(1) American University International Law Review 333, 353. 
136 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the 
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-10189, IACHR (Ser. A) No. 10 (14 July 1989) para 45. 
137 ibid paras 42 and 47, cited in Hurst Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration 
Human Rights in National and International Law’ (1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 287, 339. These findings have led the Inter-American Commission on 




Rights states that ‘[n]o provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as 
excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man…may have’.138 This opens the way for the duties 
contained in the Declaration to be incorporated into interpretations of the 
Convention, especially of Article 32(1), which provides that ‘[e]veryone has 
responsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind’.139 
 The second reason for taking a cautious approach was also applicable 
for the ACHPR – the duties are listed for individuals, but only States can be 
the subject of the individual complaints procedure within the Inter-American 
human rights system. This means that any legal effect of the duties would be 
afforded through domestic, rather than international mechanisms. It also 
means that the only non-State actors that could be considered as having 
human rights duties under the ADHR are individuals, thereby excluding 
duties for actors such as corporations or non-governmental organisations.  
 It appears from the text of the ADHR and the ACHPR that at least two 
regional human rights systems have been more embracing of duties for non-
State actors than the international human rights system. The Inter-American 
Court of Human rights also seems to have been quite creative in its 
interpretation of regional instruments to extend the purview of human rights 
protection.  
6.4.2 The Inter-American human rights system: jurisprudence 
As noted above, although the ADHR is not a legally binding treaty (as 
opposed to the ACHR), where an OAS Member State has not ratified the 
                                                 
same case, and to go so far as to interpret the ADHR with reference to the Convention, which 
has not been ratified by all OAS Member States. This ‘incorporation’ of a binding treaty into 
a non-binding declaration has the effect of binding States to treaty provisions without their 
consent, going against fundamental rules within the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. See Christina M Cerna, ‘Reflections on the Normative Status of the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man’ <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r31598.pdf> 
accessed 4 January 2018. 
138 See for discussion Douglas Hodgson, Individual Duty Within a Human Rights Discourse 
(Routledge 2016) 108. 
139 ibid. 
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ACHR, the Court and the Commission have not shied away from holding that 
State to the standards contained in the ADHR. Since the start of its operations, 
the Inter-American system has provided some landmark cases concerning 
horizontal effect, which have been influential within other regional 
systems.140  
The most well-known case regarding horizontal effect of human 
rights law decided within the Inter-American human rights system is arguably 
that of Velásquez Rodriguez v Honduras, which was actually the first case 
ever heard by the Court.141 The case took place in a more widespread situation 
of enforced disappearances within Honduras. The applicant argued that the 
right to life of Mr. Velásquez Rodriguez, who had been disappeared for seven 
years, had been violated by the State. During the seven years, his body had 
never been found, which led the Court to presume that he was no longer alive. 
Considering Honduras’ obligation under the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the Court found that the provision to ‘ensure to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise’ of the Convention rights 
requires States to ‘prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights’. 
This obligation, was explained as one of due diligence, which extends to the 
protection of rights from actions of private actors:  
[a]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a 
private person or because the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not 
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the 
Convention.142  
The Court went on to explain that due diligence, as explained in Chapter 1 of 
the present book, is an obligation of conduct rather than result. This means 
                                                 
140 E.g. the case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras (n 113) which was relied upon in the 
Ogoni case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
141 ibid. 




that the State does not necessarily have to succeed in preventing a violation, 
but that it must take ‘reasonable steps’ to do so, including of a ‘legal, political, 
administrative and cultural nature’.143 It is very interesting to see from the 
above quotation that the duty of due diligence is seen by the IACtHR as a 
duty of prevention, rather than necessarily of protection (as due diligence is 
viewed within international law more broadly).144 Indeed, although the Court 
did refer at times to protection, the obligation is clearly stated as one to 
‘prevent’ human rights violations from both State and non-State actors. The 
actor accused of being directly responsible for Mr. Velásquez Rodriguez was 
the Honduras armed forces, clearly a State actor. Nonetheless, the Court 
explained how, if it had been a non-State actor that was directly responsible, 
it would have been able to create a sufficient nexus between the perpetrator 
and the State to hold the State itself responsible. In doing so, it stated that 
‘[w]here the acts of private parties that violate the Convention are not 
seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by the government, 
thereby making the State responsible on the international plane.’145  
This reasoning by the IACtHR can be explained as one of attribution 
of actions by private actors to the State (i.e. the ‘State obligations theory’ 
explained in Chapter 3) and seems to correspond quite closely with the 
reasoning of the ECtHR in cases such as M. C. v Bulgaria, where the ECtHR 
considered an appropriate investigation by the State as a necessary 
requirement to establish that the State had protected the applicant’s rights. 
The IACtHR case has also been referenced (and followed) in more recent 
ECtHR cases, such as Bevacqua and S. v Bulgaria,146 and more substantially 
                                                 
143 ibid paras 175 and 174, respectively. 
144 See discussion on due diligence in Chapter 1.3.3. 
145 Velásquez Rodriguez v Honduras (n 113) para 177. 
146 Bevacqua and S. v Bulgaria, App No. 71127/01 (12 June 2008) para 53; Opuz v Turkey, 
App No. 33401/02 (9 June 2009) paras 83-84. See European Court of Human Rights, 
‘References to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Instruments in 
the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_inter_american_court_ENG.pdf> 
accessed 31 August 2017. 
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in Opuz v Turkey.147  
Within the Inter-American system, the findings in Velásquez 
Rodriguez regarding due diligence and non-State actors were not addressed 
until 2001, when the case of Maria da Penha v Brazil was decided by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.148 In this case, the applicant 
was a woman who had experienced severe domestic violence at the hands of 
her (then) husband, which led to her suffering from paraplegia.149 Despite 
repeatedly bringing the situation to the attention of the Brazilian authorities, 
the applicant alleged that the State ‘failed to take the effective measures 
required to prosecute and punish the aggressor’.150 Referring to an earlier 
report by the Commission regarding the human rights situation in Brazil, the 
applicant relied directly on the duty of due diligence as enunciated in the 
Velásquez Rodriguez case.151 The Commission agreed with the applicant, 
quoting the Court’s statement that ‘when the State allows private persons or 
groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights 
recognized by the Convention’ as well as Brazil’s obligation to act with due 
diligence to ‘prevent, investigate and punish’ human rights violations. The 
Commission ultimately found that ‘the domestic judicial decisions in this 
case reveal inefficiency, negligence, and failure to act on the part of the 
Brazilian judicial authorities and unjustified delay in the prosecution of the 
accused’ (who after 17 years, still had not been prosecuted). Although 
explicitly following the approach of Velásquez Rodriguez, the decision in 
Maria da Penha seems to focus more on the basis of a failure to punish the 
individual rather than a failure to sufficiently investigate the situation 
(although the obligation to punish individual perpetrators was also raised in 
Velásquez Rodriguez). Significantly, the application of the approach in 
Maria da Penha to a situation regarding the actions of a non-State actor can 
be seen as an application of indirect horizontal effect. 
                                                 
147 Opuz v Turkey (n 146). 
148 Maria da Penha v Brazil, IACHR Report No. 54/01, Case 12.051 (16 April 2001). 
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 A second significant case in which a degree of horizontal effect in a 
situation of domestic violence was applied is the case of Jessica Lenahan 
(Gonzales) v United States.152 The applicant was a mother who had a 
domestic violence restraining order against her estranged husband. The 
police in the US failed to enforce the order when requested by Ms. Gonzales, 
after which her three daughters were murdered by the husband. The 
Commission reiterated that although perpetrated by private actors, domestic 
violence ‘has been recognized at the international level as a human rights 
violation’.153 The judgment explains in detail how the obligation of due 
diligence relates to domestic violence against women, how this falls within 
the scope of the right to life, and that this was becoming a matter of consensus 
within international law.154 Citing case law of the ECtHR and the UN 
CteeEDAW, the Inter-American Commission placed much importance on 
situations where a State ‘knew of a situation of real and immediate risk’ 
regarding domestic violence, particularly where a State had already 
recognised that a women (and/or her children) was at risk, but failed to act 
diligently to take reasonable measures, i.e. those that would have a ‘a real 
prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm’.155 Interestingly, as 
seen with the ECtHR, the standard applied by the Inter-American 
Commission here is one of foresight, and the Commission actually referred 
(citing the case of Osman v United Kingdom, above) to the standards 
provided by the ECtHR, which includes that the State will be responsible if 
it ought to have known about the real and immediate risk.156 Applying this 
standard of due diligence to the present case, the Commission concluded that 
the State had not fulfilled its obligation of due diligence because, in particular 
through granting a restraining order, the US State had recognised that the 
women and her children were at risk of harm by the husband. Further, the 
police’s lack of action to implement and enforce the restraining order showed 
                                                 
152 Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, Report No. 80/11 Case 12.626 (21 July 2011). 
153 ibid para 111. 
154 ibid paras 122-134. 
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non-compliance with the duty to take reasonable measures to protect the 
children. The Commission therefore found a violation of the US’ obligation 
to protect victims from discrimination under Article 11 ADHR as well as the 
right to life under Article 1 ADHR. The indirect horizontal application of the 
rights, particularly regarding the right to life, was therefore similar in this 
case to that by the Court in previous cases.157 
Patricia Tarre Moser notes that in the Jessican Lenahan case and the 
case of Gonzales et al. v Mexico,158 among others, the IACtHR applied the 
‘theory of foreseeable risk’, which allows States to be held responsible for 
human rights interference caused by the actions of non-State actors provided 
that four elements have been fulfilled: ‘(1) There must be a situation of real 
and immediate risk, (2) this situation must threaten a specific individual or 
group, (3) the State must know or ought to have known of the risk, and (4) 
the State could have reasonably prevented or avoided the materialization of 
the risk.’159 As Moser further notes, the evolution of this theory and its 
application by the Court have ‘created a standard that States must meet and 
clarify as to what mechanisms should be in place to prevent domestic 
violence.’160 The theory, with its specific requirements and the way that the 
Court has applied it to concrete situations requiring particular action by 
States, goes further than other regional systems in detailing in which exact 
circumstances a State could be held responsible for human rights interference 
caused by non-State actors. 
Other significant cases decided within the Inter-American human 
rights protection system regarding horizontal effect concern the actions of 
companies rather than individuals. A good example is that of Ximenes-Lopes 
                                                 
157 The approach has been applied again in cases such as Gonzalez et al. v Mexico (In re Cotton 
Field), Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, IACHR (Ser. C) 
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see Patricia Tarre Moser, ‘Duty to Ensure Human Rights and Its Evolution in the Inter-
American System: Comparing Maria de Pengha v. Brazil with Jessica Lenagan (Gonzales) 
v. United States’ (2012) 21(2) Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 437. 
158 Gonzalez et al. v Mexico (In re Cotton Field) (n 157). 
159 Moser (n 157) 444-445. 




v Brazil, in which the non-State actor was a private psychiatric clinic.161 The 
applicant brought a case against the Brazilian State for failing to protect her 
brother, an individual with a psychiatric disorder who was admitted to the 
private clinic where he suffered inhuman and degrading treatment and 
ultimately died. The Commission applied a different reasoning from the 
above cases when determining that the acts of the private clinic could be 
attributed to the Brazilian State. The reasoning appears to match more closely 
that in Fadeyeva v Russia before the ECtHR, which involved a privatised 
company. In Ximenes-Lopes, the private clinic was providing a public service 
(healthcare). In its explanation of the applicable law to this case, the Court 
noted first that ‘States’ liability may also result from acts committed by 
private individuals which, in principle, are not attributable to the State’. It 
then extended the attributability of non-State actors’ actions to the State, 
holding that ‘a person or entity which, though not a state body, is authorized 
by the State legislation to exercise powers entailing the authority of the 
State…[s]uch conduct must be deemed to be an act by the State, inasmuch as 
such person acted in such capacity.’162 Applying this understanding to the 
case at hand, the Court stated that ‘health is a public interest the protection of 
which is a duty of the States’, meaning that ‘States must regulate and 
supervise all activities related to the health care given to the individuals under 
the jurisdiction thereof, as a special duty to protect life and personal integrity, 
regardless of the public or private nature of the entity giving such health 
care’163 – i.e. Brazil was under an obligation to regulate the private clinic. 
The wording here is interesting, as the Court suggests that although the 
private clinic remains a private actor, through its provision of a public service 
the clinic was a ‘private entit[y] acting in a State capacity’.164 The idea that 
human rights protection must be upheld in relation to (or even by) non-State 
actors carrying out public functions is also applied with the United Kingdom 
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through the Human Rights Act 1998 (see Chapter 7 of this book). 
Finally, the IACtHR has dealt with issues of the horizontal effect of 
human rights in advisory opinions. In an advisory opinion on the Juridical 
Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants,165 for example, the 
Court appears to treat illegal acts by non-State actors as violations of rights 
in themselves, without restricting the use of the term ‘violations’ to instances 
where the State has failed to ensure rights (as was discussed by Moser).166 
The Court opined, for instance, that as well as creating positive obligations 
for States vis-à-vis the actions of non-State actors (in situations where the 
non-State actor is under the ‘tolerance, acquiescence or negligence’ of the 
State),167 due to the erga omnes nature of the principle of non-discrimination 
‘the obligation to respect and ensure human rights…has effects on relations 
between individuals’,168 in particular on employers. This interpretation of the 
ACHR is very much reminiscent of the effect of Article 5 of the CERD (see 
Chapter 4). The notion in the advisory opinion that non-State actors are also 
capable of violating human rights goes against a popular point of view (and 
that adopted in this study) that since non-State actors cannot technically be 
bound by international legal instruments and there is no direct horizontal 
effect within international human rights law, it is not possible to say that non-
State actors themselves actually violate human rights. Rather, they interfere 
with the enjoyment of human rights, which often leads to a human rights 
violation of the State for failing to protect the affected individual.169 
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6.4.3 The Inter-American Human Rights system: scholarly works 
One author has examined one particular strand of horizontal effect in the case 
law of the Inter-American human rights system. In a research article, Patricia 
Tarre Moser carried out an analysis of the Commission’s application of 
States’ duty to ‘ensure’ the rights contained within the Inter-American 
system.170 Moser looked at the application in relation to private actors in 
cases of domestic violence, how the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Right’s approach has evolved since the its first case in 1988, and as 
mentioned above, at the ‘theory of foreseeable risk’ that has been developed 
within the Inter-American human rights system. 
A slightly different approach again was taken by Ineta Ziemele in her 
discussion of horizontal effect in the Inter-American human rights system.171 
Although she looks at some of the same case law and documents produced 
by the Inter-American system as both Clapham and Moser, Ziemele first 
seems to look at each case under the rubric of attribution, or ‘imputability’, 
before labelling each different application by the Commission and Court as 
‘elements’ of obligations of States that could increase the accountability of 
private actors for what concerns human rights interference. She examines 
several cases in which the Commission and the Court held States responsible 
for the actions of paramilitary organisations that operated in coordination 
with, under the supervision or support of State actors or with the ‘tolerance 
and agreement’ of the State. Ziemele notes that in these cases the non-State 
actors were treated as State agents, which allowed their actions to be 
imputable to the State.172 Ziemele treats this as a separate ‘element’ from the 
true obligation to prevent human rights violation, which she sees as being 
applied specifically in cases regarding States’ due diligence obligations in 
relation to the adoption and execution of legislation. Ziemele appears to 
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consider these cases to deal with a different element from cases detailing the 
obligations to investigate, prosecute and punish private perpetrators of human 
rights interference that were discussed in Section 6.4.2.173  
6.5 Concluding reflections on the horizontal effect of international 
human rights under regional human rights systems 
This chapter has provided an overview of the ways in which regional human 
rights legislation and jurisprudence of regional human rights bodies deal with 
the horizontal effect of human rights, and provided some examples of 
scholarly works on the topic. What is clear from all of the discussions is that 
the terminology used differs across both systems and the actors discussing 
the issues. Indeed, most examples (including those from scholarly works) 
referred to did not actually use the term ‘horizontal effect’, but rather focused 
on State obligations to ‘protect’, ‘ensure’, and/or ‘prevent’ human rights.  
 Scholarly works on the regional human rights systems are plentiful, 
and take very different approaches. Few actually conduct a full (or 
comparative) analysis of horizontal effect in the regional human rights 
systems, often focusing more on one system as a whole (with horizontal 
effect being treated as a small portion of this) or looking at horizontal effect 
from a particular perspective (e.g. Knox on correlative duties). Very useful 
contributions, however, have provided an overview of regional systems’ 
treatment of non-State actors which allow comparisons to be drawn (e.g. 
Clapham, Moser, Ziemele) whether this appears to be intentional or not (e.g. 
Coomans). 
Of course, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man both refer explicitly 
to the duties of individuals. However, as was highlighted above, the practical 
impact of these provisions is limited. In the African system the duties are 
owed to communities and the State rather than individuals. In the Inter-
American system the duties often equate to an obligation on an individual to 
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exercise her rights rather than an obligation owed towards other individuals. 
In both systems, the duties are only owed by individuals (and thus no other 
non-State actors such as corporations, non-governmental organisations or 
even international non-State actors), who cannot be the subject of individual 
complaints before the regional monitoring bodies.   
The discussions on the jurisprudence of the regional bodies show an 
increasing willingness to engage with the possibility of human rights 
violations by non-State actors. The bodies are to be applauded for being 
creative within the boundaries of their mandates and regional human rights 
frameworks. The limits of these frameworks, however, is clear from the 
jurisprudence. The cases require that States impose their own obligations (or 
at least regulations) on non-State actors vis-à-vis human rights, but the abuse 
by the non-State actor will, according to current approaches, always be 
inseparable from that of the State. Non-State actors are not currently seen as 
being (separately) responsible for their own actions that violate human rights 
(at the international or regional level), and individuals remain at the mercy of 
States to follow the rulings of the human rights bodies and adopt and 
implement the relevant national criminal, civil and administrative law and 
policies to enable individuals to enjoy their rights.  
Looking at the jurisprudence of the bodies, a range of terminology is 
used to reflect these State obligations, such as positive obligations, a duty of 
due diligence or an obligation to regulate. Different terms were used across 
the different systems, often to denote very similar understandings of the 
action that States should take vis-à-vis non-State actors. What is evident from 
the discussions more generally, and the use of this terminology in particular, 
is that each of the regional systems connects the conduct of the non-State 
actor with the responsibility of the State by finding the non-State actor’s 
actions attributable to the State. In the European and Inter-American systems 
this was often done on the basis of the State having some degree of control 
over a private actor (e.g. a privatised company in Fadeyeva v Russia), on the 
fact that the non-State actor was carrying out a public function (e.g. Ximenes-
Lopes v Brazil) or on the basis that the State knew or should have known that 
an individual was a risk of having their rights interfered with by private actors 
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(e.g. Osman v United Kingdom; Storck v Germany; Jessica Lenahan 
(Gonzales) v United States). The latter method was used in cases where the 
State did not have control over the private actor but was aware of facts that 
had a reasonably foreseeable risk of leading to the individual’s harm.  
In the African system, attribution was clearer in the Ogoni case 
because the Nigerian State had facilitated and ‘given the green light’ to the 
actions causing some of the human rights violations. The other violations in 
this case were found on the basis of the State’s obligation to protect human 
rights. This obligation appeared in the majority of cases to be the basis upon 
which attribution of non-State conduct to the State can be ascertained. Within 
the Inter-American system, due to the wording of the American Convention 
on Human Rights, the obligation is framed as one to ‘prevent’ rather than 
‘protect’, and in the European system reference was made to ‘positive 
obligations’ rather than a specific ‘obligation to protect’ as such. In this vein, 
many of the cases in the Inter-American system relied specifically on the duty 
of due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish non-State actors for 
interfering with the enjoyment of human rights. Within the European system 
very similar standards have emerged (e.g. concerning investigations and the 
adoption of appropriate legislative measures), although other ways of 
achieving some degree of horizontal effect can be seen in the balancing of 
private actors’ rights against one another. It could be said that in this respect 
the methods used by the regional human rights systems do not differ vastly 
from those used by the international human rights treaty monitoring bodies. 
Given the lack of reference to non-State actors’ obligations in the 
European human rights legislation and the lack of practical effect of the 
duties in the Inter-American and African systems, the only forum in which 
any degree of horizontal effect has been upheld is the jurisprudence of the 
monitoring bodies. While judges seem to have been proactive in engaging as 
much as possible with horizontal effect within their respective frameworks, 
this method of applying human rights horizontally is limited by the 






Horizontal effect of international human 
rights at the national level: The example 
of the United Kingdom 
 
7.1 Preliminary remarks 
The UK is a dualist State, meaning that it incorporates its international human 
rights obligations arising from international treaties by adopting domestic 
legislation. Until such legislation is adopted, international law does not 
become applicable in national courts or enforceable within the UK’s 
domestic legal system.1 The primary human rights instrument for which 
incorporation has been achieved is the European Convention on Human 
Rights,2 given effect to through the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).3 The 
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HRA came into force in 2000 and is widely considered to be constitutional 
in nature because ‘it concerns the legal relationship between citizen and State 
in a general, overarching manner and enlarges or diminishes the scope of 
what would now be regarded as fundamental constitutional rights.’4  
The UK has been the focus of much discussion on the horizontal 
effect of human rights. Indeed, it is one of the birth places of the terms ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect horizontal effect’ of human rights, which were heavily debated 
in the run-up to the adoption of the HRA.5 Within the UK, ‘horizontality’ 
refers to the ‘scope within which, and the extent to which, fundamental rights 
either are, or should be, binding in the private sphere.’6 This chapter first 
introduces the HRA and theories of horizontal effect that have been put 
forward by scholars, before addressing two main issues of contention and 
discussion post- (but also pre-) HRA. The issues are: first, the extent to which 
the provisions of the Statute place obligations on private actors (i.e. through 
considering them, under specific circumstances, to be public authorities); and 
second, whether the HRA ‘imports’ or incorporates rights or values found in 
the ECHR into UK private law. This chapter will review the two issues, 
relying on academic discussion and judicial decisions to identify what kinds 
                                                 
not been incorporated into UK domestic law (the practice is rather to implement principles or 
provisions from within a treaty into several pieces of domestic legislation. See Arabella Lang, 
‘Parliament’s role in ratifying treaties’, House of Commons Briefing Paper No. 5855 (17 
February 2017) <researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05855/SN05855.pdf> 
accessed 3 January 2018; Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Monitoring and 
promoting UN treaties’ 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20131113174057/http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/huma
n-rights/our-human-rights-work/international-framework/monitoring-and-promoting-un-
treaties/> accessed 3 January 2018.  
4 Lord Bingham LJ, Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151, as cited in Jana 
Gajdosova and Judith Zehetner, ‘England’ in Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi and 
Giovanni Comandé (eds), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European Union. 
Volume I: A Comparative Overview (Cambridge University Press 2010) 146. 
5 See e.g. Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Horizontality’s New Horizons - Re-Examining Horizontal 
Effect: Privacy, Defamation and the Human Rights Act: Part 1’ (2010) 21 Entertainment Law 
Review 96; Justin Friedrich Krahé, ‘The Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law 
Relationships Horizontal Effect in German, English, ECHR and EU Law’ (2015) 2 European 
Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 124, 146-147. 
6 Gajdosova and Zehetner, ‘England’ (n 4) 150. 
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of horizontal effect could be said to exist and apply within the framework of 
the Human Rights Act 1998.  
7.2 Horizontal Effect in the UK: An introduction to the Human Rights 
Act 1998 
Before the Human Rights Act came into force, many scholars had tried to 
predict the impact that it would have on private relationships.7 Debates within 
Parliament demonstrated that the sponsors and drafters of the (then) Bill 
certainly envisaged and intended the Statute to have some degree of 
horizontal effect.8 It is clear from discussions that the UK courts have an 
instrumental role in horizontal effect – they are, after all, responsible for 
interpreting and applying the HRA, whether between public or private actors.  
In relation to horizontal effect, the tasks of courts under the Human 
Rights Act can be summarised as to ‘first, determine whether there are any 
Convention obligations in play at all and, secondly, if so, how it is to give 
effect to them in domestic law.’9 This nicely echoes the important distinction 
raised by Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun Pattinson,10 and Alison Young11 
between the horizontal applicability and horizontal effect of human rights. 
Young cautions against equating the two terms. She explains that horizontal 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Gavin Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common 
Law’ (n 3); William Wade, ‘Horizons of Horizontality’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 
217; and Murray Hunt, ‘The “Horizontal Effect” of the Human Rights Act’ [1998] Public Law 
423. 
8 For a discussion and extracts of the debate relevant to horizontal effect, see e.g. Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (Oxford University Press 2006) 
474ff. 
9 Gavin Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed: Horizontal Effect after Campbell’ in Helen Fenwick, 
Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human 
Rights Act (Cambridge University Press 2007) 149. 
10 Shaun Pattinson and Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Horizontal applicability and horizontal effect’ 
(2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 623, 664, discussed in Gavin Phillipson and Alexander 
Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) Modern Law 
Review 878, 881. 
11 Alison L Young, ‘Horizontality and the Human Rights Act 1998’ in Katja S Ziegler (ed), 
Human Rights and Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2007) 36; Alison L 
Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ in David Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the Human Rights 




effect is ‘the means through which horizontal applicability is achieved’; 
horizontal applicability simply means that the relevant right is one which 
allows for obligations to be placed on private actors.12 In the words of the UN 
Human Rights Committee, horizontal applicability could refer to those rights 
which are ‘amenable’ to application between private parties.13 In this context 
Gavin Phillipson and Alexander Williams explain the different kinds of rights 
within the ECHR: (1) those ‘that by their nature can only apply against the 
state’ (Articles 6 and 7); (2) ‘the remainder of the absolute and narrowly 
qualified rights’ (Articles 2-5); and (3) ‘generally qualified rights’, i.e. those 
upon which legitimate limitations can be placed in certain circumstances 
(Articles 8-11).14 According to Phillipson’s explanation above, the first 
question for the court requires it to look at Strasbourg jurisprudence to see 
whether the ECtHR has interpreted the right as requiring positive measures 
to be taken by a State vis-à-vis two private actors. If the answer to this is 
positive, the Human Rights Act will then come into play as the source for 
determining how the court should give effect to the relevant Convention 
rights.15  
The same jurisprudence considered under question one should also 
inform the answer to question two.16 Indeed, Section 2 HRA requires courts 
to consider Strasbourg jurisprudence when deciding cases that deal with 
Convention rights. According to Colin Warbrick, this is easier said than done 
– it does not mean that Strasbourg case law can simply be applied in UK 
domestic cases. Rather, it requires the national courts to interpret the 
European Court of Human Rights’ case law, particularly when the Court is 
often not very elaborate in its judgments of ‘the law’.17 Certainly, Warbrick 
                                                 
12 Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 30. 
13 UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 31: General Legal Obligations Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) CPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 8. See for discussion 
Chapter 5 above. 
14 See Phillipson and Williams (n 10) 895-896. 
15 Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9) 149. 
16 ibid 150. 
17 Colin Warbrick, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act: 
The View from the Outside’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman (eds), 
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notes that even when the ECtHR follows particular principles in its own 
interpretation of the ECHR, it does not do so in a ‘consistent or transparent’ 
manner, which can be further obfuscated by the injection of moral values into 
the Court’s reasoning.18 
7.3 Types of horizontal effect under the Human Rights Act 
Scholars and practitioners have proffered different opinions as to the 
existence (or lack thereof) of horizontal effect through the HRA. The result 
of academic discussions has been a ‘comprehensive polarization of 
opinion’,19 although some scholars have changed their minds over time.20 
There now exists a wide scope of understandings of horizontal effect, ranging 
from direct horizontal effect on one end of spectrum to a ‘weak’ version of 
‘weak indirect horizontal effect’ on the other.  
This section will introduce the main theories of horizontal effect 
under the HRA, although some scholars believe that the HRA allows for no 
horizontal effect. Sir Richard Buxton, for example, was initially strongly of 
the opinion that no horizontal effect could arise from the HRA.21 Since the 
Act is an instrument to incorporate the ECHR into UK domestic law, and the 
ECHR itself does not contain provisions of horizontal effect, Buxton believed 
that it was impossible for the HRA to do the same.22 Since his initial rejection, 
however, Buxton LJ later changed his views on the matter (see below, 
Section 7.3.1). 
Before discussing the different theories of horizontal effect in detail 
it is important to distinguish between remedial and substantive horizontality. 
The former requires the courts to act in an ECHR-compliant manner when 
                                                 
Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act, (Cambridge University Press 2007) 36. 
18 See ibid. 
19 Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9) 148. 
20 Sir Buxton LJ has been particularly noted for his change in opinion. See e.g. Bennett, 
‘Horizontality’s New Horizons: Part 1’ (n 5) 97. See also Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 
9) 151. 
21 Bennett, ‘Horizontality’s New Horizons: Part 1’ (n 5) 97. See also Phillipson, ‘Clarity 
Postponed’ (n 9) 151. 




deciding what remedy to provide in cases concerning a breach of rights or in 
which legally binding obligations have been breached.23 Substantive 
horizontality, on the other hand, refers to the court’s obligation to take ECHR 
rights into account when ‘determining the nature of the rights and obligations 
of the applicant and the defendant.’24 According to Young, it is only the 
context of substantive horizontality that the majority of discussions on 
horizontal effect under the HRA take place.25 
While discussions on horizontal effect in the UK have focused on 
several provisions of the HRA, the ‘main player’ in the dialogue has been 
Section 6. Two aspects of the provision have been particularly discussed: the 
first is Section 6(1), according to which ‘[i]t is unlawful for a public authority 
to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right’, taken together 
with Section 6(3)(a) which clearly states that courts and tribunals fall within 
the category of ‘public authority’. The second aspect is found in Section 
6(3)(b) which extends the category of ‘public authority’ to ‘any person 
certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature’. Accordingly, the 
rights contained within the ECHR are given effect not only against the State 
(and therefore traditionally ‘public’ actors), but also private persons whose 
functions are of a public nature.26 The section does not define ‘public 
functions’. This is partially because the drafters of the Statute were hesitant 
to create an exhaustive list which would be at risk of being very quickly 
outdated given the continuing developments in tasks being delegated from 
public to private bodies (for a discussion on the interpretation of the Section 
                                                 
23 Young, ‘Horizontality and the Human Rights Act 1998’ (n 11) 37. 
24 ibid. 
25 See Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 38, figure 2.2. 
26 The full text of Section 6(1) and 6(3) reads: ‘(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act 
in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. 
... 
(3) In this section “public authority” includes— 
 (a) a court or tribunal, and 
 (b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature,  
but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in connection 
with proceedings in Parliament.’ [emphasis added]. 
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6(3)(b), see below).27 However, the omission also exists because Parliament 
thought that leaving the term undefined would lead to a broader approach 
being taken by the courts (this has not happened in practice, at least 
consistently).28 During the parliamentary debates it was stated that since the 
Act dealt with ‘an evolving situation’ the test for whether a body is a public 
authority under the HRA should ‘relate to the substance and nature of the act, 
not to the form and the legal personality’ – in order words, the author of the 
act is less important than the nature of the act itself.29 While the lack of 
definition of public authority in the HRA may seem put the courts ‘in the 
driving seat on human rights issues’, Keith Ewing cautions against 
exaggerating their authority – as mentioned above, the power of courts under 
the HRA has been circumscribed to protect parliamentary sovereignty, 
notably through Section 4 which does not allow courts to strike down Acts 
of Parliament that are incompatible with the ECHR.30 They do, however, 
seem to have a largely free reign when it comes to applying the HRA in cases 
in which the relevant law derives from common law, rather than legislation 
(see Section 7.5 below). 
It is interesting to note at this point that the case law of the UK courts 
concerning horizontal effect been somewhat ambivalent. The legislation 
itself does not explain how horizontal effect should work, and the courts have 
made the situation worse by ‘a plethora of contradictory statements 
concerning the scope of horizontal effect, combined with an apparent 
reluctance on the part of the judiciary to discuss the specific model of 
                                                 
27 HC Deb vol. 314, column 433, discussed in Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling 
Privatization with Human Rights (Intersentia 2011) 287-288. 
28 JUSTICE, ‘Public Authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998 - Justice’ 
<https://justice.org.uk/public-authorities-human-rights-act-1998/> accessed 18 August 2017.  
29 ibid. 
30 Keith D Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy’ (1999) 62 The 
Modern Law Review 79, 92. The limitations on the courts’ powers can be found in Section 
4(6) which provides that: 
A declaration under this section (“a declaration of incompatibility”)— 
(a)does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the 
provision in respect of which it is given; and 




horizontal effect created by the HRA.’31 David Hoffman has also noted that 
there is no uniform approach in the courts’ reasoning, which although 
perhaps unsurprising, from the perspective of consistency and clarity, should 
be clarified.32 Phillipson also considers the courts’ ambivalence to be 
foreseeable.33 Nonetheless, the fact that the courts have noted it ‘may never 
be resolved judicially’34 makes it extremely difficult for a private actors to 
know the circumstances in which they may be expected to act in an ECHR-
compliant manner. It also makes it unclear for individuals who wish to make 
use of the Human Rights Act to know when they would be able to bring a 
case directly against a particular body. This would have implications for 
individuals who wish to take their complaint to the European Court of Human 
Rights. If the case law were clear, the route for individuals to take may also 
be clearer, and a proper judicial interpretation of Section 6(3)(b) could 
preclude the necessity of taking a case to the ECtHR at all. 
7.3.1 Statutory horizontal effect  
Section 3(1) HRA is the source of what is commonly referred to as ‘statutory 
horizontal effect’. The provision places an obligation on courts to interpret 
legislation in a way that is compatible with the ECHR.35 It is important that 
                                                 
31 Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 17. 
32 David Hoffman, ‘Conclusions’ in David Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the Human Rights 
Act on Private Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 379, 381. 
33 Phillipson states that ‘to allow what was hitherto an international treaty to penetrate deep 
into the common law was something about which the judiciary was always likely to feel 
ambivalent.’ [footnote omitted]. Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9) 143. 
34 In the case of X v Y the Court of Appeal stated this of horizontal effect, noting that when 
applying it to individual cases, the ‘very general propositions’ put forward in legal writings 
are put into a ‘more limited and manageable perspective.’: X v Y [2004] ICR 1634, para 45, 
cited in Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9) 156.  
35 The full text of Section 3 reads:  
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights. 
(2) This section— 
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever 
enacted; 
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Section 3 does not create rights for individuals or place an obligation on the 
courts to actually apply the ECHR in every case, but rather to try to interpret 
legislation in a way that affords ECHR protection.36 The interpretative 
obligation in Section 3 extends to legislation enacted either before or after 
the HRA. However, neither Section 3 nor the Statute more generally mention 
‘ECHR rights in relation to private litigation or to the common law…in 
particular, the duty placed on courts by Section 3(1) of the HRA to employ 
ECHR rights as an interpretative guide only applies to legislation and not to 
common law.’37 It is for this reason that the concept has been dubbed 
‘statutory horizontal effect’.38 Although only applying to legislation, Section 
3(1) HRA does, unequivocally, apply to legislation governing private actors 
as well as that governing public authorities.39  
An example of horizontal effect through Section 3 HRA can be found 
in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza.40 The case concerned Schedule 1, paragraph 
2 of the Rent Act 1977. The provision states that if the spouse of a tenant of 
a dwelling-house is living in the house at the time that the tenant passes away, 
the spouse will become a statutory tenant by succession. The protection in 
the provision also extends to those living ‘as [the tenant’s] wife or husband’. 
The case of Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd41 had previously 
held that the protection did not extend to couples living together in a same-
                                                 
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible primary legislation; and 
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of 
revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility. 
36 See e.g. Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 37. 
37 Gajdosova and Zehetner, ‘England’ (n 4) 153. See also Emma Lees, ‘Horizontal Effect and 
Article 8: McDonald v McDonald’ (2014) 19 Law Quarterly Review 34; and Section 7.4 
below. 
38 Lees (n 37) 34 
39 As held by the UK Court of Appeal in the case of X v Y (n 34) para 57(2), cited by Phillipson, 
‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9) 148. 
40 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30. See for discussion, Young, ‘Horizontality 
and the Human Rights Act 1998’ (n 11). 




sex relationship, thus leaving a gap in protection. The gap was directly 
addressed in the Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza case. The defendant (Mr. Godin-
Mendoza) had been living in a stable, monogamous relationship with his 
partner who died in 2000 for many years. After his partner’s death, the 
landlord of the apartment he had rented tried to claim possession of the 
property on the basis that Mr. Godin-Mendoza did not succeed his partner’s 
tenancy. The House of Lords used Section 3(1) HRA to interpret the 
legislation so as to include same-sex partners in the definition of ‘spouse’, 
deciding that the interpretation applied in Fitzpatrick could not survive in the 
post-HRA era. Instead, the Lords interpreted the provision to give effect to 
Mr. Godin-Mendoza’s rights to private life and non-discrimination under 
Articles 8 and 14 ECHR respectively. This seminal case42 also held that the 
obligation under Section 3(1) could only require courts to interpret a statute 
if doing so did not violate a ‘fundamental feature’ of the legislation in 
question, or that ‘serious practical repercussions’ would ensue as a result.43 
If this would be the case, the court is then able to make a declaration of 
incompatibility under Section 4 HRA. Section 4 is itself of limited effect as, 
in protection of parliamentary sovereignty, it does not confer upon the courts 
the authority to actually strike down legislation, but flags the legislation as 
problematic, allowing Parliament to consider whether to take action to amend 
the law.44  
7.3.1 Direct horizontal effect 
Thomas Bennett believes that in the UK direct horizontal effect now exists 
for some rights, namely privacy. His conclusion is partially reached on the 
basis of the Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd case, which is 
generally heralded as having created a new cause of action within the 
                                                 
42 Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 18. 
43 As discussed in Young, ‘Horizontality and the Human Rights Act 1998’ (n 11). 
44 For a full discussion of the meaning and application of Section 3 HRA, particularly in the 
context of parliamentary sovereignty, see Alison L Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and 
the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing 2009). See also Gajdosova and Zehetner, ‘England’ 
(n 4) 110, 46. 
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common law.45 In particular, Bennett relies on the fact that ‘the creation of 
new causes of action is a hallmark of direct horizontal effect’, and that such 
a creation is not possible under indirect horizontal effect.46 Although the first 
point is generally agreed upon,47 the latter is hotly contested by Gavin 
Phillipson and Alexander Williams who claim that the House of Lords (and 
presumably now the Supreme Court) had, as do other constitutional courts, 
an ‘inherent ability’ to create new causes of action within common law.48 
Indeed, as Ivan Hare has noted, in the earlier case of Douglas, Zeta-Jones 
and Northern and Shell plc v Hello! Ltd49 none of the judges in the Court of 
Appeal excluded the possibility that Section 6 HRA could place courts under 
a duty to create a new cause of action.50 Gavin Phillipson and Alexander 
Williams agree that a duty (as opposed to an ability) exists requiring courts 
to develop common law in compliance with the Convention, but that it only 
applies to the extent that such compliance can be achieved through 
‘incremental’ changes to the law, rather than creating new causes of action 
                                                 
45 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. This case 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.6. 
46 Bennett, ‘Horizontality’s New Horizons: Part 1’ (n 5) 100, cited in Gavin Phillipson, 
‘Privacy: The Development of Breach of Confidence – The Clearest Case of Horizontal 
Effect?’ in David Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2011) 147. 
47 That the creation of a new cause of action is central to the direct horizontal effect of common 
law is widely supported both within and outside of the UK. In South Africa, for example, a 
judge at the Constitutional Court has stated that ‘the courts cannot invent new causes of action, 
as that would be to embrace direct horizontality’. This echoes statements of Lord Irvine in 
which he warns that courts are not able to act as legislators to ‘fashion’ a new law where there 
is no existing (statutory or common law) cause of action that courts could develop in a way 
that is ECHR-compatible. See, respectively, Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 
1996 (3) SA 850 at 442 (Kriegler J); and Lord Irvine, HL Deb vol. 583 col 784, 24 November 
1997, both cited in Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common 
Law (n 3) 831 and 828. 
48 Phillipson uses an example from the New Zealand Court of Appeal which founded a new 
privacy tort to illustrate this point. See Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1, discussed in 
Phillipson, ‘Privacy’ (n 46) 147; and in Phillipson and Williams (n 10) 884-885. 
49 Douglas, Zeta-Jones and Northern and Shell plc v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 WLR 992. 
50 Ivan Hare, ‘Verticality Challenged: Private Parties, Privacy and the Human Rights Act’ 




outright (the scholars have named this the ‘constitutional constraint 
model’).51 Bennett also uses the case of McKennitt v Ash52 as an instrumental 
basis for claiming the existence of direct horizontal effect. He notes in 
particular that Buxton LJ went against his previous vehement opinion against 
direct horizontal effect to apply Articles 8 and 10 ECHR directly between the 
private parties to the case.53  
However, the fact that the HRA is only intended to be directly 
applicable to public actors can rule out the direct horizontal effect of the 
Statute. The provisions from which horizontal effect can be derived apply 
only to ‘public authorities’, or (in the case of Sections 3 and 12), courts 
specifically.54 This is further supported by the fact that Sections 7 and 8 HRA 
only mention proceedings and remedies in cases concerning public 
authorities (excluding such actions against private actors from the remit of 
the Act).55  
Direct horizontal effect has also been rejected by Dawn Oliver in an 
interesting argument regarding the limited time period within which 
claimants must file a complaint and the limitations on the amount of damages 
that courts can grant in cases against public authorities (which must in such 
cases be treated as discretionary).56 There is no time limit, however, for 
proceedings brought against private actors carrying out public functions 
(under Section 6(3)(b)), and such actors do not enjoy the limitations on 
                                                 
51 See e.g. Phillipson and Williams (n 10) 878-879. Pannick and Lester appear to endorse a 
similar approach. See David Pannick and Anthony Lester, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights 
Act on Private Law: The Knight’s Move’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 380. See also 
Section 7.4.1 below. 
52 McKennitt v Ash [2002] QB 1334, 1351.  
53 For a discussion of the case and his approach, see Nicole Moreham, ‘Privacy and 
horizontality: relegating the common law’ (2007) 123 Law Quarterly Review 373, discussed 
in Bennett, ‘Horizontality’s New Horizons: Part 1’ (n 5) 99. 
54 Justin Friedrich Krahé also rules out direct horizontal effect of the ECHR within the UK on 
this ground, as the Convention does not make any reference to private parties Krahé (n 5) 147. 
55 Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law’ (n 3) 826. 
56 These limitations can be found in Sections 7(5) and 8(3) HRA, respectively. See Dawn 
Oliver, ‘The Human Rights Act and Public Law/private Law Divides’ [2000] European 
Human Rights Law Review 343, 346-347. 
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damages. Oliver’s argument rests on the result of upholding these differences 
while allowing for the direct horizontal effect of the ECHR which would be 
discriminatory against the private bodies.57  
7.3.2 Indirect horizontal effect 
As with the international and regional levels, indirect horizontal effect can be 
distinguished from direct horizontal effect. However, there is a slight 
difference in the way the terminology is used at the national level. When 
talking of indirect horizontal effect of the HRA, little mention is made of 
States’ obligation to protect human rights, or of due diligence of the State. 
Rather, with the exception of one theory of horizontal effect that takes the 
same approach and tends to go by the name of ‘intermediate horizontal effect’ 
(see Section 7.2.3 below) the emphasis lies on the courts and the different 
‘strengths’ of the impact that they can allow human rights to have on private 
relationships. Indirect horizontal effect is accordingly divided into ‘strong’ 
and ‘weak’ versions.  
 Simply put, indirect horizontal effect in general ‘means that whilst the 
rights cannot be applied directly to the law governing private relations and 
are not actionable per se in such a context, they may be relied upon indirectly, 
to influence the interpretation and application of pre-existing law.’58 The 
main argument in favour of indirect horizontal effect through the HRA is that 
courts are explicitly listed as a ‘public authority’ in Section 6(3)(a). Taking 
this together with Section 6(1), Young reads a clear message that it is 
‘unlawful for courts and tribunals to act in a way that is incompatible with 
Convention rights’59 in cases of public and private law alike. It would 
therefore be unlawful for courts not to act compatibly with the ECHR when 
deciding upon cases between two private parties.60 It is also important to bear 
in mind that even though Section 6(1) is the source of many instances of 
horizontal effect, it does not necessarily involve horizontal effect – it is an 
                                                 
57 ibid 352. 
58 Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law’ (n 3) 826. 





obligation which includes, but is not restricted to horizontal effect. Young 
gives the example of the case of Sunderland v P. S.,61 where it was held that 
where the court was being asked to make an order for the detention of a 
vulnerable adult, it must ‘mould and adapt’ its inherent jurisdiction to make 
sure that it complies with the ECHR. This case did not therefore involve a 
private actor, but the basis of the obligation was still Section 6(1).62 
Unlike statutory horizontal effect, indirect horizontal effect only 
applies in cases concerning common law, not legislation. As Ian Leigh 
explains, if the common law is informed by ECHR rights, which could lead 
to a modification of a common law rule, this is indirect horizontal effect.63 It 
becomes direct when the courts are ‘required to create appropriate rights and 
remedies by revising the common law to protect Convention rights subject 
only to the limitation that a clear statute must prevail’.64 
‘Strong’ indirect horizontal effect requires courts to ensure that 
common law is compliant with the ECHR. Strong indirect horizontal effect, 
as put forward by Phillipson, means that courts have to act in an ECHR-
compliant manner when making decisions regarding existing law. Because of 
this, the only way to override whichever right is at stake would be to use the 
second paragraph of the provision containing that right within the ECHR.65 
These paragraphs, as seen in Chapter 3, provide interests that may need to be 
balanced against the claimant’s enjoyment of a right, for example the public 
interest, national security, or the rights of others. The latter is of particular 
significance to horizontal effect under the HRA. Phillipson goes on to explain 
that if an interest from outside the Convention could override the Convention 
right in question, this would automatically breach the court’s obligation to 
                                                 
61 Sunderland v P. S. [2007] EWHC 623 (Fam), [2007] 2 FLR 1083, discussed in Young, 
‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 32. 
62 Sunderland v P. S. (n 61) (Munby J), cited in Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 
32. 
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act in compliance with the ECHR.66 This of course contrasts with weak 
indirect horizontal effect, whereby the Convention rights may be treated as 
principles to be balanced against others, not necessarily arising from the 
Convention itself.67 There are, according to Young, different ways to 
understand ‘strong indirect horizontal effect’. The first distinguishing factor 
is whether it would include a duty to create a new cause of action (i.e. to 
create a new, stand-alone tort that would allow individuals to bring claims 
regarding the protection of their Convention rights against private actors). 
The second factor is whether (and to what degree) courts are able to modify 
common law rules to mirror Convention rights in light of the UK’s system of 
precedence.68 Taking these factors into account, Young identifies seven 
possible understandings of strong indirect horizontal effect.69 Taken together 
with the four types of weak indirect horizontal effect, the result is that indirect 
horizontal effect could therefore place as many as 11 different kinds of 
obligations on the courts, depending on which theory is adopted.  
‘Weak’ indirect horizontal effect requires that the court reflects or 
complies with convention values rather than the rights themselves. The 
difference between strong and weak indirect horizontal effect is that under 
the strong strand, rights either apply in full or not at all, but under the weak 
strand, the ECHR is considered in terms principles which can be given 
varying weight and may ‘compete with’ other principles so that they have to 
be balanced against each other.70 Young, as Phillipson before her,71 has 
further distinguished between weaker and stronger versions of ‘weak indirect 
horizontal effect’ which depends on whether the values from the ECHR that 
are being treated as principles are considered to be ‘fundamental’ or 
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67 See Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 40-41; see also Phillipson, ‘Clarity 
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68 Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ (n 11) 43. 
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‘ordinary’ in nature.72 If found to be ordinary, ‘the weight attached to these 
values would depend upon the context of the right in question’.73 Young 
concludes that the UK courts have not taken a clear stance, but they have 
embraced a flexible approach, which would ‘sometimes’ allow certain values 
to be the most important in a given case.74 
Phillipson does not seem to see a great practical difference between 
strong and weak indirect horizontal effect, and together with Alexander 
Williams he merges three of Young’s theories of indirect horizontal effect 
together to construct a ‘constitutional constraint’ model.75 The model appears 
to sit between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ indirect horizontal effect, resulting in an 
approach whereby Convention principles will have to compete with other 
values, but the duty of the courts to develop common law incrementally 
(mentioned above) will always succeed.76  
Nonetheless, in relation to Article 8 ECHR Phillipson rejects the 
notion of strong indirect horizontal effect. In a discussion of the Campbell 
case, he notes that a duty on the court to act in a manner compatible with 
Article 8 could not amount to an obligation to ensure a particular outcome.77 
Rather, Article 8 could only ‘function in the private sphere’ as values or 
principles (weak indirect horizontal effect).78 This is because the wording of 
Article 8 is restricted to the public sphere, making no mention of private 
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actors, but is broad in both the guarantee and restrictions it contains (i.e. 
‘respect for private life’ and ‘the protection of morals’ or ‘the rights of 
others’).79 In order to bring Article 8 within the realm of private common law, 
Phillipson argues, the case law of the ECtHR is required.80  
Young explains that the HRA itself ‘clearly supports’ indirect 
horizontal effect,81 and outlines examples of several of the approaches being 
adopted by different judges during various cases,82 but does not fully 
determine which approach would be the most appropriate for courts to apply. 
Phillipson has suggested that it was more likely for courts to accept the kind 
of weak indirect horizontal effect explained above whereby the courts can 
choose how much weight to give to a Convention value (treated as a 
principle) in a particular case.83 This seems to gel with Young’s conclusion 
above regarding the court’s flexible approach, and will be seen in the 
discussion of the courts’ jurisprudence on the matter in Section 7.4. 
7.3.3 ‘Public liability horizontality’: Section 6(3)(b) HRA 
Section 6(3)(b), introduced above, has been instrumental to the UK courts’ 
ability to hold some private actors legally responsible for interfering with 
Convention rights. As noted, the construction of the provision allows private 
actors ‘certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature’ to be 
classed as public authorities for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. The 
Section therefore distinguishes between ‘core’ and ‘hybrid’ public 
authorities. Core public authorities include, for example, the judiciary and the 
police whose acts are inherently public and subject to the HRA.84 Hybrid 
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authorities, on the other hand, are only amenable to review under the HRA in 
relation to acts (or omissions) undertaken by them which can be classified as 
‘public’.  
This idea is somewhat analogous to that of immunities relating to 
international organisations such as the United Nations under public 
international law. The ‘functional immunities’ doctrine dictates that experts 
of the UN may be immune from prosecution only in so far as it is ‘necessary 
for the independent exercise of their functions’.85 For example, if an act done 
or words spoken which contravene a State’s domestic laws is committed by 
(for example) a special rapporteur for the United Nations, they will be 
afforded immunity for this if carried out as part of their official function.86 In 
the case of Section 6(3)(b) HRA, the same is true – the private actions of 
private actors must remain outside of the scrutiny of the courts, even if they 
are considered hybrid public authorities; they may only be responsible under 
the Human Rights Act if and when they are carrying out a public function.  
The end result of Section 6 HRA is that ECHR rights are (1) ‘directly 
enforceable against some bodies in respect of all of their activities’ (2) 
‘directly enforceable against some bodies in respect of some but not all of 
their activities’; and (3) ‘not directly enforceable at all against others’.87 The 
first result applies to ‘core’ public authorities. The second result refers to 
‘hybrid’ public authorities, which under Section 6(5) HRA only have to act 
in an ECHR-compliant manner with respect to private actions. The third 
result applies to private actors, who fall completely outside of the remit of 
                                                 
85 Article VI section 22, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
(adopted 13 February 1946, entered into force 17 September 1946) UNTS 1, 5 and UNTS 90, 
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the HRA. Young and Williams both refer to the horizontal effect of Section 
6(3)(b) as ‘public liability horizontality’.88 
Andrew Clapham has also drawn a comparison between approaches 
at the international and national levels. Rather than the rules on immunity, 
Clapham considers the similarities between Section 6(3)(b) and the 
international law rules on attribution found in the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles). The comparison considers the ‘functions of 
a public nature’ standard with the ‘elements of governmental authority’ in the 
Draft Articles to determine which has a broader definition of ‘public actor’.89 
Clapham had concluded that the UK ‘public’ nature is broader than the 
international standard because it was intended to cover bodies like private 
service providers even when they have not had functions delegated to them 
by the State so they cannot be said to be exercising ‘government’ functions.90 
However, as will be seen below, the judges have refused to include private 
service providers as ‘public authorities’ even when they had been contracted 
by the State to provide a public or privatised service.91 
Indeed, at the national level it has been repeatedly argued that for an 
actor to be classed as a public authority, it does not need to be given its 
‘public’ functions through statute (i.e. through statutory delegation).92 This 
means that even if an entity is not stated explicitly as having public functions, 
it can still be classed as a public authority. According to Jack Straw, ‘[w]hat 
matters is what you do and how that affects people’s rights.’93 Again, 
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Clapham compares this to the international system for establishing indirect 
State responsibility and the mention in Article 4(2) that includes in the 
definition of ‘State organ’ those persons or entities that have status in 
accordance with the State’s internal law (although as Clapham points out, this 
is not a requirement, so may not actually be more restrictive than the national 
level).94 The UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) has also 
endorsed an application of Section 6(3)(b) that does not distinguish between 
a ‘body set up by statute’ and ‘a body entrusted by the government with a 
public function by contract’.95 It has stated that ‘the loss of a single step in 
proximity to the statutory duty does not change the nature of the function, nor 
the nature of its capacity to interfere with Convention rights’.96 Therefore, 
just because the entity is not directly given the obligation by statute but is 
instead contracted by a party that is a ‘pure’ public authority, does not mean 
that it is exempt from acting in a way that is compatible with human rights.  
Clapham suggests an understanding of the Section 6(3)(b) test which 
essentially means that if the individual whose rights have been breached 
would be able to go to the ECtHR against the State for the action, they are 
protected at the national level regarding private actors too.97 It was, after all, 
the ‘raison d’être’ of the HRA that it would allow individuals to have their 
rights protected at home without having to go to Strasbourg.98 Young actually 
contends that there is no consensus as to the purpose of the HRA. She argues 
that it could be a way of making sure that the UK complies with its 
international obligations in the ECHR, but it could also be a way for the 
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courts to grant stronger protection to human rights than the ECHR itself 
does.99 The following section will discuss how these issues have played out 
in practice, focusing on the definition of ‘hybrid’ public authorities applied 
by the courts. 
7.3.3.1 Judicial application of Section 6(3)(b) 
Before delving into the jurisprudence of English courts regarding horizontal 
effect under Section 6(3)(b) HRA, a brief comment on the attitude of the 
judges must be made. It seems that although explanation as to what kind of 
bodies should fall within the provision’s remit was provided during the 
parliamentary debates on the HRA, the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords have declined to use the debates to aid their interpretation.100 The 
reasoning of the courts has been explained by Lord Nicholls:  
it is not the minsters’ words, uttered as they were on behalf of the 
executive, that must be referred to in order to understand what 
Parliament intended. It is the words used by Parliament that must be 
examined in order to understand and apply the legislation that it has 
enacted.101  
The first judgments arising from cases obliging the UK courts to deal with 
the meaning of a ‘hybrid’ public authority have been criticised for their 
reluctance to actually apply the (functional) test envisaged by Parliament and 
included in Section 6(3)(b).102 Instead, the Courts seemed to see the Section 
as some kind of continuation of the institutional test used to determine 
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whether or not a particular body’s actions were amenable to judicial review 
by the Courts.103 This is understandable given the Home Secretary’s advice 
that courts look to the tests when defining ‘public authority’ under Section 
6.104 However, in today’s environment of privatisation and the ‘shrinking of 
the state owing to the shedding of many governmental functions’, it is ‘no 
longer feasible or even useful to conceptualize the public-private divide in 
terms of an institutional distinction between state and nonstate entities.’105 
Early consideration of the judicial review test did seem to grant more 
importance to an institutional test. This involves looking at whether the body 
in question had been granted its powers relating to the act in question through 
statute,106 rather than looking at the definition of a function of a ‘public 
nature’ (something which the Courts have only ‘scratched the surface of’).107  
The test for amenability to judicial review was developed in the case 
of R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin,108 which despite 
being a significant case has been blamed for the ‘inherently unstable’ nature 
of the distinction between public and private in the case law on judicial 
review.109 Lloyd LJ started by emphasising the importance of the source of 
the actor’s power to carry out a particular function, rather than the nature of 
the function itself (i.e. an institutional test).110 He went on to introduce the 
‘public functions test’, holding that several factors could contribute to finding 
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that a body was a hybrid public authority;111 while the source of the body’s 
power is still one of these factors, the Court emphasised the need to look at, 
for example, the nature of the power as well. Unfortunately, the Court 
nevertheless failed to provide any determinative guidance for future courts.112 
The ambiguity has bled into the case law on Section 6(3)(b) HRA. 
For example, although the wording of Section 6(3)(b), which 
explicitly mentions ‘any person certain of whose functions are functions of a 
public nature’,113 the composition of bodies and their ties to the State have 
been used by courts when deciding whether a body falls under the scope of 
the provision.114 This happened in the case of Poplar Housing and 
Regeneration Community Association Limited v Donoghue.115 The Court of 
Appeal found that the charity in question, which as a housing association was 
seeking to evict a tenant, was carrying out a ‘public function’ in doing so. 
However, despite the outcome in this particular instance the Court’s 
reasoning was quite restrictive and placed much importance on the proximity 
of the charity to the local authority. Specifically, the Court required a ‘public 
character or stamp’ to be imposed on the body’s actions through certain 
characteristics, which were deemed to include ‘statutory authority for the task 
carried out; the degree of control exercised by the public body over the 
exercise of the function; and how closely the acts in question were “enmeshed 
in the activities of the public body”’.116 In other words, the determinative 
factors seemed (despite the apparent focus on the body’s actions themselves) 
to be the relationship between the private and public bodies involved. 
Stephanie Palmer understands the reasoning to effectively reject the notion 
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that the State contracting out a public function to a private actor could be 
enough to consider the private actor’s performance of that function to fall 
within the scope of Section 6(3)(b).117 This concern was certainly brought to 
bear in the case of R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation,118 which is 
largely responsible for a loop-hole and gap in human rights protection 
stemming from the finding that State-funded patents in a privately-owned 
care home cannot rely on the HRA because the provision of care is not a 
‘public function’.119  
The Leonard Cheshire case was brought by appellants whose local 
authority had placed them in a private care home run by the defendant, 
Leonard Cheshire Foundation (a charity). The defendant had been contracted 
by the State to carry out the public service of running the care home, which 
it intended to close. Despite the circumstances, the Court of Appeal 
nonetheless found that the charity’s actions were private and that the closing 
of the home would not constitute a violation of the applicants’ rights under 
Article 8 ECHR.120 The reasoning of the case was that even if a private body 
is carrying out a public function that has been delegated by a public body, it 
can only be considered to be a ‘hybrid’ public authority if the ‘function itself 
has a “public flavour”’.121 The Court’s conclusion seems at odds with the fact 
that had the local authority that had contracted the service been carrying it 
out itself, the function would have been considered to be ‘public’.122 The 
reasoning here is unpersuasive; as Paul Craig succinctly observed, ‘it is 
difficult to see why the nature of a function should alter if it is contracted out, 
rather than being performed in house’.123  
The decision, as well as the subsequent case law affirming the Court 
                                                 
117 See Palmer (n 105) 591. 
118 R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 366, [2002] HRLR 30. 
119 ibid, discussed in JUSTICE, ‘Public Authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
<https://justice.org.uk/public-authorities-human-rights-act-1998/> accessed 18 August 2017. 
120 See Williams, ‘Public Authorities’ (n 88) 50. 
121 JUSTICE (n 119). 
122 Leonard Cheshire (n 118) para 15, discussed in Williams, ‘Public Authorities’ (n 88) 50. 
123 Paul Craig, ‘Contracting Out, the Human Rights Act and the Scope of Judicial Review’ 
(2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 551, 556. 
HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
261 
of Appeal’s approach124 have been severely criticised by scholars for the 
‘incongruity and arbitrariness’ that they cause.125 The reasoning in Leonard 
Cheshire came under heavy fire by JUSTICE, which has identified three 
shortcomings of the decision regarding consistency. First, it went against the 
apparent intention of Parliament in enacting the HRA.126 Second, the decision 
is not consistent with the distinction found in Section 6 HRA between hybrid 
and ‘pure’ public authorities which the House of Lords reiterated in the Aston 
Cantlow case,127 which reiterated that whether a body can be considered a 
hybrid public authority is dependent upon the function it is carrying out, 
whereas the test for determining whether a body is a ‘pure’ public authority 
depends upon the public nature of the body itself.128 In other words, the test 
for identifying ‘core’ public authorities is institutional, whereas the test for 
identifying ‘hybrid’ public authorities is functional.129 Third, JUSTICE 
claimed that the decision was inconsistent with the European Court of Human 
Rights’ jurisprudence, which has repeatedly upheld that a State, through 
delegating certain public tasks or functions, cannot absolve itself of or 
delegate its own responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.130 
The decision appeared to be so problematic, in fact, that Parliament stepped 
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in to effectively reverse the effects of Leonard Cheshire through the adoption 
of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. Under the new Statute, private actors 
that have been contracted by a local authority to deliver residential care 
services could be classed as a hybrid public authority if its residents were 
being publicly funded.131 Williams warns that the replacement in this specific 
circumstance does not have general applicability – the reasoning of the case 
could still be applied to situations in which a private actor has been contracted 
to perform a public service.132 The fact that the new Act did not unequivocally 
hold contracted or privatised private care home providers to fall within the 
scope of Section 6(3)(b) also left room for future courts to take a restrictive 
view in some situations. 
The Lords did take a broader approach in Aston Cantlow and 
Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank and 
Another133 although this case did not involve contracting out of public 
functions to private actors. In Aston Cantlow the House of Lords adopted a 
more functional approach. Lord Nicholls explained that the test is not about 
looking at every function of an entity to see if any of them are public, but 
looking at the act that is said to have interfered with human rights enjoyment 
to see whether that particular act was a public function.134 This is not to say 
that the Court considered only the nature of the function being carried out as 
relevant to Section 6(3)(b). Indeed, the judges still included factors such as 
whether the body was empowered by statute to carrying out the function and 
whether it was receiving public funding for doing so. The list of factors in 
Aston Cantlow, which included whether the private body was ‘taking the 
place of central government or local authority in providing the function, or 
was providing a public service’, was actually relied on in subsequent, more 
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restrictive cases, such as YL v Birmingham City Council.135 It at first seemed 
as though lower courts and even the Court of Appeal were following the 
broader approach taken in Aston Cantlow,136 with one case even including a 
privatised water provider as a hybrid public authority in the case of Marcic v 
Thames Water Utilities Ltd.137 However, the Court of Appeal and House of 
Lords then reverted back to the approach in Leonard Cheshire concerning 
privately run care homes, in the case of Johnson and Others v London 
Borough of Havering.138 By holding that a private care home did not fall 
under the scope of Section 6(3)(b), the Court of Appeal again allowed a 
protection gap to form, holding public bodies carrying out a function to 
ECHR standards whilst allowing private bodies carrying out the same 
function to act in a non-ECHR compliant manner.  
The same, limited approach towards contracted out and privatised 
services was solidified in the case of YL v Birmingham City Council. In the 
case, which has received much criticism, Birmingham City Council had 
contracted with Southern Cross Healthcare, a private body, in order to fulfil 
its duty under the National Assistance Act to ‘make arrangements for 
providing residential assistance’ to an elderly woman suffering from 
Alzheimer’s. The body tried to end the agreement following disputed 
accusations about the conduct of the woman’s family during visits, but they 
could only terminate the agreement ‘for good reason’.139 One criticism of the 
case is that the House of Lords’ distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’, in 
stating that the performance of functions for commercial gain ‘point[ed] 
against’ those functions being public’, was not intended by the drafters of the 
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Statute.140 Stephanie Palmer similarly raises concerns over the Lords’ focus 
on the actors’ motivation.141 Because private actors will typically act for 
private gain whereas public actors would act in the public interest,142 it makes 
it very unlikely that an ostensibly private body which carries out public 
functions for profit would fall within the ambit of ‘hybrid’ public authority. 
Palmer further notes that using motivation as a factor will help to determine 
the nature of the actor itself, but not the nature of the function it is carrying 
out.143 
The dissentients in the case, Lady Hale and Lord Bingham, viewed 
the private actor as a hybrid public authority. They looked at the degree of 
responsibility that the State had taken on for the performance of the task in 
question, as well as the degree of recognition the State had given to the public 
interest or importance of the task being carried out.144 Palmer has noted that 
the majority decision in YL seems to follow the distinction between public 
and private actors made in cases concerning judicial review, mentioned 
above. However, she also points out that the HRA has similarly had an impact 
on the development of that strand of case law.145 
The outcome and reasoning of YL led the JCHR to suggest that the 
UK judiciary has failed to grant indirect horizontal effect to the extent that 
Parliament envisaged during the drafting of the HRA.146 The upset from the 
case, as with Leonard Cheshire before it, led Parliament to adopt new 
legislation to remedy the loophole in human rights protection. In 2014, the 
Care Act was adopted, which reiterates the approach taken in the Health and 
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Social Care Act 2008 but includes in the definition of hybrid public 
authorities those private care homes whose care for an individual has been 
‘arranged by and/or paid for’ by a public authority.147 
7.3.3.2 Possible solutions to the interpretative issues of Section 
6(3)(b) Human Rights Act 1998  
In its ninth report in 2006-2007 on ‘The Meaning of Public Authority under 
the Human Rights Act’,148 the JCHR identified three possible avenues that 
could be taken to try to remedy the problems caused by the inconsistent and 
over-restrictive application of the HRA by UK Courts.  
One possibility would be to adopt legislative solutions such as listing 
or ‘scheduling’ public authorities through amendment of the HRA or 
extending application of the HRA by sector. However, this could lead to 
inconsistency in the application of the HRA; unless a more general solution 
is achieved, ‘it will be necessary for any Bill that provides for the contracting-
out of public functions to identify clearly that the body which performs those 
functions will be a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights 
Act.’149 Another legislative solution would be to amend the HRA to clarify 
the meaning of ‘functions of a public nature’, but this is seen as the most 
radical option. In light of the reluctance during the drafting stages of the HRA 
to include a definition as this may restrict the Act’s ability to adapt as time 
goes on,150 amending the Act in this way does not seem very promising.  
Because the HRA has such great constitutional importance, direct 
amendment should be a last resort. However, a case can be made for a 
separate, supplementary and interpretative statute, specifically directed at 
clarifying the interpretation of functions of a public nature. The JCHR has 
suggested the following: ‘a function performed pursuant to a contract or other 
arrangement with a public authority which is under a duty to perform the 
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function’.”151 More than one Bill has been introduced in the House of 
Commons to this end, the latest of which was introduced in 2009-2010, 
listing factors to be considered in determining whether a body should be 
considered a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act.152 
The ‘Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning of Public Authority) Bill 2009-10’ 
did not make it further than its first introduction to the House of Commons, 
and any attempts to introduce a similar bill seem to have been dropped.  
Repealing the Act, however, may be a real option. The UK’s 
Conservative Party has repeatedly advocated the repeal of the Human Rights 
Act, in order that the UK domestic courts would no longer be bound to make 
their judgments compliant with the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Although now the Conservative party has delayed any repeal 
of the HRA while Britain’s exit from the European Union is still underway, 
it still expects to review the current framework for human rights within the 
UK once Brexit has occurred.153 If the Act is repealed, it may be possible for 
the Conservative party to subdue the inevitable political fallout by adopting 
a new Statute safeguarding human rights that could tackle the issue of the 
horizontal effect of human rights more coherently. The Party has indeed 
mentioned a replacement ‘Bill of Rights’ on several occasions,154 although 
no details have been given regarding the possible horizontal effect of the 
                                                 
151 House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The Meaning of 
Public Authority under the Human Rights Act - Ninth Report of Session 2006-07’ (n 146) 46. 
152 Human Rights Act 1998 (Meaning Of Public Authority) Bill 2008-09 
<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2008-
09/humanrightsact1998meaningofpublicauthority.html> accessed 18 August 2017.  
153 Samuel Osborne, ‘Conservative Manifesto: Theresa May Announces UK Will Remain Part 
of European Convention of Human Rights’ The Independent (18 May 2017) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/conservative-manifesto-uk-echr-european-
convention-human-rights-leave-eu-next-parliament-election-a7742436.html> accessed 24 
August 2017. 
154 See Jon Stone, ‘Plans to Replace Human Rights Act with British Bill of Rights Will Go 
Ahead , Justice Secretary Confirms’ The Independent (22 August 2016) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/scrap-human-rights-act-british-bill-of-
rights-theresa-may-justice-secretary-liz-truss-a7204256.html> accessed 24 Augsut 2017. See 
also, for a discussion of the possible consequences Brexit and the Bill of Rights, Alison L 
Young, Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (Oxford University Press 2017) 298-306. 
HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
267 
rights included and there has been conjecture that such plans will be 
discarded.155 Nonetheless, the possibility is an interesting one, and any 
developments in this regard should not be ignored. 
In an earlier report on the meaning of public authority, the JCHR 
suggested a concrete definition that should be adopted through primary 
legislation. Finding support from the National Secular Society in a 
memorandum to the JCHR’s more recent report, the body suggested 
amending the definition of public authority to include ‘when a public body 
delegates functions that would otherwise be the response of that body, those 
functions and the private body delivering them are considered public or the 
purpose of the Human Rights Act’.156 
The second solution identified by the JCHR is the protection of 
human rights through the terms of contracts between public authorities and 
private providers of public services. This could be a very effective method, 
as many of the cases requiring an interpretation of Section 6(3)(b) involve 
private actors who have been delegated the function of providing public 
services (i.e. privatised services such as water, and to some extent, 
prisons).157 Indeed, it could be very useful in protecting individuals’ rights in 
situations where public services have been contracted out to private actors, in 
which the judges have been very reluctant to consider the private actors as 
hybrid public authorities.158 A related idea advocated by the JCHR would be 
the publication of ‘authoritative guidance’ on what kinds of organisations 
would fall within the scope of the HRA. Interestingly, a document to provide 
public authorities with guidance detailing how they can comply with human 
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rights standards in their daily operations was adopted by the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs (now the Ministry of Justice) in 2006.159 However, the 
guidance failed to offer a concrete understanding of what a public authority 
actually is.160 
Finally, the JCHR identified the possibility of achieving more 
consistent and comprehensive protection of human rights through judicial 
decisions via government intervention as a third party in cases where they 
would rather the respective court adopt a broader interpretation of Section 
6(3)(b) that would be more in line with the intentions of Parliament.161 
However, this could be seen as an unwelcome encroachment upon the 
authority of judges to interpret and apply the law. It would further require 
consistent intervention by Parliament, which has not shown a consistent 
impetus to intervene in this issue so far.  
Perhaps the most realistic solution would be for Parliament to 
continue to legislate as it did in the Health and Social Care Act 2004 and the 
Care Act 2008 to close loopholes in specific circumstances. The commentary 
of academics and civil society could help to flag up instances in which this 
should be done. The fact that it has been done in the past, however, does not 
indicate in itself that Parliament would be willing to do the same in other 
contexts, where individuals are perhaps less vulnerable. Unless and until that 
occurs (or indeed the HRA is amended or appealed), we remain at the mercy 
of the UK judiciary to adopt a broader interpretation of Section 6(3)(b). 
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7.3.3.3 Public liability horizontality and the rights of ‘hybrid’ public 
authorities 
Section 6 HRA is not interesting only regarding the definition of ‘functions 
of a public nature’. As Alexander Williams has repeatedly noted, a deeper 
issue deserves a close analysis: whether or not hybrid public authorities enjoy 
Convention rights themselves when performing public functions.162 It is 
assumed that hybrid public authorities maintain their ECHR rights when 
carrying out private functions, since (remembering Section 6(5) HRA) they 
are not classed as a public authority in this respect.163 The same assumption 
has not been welcomed by some commentators and judges in relation to their 
public functions, whose arguments Williams rejects as lacking sufficient 
analysis to support claims that hybrids cease to enjoy their own rights.164  
Academic discussions of this issue start with the (correct) claim that 
if a body could not be considered to be a ‘victim’ under Article 34 ECHR, 
they do not enjoy Convention rights pursuant to the Human Rights Act. 
Under Section 7(1) HRA, to be classed as a rights-holder an actor must fall 
within the scope of ‘non-governmental organisation’ within Article 34.165 
There is also agreement that ‘core’ public authorities cannot fall within 
Article 34, since they are ‘inherently governmental’.166 However, some 
commentators (and judges) then argue that hybrid public authorities would 
not be included in this definition when performing public functions. The 
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jurisprudence from Strasbourg on this and on State responsibility can be 
helpful in ‘debunking’ the stripping of rights argument, since it ‘cannot 
convincingly’ be regarded as viewing hybrid public authorities as 
governmental organisations for the purposes of Article 34.167  
Williams points out that under liberal theory, it is usually possible to 
distinguish between public and private actors by looking at their motives – 
public actors have to act in the public interest but private actors can act to 
their own ends as long as they stay within the confines of the law.168 Williams 
goes on to argue that for the scholars and judges taking this approach to be 
persuasive (and indeed to show that the Strasbourg jurisprudence is actually 
relevant here),169 they would have to find case law that treated a ‘self-serving 
private organisation’, when carrying out a particular public task, to fall 
outside of the scope of Article 34. However, a clear enough example does not 
exist. If anything, the ECtHR has decided to the contrary, ruling that if an 
actor has ‘predominantly self-serving commercial motives’ it will not be 
considered a governmental organisation for Article 34.170  
Williams points out that it is not actually difficult to allow ‘hybrids’ 
to enjoy their human rights. It would simply mean that they could still make 
a claim against a public authority themselves, or that they could use them as 
a ‘defence’ when accused of violating someone else’s rights (using the 
second paragraph of the relevant Convention right).171 This defence would of 
course be difficult for them to use – the justifications found in the second 
paragraph of Convention rights has been restricted to ‘matters relevant to a 
government body and not of any non-public body’.172 It would most of all be 
difficult for hybrids to rely on the ‘protection of the rights of others’ 
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justification, since they would be trying to argue that they were doing this by 
‘advancing’ their own right.173 This means that the ‘horizontal’ nature of the 
case should be taken into account to some extent, otherwise it wouldn’t be 
possible for the hybrid to rely on their own rights in practice.  
To avoid any non-protection of the rights of hybrids, the same 
approach should be taken as under the common law in a case of indirect 
horizontal effect whereby the court is under an obligation to act compatibly 
with the ECHR and can thereby use the defendant’s human rights as a 
‘defence’ for a private actor (on the basis that to develop the common law in 
another way would require the court to breach its own obligations under 
Sections 6(1) and 6(3)(a) HRA).174 This would result in the court balancing 
the rights of both parties. It should be at this later stage of balancing that the 
impact of upholding one party’s rights against the other party’s rights should 
be discussed, rather than at the earlier stage of deciding whether a party is a 
hybrid public authority or not.175  
Under this approach, which Williams has dubbed the ‘chameleonic 
model’, a case starts as a vertical one against a public authority but then the 
hybrid’s rights come into play and the dispute actually changes ‘to take on a 
more horizontal character.’176 In this sense, chameleonic horizontal effect is 
‘neither a purely “vertical” nor “horizontal” framework of rights protection 
against hybrid public authorities.’177  
Taking this approach, the horizontal effect arising from section 
6(3)(b) HRA is actually quite in line with indirect horizontal effect as 
explained above and applied in the case law of the UK courts in cases 
regarding common law disputes between two private actors.178 The 
difference between them, as Williams explains, is that under indirect 
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horizontal effect, ‘Convention rights [are applied] to the law rather than 
generating a cause of action directly against the defendant itself, as the hybrid 
scheme does.’179 There is also a difference in the scope of cases in which an 
individual could claim a violation of their rights. Under the common law 
approach, the individual has to prove that if the court did not take their rights 
into account in a case, the court would be liable before Strasbourg. This is 
not the case under the chameleonic model, because the hybrid scheme creates 
new Convention remedies that are not available against the State itself (these 
are already allowed for elsewhere in the HRA, according to the two ways of 
establishing State responsibility in Strasbourg).180 Under the hybrid scheme, 
as long as the claim falls within the scope of one of the ECHR rights, the 
claimant does not need to prove that the State would be liable for breach of 
rights at Strasbourg. 
Williams ultimately uses chameleonic horizontal effect as an 
argument for adopting a broader interpretation of Section 6(3)(b) – if being 
considered a ‘hybrid’ public authority would strip a private actor of their 
rights, this would be a good impetus for courts to take a narrow perspective. 
If, however, their rights are unaffected by the fact that they carry out public 
functions, there would be less reason to adopt a restrictive interpretation of 
public functions.181  
7.3.4 Other types of horizontal effect in the HRA 
As well as those discussed, other theories of horizontal effect deriving from 
the HRA have been put forward. One of these has been labelled ‘intermediate 
horizontal effect’ by Ian Leigh,182 and is the most similar theory so far to 
indirect horizontal effect at the international and regional levels. While 
stemming from Section 6 HRA, it does not depend on the classification of a 
private actor as a ‘public authority’ by reason of it carrying out public 
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functions. Rather, it ‘occurs where an individual is able to bring an action 
against a public body for failing to protect Convention rights, when this 
failure stemmed from the actions of a private individual.’183 If successful, an 
argument of intermediate horizontal effect may indirectly impose an 
obligation on a private actor to act in an ECHR-compliant manner.184 Ian 
Leigh’s intermediate horizontal effect is very similar, if not the same, as what 
Stefan Somers terms ‘system responsibility’, which amounts to ‘the 
responsibility of the state to protect human rights in horizontal 
relationships’.185 This type of horizontality seems to have been adopted by 
Sir Terence Etherton in the recent case of Watts v Stewart.186 
Alison Young contrasts intermediate horizontal effect with indirect 
horizontal effect. Under intermediate horizontal effect, the ‘primary legal 
obligation rests with the state’, and private parties cannot be subject to legal 
action requiring them to act compatibly with ECHR rights,187 whereas under 
indirect horizontal effect the cause of action is directly against the private 
actor. With intermediate horizontal effect, the consequence of a successful 
claim is that the private party is still required to act in a way that is ECHR-
compliant, which the State has to ensure (i.e. obligation to protect at the 
international level).188 
Young also explains that the nature of the obligation imposed on the 
private actor is different under intermediate and indirect horizontal effect. 
Under indirect horizontal effect the private actor is placed under an obligation 
to act in an ECHR-compliant manner vis-à-vis the claimant. This creates a 
‘Hohfeldian claim right’, which entails a correlative duty on behalf of the 
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private actor.189 With intermediate horizontal effect, there is legislation to 
make sure that private actors do not act in a certain way, but the claimant is 
not capable of bringing an action against the actor. Instead, they are reliant 
on the State to prosecute the private actor. If there were an instance where 
rights (e.g. privacy) were interfered with but the State did not prosecute the 
private actor, then the individual would be able to bring a case against the 
State for failing to protect their right to privacy.190 The obligations under 
intermediate horizontal effect are placed on the State but there is no claim 
right – it is more that the State has the power which creates liability to 
prosecution for the private actor. Ian Leigh describes the duty on the State as 
a fencing duty.191  
Even more forms of horizontal effect have been said to exist by virtue 
of the HRA. Thomas Raphael identifies a theory that does not derive from a 
particular provision within the HRA, but exists simply because the Act does. 
It is labelled ‘developmental influence’ and is similar to ‘indirect horizontal 
effect’ but means simply that the HRA as a whole will be considered by the 
courts when they are developing rules of common law (as happens with other 
legislation as well).192 The same theory is considered by Alison Young under 
the label of ‘background horizontality’. Under this theory, it is the HRA itself 
that motivates the courts to develop common law compatibly with the ECHR, 
although there is no obligation for them to do so.193  
7.4 Importing human rights into private law 
The second context in which horizontal effect of the Human Rights Act has 
been heavily discussed relates to the importation of human rights into private 
common law. There has been a distinction made between the function of 
human rights values in public and private law disputes.194 In public law cases, 
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human rights defend inferiorly positioned individuals against the powerful 
State, whereas in private law cases, the invocation of human rights is more 
of an argumentative tool. In private law, human rights arguably act as 
‘diamonds to be traded with others or discarded by choice’.195 In this sense, 
an argument that human rights should not have direct application between 
private individuals is understandable. However, the use of this analogy also 
suggests that the rights in question merely function as tools with which to 
strengthen arguments. Treating human rights only as an argumentative tool 
assumes that the presumed formally equal relationship between the 
individuals party to the dispute exists in fact. In reality, many instances in 
which individuals wish to invoke their rights in private law disputes involve 
a factually ‘superior’ actor that has the ability to abuse its own power, thereby 
infringing the rights of the more vulnerable individual. There is therefore a 
growing need to ‘counterbalance excessive dominances by private powers to 
the detriment of less powerful private actors’.196 Through the construction of 
the Human Rights Act and their obligations to act compliantly with the 
ECHR, it has fallen to judges in private law litigations to fill the resulting gap 
in governance and human rights protection. The result, particularly when the 
competing rights of two private actors must be balanced, can be termed 
‘judicial governance’197 and has led to the assertion by Justin Friedrich Krahé 
that direct horizontal effect is rendered ‘superfluous’ – the ability of judges 
to apply rights through the common law makes it unnecessary for the ECHR 
rights themselves to bind private actors.198 
The way that the judiciary could, should and has imported human 
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Ciacchi and Giovanni Comandé (eds), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the European 
Union: Vol. I and II (Cambridge University Press 2010) 428. 
197 Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European Fundamental Rights, Private Law and Judicial 
Governance’ in Hans Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 124-25. 




rights into private common law has resulted in a plethora of scholarly 
opinions on the matter. Within the discussions and suggestions can be found 
many of the theories of direct and indirect horizontal effect explained above. 
Before the Human Rights Act came into force in 2000, its potential impact 
on common law rules applicable between two private parties was expected to 
be its ‘area of greatest obscurity’.199 In this context, Susan Pascoe has warned 
that because of ‘increased recognition that human rights norms…affect the 
private sphere, the borders between public and private law are becoming 
progressively blurred.’200 A similar statement could be made in relation to 
the Section 6(3)(b) HRA. This section of the present chapter will take 
examples from some of the most prevalent legal scholars and examine the 
approach that the courts have taken towards developing private common law 
in compliance with the ECHR. 
The scholarly debate was started by Sir William Wade QC, who 
believed that the HRA would have direct horizontal effect for two reasons. 
The first was on a literal reading of Section 6(1) HRA, which he understood 
to include a categorical duty for courts to comply with the ECHR in all cases, 
regardless of whether the parties were public or private entities.201 Gavin 
Phillipson has rejected this argument, particularly by using the reasoning that 
in order to bring a case against another private actor, an individual must be 
able to allege that the defendant has ‘acted, or are threatening to act, 
unlawfully’.202 However, using the simple (and logical) reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal, an applicant has no HRA cause of action ‘if the applicant 
did not assert any cause of action against the [private actor] under the 
HRA.’203 The second part of Wade’s argument is based on the ‘spirit’ of the 
law, rather than a literal reading. Taking this approach, Wade understood 
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human rights to be universal values, which ‘ought…to be operative erga 
omnes’; he believed there to have been recent developments in the Western 
world which gave citizens a legitimate expectation that they could uphold 
their rights against each other, as well as against public actors.204 While many 
scholars have tended to favour indirect horizontal effect, Wade has received 
some support for his views.205  
Sir Wade further believed that drawing a distinction between public 
and private authorities was actually unnecessary. Since the courts are obliged, 
as a public authority themselves, to act compatibly with the ECHR in all 
cases, it made no practical difference whether the parties themselves were 
public authorities.206 This view has been heavily criticised by David Pannick 
and Anthony Lester for Wade’s self-pronounced ‘simple’ interpretation of 
the impact of the HRA on private law,207 particularly as he relied on an 
apparently erroneous understanding of their own position on the matter.208 
Pannick and Lester take further issue with Wade’s argument because it 
‘makes nonsense of’ the clear distinctions made in Sections 6, 7 and 8 HRA 
between private actors and public authorities mentioned above.209 
Nevertheless, other scholars believe that the HRA has given direct 
horizontal effect. For example, Bennett claims this in relation to privacy, and 
to some extent also defamation.210 He explains the establishment of the ‘new 
tort’ of misuse of private information (discussed below), starting with 
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd,211 followed by several other 
cases regarding the protection of individuals’ privacy from the press.212 He 
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then examines the McKennitt v Ash case and the case of Applause Store 
Productions Ltd v Raphael, both of which concerned two private 
individuals.213 Through the case law he sees a definite move away from 
breach of confidence towards a new tort on misuse of private information, 
which has become broader and is based on Articles 8 and 10 ECHR.214 The 
final result for Bennett is that the Convention rights are directly applicable 
between two private parties where there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The views of other scholars on this point will be addressed through 
an examination of the relevant case law. 
7.4.1 Importing human rights into common law: jurisprudence  
The courts began importing human rights into the common law at an early 
stage after the entry into force of the Human Rights Act. In Douglas v Hello! 
Ltd (No. 1)215 Sedly LJ stated that even if there is no direct horizontal effect 
or carte blanche for individuals to claim a breach of rights by others, once 
there is an existing cause of action against another individual (i.e. in private 
law), the relationship between the private parties can be directly affected if 
the Convention rights are invoked.216 While this gives an indication that some 
form of indirect horizontal effect would be favoured by the courts, much 
more indication was given in the Campbell case. 
In Campbell the judges seemed to favour indirect horizontal effect,217 
modifying a rule of common law so as to protect Convention rights, which 
put an obligation on a private actor to act in a specific way.218 Phillipson has 
examined the individual opinions of the judges in the case. For the majority, 
Lady Hale appeared to endorse strong indirect horizontal effect, stating that 
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‘the court as a public authority must act compatibly with both parties’ 
Convention rights’.219 This finding corresponds with a statement of the Lord 
Chancellor in the parliamentary debates on the HRA that according to the 
government that ‘it is right as a matter of principle for the courts to have the 
duty of acting compatibly with the Convention not only in cases involving 
other public authorities but also in developing the common law in deciding 
cases between citizens’.220  
Lord Hope also seemed to favour strong indirect horizontal effect, but 
only in so far as it required compliance by the courts with Article 10 ECHR, 
rather than the ECHR more generally.221 Interestingly, each judge in the 
Campbell case took a different approach towards horizontal effect, how and 
whether it should apply. While they all referred to Strasbourg jurisprudence 
in coming to their conclusions, this is not enough on its own to be able to say 
that it has ‘settled’ the issue of horizontal effect arising from the HRA.222 
Interestingly, in the subsequent case of Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No. 3),223 the 
Court of Appeal conflated the views of Lady Hale and Lord Nicholls in 
Campbell.224 The former had, as mentioned, endorsed strong indirect 
horizontal effect, while Lord Nicholls favoured weak indirect horizontal 
effect, opting to see Section 6(1) as placing a duty on the court to take account 
of the values found in the ECHR rather than a duty to amend existing 
common law to bring it in line with the Convention rights.225 Phillipson’s 
conclusions on how the courts have treated horizontal effect match the views 
of Young referred to above – that the courts have left themselves the ‘ability 
to bring Convention principles into private law’ but have not accepted 
themselves to be bound to act compliantly with them.226 A primary way in 
which this has been achieved has been by effectively dodging any concrete 
                                                 
219 Campbell (n 45) 546 (Lady Hale), quoted in Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9) 158. 
220 Lord Chancellor, HL Deb vol. 583 col 783 24 November 1997, cited in Ewing (n 30) 89. 
221 See Campbell (n 45) para 114, cited in Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9) 158-159. 
222 Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9) 158-167. 
223 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No. 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125. 
224 See Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 9). 
225 See for discussion, ibid. 




discussion of the abundance of academic literature on the topic.227 
According to Thomas Bennett, the significance of the Campbell case 
lies in its creation of a new tort of misuse of private information.228 However, 
when the wording of the Lords in the decision is examined more closely, they 
appeared to be intending to build on previous developments in the common 
law; Phillipson notes that the Lords may have played down or been unaware 
of the significance of the development they brought about in Campbell and 
they can by no means be said to have intended to create a new, separate cause 
of action, whatever its effects in practice.229 Indeed, the Lords seem to have 
agreed with Pannick and Lesters’ suggestion that ‘instead of creating a free-
standing private law cause of action for breach of article 8, the courts should 
further develop the law protecting confidences incrementally’.230 In making 
this suggestion, the scholars reject Sir William Wade’s approach (similar to 
that of Bennett), which would have allowed the former, more drastic judicial 
action. The tort, described by the Court of Appeal in Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
(No.3) as ‘the action previously known as breach of confidence’ has 
subsequently been accepted by the UK courts. 231 The view of Pannick and 
Lester regarding an incremental development of the law aligns well with 
Phillipson and Williams’ constitutional constraint model, mentioned 
above.232 Incremental development was also predicted in Oliver’s statement 
that, ‘as anticipated by the Lord Chancellor…[the courts will] develop the 
common law and equity incrementally to protect parties against what would 
be breaches’ of the ECHR had they been carried out by public authorities.233 
 The case law of English courts regarding the importation of the HRA 
into private common law disputes still appears to be relatively open. 
Certainly, the judges have been less concrete than scholars in this area, who 
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have provided significant guidance in the hopes that the courts will follow a 
particular model. It does seem, at least in relation to privacy, that the judiciary 
has taken on an incremental development approach, even though some 
developments appear quite radical when taken at face value. An example of 
recent jurisprudence from a different context will be examined in the 
following section. 
7.4.2 A recent example: McDonald v McDonald  
At the time of writing, the most significant recent case heard in the United 
Kingdom that dealt with horizontal effect in private law was that of 
McDonald v McDonald, in 2016.234 This case is also a good example of the 
practical effect that Section 6(3)(b) HRA can have, when private entities in a 
similar position to public authorities are not classed by the court as public 
authorities for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. The case was appealed 
to the UK Supreme Court and involved a woman (the claimant) who had 
suffered from psychiatric and behavioural problems since she was a child. 
The claimant, now in her forties, was renting a house from her parents, who 
had bought the house with a mortgage from Capital Home Loans Ltd. When 
the parents’ mortgage payments went into default, the claimant was served 
with a notice that her tenancy would be terminated. She filed a complaint 
against the possession order, which was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme 
Court.  
The Supreme Court, as the Court of Appeal before it, did not reject 
the applicant’s claim that Article 8 ECHR was relevant to the case, since the 
possession order would have a large impact on her ability to enjoy her home. 
It did not find, however, that the right was applicable to the situation at hand, 
which would have allowed the claimant to use Article 8 as a ‘proportionality 
defence’ against the mandatory possession order under Section 21(4) 
Housing Act 1988.235 However, according to Sarah Nield, if an infringement 
of an ECHR right is to be justified (possible, e.g., through the second 
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paragraph of Article 8), ‘the principle that no individual should bear an excess 
burden’ is of paramount importance.236 To this principle, an assessment of 
proportionality of the infringement is fundamental.237 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court in McDonald explicitly referred to two previous cases when stating that 
‘it is, in principle, open to an occupier to raise’ the issue of proportionality of 
an order for possession against them, and ‘to incite the court to take that into 
account when deciding what kind of order to take’ (having already explained 
that there are several options open to the court other than granting a 
possession order).238 The cases referred to, however, concerned possession 
orders on behalf of public authorities under Section 6 of the Human Rights 
Act rather than the private entity that was involved in McDonald.239 
In the case of Manchester City Council v Pinnock in particular, the 
decision was made by the Supreme Court to follow the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on the matter to allow (albeit it in limited circumstances) 
assessments of proportionality to be made regarding public authorities.240 
This was possible because of the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on the matter. The jurisprudence did not extend to cover cases 
in which the landlord was a private entity, in relation to which the Supreme 
Court found that ‘clear and authoritative’ jurisprudence was lacking.241 Nield, 
however, provides examples of cases that could have been relied upon to 
allow the Supreme Court to read a proportionality assessment into the 
McDonald case. In doing so, she criticises the Supreme Court’s lack of 
engagement with intermediate horizontal effect, which can be found in the 
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case law of the ECtHR.242 The first example that Nield gives is the fairly 
recent case of Zehentner v Austria.243 Like McDonald, this case concerned a 
claimant who had suffered from a mental health condition, which had 
resulted in her being detained in hospital. While in hospital, she was unable 
to meet a deadline for contesting the forced sale of her home. Because of the 
lack of safeguards available for individuals placed in such a vulnerable 
position, Austria was found responsible for a breach of its positive obligation 
under Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR (the right to property) to ‘safeguard the 
mentally disabled embroiled in enforcement proceedings’.244 Nield suggests 
that similar reasoning, which in Zehentner focused on the vulnerability of the 
claimant due to her health, could have been adopted in McDonald which 
would have led to a proportionality assessment. The Supreme Court, 
however, used the facts of the case to decline to follow it in McDonald, 
relying on the fact that the dispute in Zehentner was not about a possession 
order.245 
In McDonald, the Supreme Court reiterated this, noting that the 
respondent in the case could not be considered a public authority under 
Section 6 HRA.246 At no point in the judgment did the Court delve into further 
details on the distinction between public authorities and private actors, or 
whether the private landlord could be treated as a ‘functional’ public 
authority under Section 6 (3)(b). Significantly, in contrast to the cases 
discussed above, the Court refrained from discussing theories of horizontal 
effect altogether.247 While Susan Pascoe notes that this is understandable in 
light of the ‘plethora of models’ of horizontal effect, the lack of clarity in 
approach does seem to have left lower courts without clear guidance on the 
horizontality of Article 8.248 
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When discussing the claimant’s argument that the protection afforded 
in Pinnock should equally apply vis-à-vis private landlord, the Court raised 
the point that unlike public authorities, private landlords are entitled to their 
own protection under the ECHR in such cases – notably under Article 1 
Protocol 1 (the right to property).249 The issue of an individual bearing an 
‘excess burden’ raised by Nield came into play here, as the Supreme Court 
examined the correct balance to be struck between the two private actors’ 
human rights. The Court concluded that the balance was not theirs to make, 
but rather had already been judged and implemented accordingly by 
Parliament through the Housing Act 1988. Since the parties were in a 
contractual relationship regulated by legislation, it would be for Parliament, 
not the courts, to amend the protection of both parties’ rights within the 
relationship;250 as Murray Hunt has stated, ‘private relationships are left 
undisturbed insofar as they are not [already] regulated by law’.251 
Other cases from the ECtHR, two of which even involved possession 
orders and private landlords, were similarly rejected by the Supreme Court.252 
The judges in McDonald were of the opinion that should they come to a 
different conclusion regarding the proportionality assessment, they would 
make the ECHR ‘effectively…directly enforceable as between two citizens 
direct so as to alter their contractual rights and obligations’, i.e. give direct 
horizontal effect to Article 8 in this case. The Court strongly believed that 
this was not the intention behind the Convention. Susan Pascoe takes issue 
with the conclusion of the Supreme Court, claiming it to be ‘incongruous to 
                                                 
249 McDonald (n 234) para 39. 
250 ibid para 46. 
251 Hunt (n 7) 434, as cited in Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and 
the Common Law’ (n 3) 831. This view is also taken by Pannick and Lester, who (as Hunt 
did) follow the methodology of Kriegler J in the case of Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 
850, CC according to which human rights only come into play between private actors where 
the State owes a positive obligation to protect one individual’s human rights from harm by 
the other. See Pannick and Lester (n 51) 384-385.  
252 See Zrilić v Croatia, App No. 46726/11 (3 October 2013); Brežec v Croatia, App No. 
7177/10 (18 July 2013); and Belchikova v Russia, App No. 2408/06 (25 March 2010), 
discussed in McDonald (n 234) paras 51-54. 
HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
285 
use the ground of contract and statute’ (referring here to the Court’s finding 
that Parliament had already struck a balance within the applicable legislation, 
which continued to reflect Parliament’s views on the matter) regarding 
private landlords, when housing associations classed as ‘public authorities’ 
for Section 6 HRA would also rely on the contract and statute.253 
Although the ECtHR cases mentioned thus far would seem to lead to 
a conclusion contrary to that of the Supreme Court, Andrew Dymond has 
brought attention to a case decided after McDonald by the European Court 
which ‘echoes that of the Supreme Court in McDonald.’254 The case, Vrzić v 
Croatia, dealt with mortgage possession proceedings that had been brought 
by a private individual.255 The Court considered previous cases in which it 
had held that anyone whose right to respect for their home was at risk of 
interference ‘should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the 
measure determined by an independent tribunal’ in line with Article 8 
ECHR.256 However, a distinction could be drawn in Vrzić because the 
proceedings were instigated by a private actor (as in McDonald) and did not 
concern a ‘State-owned or socially-owned’ dwelling; the Court’s findings of 
a right to a proportionality defence in previous cases had not required a 
consideration of another private interest, which was at stake in Vrzić (as in 
McDonald).257 Pascoe nonetheless claims that Vrzić only supports McDonald 
to an ‘extremely limited’ degree.258 She bases this on the fact that the outcome 
in Vrzić depended heavily on the fact that judicial procedural safeguards (the 
existence of which the State is obliged to afford) available to the claimants, 
who had failed to make use of them.259 This contrasts with McDonald, where 
no safeguards were open to the claimant (as in Zehentner v Austria).260  
Ultimately, the decision in McDonald leaves future judges in 
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somewhat of a ‘straightjacket’, as it leaves very little room for a finding that 
Article 8 allows individuals a proportionality defence against private 
landlords pursuing possession orders. Pascoe suggests that the case could 
‘reflect the biases of the judges’ who may act as private landlords. Rather 
than seeking a judicial solution to provide increased protection for vulnerable 
individuals in the position of Ms. McDonald as well as private landlords 
whose property is at risk, Pascoe suggests that such action should come 
directly from the Government.261  
7.5 Concluding reflections on the horizontal effect of international 
human rights within the United Kingdom 
Any conclusions drawn on the (future of) horizontal effect of human rights 
within the UK must be made lightly in the face of possible change in the 
legislative framework. While Brexit may have bought the Human Rights Act 
a grace period, it is likely that it will be either amended or repealed by the 
Conservative party once the Brexit process has been concluded. That being 
said, the effect of even a repeal of the HRA may not actually be that drastic 
in relation to some areas of law. It would remove any possibility of the ECHR 
rights having direct horizontal effect in the UK, since the courts would no 
longer be under an obligation to interpret legislation in a way that is 
compatible with ECHR rights.262 However, the indirect horizontal effect of 
human rights in common law proceedings may not be under immediate 
threat. The common law that has already been modified so as to comply with 
the ECHR (which the court is obliged to do under Section 6(1)) has the effect 
of creating an obligation for a private actor equating in practice to an 
obligation to respect the human rights of others through the common law. 
These modifications would continue to exist after repeal of the HRA, at least 
until future cases challenged the precedent that had been set by the cases 
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establishing the obligations.263 
 Conclusions can of course be drawn on the basis of the legislation 
itself and existing jurisprudence on the matter. There does not seem to be a 
viable argument that there is direct horizontal effect by virtue of the HRA. 
Even in those cases in which Section 6(3)(b) can be invoked to categorise a 
private actor as a hybrid public authority, no true horizontal effect is achieved 
– it still does not hold non-State actors responsible for human rights standards 
as private actors. The test for determining whether a private actor is one 
‘certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature’ has been 
inconsistently applied by the courts, and has in some instances led to such 
severe consequences for the protection of human rights that Parliament has 
felt the need to intervene. Many calls have been made for the courts to adopt 
a purely functional test for Section 6(3)(b), which would echo the distinctions 
made in the provision itself. A test completely reliant upon the functions of 
an actor would rather not mention whether the actors would be public or 
private in nature at all. The HRA goes beyond this distinction, which is a very 
positive step in terms of broadening the scope of potential human rights 
protection, but it still contains this distinction. The fact that it is still framed 
so strongly in terms of ‘private’ or ‘public’ actors makes it easier for courts 
applying it to be more conservative in their application, as the extremely 
strong historical connotations accompanying the public/private divide are 
very hard to dispel. Unfortunately, despite claims that the public/private 
distinction is becoming outdated, coming up with an alternative in the context 
of the HRA would be a formidable task. 
The situation does not, unfortunately, seem much more hopeful in 
relation to indirect horizontal effect and the application of the Human Rights 
Act in private common law cases. While there now exist many different 
theories of indirect horizontal effect, giving judges a plentiful supply from 
which to choose an approach, they seem to prefer not to engage with the 
considerable scholarly expertise to come to a concrete approach. It was seen 
on the one hand that the courts have taken a somewhat more open approach 
                                                 




in cases concerning the tort of ‘misuse of private information’, having 
developed the previous tort of breach of confidence in the Campbell case to 
bring it into conformity with the Human Rights Act. On the other hand, 
though, the courts took a very restrictive approach in McDonald v McDonald 
which resulted in a gap in human rights protection. While the approach of the 
Supreme Court was commendable from the perspective that it gave 
considerable deference to Parliament and did not encroach on parliamentary 
sovereignty, the Lords were quick to reject jurisprudence from Strasbourg 
that could have aided in providing a vulnerable individual with human rights 
protection.  
It also seems that, like at the regional and international level, the UK 
domestic courts treat horizontal effect differently in relation to different 
rights. In particular, they have used the Human Rights Act to substantially 
(although incrementally) develop the protection of privacy in the common 
law. Phillipson and Williams suggest that this is for several reasons, in 
particular that there was an ‘embarrassing’ gap in the protection of privacy 
prior to the HRA, and that it seemed very unlikely that Parliament would 
bridge the gap by adopting legislation.264 The reason for greater 
developments in privacy could also be because it is regulated by common 
law. From the case law examined above (particularly the Campbell and 
McDonald cases) it appears that the UK courts adopt a much stricter 
perspective when dealing with issues that are regulated by statute, as opposed 
to issues arising under the common law. Perhaps in order to protect 
parliamentary sovereignty in this area, the courts have refused to carry out 
any balancing exercise of their own between the rights of two private 
individuals, claiming that a balance has already been struck within the 
relevant legislation. In light of this, and in order to correctly find the balance 
between the protection of rights and protection of the common law, it would 
be wise to heed Young’s words when she states that ‘the extent to which 
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Convention rights should create obligations for private parties [is] best 
resolved within the particular framework of each Convention right.’265 
  Overall, the judges in the UK courts have seemed reluctant to delve 
too far into theories of horizontal effect of human rights in recent cases, at 
least in terms of endorsing a particular theory as being generally applicable. 
Instead, the case law shows that judges have often tended to avoid the 
language of horizontal effect entirely (e.g. in McDonald). They also seem to 
have favoured different approaches according to the circumstances of a case 
– in relation to privacy and the common law, for example, the judges have 
been instrumental in developing the new tort of misuse of private 
information, which allows for a degree of indirect horizontal effect. In the 
context of housing and possession orders that are regulated by statute, the 
courts have taken a much stricter stance. Taken together with the 
inconsistencies of the jurisprudence on hybrid public authorities, while the 
law on privacy is becoming clearer, substantial problems of consistency and 
clarity remain in relation to the horizontal effect of human rights in the United 
Kingdom. Any replacement or amendment to the Human Rights Act – on 
pause for the moment – should carefully take these issues into consideration. 
 Finally, the findings of this chapter must be seen in light of the present 
book as a whole. The chapter has provided an example of how domestic legal 
systems may deal with the impact of non-State actors on the enjoyment of 
human rights. While the Human Rights Act is particular to the UK, and the 
common law system is found in relatively few states, the matters discussed 
in this chapter highlight challenges that could be faced by many different 
national legal systems. These include the point at which private actors 
conducting public functions should, or could, be placed under a legal 
obligation to act in the human rights-compliant manner expected of State 
actors and the role of human rights in private law disputes. Further, this 
chapter has shown that the aforementioned reluctance of the judiciary to 
engage with theories and scholarly debates on horizontal effect can lead to 
challenges of conceptual clarity at the national level similar to those at the 
                                                 




regional, and especially international level. As will be seen in Chapter 8, the 
findings of the theories and particularly the use of horizontal effect in the 
United Kingdom also constitute helpful points of comparison with the uses 
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A critical analysis of the current 
horizontal effect of international human 
rights law at the international, regional 
and national levels1 
 
8.1 Preliminary remarks 
The previous five chapters of this book (3-7) addressed whether, how and to 
what extent the horizontal effect of international human rights occurs at the 
international, regional and national levels. With the exception of a handful of 
treaty provisions at the international and regional levels that could be viewed 
as applying to non-State actors, the analysis has shown a lack of direct 
horizontal effect in these systems. Even considering the exceptions found in 
human rights treaties, the current constraints of the international human rights 
framework mean that the provisions cannot actually be applied against non-
State actors. More examples were provided in Chapter 3 regarding 
developments towards the direct horizontal effect of international human 
rights law outside of binding, international human rights law (e.g. within soft-
law instruments, adjudicatory bodies outside of human rights law and some 
recent domestic case law and legislation). However, within the field of human 
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rights and in the work of human rights adjudicatory bodies, the findings 
demonstrated that overwhelmingly, indirect rather than direct horizontal 
effect features on all three levels examined. Unquestionably, within the 
jurisprudence of human rights monitoring bodies and courts on each level, 
there has been no direct horizontal effect of human rights. The extent to which 
the results provide further protection for individuals against the harmful 
actions of non-State actors varies, however. Several different bases and 
methods of indirect horizontal effect can be identified within the systems 
examined. This chapter will critically analyse the findings of the previous 
chapters, starting with a more general critique of indirect horizontal effect 
before identifying and explaining three main models of indirect horizontal 
effect: (1) diagonal indirect horizontal effect; (2) categorical indirect 
horizontal effect; and (3) value-driven indirect horizontal effect. 
8.2 General critical remarks on indirect horizontal effect 
It should be quite clear by now that indirect horizontal effect has different 
consequences at the national, regional and international levels. While, as 
explained below, the methods used and bases relied upon at the regional and 
international level are very similar, indirect horizontal effect at the national 
level can be very different. Chapter 7 analysed horizontal effect within the 
United Kingdom, in relation to the HRA 1998. One of the most problematic 
aspects of indirect horizontal effect in this context, when applied in private 
law cases, has been highlighted by Hugh Collins. He points out that bringing 
human rights into private law cases blurs the traditional boundaries between 
public law, which governs State-citizen relationships, and private law, which 
governs inter-citizen relationships.2 Collins admits that blurring the 
distinction between the two kinds of law in itself may not be problematic, but 
underlines the importance of the boundaries and the reason that they were 
established in the first place.3 While public law, and human (or fundamental) 
                                                 
2 Hugh Collins, ‘On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law’ in 
Hans Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford University Press 
2014) 34.  
3 ibid 35.  
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rights in particular evolved to protect individuals from the potential abuse of 
power by the State, private law evolved with much more economic interests 
at its centre – although still protecting individuals from harms, and to some 
extent dealing with human rights, Collins states that the specific rights 
mentioned in private law (predominantly property and liberty-related) 
discourse diverge from those found in public law discourse.4 Additionally, he 
notes, ‘the rights mentioned in the discourses of private law, if referred to at 
all, appear to weigh less heavily than those protected in the context of public 
law.’5 His main point here is that to bring human rights into private law cases 
would be to use them for a ‘function outside their original scope and 
purpose.’6 However, this appears to be quite a narrow perspective – while the 
scope and purpose of rights must be considered, it is clear from the (private) 
case law in which indirect horizontal effect has been applied that using rights 
in this way has been able to fill gaps by providing protection for individuals’ 
interests that would not otherwise be afforded.7 In addition, the use of indirect 
horizontal effect in the UK private law has not had extremely drastic results 
– although admittedly a new cause of action can be said to have been created 
following the case of Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd,8 individual 
modifications to the law have been incremental. The blurring of the 
boundaries between public and private is exacerbated not necessarily by the 
use of indirect horizontal effect in itself, but in the way that (as seen in 
Chapter 7 and mentioned below) the judiciary has not been particularly clear 
in explaining the theoretical reasoning behind it using human rights to modify 
rules of common law, avoiding meaningful engagement with the plethora of 
scholarly opinion on the matter. The distinction has been further blurred by 
the ways in which the UK courts have defined ‘hybrid’ public authorities in 
                                                 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid.  
6 ibid.  
7 Overall, the horizontal application of fundamental and human rights in this manner should 
be considered a ‘positive phenomenon’. See Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European 
Fundamental Rights, Private Law and Judicial Governance’ in Hans Micklitz (ed), 
Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 136. 




Section 6(3)(b) HRA.9 By treating some actors as private and falling outside 
of the scope of protection afforded by the HRA because of a restrictive 
approach as to what constitutes ‘a person certain of whose functions are 
functions of a public nature’ (although the same actions fall within the HRA 
when carried out by a public authority), as occurred in the case of YL v 
Birmingham City Council,10 the courts have made it difficult to see what the 
distinction between public and private really is. As Stephanie Palmer has 
pointed out, the situation is reminiscent of ‘Dicey’s premise that the Rule of 
Law admits of no separation between public and private law’.11 
However, while a lack of distinction between public and private law 
may be problematic, one has to question the extent to which the boundary 
between public and private per se remains useful in a society where many 
‘private’ actors carry out ‘public’ tasks and where many ‘private’ actors are 
placed in a similar position to ‘public’ actors in terms of their ability to 
negatively impact (and in some situations even to realise) the enjoyment of 
human rights. Such considerations have called into question whether the 
public-private divide is useful or unhelpful as a construct,12 particularly for 
deciding which actors should be subject to human rights obligations. While 
it is evidently well-entrenched in the United Kingdom, it may be possible to 
base an argument that a particular actor should have human rights obligations 
on a factor other than their public nature, for example their capacity, 
resources, or the level of impact that they can have on the enjoyment of 
                                                 
9 For an interesting discussion of this, see Stephanie Palmer, ‘Public, Private and the Human 
Rights Act 1998: An Ideological Divide’ (2007) 66(3) Cambridge Law Journal 559. 
10 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] EWCA Civ 26; [2008] QB 1. 
11 Palmer (n 9), citing Albert V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(10th edn, Macmillan 1959). 
12 Such criticisms, based on the normative consequences of the divide, have been made in the 
context of domestic and international law. See e.g. Christine Chinkin, ‘A Critique of the 
Public/Private Dimension’ (1999) 10(2) European Journal of International Law 387; 
Catherine Moore, ‘Women and Domestic Violence: The Public/Private Dichotomy in 
International Law’ (2003) 7(4) The International Journal of Human Rights 93; and William 
Lucy and Alexander Williams, ‘Public and Private: Neither Deep nor Meaningful?’ in Kit 
Barker and Darryn Jensen (eds), Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2013). 
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human rights. A discussion of this falls outside the scope of the present book, 
but has been the subject of several academic studies.13   
Indirect horizontal effect can also be criticised for its lack of 
precision. Thomas Bennett, for example, has declared it to be ‘an inexact 
method for the supposed protection of what are meant to the basic, 
fundamental rights of individuals’.14 Stated in the context of indirect 
horizontal effect as seen in the UK legal system, Bennett considers indirect 
horizontal effect to be ‘weakened by the fact that it tries to please 
everybody’.15 This criticism should be given due credit, although it certainly 
should not be considered to nullify the significance of indirect horizontal 
effect. On the one hand, the consequence of successful indirect horizontal 
effect cases can be to further human rights protection and (especially at the 
regional and international levels which use States’ obligation to protect 
human rights) to require the State to adopt more effective measures to protect 
individuals from harm by non-State actors. This goes further than a simple 
case-by-case impact, resulting in broader, and perhaps more institutional 
improvements for human rights protection. On the other hand, the positive 
impacts of indirect horizontal effect are constrained by the restrictions of the 
powers of courts to interpret international human rights law in a legitimate 
                                                 
13 The present study has been conducted to assess and suggest proposals for improving the 
respect, protect and fulfilment of human rights and human dignity in light of the impact of 
non-State actors, rather than to argue that (and why) non-State actors should be subject to 
legal human rights obligations. Andrew Clapham, for example, has discussed how human 
rights obligations have on occasion been placed on non-State armed groups because of their 
capacity and willingness to fulfil them. See Andrew Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of 
Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 
491. The idea that some non-State actors should have human rights obligations because of the 
authority that they exercise in society is suggested by the Icelandic Human Rights Centre. See 
Icelandic Human Rights Centre, ‘The Role of Non-State Entities’ 
<http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-
ideas-and-fora/human-rights-actors/the-role-of-non-state-entities> accessed 27 September 
2017. 
14 Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Horizontality’s New Horizons - Re-Examining Horizontal Effect: 






way. Certainly within international law there are accepted limits to 
interpretation, laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.16 
Courts, in abiding by these limits, are often unable to provide victims of 
human rights interference with effective remedies (or even hear cases 
concerning non-State actors) which would otherwise be available had the 
perpetration been done by a State actor. Herein lies the crux of the inadequacy 
of indirect horizontal effect in practice. 
Courts within national legal systems must also be very mindful of 
their role as appliers, rather than makers of law. Within the United Kingdom, 
for example, it was seen in Chapter 7 that the courts have been very careful 
to respect the separation of powers and avoid usurping the role of Parliament 
to make law (e.g. in the case of McDonald v McDonald).17 In respecting these 
boundaries, courts are often unable to provide victims of human rights 
interference with effective remedies that would otherwise be available had 
the perpetration been done by a public actor. Nonetheless, the large amount 
of case law and general comments entailing a degree of indirect horizontal 
effect at least draws attention to the fact that different kinds of non-State 
actors can have a huge and potentially negative impact on individuals’ 
enjoyment of their rights. As well as the use of indirect horizontal effect in 
case law, the attention paid to non-State actors in general comments in 
particular demonstrates that the international human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies are aware of and aim to address human rights interference by non-
State actors. Indirect horizontal effect in this context could thus even be said 
to have an awareness-raising role, as well as providing more concrete 
protection. 
The implications of indirect horizontal effect also compensate to 
some extent for the fact that only States may ratify human rights treaties. 
                                                 
16 See Articles 31 and 32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) UNTS vol. 1155, 331. For an in-depth discussion 
of the rules of interpretation under the Convention, see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias 
and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: 30 Years On (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010). 
17 McDonald v McDonald [2016] SC 28. See Chapter 7.4.2. 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF IHRL 
 
299 
Indirect horizontal effect allows individuals the opportunity to access 
remedies for interferences of their human rights by non-State actors. 
However, the method used varies across the different legal systems studied. 
At the international and regional levels, wherein the human rights provisions 
are directly applied by the adjudicating bodies, individuals are granted access 
to redress by virtue of States’ positive obligation to protect human rights. At 
the national (UK) level on which the international and regional treaties 
containing the human rights provisions are not directly applicable (due to the 
UK’s dualist system), indirect horizontal effect is applied in a different 
manner and with different results, discussed below. The use of indirect 
horizontal effect at the regional and international levels showed that it has 
enabled scholars, law-makers and adjudicatory bodies to consider how 
different kinds of non-State actors interfere with the enjoyment of human 
rights and how States should address this, focusing on States’ obligation to 
protect. Especially in general comments, which have a broader scope than 
individual complaints against a State Party to a human rights treaty, the 
human rights treaty monitoring bodies have been able to consider the treaties 
as ‘living instruments’ to afford the widest possible protection of human 
rights and consider how the treaties should apply in light of the particular 
threats brought by today’s society. Nonetheless, as explained in Chapter 5, 
some non-State actors are left completely outside the application of indirect 
horizontal effect. At the national level, legislation has widened the definition 
of a public actor (thereby extending the amount of cases between public and 
private actors). In addition, courts have been able to bring human rights 
considerations into play in cases between two private actors by applying 
indirect horizontal effect. The three models of indirect horizontal effect 
identified below are based on these findings. 
Before explaining the models, a few final comments need to be made 
regarding indirect horizontal effect from the point of view of different actors. 
First, indirect horizontal effect featured prominently in scholarly works on 
the national, regional and international levels. What is interesting, though, is 
that it was only at the national level that scholars actually used the 




at the international level, most studies are coined in terms of positive 
obligations, ‘horizontality’, or ‘horizontal effect’ more generally. At the 
national level the discussion of theories of indirect horizontal effect threatens 
to become overwhelming, given the large number of theories of indirect 
horizontal effect identified. Although explained very clearly by scholars such 
as Alison Young and Gavin Phillipson, the complex and competing theories 
of indirect horizontal effect, which are not all applied in practice, make it 
perhaps less surprising that the judiciary at the national level has refrained 
from actively engaging with scholarly opinion on the matter.  
At the international and regional levels, too, there was very little 
discussion of the more theoretical aspects of indirect horizontal effect by the 
human rights treaty monitoring bodies and courts. While most invoked 
States’ positive obligations when applying indirect horizontal effect, some 
bodies did not mention, for example, the duty of due diligence, despite clearly 
using the language and elements of the duty. Similarly, while most bodies did 
mention ‘private’ actors, the vast majority did not use the language of 
‘horizontal effect’ in views or general comments. The main exception to this 
was the HRCtee in its statement that the ICCPR does not in general have 
horizontal effect.18 However, the lack of engagement with horizontal effect 
terminology has failed to prevent the monitoring bodies from looking closely 
at the way that States, and in some instances even ‘actors other than States’ 
should act in order to prevent violations of or interference with the enjoyment 
of human rights.19  
                                                 
18 See UN HRCtee, ‘General Comment No. 31: General Legal Obligations Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) CPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 8, discussed in Chapter 
5.2.1. 
19 Action that States should take in relation to non-State actors was seen very clearly in the 
CteeESCR’s general comment on business and human rights. UN CteeESCR, ‘General 
Comment No. 24 on State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities’ (10 August 2017) E/C.12/GC/24. 
Suggestions as to how non-State actors should act were found, for example, in General 
Comment Nos. 14 and 15 of the UN CteeESCR, which both included sections entitled 
‘Obligations of actors other than States’. See UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 
2000) E/C.12/2000/4, Section 5; UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The Right to 
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8.3 The types of horizontal effect applied at the international, regional 
and national levels 
Although the previous chapters of this book discussed many different 
theories of indirect horizontal effect, not all of them have been applied in the 
jurisprudence of the monitoring bodies and courts. The following analysis 
demonstrates the three main models of indirect horizontal effect that were 
applied on the international, regional and national levels: (1) diagonal indirect 
horizontal effect; (2) categorical indirect horizontal effect; and (3) value-
driven indirect horizontal effect.  
(1) Diagonal indirect horizontal effect  
The first and most simple of the three models of indirect horizontal effect is 
‘diagonal’ indirect horizontal effect, so-called because of the diagonal 
trajectory of responsibility for the violation of human rights under this 
method (see Figure 8.1). Diagonal indirect horizontal effect refers to what is 
quite a clear-cut method of acknowledging the harmful effects that non-State 
actors can have on human rights enjoyment. This model of indirect horizontal 
effect was actually explained in Chapter 3.3.1, and holds States responsible 
for the actions of non-State actors under the State’s positive obligation to 
protect human rights. As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the model is extremely 
widely applied in jurisprudence at the international and regional levels. 
Indeed, within the European human rights system, ‘the establishment and 
development of the horizontal effect of the Convention is…in its entirety, a 
consequence of the theory of positive obligations’.20 The reason for this is 
logical – only States can be party to the relevant human rights treaties, and 
only States can be the subject of complaints brought by individuals about 
violations of their rights, even if the harm that occurred was actually directly 
caused by a non-State actor. Therefore, the only way for human rights courts 
                                                 
Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant)’ (20 January 2003) E/C.12/2002/11, Section VI. This 
discussion took place in Chapter 5.3. 
20 Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, ‘Positive Obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights: A guide to the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 




and monitoring bodies on these levels to address the harmful actions of the 
non-State actors is to find a way to hold the State responsible for them. In 
essence, cases in which diagonal indirect horizontal effect is applied have the 
immediate consequence of invoking the international responsibility of the 
State, whilst their outcomes can require a direct standard of behaviour to be 
imposed on the non-State actor at the national level (for example, through 
the adoption of appropriate legislative measures by the State), thereby 
rendering them directly responsible at the national level. The non-State actors 
can be said to be indirectly responsible (although perhaps not in a legal sense) 
at the international level through the acknowledgement that their actions have 
interfered with the enjoyment of human rights and led to a human rights 
violation. Figure 8.1 depicts the diagonal relationship between actors and 
obligations that occurs in diagonal indirect horizontal effect. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Diagonal indirect horizontal effect (source: the author) 
 
The analysis in Chapter 5 showed that diagonal indirect horizontal 
effect is consistently applied by the different human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies, but is sometimes expressed in different manners. One of the main 
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legal, administrative or other appropriate measures to protect individuals 
from non-State actors – to adopt an appropriate framework within the State 
capable of preventing, investigating and punishing instances of non-State 
actor interference with human rights. In other words, the monitoring bodies 
uphold the standards of due diligence. This was found across the range of 
treaty bodies examined and in relation to different kinds of non-State actors, 
including private individuals (i.e. spouses), private companies and private 
providers of public services. This has not been made explicit by each of the 
bodies every time that they appear to apply the obligation (especially for the 
CteeESCR) although the actual standards upheld do appear to be consistent. 
The same outcome was found at the regional level, where different 
terminology was used in the three systems analysed to reflect very similar 
content of obligations and standards. 
The obligation of due diligence has often been applied when the non-
State actor interfering with human rights operates in the purely private 
sphere. At the international level this was particularly true of those 
monitoring bodies dealing with issues of discrimination (i.e. the CteeEDAW 
and CteeERD), which very commonly occurs in purely private relationships 
between two individuals. The jurisprudence from the regional human rights 
systems again showed a lot of congruence with the international bodies in 
this respect (e.g. in the case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States).21 
As explained in Chapter 1.3.3, the duty is one of conduct, rather than result, 
meaning that the test for whether due diligence has been taken rests not on 
the positive outcome of due diligence measures but on the nature and extent 
of measures taken in a particular situation. This has led the international 
monitoring bodies to take an approach of listing possible action to be taken 
in their general comments, although it is not possible to create an exhaustive 
checklist of protective measures to combat every circumstance of human 
rights interference by non-State actors. The general comments have by now 
provided quite an extensive array of measures that States should be taking in 
                                                 





different subject-areas (e.g. regarding employment, or the provision of 
services) or in relation to specific rights within their respective conventions.  
As well as the duty of due diligence (or perhaps even part of it, as the 
bodies’ practice is not clear on this point), diagonal indirect horizontal effect 
can be applied where States have not fulfilled an obligation to regulate private 
actors. The obligation has been upheld in the jurisprudence of each of the UN 
monitoring bodies except for the CteeAT, and is particularly elucidated in the 
context of privatisation or the delegation of ‘public’ tasks to non-State actors, 
as well as in the ‘quasi-public sphere’, such as employment. The same can be 
said of the regional human rights courts (and commissions) which have also 
upheld a State obligation to regulate non-State actors alongside a clear due 
diligence obligation. Examples at the regional level include the well-known 
case of Fadeyeva v Russia22 at the European Court of Human Rights and the 
case of Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil at the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.23 
What is less clear about the interpretation and application of human 
rights by the UN monitoring bodies is to what extent they actually engage 
with the concept of attribution, at least from the perspective of State 
responsibility within international law. Although some of the bodies have 
mentioned that non-State actors’ conduct can be attributed to the State, with 
the exception of the CteeESCR in its general comment on business and 
human rights, none of the bodies have explicitly engaged with the 
International Law Commission’s DASR.24 This begs the question whether 
the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies view ‘attribution’ as simply 
another word for describing the way in which the obligation to protect works 
in practice, thus enabling the ‘attribution’ of non-State conduct to States in 
                                                 
22 Fadeyeva v Russia, App No. 55723/00 (9 June 2005). 
23 Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil, IACHR (Ser. C) No. 149 (4 July 2006). 
24 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (2001) Vol. II Part Two Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (as corrected) A/56/10, 30-143. Of course, this would only be 
possible in their practice after the publication of the DASR in 2001, but is still striking in light 
of the importance the DASR have now gained in international law. 
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the situations where the obligation to protect has not been fulfilled. If so, the 
language used could create confusion amongst international law scholars, 
aggravated by the explicit reference to DASR in the CteeESCR’s General 
Comment No. 24.  
At the regional level the situation is in one sense clearer, in that the 
human rights jurisprudence contains more direct explanations of how the 
conduct of non-State actors is being attributed to the State (although still not 
consistently following the international law rules on attribution). This 
included the case of Fadeyeva v Russia within the European system and the 
Ogoni case in the African system.25 In the Ogoni case, for example, the fact 
that the Nigerian State had ‘given the green light’ to the private company 
whose actions had interfered with the enjoyment of human rights led the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to conclude, in relation 
to some complaints, that the State was responsible for the non-State actors’ 
activities and had violated the human rights.26 In another sense, however, the 
use of ‘attribution’ arguments by the regional human rights courts is less clear 
– the continued use of attribution in connection with an obligation to regulate 
and a broader obligation to protect human rights makes it harder to 
differentiate between the two approaches, if indeed the bodies consider them 
to be different approaches.  
It could be concluded that there are actually two types of diagonal 
indirect horizontal effect – the first based on the obligation to protect human 
rights (including due diligence and an obligation to regulate) and the second 
based on rules of attribution, or at least the finding of a sufficient nexus 
between the State and non-State actor. These could be named (1) protection-
-based diagonal indirect horizontal effect; and (2) attribution-based diagonal 
indirect horizontal effect. The two are closely related in that they both 
ultimately hold the State responsible at the international level for harmful 
activities conducted by non-State actors that interfered with the enjoyment of 
                                                 
25 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v Nigeria, Communication No.155/96 (27 October 2001). 




human rights. The legal basis of each type is distinct, however. The possible 
confusion around attribution is caused by cases in which a combined 
approach is taken, looking both at the State’s protective obligations and 
looking for a manner in which to connect the non-State actor’s conduct to the 
State, but without using the language of attribution (as explained above). As 
was seen in the Ogoni case, it is even possible to use the two strands 
separately within one case that deals with violations of multiple rights. 
Although slightly different, both kinds of diagonal indirect horizontal effect 
can be said to place non-State actors under an indirect obligation to act in a 
particular way. Under the protection-based model, seen in cases such as 
Habassi v Denmark27 and B. d. B. v The Netherlands28 the conduct of the non-
State actor will be further regulated through administrative, legislative or 
other measures that are adopted on a more general basis. Those actors whose 
behaviour is attributed to the State under the second model, such as in the 
cases of Fadeyeva v Russia,29 Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil30 and Jessica Lenahan 
(Gonzales) v United States31 may, depending on the closeness of the 
relationship between the State and the non-State actor, be subject to more 
direct and/or specific oversight or supervision by the State. 
Another aspect of the obligation to protect was briefly examined in 
Chapters 3 and 6, involving the balancing of one individual’s rights against 
another’s, leading to the restriction of the enjoyment of the first individual’s 
rights in favour of the enjoyment of the second individual’s rights. Although 
this has been treated as a separate approach by some authors,32 the cases 
involving a balancing of rights (allowed pursuant to the ‘legitimate 
limitations’ clauses found in some provisions) arguably also fall under the 
                                                 
27 UN CteeERD, Habassi v Denmark (10/1997) UN Doc. CERD/C/54/D/10/1997 (17 March 
1999), discussed in Chapter 5.6.2. 
28 UN HRCtee, B. d. B. et al. v The Netherlands (273/1989) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) 
286 (30 March 1989), discussed in Chapter 5.2.2. 
29 Fadeyeva v Russia (n 23) discussed in Chapter 6.2.2. 
30 Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil (n 23) discussed in Chapter 6.4.2. 
31 Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States (n 21) discussed in Chapter 6.4.2. 
32 For example by Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 
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obligation to protect human rights. Within the European human rights system, 
these cases (e.g. Appleby v United Kingdom) have certainly been discussed 
within the context of positive obligations under the ECHR.  
(2) Categorical indirect horizontal effect 
The second type of indirect horizontal effect that can be identified is 
‘categorical indirect horizontal effect’. The word ‘categorical’ is used here to 
reflect the adjudicatory bodies’ re-categorisation of actors (i.e. the 
categorisation of private actors as public actors) for the purposes of human 
rights. This refers to cases in which human rights provision are being applied 
to what is ostensibly a private actor who is being treated, for the particular 
instance at hand, as a special kind of public actor – a ‘quasi-public actor’. At 
first sight, this may appear similar to direct horizontal effect, in that the 
claimant of a human rights violation is able to obtain redress against the non-
State actor themselves. However, the fact that the responsible actor is deemed 
to be a public actor in the particular circumstances of the case means that this 
method is actually a form of indirect horizontal effect – the redress is against 
a ‘public’ actor.  
There are several ways in which this can be achieved. The first is by 
using a functional test, treating the non-State actor as a public actor because 
they are carrying out certain ‘public’ functions. Chapters 5 and 7 showed that 
this approach has been taken by the CteeAT, and can be found in Section 
6(3)(b) of the HRA 1998, although the judiciary has not consistently applied 
the provision in this way.33 The second way to achieve categorical indirect 
horizontal effect is by using an institutional test. This entails looking at 
whether the public actions that the non-State actor has taken have been 
institutionally delegated to them by a public actor, i.e. through a statute. 
                                                 
33 The CteeAT applied this model in Sadiq Shek Elmi v Australia v Australia (120/1998) UN 
Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (25 May 1999). Section 6(3)(b) HRA provides that ‘any person 
certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature’ falls within the definition of 
‘public authority’, meaning that under Sections 6(1) and 6(5) they must act compatibly with 
the ECHR, in so far as they are carrying out public functions. Chapter 7.3.3.1 discussed the 




Under a functional test, the kind and extent of public functions required to be 
carried out by the non-State actor in order for them to be classed as a public 
actor may vary. Taking the example of the Human Rights Act, no explanation 
is provided in Section 6(3)(b) of what a public function actually is – the 
provision simply extends the scope of the Act (and therefore the ECHR) to 
‘any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature’. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, the UK judiciary has struggled to apply Section 
6(3)(b) in a consistent way, and has sometimes applied a mixed approach 
which has unfortunately failed to provide much coherent guidance on what 
kinds of functions are of a public nature. It has been repeated that the mere 
fact that a function being carried out by a non-State actor used to be 
conducted by a State actor does not suffice to render it a public function, 
creating some confusion between a functional and an institutional test 
(particularly in cases such as R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation34 
and YL v Birmingham City Council35). However, other cases such as Aston 
Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank 
and Another36 took a more functional approach, and Antenor Hallo de Wolf 
has noted in the context of privatised water and sewerage utilities, at least the 
lower courts appear to assume that the body providing a privatised public 
service is carrying out public functions for the purposes of the HRA.37 
At the international level the CteeAT has dealt with categorical 
indirect horizontal effect in relation to non-State armed groups. Given the 
nature of the groups and the fact that they are usually engaged in an armed 
conflict with the State in a particular territory, the public functions that they 
carry out are not delegated from a ‘pure’ public authority. Instead, the groups 
take up the responsibility for carrying out the public functions of their own 
accord. To be categorised as ‘public’ actors at the international level, a non-
                                                 
34 R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 366, [2002] HRLR 30. 
35 Palmer (n 9) 593. 
36 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank and 
another [2003] UKHL 37. 
37 See e.g. Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2001] All ER 698, cited in Antenor Hallo de 
Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with Human Rights (Intersentia 2011) 296. 
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State actor has to reach a higher threshold than at the national level. The 
CteeAT applied categorical indirect horizontal effect in the case of Sadiq Shek 
Elmi v Australia.38 This case was discussed in depth in Chapter 5, in which it 
was explained that the group in question, vying for control of territory in 
Somalia, had ‘prescribed its own laws and law enforcement mechanisms and 
[having] provided their own education, health and taxation system’,39 and 
was ‘exercising certain prerogatives that [were] comparable to those 
normally exercised by legitimate governments’.40 This was sufficient for the 
CteeAT to determine that the group was carrying out ‘quasi-governmental’ 
tasks and could be capable of committing torture despite the requirement in 
Article 1 CAT that a public official be involved in order to consider something 
torture. Nonetheless, Chapter 5 also stressed that the case is not likely to be 
followed in the future (as shown by subsequent cases) because of its very 
particular circumstances. The fact that the CteeAT’s opinion did not lead to a 
finding that the group had violated a human right, but rather that Australia, a 
State Party to the CAT, would violate the Convention if it carried out its 
intention to extradite the claimant to Somalia also plays a role in the limited 
precedential value of the case (which is naturally exacerbated by the fact that 
the CteeAT does not have a system of precedence). To date, although Sadiq 
Shek Elmi v Australia is significant, it remains one of very few examples of 
categorical indirect horizontal effect at the international level. Nonetheless, 
it opens the door for future general comments and case law to apply a similar 
approach, which was arguably done by the CteeEDAW in its General 
Recommendation No. 30.41  
The advantage of categorical indirect horizontal effect lies in the fact 
that (at least at the national level) victims are able to get redress directly 
against the actor responsible for the interference with the enjoyment of their 
human rights. However, it has been applied in very limited situations and it 
                                                 
38 Sadiq Shek Elmi v Australia (n 33). 
39 ibid para 5.5. 
40 ibid para. 6.5. 
41 UN CteeEDAW, ‘General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, 




does further blur the distinction between what constitutes a public and a 
private actor. This may make it difficult for both victims and the ‘quasi-
public’ actors themselves to know when a particular actor and the conduction 
of certain functions would need to comply with the standards found in human 
rights provisions. That being said, the fact that the United Kingdom does have 
a system of precedence has not particularly helped the consistency, clarity or 
coherence of applications of categorical indirect horizontal effect. Indeed, on 
more than one occasion, the outcome of cases has led to such negative results 
that Parliament has had to intervene and enact additional legislation to 
provide wider protection of human rights (see Chapter 7.3.3.1). 
(3) Value-driven indirect horizontal effect 
‘Value-driven indirect horizontal effect’ is the third and final method of 
indirect horizontal effect found in the analyses of the human rights 
jurisprudence at the international, regional and national levels. It does not 
concern the application of human rights provisions between private parties, 
but it does apply in cases between two private individuals. Put simply, value-
driven indirect horizontal effect involves adjudicatory bodies invoking the 
values that are protected by human rights in order to determine the way in 
which relevant private laws should be interpreted. The role for human rights 
in cases in which value-driven indirect horizontal effect is applied is thus an 
interpretative tool. To explain further, value-driven indirect horizontal effect 
refers to the application of existing law (which is not human rights law) ‘in 
light of the values represented by any applicable [human rights], in 
recognition that the actions by private individuals can produce similar or 
identical effects or harms to those of governmental bodies’.42 
In the analyses in Chapters 3-7, clear examples of value-driven 
indirect horizontal effect were only found in the jurisprudence at the national 
level, within the United Kingdom, although a similar approach was briefly 
                                                 
42 As will be explained below, value-driven indirect horizontal effect therefore mirrors Gavin 
Phillipson’s ‘weak’ indirect horizontal effect discussed in Chapter 7.3.2. Gavin Phillipson, 
‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law: A Bang or a Whimper ?’ 
(1999) 62(6) 824, 830. 
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discussed in Chapter 6 in the practice of the ECtHR. The discussion of the 
case of Pla and Puncernau v Andorra,43 suggested that the influence of the 
ECHR on private relationships that occurs through an assessment by the 
ECtHR of the interpretation of a private act (in that case, a will) is similar to 
the influence that the ECHR has on private relationships in private, common 
law cases within the UK. It is such cases that demonstrate value-driven 
indirect horizontal effect. 
If there is no possibility that a private body can be classed as a ‘hybrid’ 
public authority for the purposes of Section 6(3)(b), the possibility that the 
basis of a claim could be against the ostensibly private actor is excluded. 
However, it has been possible for the ECHR to come into play against a 
private actor once an action has already been brought before a national court. 
This is made possible by arguing that the court, as a public authority, must 
apply the Convention standards in its interpretation and application of the 
law.  
Value-driven indirect horizontal effect actually encompasses Gavin 
Phillipson’s ‘weak’ indirect horizontal effect, discussed in Chapter 7.3.2. 
Phillipson’s theory was that indirect horizontal effect could be either ‘strong’ 
or ‘weak’, depending on whether the ECHR is considered in interpretation as 
rights (the ‘strong’ model) or as principles/values (the ‘weak’ model). This 
distinction is useful and has been widely adopted, but it is possible that using 
the terminology ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ could encourage an assumption as to 
whether the practical effects of each model are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than the 
other.  
As mentioned above, value-driven indirect horizontal effect, which 
was seen to feature almost exclusively in domestic cases between two private 
actors, regards the application of laws that are not human rights laws. The 
role of human rights as an interpretative tool explains why value-driven 
indirect horizontal effect is not witnessed in cases before the UN human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies, since they concern only the application of 
international human rights law. The UK judiciary, on the other hand, is 
                                                 




actually obliged to take the ECHR into account when it is making a decision 
in a private, common law case. Sections 6(1) and 6(3)(a) HRA 1998require 
that courts act compatibly with the ECHR. As explained in Chapter 7.3.2, this 
could mean several different things, but the case law of the courts shows an 
inclination towards value-driven horizontal effect. It also appears to limit 
itself to what Phillipson and Alexander Williams label the ‘constitutional 
constraint model’, meaning that while the courts have an obligation to 
develop the common law in a way that renders it compatible with the ECHR, 
the obligation only applies to the extent that the courts can modify the 
common law incrementally – there is no obligation on the courts to simply 
create new causes of action that would allow for horizontal effect of the 
Convention.44  
However, value-driven indirect horizontal effect, particularly as 
currently applied within the United Kingdom, lacks clarity. As demonstrated 
in Chapter 7, the way in which the courts have dealt with their obligation 
under Section 6 HRA has not been fully consistent, and the judiciary seems 
(for the most part) to have been reluctant to fully engage with theories of 
horizontal effect and explain the approach that it is taking in a specific case. 
If applied outside of the United Kingdom, which has a strong system of 
precedence, the transparency of this model could be even more problematic, 
unless judges become more explicit about the way in which they are applying 
indirect horizontal effect in specific cases. 
It cannot be said that under value-driven indirect horizontal effect the 
UK courts are actually able to place human rights obligations on private 
actors, although they do indirectly require non-State actors to abide by human 
rights standards by using human rights values to alter the standards of 
conduct required in the private law in question. There is actually much to be 
said, in relation to some rights (following the findings in Chapters 5 and 7 
that a right-by-right approach is often taken), for placing obligations only on 
public entities, or at least only on entities which are carrying out a public 
                                                 
44 Gavin Phillipson and Alexander Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional 
Constraint’ (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 878. 
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function; purely private entities simply do not have the capacity to fulfil some 
human rights obligations to the same extent as States (e.g. the right to a fair 
trial).  
The approach of the UK in private common law disputes remains, in 
Phillipson’s words, quite ‘weak’, but this is not surprising in light of the 
human rights law framework (the HRA). Given that, as Phillipson explains, 
there is actually no direct implementation of the ECHR into domestic law 
through the HRA, the rights contained in the instrument can only amount, in 
the private sphere, to ‘legal values and principles’, in contrast to the ‘clear 
entitlements’ the rights afford when they are invoked against public 
authorities.45 This differs from other States, such as the Netherlands, which 
allow for the direct incorporation of the ECHR in their national jurisdiction.46 
Doing so removes the limit that is placed on which individuals can submit a 
claim to the ECtHR through the requirements relating to the ratione personae 
of the case.47 Andrew Clapham has (correctly) questioned arguments that in 
such cases the rights contained in the ECHR have direct horizontal effect 
because the judges in the national courts are bound to ensure their respect.48 
He does, however, acknowledge that in some cases this may be true, 
especially given Frédéric Sudre’s evidence that the French Cour de Cassation 
does in fact apply the Convention between private parties.49 This is a rather 
rare situation, although it may be preferable to that of the United Kingdom 
since there would be no limitation of requiring the classification of a non-
State actor as a public authority. However, in most cases, Clapham points out, 
there would still be limitations in place through the terms of incorporation of 
the Convention,50 thus not in reality immediately offering this wider scope of 
protection.  
                                                 
45 Phillipson (n 42) 837. 
46 See Chapter 6.2.3, footnote 92. 
47 This refers to the criteria found in Article 34 ECHR and was discussed in Chapter 7.3.3.3. 
See Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (n 32). 
48 ibid 350. 
49 Frédéric Sudre (2000) 1369, cited in Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors (n 32) 349. 




8.4 Concluding reflections on indirect horizontal effect 
There are many examples demonstrating that human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies and courts do not shy away from engaging with harmful conduct by 
non-State actors that interfere with the enjoyment of human rights. The many 
theories of horizontal effect discussed in Chapters 3-7 can actually, in 
practice, be boiled down to three main types of indirect horizontal effect. 
While each type is different and has a different (legal) basis, they all open the 
way for individuals to gain redress for human rights interference caused by 
non-State actors. Similarly, to differing degrees they each uphold human 
rights standards vis-à-vis non-State actors, whether by: (1) requiring States 
to take measures to ensure that this happens (diagonal indirect horizontal 
effect); (2) re-categorising certain non-State actors as public actors for the 
purposes of a particular complaint (categorical indirect horizontal effect); or 
(3) modifying (the interpretation of) rules of private law to ensure that human 
rights values are protected, even if this requires a private actor to comply with 
human rights standards (value-driven indirect horizontal effect). All three 
therefore go some way towards closing the gap in human rights protection 
that is left by the current international human rights law framework.  
However, the analyses show that the application/use of each model 
by monitoring bodies and courts on all levels examined are inconsistent and 
sometimes incoherent. Sometimes the inconsistency stems from the language 
used by the relevant body, despite the concrete standards and outcomes of the 
cases being very similar to one another (e.g. the use or non-use of the terms 
‘due diligence’ and the ‘obligation to protect’ human rights). On other, more 
worrisome occasions, the inconsistency or incoherence stems from the 
content of the standards applied (e.g. the test used to determine whether an 
actor is a hybrid public authority under the Human Rights Act 1998). A 
general lack of willingness and ability (in the sense that both monitoring 
bodies and courts must act within the confines of their mandates and legal 
systems in which they operate) to actively engage with theoretical concepts 
and scholarly opinion relating to horizontal effect and to use particular 
terminology further obfuscates the clarity that such cases could bring to the 
issue of horizontal effect. As it stands, although the three models of indirect 
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horizontal effect can be clearly seen in jurisprudence, it remains unclear for 
individuals, non-State actors and to some extent also States, exactly what 
conduct can be and is expected of different kinds of non-State actors vis-à-
vis human rights. Indeed, the majority of practice at the international and 
regional levels focused almost exclusively on the standards of behaviour 
expected of States without explaining the standard of conduct expected of 
non-State actors. This has the effect that individuals may not be aware of 
when their human rights have been violated, or whether they are able to file 
a complaint against the State for the harm they have suffered. Additionally, 
at least at the international and regional levels, non-State actors may not be 
aware of the conduct that is expected of them. It also seems as though 
monitoring bodies and courts have actually gone as far as they can do within 
the confines of their mandates and legal frameworks in individual cases to 
achieve more protection for human rights. The methods being used to achieve 
indirect horizontal effect have not actually changed much over the years in 
which they have been applied, although the CteeESCR seems to be 
considerate of the current developments regarding businesses and human 
rights.  
Perhaps human rights law has reached a stalemate with this issue – 
further progress in holding non-State actors responsible for the harm they 
cause to human rights may not be made in international human rights law as 
it currently stands. Much progress remains to be made, however, especially 
considering the inability of indirect horizontal effect to provide consistent, 
comprehensive protection for individuals from the harmful conduct of non-
State actors. This leaves us with two main avenues for moving forwards – 
expanding the scope of international human rights law to apply to non-State 
actors, or looking outside of the legal framework to improve the conduct of 
non-State actors for what concerns human rights. To an extent, both of these 
are already being done. For example, a binding treaty on business and human 
rights, as mentioned before, is now being negotiated, although its success 
remains to be seen. Measures are being taken outside of the international 
human rights law framework (certainly outside of binding human rights law) 




are currently quite fragmented and have very different rates of success. The 
following chapter will suggest a way to strengthen efforts being taken beyond 
(but including) the legal framework by taking a governance approach to 






A proposal to move beyond achieving 
horizontal effect of human rights through 
international human rights law 
 
9.1 Preliminary remarks  
The previous chapters of this book have shown that international human 
rights law still struggles to give non-State actors a direct (legal) role in the 
protection and realisation of human rights. Substantial gaps remain in the 
legal framework despite the progress made towards bringing non-State actors 
into the system, through indirect horizontal effect by international treaties, 
courts and treaty bodies, the balancing of different rights against each other, 
the limitation of human rights etc. Consequently, non-State actors often 
cannot be held responsible for causing violations of human rights.  
This chapter suggests that a broader, governance approach be taken 
to international human rights. Specifically, a multi-level governance 
approach is suggested, which would utilise the strengths of both the legally 
binding and the soft-law and other, extra-legal mechanisms already existing 
in a coordinated governance system that adheres to principles of good 
governance. Multi-level governance regimes involve taking a multi-
stakeholder approach, accepting different State and non-State actors’ role in 
the performance of governance activities on different levels, namely the 
local, national, regional and international levels.  
 The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first, Section 9.2, 
discusses some current understandings of governance and provides the 




particular, the notion of ‘governance beyond government’ is explained, as 
well as the current governance of international human rights and its 
placement within global governance are explained in Section 9.2. The 
concept of ‘good governance’ and its close relationship with human rights 
and human rights-based approaches are then discussed in Section 9.3. 
Examples from the governance of international human rights are used 
throughout Sections 9.2 and 9.3. The third part of the chapter, Section 9.4, 
introduces the theory of multi-level governance and brings each aspect and 
theory of governance adopted in the chapter together. This lays down the 
foundations for Chapters 10 and 11, in which the multi-level governance 
approach to international human rights suggested by this study is applied to 
the case studies of the World Bank and non-State armed groups. Overall, the 
chapter aims to answer the research question: ‘Moving beyond horizontal 
effect through human rights law, how can a governance approach to human 
rights be envisaged?’. 
9.2 What is governance? 
This section begins by providing a definition of governance more broadly, 
before highlighting the aspect of governance that is key to this study – 
governance beyond government. Pinning down a universally acceptable 
definition of governance is notoriously difficult, and by now many different 
formulations have been given and used in various contexts. Indeed, 
governance has been described as ‘many things, including a buzzword, a fad, 
a framing device, a bridging concept, an umbrella concept, a descriptive 
concept, a slippery concept, an empty signifier, a weasel word, a fetish, a 
field, an approach, a theory and a perspective’.1 The current study uses 
governance as both an approach and a concept. Governance as a concept is 
used to describe a system of governing international human rights, whereas 
governance as an approach is used as an alternative to a legal approach. The 
difference between legal and governance approaches, and indeed law and 
                                                 
1 David Levi-Faur, ‘From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”?’ in David Levi-faur (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press 2012) 3. 
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governance, must be clarified before embarking on an in-depth discussion of 
governance as a concept. This is particularly important in light of the research 
question answered by this chapter and the intended audience of this book 
(primarily legal scholars). Nowadays, there is a clear distinction between 
‘law’ and ‘governance’ approaches to societal issues. A legal approach 
focuses, as the first 8 chapters of this book, on the laws in place to solve a 
particular societal issue. In contrast, a governance approach includes extra-
legal and less formal activities by a variety of actors. Thus, while a 
governance approach includes legal measures, it is a much broader and more 
inclusive approach that allows regulations, policies and guidelines to 
contribute to solving an issue. Studies that address societal issues from both 
a law and a governance perspective, of which the current book is one, are 
considered to take a ‘law and governance’ approach and are becoming more 
common within academia.2 
 The concept of governance will now be defined and explained. 
‘Governance’ has been practiced for many, many years and can be traced 
back to classical Latin and Greek as a reference ‘to the action or way of 
managing or coordinating interdependent activities’.3 Over time, numerous 
different definitions of governance have been offered, but many scholars 
support the assertion that governance can be said to exist to ‘steer’ the 
behaviour of different actors in order to achieve a common purpose.4 The 
                                                 
2 This can be seen, for example, in the establishment of law and governance institutions, such 
as the ‘Netherlands Institute for Law and Governance’, or law and governance 
departments/research centres within universities. See Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘Comparative 
Law and Governance: Towards a New Research Method’ in Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi and 
others (eds), Law and Governance: Beyond the Public-Private Law Divide (Eleven 
International Publishing 2013) 223. 
3 W Andy Knight, ‘Global Governance as a Summative Phenomenon’ in Jim Whitman (ed), 
Palgrave Advances in Global Governance (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 166. 
4 This belief is held, for example, by Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor, W Andy Knight, 
Marie-Claude Smouts and James N Rosenau. See Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor, 
Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society (Cambridge University 
Press 2009) 1; Knight (n 3) 178; Marie-Claude Smouts, ‘The Proper Use of Governance in 
International Relations’ (1998) 50(155) International Social Science Journal 81, 82; and 




notion that governance is a system that deals with the management and 
coordination of activities is also very common. This is visible in the World 
Bank’s definition of governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised 
in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development’,5 as well as in the definition provided by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP considers governance to be:  
the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the 
management of a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises 
mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and 
groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their 
obligations and mediate their differences. Governance encompasses, 
but also transcends, government. It encompasses all relevant groups, 
including the private sector and civil society organizations.6 
This definition is particularly relevant for the context of the current study. 
This is because, as will be shown in Section 9.2.2, the governance of 
international human rights comprises activities taken on multiple levels, 
consists of various mechanisms, processes and institutions and encompasses 
different groups and actors, including the private sector and civil society 
organisations. Of course, international human rights also concern the exercise 
of legal rights (afforded to citizens through international human rights law) 
and obligations. For these reasons, the UNDP’s definition of governance will 
be followed by the present study.  
According to this definition, the management of affairs can be 
considered to be the purpose of governance, which can be said to comprise 
the tasks of drafting, adopting, implementing and enforcing rules, or 
standards, and the mechanisms, processes and institutions that exist to 
                                                 
Advances in Global Governance (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 8. 
5 Carlos Santiso, ‘Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and 
Conditionality’ (2001) 7(1) The Georgetown Public Policy Review 1, 3. 
6 UN Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Disaster Risk Reduction, Governance & 
Mainstreaming’ 
<http://www.preventionweb.net/files/17429_4disasterriskreductiongovernance1.pdf> 
acessed 21 September 2017. 
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achieve these tasks. As the UNDP’s definition goes on to suggest, governance 
involves many different actors, including State actors and different kinds of 
non-State actors. Together with the assertion that governance ‘transcends’ 
government, this suggests that different actors may conduct the various 
governance tasks. This relates very strongly to the notion of ‘governance 
beyond government’, which is central to this study’s definition of governance 
and will be explained in detail in the following sub-section. 
9.2.1 Governance beyond government 
Whether governance means something equal to, less than, or more than 
‘government’ has been a topic of hot debate in governance literature. While 
there are still disagreements as to what the distinction between governance 
and government is, this study takes the stance that governance includes, but 
is not restricted to, governmental activity and governmental actors.  
Governance is understood in this study as referring to ‘activit[ies] 
independent of the numbers and kinds of actors carrying [them] out.’7 Indeed, 
a crucial characteristic of governance is that ‘the state increasingly depends 
on other organizations to secure its intentions, deliver its policies, and 
establish a pattern of rule’, i.e. to draft, adopt, implement and enforce 
standards and rules.8 Awareness is certainly growing of the fact that non-
State actors have been able to establish patterns of rule ‘in the absence of 
state activity’.9 In the context of international human rights, examples of State 
dependency on non-State actors to implement standards can be seen in the 
delegation by States of certain public functions (for example the provision of 
public services) to private actors in order to fulfil the State’s international 
obligations. This was seen on several occasions in Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
study in relation to privatised services such as water or healthcare, where, due 
to lack of resources, States delegate the de facto fulfilment of a human right 
                                                 
7 Michael Zürn, ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’ in David Levi-Faur (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press 2012) 730. 






to private actors. An example of the ability of non-State actors to establish 
patterns of rule without the State is the self-regulation of several types of non-
State actors for what concerns human rights. Business enterprises and NGOs 
have been especially active in this respect, particularly within certain topic 
areas. Many businesses in the garment industry have now adopted codes of 
conduct regarding worker’s rights,10 while several large NGOs have 
developed and adopted standards and guidelines in relation to the protection 
of human rights during disasters.11 Ultimately, although nation-States remain 
the primary legal actors, they are by no means the only relevant or capable 
entities for drafting, adopting, implementing and enforcing international 
standards.12 
To succinctly describe the growth of governance beyond government, 
                                                 
10 An example is the company Tommy Hilfiger (owned by PVH Corp.) which includes 
standards concerning non-discrimination, forced labour, child labour, health and safety and 
hours of work, among others. The code is available at 
<http://www.pvh.com/responsibility/policy/shared-commitment> accessed 2 January 2018. 
Many codes of conduct that contain provisions regarding workers’ rights focus on forced 
labour and child labour. See e.g. the code of conduct of H&M, Section 2 
<http://sustainability.hm.com/content/dam/hm/about/documents/en/CSR/codeofconduct/Co
de%20of%20Conduct_en.pdf> accessed 2 January 2018; the ‘Topshop Code of Conduct’ 
<http://eu.topshop.com/pdf/tscodeofconduct.pdf> accessed 2 January 2018; and the Code of 
Conduct of America Today, available online at <https://www.america-today.com/fr/code-of-
conduct> accessed 2 January 2018. 
11 A well-known self-regulatory initiative by NGOs is the Sphere Project, ‘Humanitarian 
Charter and Sphere Minimum Standards in humanitarian Response’ (2011) 
<http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/> accessed 2 January 2018. This document is 
grounded in the core international human rights law treaties. Other such initiatives have been 
taken by NGOs working together with other actors (such as UN organisations). See e.g. the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ‘Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in 
Situations of Natural Disaster’ (2011) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IDPersons/OperationalGuidelines_IDP.pdf> 
accessed 2 January 2018. Both initiatives are discussed in Marlies Hesselman and Lottie Lane, 
‘Disasters and Non-State Actors – Human Rights-Based Approaches’ (2017) 5(6) Disaster 
Prevention and Management 526, 533. 
12 As David Levi-Faur puts it: ‘The idea of a sovereign state that governs society top-down 
through laws, rules and detailed regulations has lost its grip and is being replaced by new 
ideas about a decentered governance based on interdependence, negotiation and trust.’ See 
Levi-Faur, ‘From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”?’ (n 1) 10. 
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the language of ‘shifts’ in governance can be used. There are three kinds of 
shifts of governance functions that were traditionally done by the State and 
are now being taken over by or delegated to other actors.13 The first is an 
‘upward’ shift, with governance activities moving from the national to the 
regional, transnational, intergovernmental, and global spheres.14 In the 
context of international human rights, the upward shift has led to governance 
by (for example) regional and international organisations, such as the United 
Nations and the World Bank. The second is a shift ‘downward’, to the local, 
regional and metropolitan levels within a State. The third shift is horizontal, 
which is the shift ‘to private and civil spheres of authority’.15 In the context 
of international human rights this has led in particular to governance activities 
being undertaken by non-governmental organisations, international 
organisations and the private sector.  
The shifts in governance, and the move from government to 
governance more broadly, an umbrella term for which is the ‘hollowing out 
of the State’, raise questions of the continued role and relevance of the State. 
This is particularly true in the context of human rights, where according to 
the current legal framework the State retains a central role. Some scholars 
believe that non-State actors usurp State authority and leave a weakened and 
less authoritative State behind,16 or even render the State irrelevant to 
governance.17 However, as evident in the example provided above regarding 
                                                 
13 ibid 7. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. Samantha Jones and others, who also use the notion of shifts of governance, describe 
this kind as an ‘outwards’ shift. See Samantha Jones and others ‘Governance Struggles and 
Policy Processes in Disaster Risk Reduction: A Case Study from Nepal’ (2014) 57 Geoforum 
78, 79. 
16 For discussion of the ‘hollowing out’ of the State, see e.g. Roderick A W Rhodes, ‘The 
Hollowing Out of the State - the Changing Nature of the Public-Service in Britain’ (1994) 
65(2) Political Quarterly 138; Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, Governance Theory and 
Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 86-87; Janet Newman, 
Remaking Governance: Peoples, Politics and the Public Sphere (Policy Press, University of 
Bristol 2005), discussed in Bell and Hindmoor (n 4) 1-19; and Samantha Jones and others (n 
15) 78. 




the delegation of public services, it is often the case that States intentionally 
delegate certain tasks or even authority to non-State actors. Ultimately, the 
end result and consequence for the State is that while it retains a central role, 
‘it no longer monopolizes the governing of the general well-being of the 
population in the way that it used to do.’18 In other words, and bringing us 
back to the definition of governance provided by the UNDP and adopted by 
this thesis, the role of the State in international human rights governance can 
be said to be limited to ‘steering’, whereas the ‘rowing’ should be left to other 
actors.19 When this occurs through shifts in governance to non-State actors, 
it can be considered to be an expansion, rather than decline of the State, which 
is trying to govern better rather than govern less.20  
A potential risk of governance beyond government lies in the fact that 
there does not appear to be a limit to the number of actors that can be involved 
in governance. This may lead to a situation of fragmentation or duplication 
of standards and governance activities pertaining to a particular subject area 
or actor, while gaps exist in relation to other areas. In the context of the 
present study, the questions are therefore raised of how the governance of 
international human rights can be organised and tasks distributed, and how 
the system can maximise the achievement of its purpose. 
A second, and related concern is that there is no general standard of 
how formalised activities need to be in order to be described as governance. 
This issue, together with the first risk of governance beyond government, can 
lead to questions of legitimacy of a governance system, which are often not 
                                                 
(2005) 28(3) Scandinavian Political Studies 195, 195-196, cited in Levi-Faur, ‘From “Big 
Government” to “Big Governance”?’ (n 1) 10.  
18 ibid, cited in Levi-Faur, ‘From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”?’ (n 1) 10. 
19 Claus Offe, ‘Governance: An “Empty Signifier”’ (2009) 16(4) Constellations 550, 555, 
cited in Levi-Faur, ‘From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”?’ (n 1) 2. 
20 Bell and Hindmoor (n 4), discussing Tabatha Wallington, Geoffrey Lawrence and Barton 
Loechel, ‘Reflections on the Legitimacy of Regional Environmental Governance: Lessons 
from Australia’s Experiment in Natural Resource Management’ (2008) 10(1) Journal of 
Environmental Policy & Planning 3. See also Barton Loechel, Geoffrey Lawrence and Lynda 
Cheshire, ‘Multi-sectoral collaboration in Central Queensland: bringing the state back in? 
(2005) Paper presented at the United National International Conference on Engaging 
Communities, August 14-17, Brisbane, Australia. 
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answered, or even considered in governance literature.21 These two 
challenges will be addressed in the remaining sections of this chapter. In 
particular, the issue of legitimacy will be dealt with in relation to the 
particular governance theory suggested by this chapter – multi-level 
governance – in Section 9.4.  
9.2.2 The governance of international human rights 
The definition of governance as explained above will now be applied to the 
context of international human rights. In this section, the main governance 
actors in the protection of international human rights are introduced. The 
explanation is not exhaustive, but intends to provide an overview of what is 
meant by the governance of international human rights. This overview will 
feed into the remaining sections of this chapter. 
The governance of international human rights occurs on several levels 
and by many different actors. The purpose of the governance of international 
human rights is to steer relevant actors (including non-State actors) in order 
to achieve better respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights. Bearing 
in mind the purpose of human rights themselves as enabling a life of dignity, 
as explained in the introduction to this book, it could ultimately be said that 
the purpose of the governance of international human rights is to further 
human dignity.  
At the international level, the United Nations human rights system 
can be taken as the starting point for human rights governance. This system 
consists of instruments, mechanisms, procedures and processes for 
improving human rights protection throughout the world. These are of both 
a binding nature (i.e. the UN human rights treaties and relevant customary 
international law) and a non-binding nature (e.g. the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, and the individual complaints procedures 
before the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies). As well as institutions 
                                                 
21 This has led to criticisms of scholars’ use of governance theories, particularly for what 
concerns legitimacy. This will be discussed below, in Section 9.4.3.4. See, in the context of 
multi-level governance, Yannis Papadopoulos, ‘Problems of Democratic Accountability in 




and organs established under the auspices of the United Nations themselves 
that play a large role in the governance of international human rights (e.g. the 
General Assembly, the Human Rights Council and the UN treaty monitoring 
bodies), other actors contribute to the drafting, adoption, implementation and 
enforcement of international human rights standards. A key actor, of course, 
is States. As explained in Chapter 2 of this book, States are the primary 
subjects of international law. They therefore have a predominant role in the 
drafting and adoption of legal standards at the international and regional 
levels, as well as implementation at the national level. Beyond legal 
standards, States also play a large role in extra-legal governance activities, 
such as the adoption of policies, memoranda of understanding and 
aspirational instruments such as the Sustainable Development Goals,22 at the 
sub-national, national, bilateral, regional and international levels.  
Additionally, a variety of non-State actors participate in many 
different ways and to different extents in all aspects of human rights 
governance, on different levels. For example, NGOs commonly lobby 
governments and international organisations, provide shadow reports on the 
implementation of human rights in practice (for example to the human rights 
treaty monitoring bodies), submit amicus curiae briefs on behalf of 
individuals (e.g. the Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights on behalf of the Ogoni people in 
Nigeria23), provide free legal assistance, draft guidelines for various actors 
regarding human rights protection,24 provide other non-State actors with 
guidance on how they can better respect/protect human rights (e.g. the NGO 
Bettercoal in relation to coal companies25), take human rights-based 
                                                 
22 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v Nigeria, Communication No.155/96 (27 October 2001). 
23 This was seen in Chapter 6 in the discussion of the African system of human rights 
protection. See The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic 
and Social Rights v Nigeria, Communication No.155/96 (27 October 2001). 
24 An overview of guidelines on human rights prepared by NGOs, for example, can be found 
on the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Website <https://www.business-
humanrights.org/principles/guidelines-prepared-by-ngos> accessed 2 January 2018. 
25 Bettercoal is an NGO that helps coal suppliers improve their corporate responsibility, 
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approaches themselves,26 participate in and contribute to the drafting of 
international human rights treaties, etc. NGOs operate at the sub-national, 
national, regional and international levels, and often constitute a crucial link 
between the levels and between different actors (this will be further discussed 
in Chapters 10 and 11 in relation to recommendations for moving towards a 
multi-level governance approach to international human rights). 
By now, there are also several non-State dispute settlement bodies 
that operate internationally and deal with human rights issues (even if they 
are not human rights mechanisms per se). Examples here are the bodies 
briefly discussed in Chapter 3, which dealt with investment arbitration (the 
International Centre for Settlement of Disputes and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization). Arguably, though, it would also include bodies such 
as the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which constitutes the 
international dispute resolution body for sports. This body applies non-State 
regulations (e.g. FIFA’s regulations), which increasingly include human 
rights provisions.27 
                                                 
including regarding human rights, by using a ‘reinforcing loop of improvement’. See 
<www.bettercoal.org/about> accessed 12 November 2017. 
26 Human rights-based approaches will be discussed in Section 9.3.2 below. 
27 For example, the April 2016 edition of the ‘FIFA Statutes: Regulations Governing the 
Application of the Statutes’ includes the provision that ‘FIFA is committed to respecting all 
internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these 
rights’ 
<https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben
_neutral.pdf> accessed 2 January 2018. FIFA also now has a Human Rights Policy and 
requires ‘bidding member associations, the government and other entities involved in the 
organisation of the tournament’ to implement human rights and labour standards. See 
respectively, ‘FIFA’s Human Rights Policy’ (2017) 
<http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/12/fifas
humanrightspolicy_neutral.pdf> accessed 2 January 2018; ‘FIFA Regulations for the 
selection of the venue for the final competition of the 2026 FIFA World Cup’ 
<https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/91/60/99/biddingr
egulationsandregistration_neutral.pdf> accessed 2 January 2018; and FIFA, ‘Guide to the 
Bidding Process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup’ 
<http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/91/88/61/en_guidet
othebiddingprocessforthe2026fifaworldcup_neutral.pdf> accessed 2 January 2018. For 




Other non-State actors involved in human rights governance include 
bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
which has undertaken a lot of work concerning corporate social 
responsibility. ISO has, for example, adopted ‘ISO 26000’ in 2010, a multi-
stakeholder initiative that ‘provides guidance on how businesses and 
organizations can operate in a socially responsible way’, including human 
rights.28 ISO also helps organisations with the implementation of these 
standards, having organised initiatives such as a workshop to help 
organisations understand how they can operationalise ISO 26000.29  
On a regional level, regional organisations have a huge role in the 
governance of international (or regional) human rights. The Organization of 
African Unity, the Organization of American States and the Council of 
Europe have adopted several instruments containing human rights standards, 
as discussed in Chapter 6. As also mentioned in Chapter 6, the European 
Union has become more active in relation to human rights over time, having 
initially focused on economic issues within the Union.30 The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations has also taken action for the protection of human 
rights, including the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights and the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration 
                                                 
UEFA, see Tomáš Grell, ‘Human Rights as Selection Criteria in Bidding Regulations for 
Mega-Sporting Events – Part 1: IOC and UEFA’, Asser International Sports Law Blog (20 
December 2017) <http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/author/Antoine%20Duval> accessed 
2 January 2018. 
28 Negotiations that led to ISO 26000 involved government representatives, NGOs, industry, 
consumer groups and labour organisations. See the website of ISO <https://www.iso.org/iso-
26000-social-responsibility.html> accessed 22 December 2017. The full ISO 26000 
guidelines are available at <https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en>. For 
discussion of ISO 26000, particularly in the context of partnerships between public and private 
actors, see Rebecca Schmidt, ‘The ISO 26000 Process as a Model for Public-Private 
Cooperation in a Fragmented Transnational Regulatory Space’ (2013) IRPA Working Paper 
– GAL Series No. 5/2013. 
29 See the website of ISO <https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-social-responsibility.html> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
30 This is evident in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, 391–407. 
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of Human Rights.31 
Private companies, as seen in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, can also have a role 
in the governance of international human rights, particularly in the 
implementation of standards. This is evident in the fact that States often 
delegate the de facto fulfilment of certain human rights (e.g. the right to 
health, the right to water) to private or privatised companies.32 The UN 
CteeESCR’s general comment on business and human rights also 
demonstrates this, as well as the fact that business enterprises sometimes have 
more or better resources for fulfilling human rights, which the State may not 
have.33 As well as this, many private companies, particularly multinational 
corporations, have adopted self-regulatory instruments that include 
provisions for the respect or protection of human rights, very often in the 
form of corporate codes of conduct or ‘policy statements’.34 A list of all 
companies that are known to have adopted codes of conduct or policy 
                                                 
31 For information on the work of the Commission, see <http://aichr.org/about/> accessed 22 
December 2017. The Declaration was adopted on 18 November 2012 and is not legally 
binding. The text of the Declaration is 
<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/6_AHRD_Booklet.pdf> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
32 For a thorough discussion, see Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with 
Human Rights (Intersentia 2011). In the context of the right to freedom of expression, see also 
Lottie Lane, ‘Private Providers of Essential Public Services and de jure Responsibility for 
Human Rights’ in Marlies Hesselman, Brigit Toebes and Antenor Hallo de Wolf (eds), Socio-
Economic Human Rights in Essential Public Services Provision (Routledge 2017). 
33 See UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24 on State Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities’, 10 
August 2017, E/C.12/GC/24, para 4, in which the Committee suggests that States should 
mobilise private resources as part of their obligation to fulfil human rights. 
34 For discussion of codes of conduct, see Rhys Jenkins, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-
Regulation in a Global Economy’ (2001) Technology, Business and Society Programme 
Paper Number 2, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development; Annegret Flohr, 
Self-Regulation and Legalization: Making Global Rules for Banks and Corporations 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2014); Alex Wawryk, ‘Regulating Transnational Corporations through 
Corporate Codes of Conduct’ in Jedrzej George Frynas and Scott Pegg (eds), Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) 53; and Orly Lobel, ‘New 
Governance as Regulatory Governance’ (2012) Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research 
Paper No. 12-101, 3. See also Lane, ‘Private providers of essential public services and de jure 




statements that include human rights provisions has been compiled by the 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, and includes banks, food and 
beverage companies, oil companies, supermarkets, law firms, electric 
companies, and many more.35 As well as companies, some NGOs have 
adopted codes of conduct that include human rights provisions.36 
Finally, it is important to highlight the role of local communities and 
individuals in the governance of international human rights. As human rights-
holders, these actors are most often the victims of human rights violations 
and they often have a large role in the enforcement of human rights standards. 
This is not to say that local communities and individuals have the ability to 
enforce a standard per se, but under the international human rights law 
framework, at least, individuals are the only actors capable of being party to 
a complaint regarding a human rights violation (as discussed in Chapter 1 of 
this book) and thus trigger various human rights accountability mechanisms. 
Local communities may be victims of human rights violations arising from, 
for example, pollution caused by industrial plants, or the phenomenon of 
‘land grabbing’, consequent to which the communities may find themselves 
being forcibly resettled or losing their homes.37 Human rights accountability 
mechanisms have also been used in relation to the rights of local (indigenous) 
communities to own their ancestral lands.38 Further, to a more limited extent, 
local communities and individuals may play a role in the implementation of 
human rights. This is certainly the case in times of disasters that have a 
negative effect on the enjoyment of human rights, where individuals and local 
                                                 
35 See Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Company policy statements on human 
rights’ <https://business-humanrights.org/en/company-policy-statements-on-human-rights> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
36 See e.g. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (n 11) discussed in Hesselman and Lane (n 11) 
533. 
37 See e.g. European Parliament Think Tank, ‘Land Grabbing and Human Rights: The 
Involvement of European Corporate and Financial Entities in Land Grabbing outside the 
European Union’ (2016) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_STU(2016)
578007> accessed 22 December 2017. 
38 This occurred in the case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua 
IACHR (Ser. C) No. 79 (31 August 2001). 
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communities are often the first responders and take upon themselves the 
responsibility to provide human rights-related assistance.39 
While the above discussion only provides an overview of the 
governance of international human rights, it is evident that many actors are 
involved in different governance activities, and on different levels. This is 
significant for the multi-level governance approach suggested in this chapter 
and will be revisited in Section 9.4.4. 
9.2.3 International human rights governance as part of global governance 
It is worth noting at this point that the governance of international human 
rights can be considered to be a subset of global governance. Global 
governance itself can be ‘broadly understood as a term of reference for the 
various and collected ways in which life on this planet is managed’.40 
Functioning as an umbrella term, global governance comprises ‘the sum of 
myriad...control mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, structures, 
and processes’,41 of which international human rights is one. Global 
governance therefore constitutes ‘summative governance’, or in other words, 
the amalgamation of lots of different governance systems that together give 
us an idea of how the world is actually governed (as opposed to constituting 
one single definable governance system).42 
Global governance can also be described as a form of governance 
beyond government. Although there is no centralised global government, in 
the context of global governance the term ‘governance beyond government’ 
can be used to refer to the participation of non-State actors such as 
international and inter-governmental organisations, multinational 
                                                 
39 See for discussion, Lane and Hesselman (n 17) and Hesselman and Lane (n 11). 
40 Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Global Governance’ in Mark Bevir (ed), Encyclopedia of Governance 
(SAGE Publications 2007) 345-349. 
41 Rosenau, ‘Governance in the Twenty-First Century’ (n 4) 11. 
42 See e.g. Knight (n 3) 160-188. This is evident in the distinction between governance as a 
whole and governance ‘sectors’ or ‘silos’ which could also be seen as coming together to 
make global governance. See Jim Whitman, ‘Global Governance as Sector-Specific 





corporations and international civil society, the global market and citizens’ 
movements, as well as States, in international governance systems.43 Indeed:  
a wide range of actors…are engaged in numerous governing-related 
activities, structuring and directing the behaviour of interdependent 
actors and resulting in some relatively novel modes of governance such 
as public-private partnerships, coalitions of subnational governments, 
informal groups of like-minded government officials, and private 
regulatory schemes.44  
The different actors involved, often of a transnational nature, have ‘come 
together in different combinations to attempt to address specific problems 
with varying degrees of success’,45 and sometimes resemble a governance 
network.46 It can be argued that two ‘worlds’ exist in global governance – the 
traditional, State-centric world (of which international human rights is 
certainly part), and a ‘dynamic multi-centric source of authority’.47 This 
raises concerns regarding the loss of State authority (for example to 
international organisations), but as with governance beyond government 
                                                 
43 Chhotray and Stoker (n 16) 93.  
44 Jan Wouters and others (eds), Global Governance and Democracy: A Multidisciplinary 
Analysis (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 1. For discussions of global governance in different 
contexts and from different perspectives, see the work of the Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies <https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications> accessed 2 January 2018. 
45 Thomas G Weiss, D Conor Seyle and Kelsey Coolidge, ‘The Rise of Non-State Actors in 
Global Governance: Opportunities and Limitations’ [2013] One Earth Future Discussion 
<http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/gg-weiss.pdf> accessed 22 September 2011, 
12. This also highlights the purposive nature of global governance, which is again seen as a 
tool for steering actors and communities. Knight, for example, states that ‘the purpose of 
global governance…is to steer and modify the behaviour of actors who operate on the global 
stage in such a manner as to avoid deadly conflicts and control intense socioeconomic and 
political competition. In that sense of the term, global governance implies a purposive activity, 
in the absence of world government, that could involve a range of actors besides states’: 
Knight (n 3) 178. 
46 Knight (n 3) 184. 
47 James N Rosenau and JP Singh, Information Technologies and Global Politics: The 
Changing Scope of Power and Governance (State University of New York Press 2002) 36, 
cited in Stephen Welch and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, ‘Multi-Level Governance and 
International Relations’ in Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (eds), Multi-level Governance 
(Oxford University Press 2004) 131. 
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more generally, the fact that the authority of the ‘alphabet soup’ of 
organisations has increased is not necessarily to the detriment of the authority 
of States.48 In the governance of international human rights, States remain the 
only entities capable of creating binding international standards for what 
concerns human rights, thus retaining a crucial role within the legal aspects 
of human rights governance.49 Caution should be taken, however, as non-
State actors also have a role to play in the adoption of binding norms; there 
is now a tendency for rules to be adopted by States with the participation of 
non-State actors, which are then implemented by a decentralised system of 
various actors at different territorial levels.50 
9.2.4 Summary of findings in the context of international human rights 
The discussions above have laid down the current study’s definition of 
governance and highlighted its most crucial characteristics for the context of 
this study. The findings can be summarised into four main points: 
1. Governance is purposeful in nature, in the sense that it functions to 
steer communities towards a common goal. In the context of the 
present study, the purpose of governance is the better respect, 
protection and fulfilment of international human rights, or to enable 
individuals to live a life of dignity; 
2. The purpose of governance is achieved through various kinds of 
governance activities, which in the context of the present study can 
be summarised as the drafting, adopting, implementation and 
                                                 
48 Craig N Murphy, ‘Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood’ (2000) 76(4) 
International Affairs 789, cited in Chhotray and Stoker (n 16) 79. 
49 The State is still viewed by many scholars as ‘central’ to global governance – despite the 
growing power and capabilities of non-State actors globally, States are still crucial cogs in the 
global governance machinery. See e.g. Chhotray and Stoker (n 16) 87-88, discussing Peter 
Evans, ‘Introduction: Development Strategies across the Public-Private Divide’ (1996) 24(6) 
World Development 1033; Peter Evans, ‘Government Action, Social Capital and 
Development: Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy’ (1996) 24(6) World Development 1119; 
Peter Evans, ‘The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization’ 
(1997) 50(1) World Politics 62; and Michael Mann, ‘Has Globalization Ended the Rise and 
Rise of the Nation-State?’ (1997) 4(3) Review of International Political Economy 472. 
50 See Tony Porter, ‘Global Governance as Configurations of State/Non-State Activity’ in Jim 




enforcement of standards/rules;  
3. A variety of actors can conduct governance activities and be 
considered as governance actors, including State and non-State 
actors; and 
4. International human rights governance is conducted by many 
different actors on multiple levels and constitutes one subset of 
global governance. 
These findings form the basis of the approach suggested in Section 9.4 and 
applied in Chapters 10 and 11.  
9.3 Good governance  
The following sections will answer the question of how the achievement of 
the international human rights governance system’s purpose can be 
maximised. It is argued in this section that due to its close relationship with 
human rights, ‘good governance’ should be followed throughout 
international human rights governance. First, a definition of good governance 
is provided, focusing on the principles of good governance. The relationship 
between good governance and human rights is then described, and a good 
governance approach to human rights through human rights-based 
approaches is suggested and explained. Together with the definition of 
governance provided in Section 9.2 and the multi-level governance approach 
suggested in Section 9.4 (below), good governance will be applied to the case 
studies in Chapters 10 and 11. 
9.3.1 A definition of good governance 
The term ‘good governance’ first emerged as part of the international drive 
for development, especially within the context of international development 
institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme. The first use of ‘good governance’ can be traced to a 1989 report 
published by the World Bank, which has been a primary proponent of the 
concept.51 In 1992, the Bank stated in a subsequent report that good 
governance is ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management 
                                                 
51 Welch and Kennedy-Pipe (n 47) 128.  
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of a country’s economic and social resources for development’.52 Good 
governance thus relates to the way in which governance activities are 
performed.53 The concept can be said to reflect the World Bank’s aspirations 
for a better world’,54 and has now been defined and applied by many ways 
and in many contexts. 
The International Development Association, the lending arm of the 
World Bank Group, has identified four criteria against which to review 
governance, which can be summarised as: (1) accountability; (2) 
transparency; (3) the rule of law; and (4) participation.55 Very similar criteria 
have been put forward by several international organisations, including the 
UNDP,56 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
                                                 
52 The World Bank, ‘Governance and Development’ (1992) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/604951468739447676/pdf/multi-page.pdf> 
accessed 2 January 2018 [emphasis added], cited in Carlos Santiso, ‘Good Governance and 
Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality’ (2001) 7(1) The Georgetown Public 
Policy Review 1, 3. 
53 As Jilles Hazenberg explains, governance itself refers to a ‘move away from the state’ 
whereas good governance has ‘a much stronger tie to government performance’ and the 
quality of governance activities [emphasis added]. See Jilles LJ Hazenberg, ‘Good 
Governance Contested: Exploring Human Rights and Sustainability as Normative Goals’, in 
Ronald Holzhacker, Rafael Wittek and Johan Woltjer (eds), Decentralization and Governance 
in Indonesia: Development and Governance Vol. 2 (Springer International 2016) 33-34. 
54 Bevir (n 8). The World Bank’s treatment of good governance will be dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter 10. 
55 The full criteria listed by the IDA are: ‘good public sector management with accountable 
public institutions that give priority to productive social programs and to policies designed to 
reduce poverty and support sound fiscal choices; transparent policy making and 
implementation; clarity, stability, and fairness in the rule of law; and openness to the 
participation of affected citizens in the design and implementation of policies and programs 
that impact them’. International Development Association, ‘Additions to IDA Resources: 
IDA12 Replenishment, Executive Summary’ 
<http://ida.worldbank.org/financing/replenishments/ida12-replenishment> accessed 22 
September 2017, cited in International Fund for Agricultural Development, ‘Good 
Governance: An Overview’, EB 99/67/INF.4 (1999) paras 7-10. 
56 The UNDP takes a broader definition, requiring eight elements to be fulfilled. These 
include: participation, responsiveness, rule of law, transparency, equity, consensus 
orientation, effectiveness and efficiency and strategic vision. See UNDP, ‘Governance for 
Sustainable Human Development - Human Development Report 1997’ (1997) UNDP Policy 




Rights,57 the former UN Commission on Human Rights58 and other 
international financial institutions.59 The common elements between 
definitions appear to be accountability, transparency and participation,60 
which can be considered to be the core principles of good governance. The 
discussions in the following sections of this chapter and Chapters 10 and 11 
of this book will not test current legal and governance systems against these 
standards per se, but argue that all governance activities should be 
transparent, accountable and participatory. An explanation of the criteria is 
therefore necessary. The following definitions draw heavily on those of 
institutions that advocate good governance, in particular those of the World 
Bank.61  
9.3.1.1 Transparency 
A transparent governance system is one in which the applicable rules and 
regulations are followed when decisions are being made and enforced, as well 
as being made available to those affected by them.62 In this respect, 
                                                 
September 2017. 
57 The UN OHCHR defines good governance as entailing ‘full respect of human rights, the 
rule of law, effective participation, multi-actor partnerships, political pluralism, transparent 
and accountable processes and institutions [or] an efficient and effective public sector’. Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Good Governance and Human 
Rights’ 
<http://ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.a
spx> accessed 22 September 2017. 
58 The Commission identified the following criteria: ‘transparency, responsibility, 
accountability, participation and responsiveness (to the needs of the people)’. See United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, ‘The role of good governance in protecting human 
rights’, Resolution 2000/64 (2000). 
59 For an overview of the definitions used by the different institutions, see International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (n 55). For a broader overview of different definitions of good 
governance, see Naveed Ahmed, ‘Reinforcement of Good Governance in the International 
Financial Institutions’ (2015) 2(11) Law, Social Justice & Global Development. 
60 The UNDP also focuses on these three criteria in particular, despite its more inclusive set 
of standards. See UNDP, ‘Governance for Sustainable Human Development (n 56). 
61 See Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Good Governance: Lessons from International 
Organizations’ (2004) Working Paper No. 54 University of Leuven Institute for International 
Law 2. 
62 See United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
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transparency is closely related to access to information (and therefore, from 
a human rights perspective, freedom of expression);63 governance actors 
should make information regarding their decision-making, including 
information on which rules and regulations were followed and what 
information was considered in the decision-making process, available to the 
public in an accessible manner.64 Further, transparency means that 
organisations should show how their decisions can be justified in relation to 
previous decisions65 (therefore also to some extent referring to 
‘predictability’, which is a good governance requirement promulgated by the 
Asian Development Bank).66 According to the UNDP, transparency also 
requires that ‘[p]rocesses, institutions and information are directly accessible 
to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to 
understand and monitor them.’67 In this sense, and as mentioned by the World 
Bank,68 transparency is related to the second element of accountability. 
9.3.1.2 Accountability 
A definition of accountability offered by the World Bank explains that 
‘accountability exists when there is a relationship where an individual or 
                                                 
(UNESCAP), ‘What Is Good Governance?’ (10 July 2009) 
<http://www.unescap.org/resources/what-good-governance> accessed 6 October 2017. 
63 The links between good governance and human rights will be examined in detail below, in 
Section 9.2.7. 
64 See the ‘What is Good Governance’, which forms part of the ‘Good Governance Guide’ 
adopted by a group of local government organisations from Victoria, Australia 
<http://www.goodgovernance.org.au/about-good-governance/what-is-good-governance/> 
accessed 6 October 2017; and UNESCAP (n 62). 
65 Michael D Mehta, ‘Good Governance’ in Mark Bevir (ed), Encyclopedia of Governance 
(SAGE Publications 2007) 361. 
66 Asian Development Bank, ‘Governance: Sound Development Management’ (1995) 
<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32027/govpolicy.pdf> 
accessed 6 October 2017, cited in International Fund for Agricultural Development (n 55) 
para 13. 
67 UNDP, ‘Governance for Sustainable Human Development (n 56) 14. 
68 The World Bank, ‘Governance - the World Bank’s Experience (English)’ (Development in 
Practice, 1994) 29 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711471468765285964/Governance-the-World-




body, and the performance of tasks or functions by that individual or body, 
are subject to another’s oversight, direction or request that they provide 
information or justification for their actions.’69 This seems quite broad in 
terms of who should be subject to accountability, although the Bank often 
appears to focus on public officials as the subjects of accountability. The 
UNDP, however, mentions that non-State actors such as the private sector 
and civil society organisations must also be accountable to stakeholders.70 
The accountability of both State and non-State actors is crucial in a system 
which understands governance as referring to the actions of both kinds of 
actor.  
The World Bank has identified two stages of accountability as a 
criterion of good governance: answerability and enforcement.71 
Answerability requires that actors explain and justify their reasons for taking 
certain decisions and actions both to the public and to bodies conducting 
oversight of each actor. It is thus linked to transparency. Enforcement, 
according to the Bank, relates to the ability of oversight bodies to sanction 
actors for not complying with norms to which they are expected to conform, 
and to provide a remedy for individuals suffering as a result of the non-
compliance.72 The Bank’s definition of accountability coincides somewhat 
with that of Mark Bovens, although enforcement or sanctions are not 
necessarily a prerequisite for Bovens – as Carol Harlow and Richard 
Rawlings note, he views sanctions as transforming ‘thin’ accountability to 
‘thick’ accountability. Bovens’ ‘thin’ accountability refers to ‘(i) giving an 
account, in the attenuated sense of narration; (ii) questioning or debating the 
issues; and (iii) evaluation of passing judgment.’73 Interestingly, Harlow and 
                                                 
69 Rick Stapenhurst and Mitchell O’Brien, ‘Accountability in Governance’ (World Bank 
Institute) 
<https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/A
ccountabilityGovernance.pdf> accessed 22 September 2017, 1. 
70 UNDP, ‘Governance for Sustainable Human Development (n 56) 15. 
71 See Stapenhurst and O’Brien (n 69) 1. 
72 ibid. 
73 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, ‘Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: 
A Network Approach’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 542, 545 citing Mark Bovens, 
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Rawlings are also of the opinion that enforceability is not essential to 
accountability, as it could ‘even act as an obstacle to accountability by 
creating incentives to deny responsibility’.74 Due to the links between 
accountability and the right to an effective remedy, however, this book will 
adopt the World Bank’s ‘thick’ notion of accountability.75  
Although it will not be discussed here, it is also important to note that 
there are many different kinds of accountability, including legal, political, 
horizontal, vertical, social and diagonal accountability.76 Each kind of 
accountability requires different mechanisms to be put in place and achieves 
the end result of holding actors accountable through different methods.  
9.3.1.3 Participation 
The third element of participation requires that each actor involved in or 
affected by the governance mechanism have a voice during the adoption and 
implementation of norms. The World Bank favours a definition of 
participation as ‘a process through which stakeholders influence and share 
control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which 
affect them’.77 The Asian Development Bank takes a similar perspective, 
                                                 
Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A 
Conceptual Framework’ (2006) European Governance Papers No. C-06-01 
<http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/lib/ep7.pdf> accessed 1 August 2017. 
74 Harlow and Rawlings (n 73). 
75 The right to an effective remedy is found, for example, in Article 13 European Convention 
on Human Rights, which provides that ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in 
this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity’. It is connected to accountability particularly through the mechanisms in place – a 
complaint against a human rights violation at the national level provides an individual with 
an avenue for receiving an effective remedy whilst simultaneously providing a mechanism 
through which to hold the State accountable for violating a right found in the Convention. For 
further discussion, see Section 9.2.7. 
76 See Stepenhurst and O’Brien (n 69). For detailed discussion of accountability and its 
different forms, see Mark Bovens, Robert E Goodin and Thomas Schillemans (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press 2014). 
77 The World Bank, ‘The World Bank Participation Sourcebook’ (1996) xi 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/289471468741587739/pdf/multi-page.pdf> 




defining participatory development as a ‘process through which stakeholders 
can influence and share control over development initiatives, and over the 
decisions and resources that affect themselves.’78 The key thus seems to lie 
in empowering shareholders; the UNDP emphasises that participation results 
in individuals being ‘closely involved in the economic, social, cultural and 
political processes that affect their lives’.79 Crucially, according to the 
UNDP, although the level of control that people possess may differ,80 this 
involvement should extend to all areas of life, and give rise to ‘constant 
access to decision-making and power.’81 
Participation essentially requires that within a governance system, 
each actor involved in or affected by a particular activity have a voice during 
the adoption and implementation of norms. In the context of development 
banks in particular, the importance of participation has been highlighted 
because:  
[w]hen citizens develop a sense of ownership of development efforts as 
a consequence of their engagement in decision making about selecting, 
planning, managing, and monitoring project activities, results are 
typically enhanced and impact more sustained. Similarly, when relevant 
institutional stakeholders are involved in designing programs or policy 
changes and planning their implementation, the outcomes are usually 
improved. At the same time, capacities are built, social capital 
enhanced, and partnerships between government, civil society, and the 
private sector improved as people learn by working together in a 
                                                 
78 Asian Development Bank, ‘Framework for Mainstreaming Participatory Development into 
Bank Operations’ (1996), cited in Richard S Ondrik, ‘Participatory Approaches to National 
Development Planning’ (1999) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEASTASIAPACIFIC/Resources/226262-
1143156545724/Brief_ADB.pdf> accessed 6 October 2017. 
79 UNDP, Human Development Report 1993 (Oxford University Press 1993) 21. 
80 People may have ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ control, depending, for example, on whether they are 
participating through an elected representative, or are representing themselves directly. See 
ibid. 
81 ibid. 
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supportive milieu.82 
It is evident, then, that participation is not only about the involvement 
of affected actors, but also the building of relationships between actors with 
different roles and positions within a governance system. This view of 
participation corresponds to a large degree to participation as a human rights 
principle, substantiated most evidently through the right to equal 
participation in public affairs (found, for example, in Article 25 ICCPR).83 
The significance of participation is increased in light of its positive effect on 
the enjoyment of many human rights.84  
It is important to note that whether governance is ‘good’ or not 
pervades the entirety of a governance system. This means that every stage of 
governance, from the drafting and adoption of standards, to the 
implementation and enforcement of applicable rules, must be done in a 
transparent, participatory and accountable manner.85  
                                                 
82 Asian Development Bank, Poverty and Social Development Papers No. 6 (2003), cited in 
Habib Mohammad Zafarullah and Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, Managing Development in a 
Globalized World : Concepts, Processes, Institutions (CRC Press 2012) 318. 
83 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) UNTS vol. 999, 171 (ICCPR). 
84 The UN OHCHR has stated that the right to equal participation in public affairs is 
‘inextricably linked to other human rights such as the rights to peaceful assembly and 
association, freedom of expression and opinion and the rights to education and to 
information.’ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Equal 
Participation in Political and Public Affairs’, 
<ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/EqualParticipation.aspx> accessed 16 December 2016. 
85 This has been emphasised by the World Bank, which has identified six areas, or 
‘dimensions’ in which the ‘goodness’ of a country’s governance should be assessed: (1) voice 
and accountability; (2) political stability and absence of violence; (3) government 
effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law; and (6) control of corruption. The Bank 
has further developed individual governance ‘indicators’ for over 200 countries to assess good 
governance in each of these dimensions. See World Bank, ‘Worldwide Governance 
Indicators’ <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home> accessed 2 
January 2018, discussed in Hazenberg (n 53). Because of the country-specific contexts in 
which they have been developed, the present study will not use the indicators or dimensions, 




9.3.2 Good governance and human rights: Human rights-based approaches 
This section discusses the relationship between good governance, human 
rights and human rights-based approaches, building on the definition of good 
governance provided above. 
In recent years, more and more connections have been made between 
good governance and human rights. Some scholars even go so far as to argue 
that there is a right to good governance, as part of the right to development.86 
Various international organisations advocate a good governance approach to 
human rights and vice-versa. This includes several human rights bodies, such 
as the UN Human Rights Council, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN CteeESCR. As 
stated by the CteeESCR, the OHCHR has been particularly active in linking 
the concepts, having organised two international conferences on the topic and 
published an extensive report on ‘Good Governance Practices for the 
Protection of Human Rights’.87  
The concepts can by now be considered to be mutually reinforcing. 
First, good governance benefits from the more detailed standards of conduct 
provided by human rights.88 The international system for the protection of 
human rights provides values to guide both State and non-State actors, and 
concrete performance standards against which their conduct can be judged, 
better enabling the actors to be held to account.89 The OHCHR identifies a 
further role for human rights in aiding the development of institutional 
aspects of good governance (e.g. legislative frameworks). In turn, human 
rights benefit from the enabling environment provided by good governance,90 
which has been described by the CteeESCR as being ‘essential to the 
                                                 
86 See e.g. C Raj Kumar, Corruption and Human Rights in India: Comparative Perspectives 
on Transparency and Good Governance (Oxford University Press 2011) 92-93. 
87 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Good Governance 
Practices for the Protection of Human Rights’ (2007) 
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realization of all human rights, including the elimination of poverty and 
ensuring a satisfactory livelihood for all’.91 Good governance systems require 
appropriate regulations, institutions and procedures to be established, which 
are crucial for the effective realisation of human rights – sustainable human 
rights realisation requires action that goes beyond the mere adoption of 
relevant legislation to include ‘political, managerial and administrative 
processes responsible for responding to the rights and needs of the 
population’.92  
Further links between the concept are found in the OHCHR’s 
statement that ‘the true test of good governance is the degree to which it 
delivers on the promise of human rights’.93 The body has even stated that 
‘good governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public 
affairs, manage public resources, and guarantee the realization of human 
rights’,94 thereby seemingly including the realisation of human rights as an 
aspect of good governance. While this may be true, it is important, in light of 
the OHCHR’s focus on public institutions, to keep in mind this study’s 
definition of governance going beyond government.  
The strength of the relationship between good governance and human 
rights has also been repeatedly highlighted by the UN Human Rights Council 
(building on the work of the previous Commission on Human Rights, 
recognising that:  
transparent, responsible, accountable and participatory government that 
is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people, including 
                                                 
91 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 12: The 
Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant)’ 12 May 1999, para 23. 
92 ibid. 
93 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Good governance 
and human rights’ (2016) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceI
ndex.aspx> accessed 12 November 2017, cited in David Androff, ‘Human Rights-Based and 
Good Governance Approaches to Social Development’ in James Midgely and Manohar Pawar 
(eds), Future Directions in Social Development (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 67. 
94 Androff (n 93) 67, quoting Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 




women and members of vulnerable and marginalized groups, is the 
foundation on which good governance rests and that such a foundation 
is an indispensable condition for the full realization of human rights.95 
Given the close ties between good governance and human rights, and 
in particular the latter’s need of good governance, it is important to consider 
how a good governance approach to international human rights could be 
taken. Perhaps the easiest way to conceive of a ‘good’ human rights 
governance system is to take a ‘human rights-based approach’ (HRBA96). 
Several similarities can be identified between good governance and HRBAs 
conceptually. As with good governance, for example, the concept of HRBAs 
can be traced back to development studies, in particular international 
development cooperation. Also in parity with good governance, the concept 
of HRBAs has now gained much traction and is considered to have a much 
broader scope of application. Congruently with good governance, a HRBA is 
difficult to specify in terms of particular action to be taken, and is also defined 
through the identification of certain elements that should be present (or 
principles that should be followed), some of which match those of a good 
governance approach. In light of the different uses and understandings of 
HRBAs, a ‘Statement of Common Understanding’ was adopted by UN 
agencies in 2003, detailing what a HRBA actually is. In the statement, three 
common aspects of HRBAs are identified: (1) all activities within 
development cooperation should aim to ‘contribute directly to the realization 
of one or several human rights’; (2) human rights principles should guide 
programmes in all sectors (including governance) and at all stages of the 
process, comprising ‘planning and design (including setting of goals, 
objectives and strategies); implementation, monitoring and evaluation’; and 
(3) the ‘relationship between individuals with valid claims (rights-holders) 
and State and non-State actors with correlative obligations (duty-bearers) is 
                                                 
95 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 7/11, ‘The role of good governance in the protection 
of human rights’, (27 March 2008) A/RES/7/11. 
96 See UN Practitioner’s Portal on Human Rights Based Approaches to Programming’ 
<http://hrbaportal.org/> accessed 2 January 2018. 
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determined by human rights’, working to strengthen the capacity of each.97 
The definition of a HRBA has more recently been provided by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council in 2015, using the Statement as a point from 
which to build a more concrete list of principles for a HRBA. The principles 
are intended to be adhered to at all stages of an actor’s activities, and signify 
that HRBA go beyond the application of human rights standards by providing 
a conceptual framework to guide activities.98 The list of principles identified 
by the Human Rights Council can be summarised as: 
(a) Universality:  
(b) Indivisibility; 
(c) Participation and consultation; 
(d) Non-discrimination; 
(e) Accountability; 
(f) Transparency; and 
(g) Do no harm or do less harm.99 
From this definition, it is possible to draw several parallels between 
HRBAs and good governance, particularly for what concerns the three good 
governance principles of transparency, accountability and participation. The 
OHCHR, for example, notes that (in the context of poverty reduction) a 
HRBA requires ‘active and informed participation by the poor in the 
formulation, implementation and monitoring of poverty reduction 
                                                 
97 The Statement was adopted following an ‘Inter-Agency Workshop on a Human Rights-
Based Approach’ in May 2003. See United Nations Development Group, ‘The Human Rights 
Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among 
UN Agencies’ (2003) <https://undg.org/document/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-
development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies/> accessed 
12 November 2017. 
98 Hesselman and Lane (n 11). 
99 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Final research-based report of the Human Rights Council 
Advisory Committee on best practices and main challenges in the promotion and protection 
of human rights in post-disaster and post-conflict situations’ (10 February 2015) 




strategies’.100 The OHCHR further comments on the emphasis that HRBAs 
place on accountability, in particular that ‘[r]ights imply duties, and duties 
demand accountability.’101 Furthermore, whichever means of accountability 
is chosen under HRBAs, the OHCHR stresses that ‘all mechanisms must be 
accessible, transparent and effective.’102 The three good governance 
principles are also reflected in international human rights law more broadly, 
both in international human rights instruments and in the work of the United 
Nations international human rights treaty monitoring bodies. Participation, 
for example, is substantiated through the right to participation in public 
affairs (found in Article 25 ICCPR), which has a large effect on the 
enjoyment of many human rights.103 Similarly, accountability could be said 
to be reflected through the right to an effective remedy. According to the 
ICCPR, this extends to a requirement that States ‘ensure that any person 
claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent 
authority provided for by the legal system of the State’, and that States should 
work towards making judicial remedies available.104  
 In the context of international human rights and non-State actors, an 
interesting panel took place in September 2015 at the United Nations Human 
Rights Council, which focused on a human rights-based approach to good 
governance in the public service. The opening speaker, Ibrahim Silamar, 
reiterated the abovementioned connections between good governance and 
human rights made by the OHCHR.105 Significantly, he linked the debates to 
                                                 
100 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Principles and 
Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies’ (2012) 
HR/PUB/06/12, para 23, 
<http://ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyStrategiesen.pdf> accessed 12 November 
2017. 
101 ibid para 24. 
102 ibid [emphasis added]. 
103 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Equal Participation 
in Political and Public Affairs’ (n 84). 
104 Article 2(3)(b) ICCPR. The right to an effective remedy can also be found in Article 13 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
105 See Ibrahim Salama, ‘Opening Statement’, presented at the ‘Panel discussion on a human 
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the issue of non-State actors and human rights, adding in his concluding 
statement that ‘States should ensure that private actors comply with human 
rights standards and operate in a manner that achieves and secures the dignity 
of all individuals and communities’.106 Further mention of the significance of 
non-State actors in good governance and human rights was made (among 
others) by a delegate for Belgium. The delegate noted the importance of good 
governance for private actors involved in public service provision, and that 
the Belgian government ‘wishes to see Business take comprehensive 
initiatives to encourage the streamlining of Human Rights due diligence in 
all their operations’, asking the panellists to elaborate on the role of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and challenges to 
ensuring the principles of good governance are respected no matter the 
(public or private) identity of the relevant actor.107 Another interesting 
connection was made in the panel between good governance and existing 
treaty law, relying on the ‘trias’ of ‘information (i.e. transparency), 
participation and access to justice’ found in the Aarhus Convention.108 
Looking at these three principles, which Anne Peters argued ‘captur[e], in a 
very easy formula, the main elements of good and accountable governance’, 
through the lens of human rights, it is possible to flesh out and apply good 
governance beyond the realm of public services.109 Strikingly, although 
                                                 
rights-based approach to good governance in the public service’, 15 September 2015 
<https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/30thSession/Pages/Oral
Statement.aspx?MeetingNumber=23&MeetingDate=Thursday%2c%2024%20September%2
02015> accessed 12 November 2017. See also Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Good Governance Practices for the Protection of Human 
Rights’ (n 87). 
106 Salama (n 105).  
107 Statement by the permanent representative of Belgium to the United Nations presented at 
the ‘Panel discussion on a human rights-based approach to good governance in the public 
service’ (n105). 
108 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (adopted 25 June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001) 2161 UNTS 447 (Aarhus 
Convention). Anne Peters, statement presented at the ‘Panel discussion on a human rights-
based approach to good governance in the public service’ (n 105). 




confined to the environmental sphere, the Convention couches the three 
aspects of good governance as rights, rather than principles, and contains 
multiple connections between the three pillars and human rights in its 
preamble.110 
 It can be concluded from this discussion that good governance and 
human rights are closely connected and mutually reinforcing, and could both 
be used to ensure that international human rights governance is done in a way 
that maximises the system’s achievement of its purpose. Furthermore, 
beyond the added value of each concept explained by the OHCHR, the 
distinct approaches, viewed as conceptual frameworks, also complement 
each other. The added value of a good governance approach for human rights 
lies in the fact that governance, as understood in the present study, allows us 
to move our focus away from international legal obligations and the 
consideration of rights-holders and obligation-holders (upon which HRBA 
seem to focus) and away from the State-centric nature of the international 
human rights law system. In so doing, good governance opens the way for 
more inclusion of non-State actors, both as governing actors in their own right 
and as those affected by decisions taken within a governance system. The 
added value of HRBAs is two-fold. First, it lies in the more specific and 
comprehensive principles that must be followed throughout activities – for 
example non-discrimination and the principle of doing no harm or doing less 
harm. Second, HRBAs require all activities to seek to ‘contribute directly to 
the realization of one or several human rights’.111  
 Good governance will be applied throughout Chapters 10 and 11, as 
part of the multi-level governance approach that will be suggestion in Section 
9.4. Human rights-based approaches will also be applied in Chapter 10 as a 
basis on which to argue that the World Bank should include human rights in 
its policies and programmes. 
                                                 
110 See Aarhus Convention (n 108) Preamble. 
111 United Nations Development Group, ‘The Human Rights Based Approach to Development 
Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies’ (2003) 
<https://undg.org/document/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-
towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies/> accessed 12 November 2017. 
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9.4 Multi-level governance 
The following sections will introduce the theory of multi-level governance, 
explain a multi-level governance approach to international human rights 
(bearing in mind the study’s understanding of governance and the importance 
of good governance) and address some key challenges to implementing a 
multi-level governance regime.  
Multi-level governance was introduced in the context of governance 
within the European Union. The key proponents and developers of multi-
level governance, Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, originally envisaged 
multi-level governance as a theory suited to economic governance within the 
European Union.112 multi-level governance is certainly still widely used 
within the European Union, as evidenced by the Charter for Multilevel 
Governance that was adopted by the European Committee of the Regions in 
2014.113 However, as with many governance theories, multi-level governance 
has by now been defined by many different scholars, used in different ways 
and adapted to different situations. Indeed, since its academic debut in the 
early 1990s, multi-level governance has been applied to broad and diverse 
                                                 
112 See Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of 
Multi-level Governance’ (2003) 97(2) The American Political Science Review 223; and Gary 
Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, ‘Contrasting visions of multi-level governance’ in Ian Bache and 
Matthew Flinders (eds), Multi-level governance (Oxford University Press 2004). Multi-level 
governance was actually introduced by Gary Marks in 1993 in the context of Europe, but has 
been significantly developed by the two scholars working together. See Gary Marks, 
‘Structural policy and multi-level governance in the EC’, in Alan W Cafruny and Glenda G 
Rosenthal (eds), The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond 
(Lynne Rienner 1993). For a review of the original use and developments of multi-level 
governance in the literature, see Paul Stephenson, ‘Twenty Years of Multi-Level Governance: 
“Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?”’ (2013) 20(6) Journal of 
European Public Policy 817, 817-822. 
113 See European Committee of the Regions, ‘Charter for Multilevel Governance in Europe’, 
20 February 2014, <https://portal.cor.europa.eu/mlgcharter/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 12 
November 2017 (Charter for Multilevel Governance in Europe). While this instrument shows 
that multi-level governance is considered significant at the European Union level, it is 
important to bear in mind that it is not legally binding. Closer inspection of the Charter also 




settings, including, inter alia, environmental,114 climate change115, health116 
and global governance.117 As well as different topic areas, multi-level 
governance has now been applied to ‘a wide variety of multilevel governance 
systems ranging from global institutions, regional organizations, such as the 
EU, national governments, and subnational governments’.118 Having 
conducted a thorough literature review of the studies applying multi-level 
governance to different fields, Paul Stephenson has identified five main uses 
of multi-level governance that have developed over time.119 The most recent, 
                                                 
114 See e.g. Inger Weibust and James Meadowcroft (eds), Multilevel Environmental 
Governance: Managing Water and Climate Change in Europe and North America (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2014); Joanna Cent, Malgorzata Grodzińska-Jurczak and Agata Pietrzyk-
Kaszyńska, ‘Emerging Multilevel Environmental Governance – A Case of Public 
Participation in Poland’ (2014) 22(2) Journal for Nature Conservation 93; Jouni Paavola, 
‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance: Exploring the Economic Explanations’ (2016) 
26(3) Environmental Policy and Governance 143; Stefan Larsson, Lars Emmelin and Sandra 
Vindelstam, ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance: The Case of Wind Power 
Development in Sweden’ (2014) 6(2) Societal Studies 291; Gerd Winter (ed), Multilevel 
Governance of Global Environmental Change Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2006).   
115 See e.g. Jan Corfee-Morlot and others, ‘Cities, Climate Change and Multilevel 
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Jogesh and Arabinda Mishra, ‘Multi-Level Climate Governance and the Role of the 
Subnational Level’ (2015) 12(4) Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences 235; Joyeeta 
Gupta, ‘The Multi-Level Governance Challenge of Climate Change’ (2007) 4(3) 
Environmental Sciences 131. 
116 See e.g. Sharifah Rahma Sekalala and Monica Twesiime Kirya, ‘Challenges in Multi-Level 
Health Governance: Corruption in the Global Fund’s Operations in Uganda and Zambia’ 
(2015) 7(1) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 141; Kumanan Wilson, ‘The Complexities of 
Multi-Level Governance in Public Health’ (2004) 95(6) Canadian Journal of Public Health 
409; Seye Abimbola and others, ‘Towards People-Centred Health Systems: A Multi-Level 
Framework for Analysing Primary Health Care Governance in Low- and Middle-Income 
Countries’ (2014) 29(2) Health Policy and Planning 29. 
117 See e.g. Zürn, ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’ (n 7); and César de Prado, 
Global Multi-Level Governance: European and East Asian Leadership (United Nations 
University Press 2007). 
118 Arjan H Schakel, ‘Applying Multilevel Governance’ in Hans Keman and Jaap Woldendorp 
(eds), Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2016) 97. 
119 The five main uses are: (1) ‘original’ uses; (2) functional uses; (3) combined uses; (4) 
normative uses; and (5) comparative uses. Stephenson (n 112) identifies that ‘original uses’ 
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‘comparative’ use began being used in 2007, and refers to a growing corpus 
of literature examining multi-level governance in the context of globalisation 
and international law.120 Despite such developments in the literature, 
however, no study has yet discussed or applied multi-level governance in the 
context of international human rights. The present study seeks to fill this gap. 
Before doing so, however, a more thorough definition of multi-level 
governance will be provided. 
9.4.1 Defining multi-level governance 
Defining what multi-level governance is in concrete terms is somewhat of a 
challenge. However, it is possible to identify two main characteristics, or 
‘dimensions’ of a multi-level governance system – the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions.121 The first, vertical dimension corresponds to the ‘multi-level’ 
nature of multi-level governance, ‘refer[ring] to the increasing 
interdependence of actors situated or nested at different territorial levels’.122 
The second, horizontal dimension denotes the ‘increased role of nonstate 
actors in decision making’.123 This dimension can be said to represent the 
‘governance beyond government’ approach that is very often found in multi-
level governance.124 It is possible to roughly equate the two dimensions of 
multi-level governance with two of the shifts in governance discussed in 
                                                 
are present from 1993 onwards, functional uses from 1997 onwards, combined uses from 2001 
onwards, normative uses from 2003 onwards and comparative uses from 2007 onwards. 
Within the types of use, he has also identified the different contexts and fields within which 
the uses have occurred. 
120 Stephenson refers here to authors such as Enderlein, Kaul, and Slaughter and Hale. See 
ibid 829-830. 
121 Some authors, such as Simona Piattoni, identify three dimensions (or ‘distinctions’) within 
multi-level governance, although they can still be roughly translated into the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions. See Simona Piattoni, The Theory of Multi-level Governance: 
Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges (Oxford University Press 2010) 17. 
122 Ian Bache, ‘Multilevel Governance’ in Mark Bevir, Encyclopedia of Governance (SAGE 
Publications 2007) 581-583. 
123 ibid. 
124 Most proponents of multi-level governance understand governance as going beyond 
government (which is generally equated to the ‘nation-State’) to include more fragmented and 




Section 9.2 – the vertical dimension resembles the upwards shift in 
governance, and the horizontal dimension resembles the horizontal shift in 
governance. Although the name of multi-level governance would suggest that 
its vertical dimension is its more significant trait, the horizontal dimension 
has been the focus of much attention, particularly because of the coordination 
and cooperation that occurs between the different actors involved in a multi-
level governance system. The horizontal dimension has led to claims that 
multi-level governance ‘emphasise[s] how the different levels were traversed 
and linked by actors moving rather freely across formally still existent levels 
of government and spheres of authority.’125 From this perspective, it is 
possible to link multi-level governance with ‘network governance’, and to 
identifying policy networks126 created by the movement and coordination 
between different governance actors on different governance levels.127 Such 
coordination is a crucial to an effective system of multi-level governance but 
also constitutes one of its most substantial challenges. This will be discussed 
below, in Section 9.4.3.2.             
 Multi-level governance can be summarised as shown in Figure 9.1. 
 
                                                 
125 ibid 20. 
126 A discussion of policy networks falls outside of the scope of this book. It suffices to note, 
at this point, that a ‘policy network’ can be defined as ‘a social system in which actors develop 
comparatively durable patterns of interaction and communication aimed at policy problems 
or policy programs’. See Johannes TA Bresser and Laurence J O’Toole, ‘The selection of 
policy instruments: A network-based perspective’ (1998) 18(3) Journal of Public Policy 213, 
218, cited in Laurence J O’Toole and Kenneth I Hanf, ‘Multi-Level Governance Networks 
and the Use of Policy Instruments in the European Union’ in Johannes TA Bresser and Walter 
A Rosenbaum, Achieving Sustainable Development: The Challenges of Governance Across 
Social Scales (Praeger Publishers 2003) 257, 259. 
127 See e.g. Gary Marks and others, Governance in the European Union (SAGE Publications 
1996); Thomas Conzelmann, ‘Towards a New Concept of Multi-Level Governance?’, 
Commitee of the Regions (2009) 30-31 
<http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/governance/Documents/Conzelmann.pdf> accessed 25 
September 2017. 




Figure 9.1: Multi-level governance (source: the author) 
9.4.2 Type I and Type II multi-level governance 
It is important to note that there are two types of multi-level governance 
systems – Type I and Type II.128 The distinction between the two types lies 
in the way that a multi-level governance system is organised.  
First, this relates to the fact that multi-level governance systems are 
divided into ‘jurisdictions’, or segments. In Type I multi-level governance 
systems, the jurisdictions are ‘general purpose’, being divided on the basis of 
a territorial level (i.e. the international, regional, national, sub-national).129 
This means that at each level within a Type I multi-level governance system, 
governance activities are bundled together, with the distinction between 
jurisdictions residing in their territorial scope. Ultimately, the jurisdictions in 
Type I multi-level governance can be described as ‘conceiv[ing] authority in 
neatly defined local, regional, national, and international layers’.130 
Jurisdictions in Type II multi-level governance systems, on the other hand, 
are divided in a task-specific manner, on the basis of what action is required 
on the different levels. This results in ‘specialised’ jurisdictions,131 and means 
that, on the basis of their expertise, some governance actors may operate in 
multiple jurisdictions.  
                                                 
128 Marks and Hooghe (n 112). 
129 Hooghe and Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How?’ (n 112) 236. 
130 Alessandra Casella and Barry R Weingast, ‘Elements of a Theory of Jurisdictional Change’ 
in Barry Eichengreen, Jeffry Frieden and Jürgen von Hagen (eds), Politics and Institutions in 
an Integrated Europe (Springer Verlag 1996) 13, cited in Marks and Hooghe (n 112) 20. 















 Second, the difference in the organisation of Type I and Type II multi-
level governance lies in the structure of the jurisdictions. In Type I multi-
level governance, membership is ‘non-intersecting’, meaning that smaller 
jurisdictions will ‘be contained within the borders of the larger ones’,132 in a 
‘Russian doll-like’ manner.133 This means that each jurisdiction in Type I 
multi-level governance has separate members, which do not overlap with the 
members of other jurisdictions. In Type II multi-level governance systems, a 
more flexible approach is taken, and there can be intersecting memberships 
between jurisdictions. Under Type II multi-level governance the allocation 
of an actor to a jurisdiction is based not on the level on which the actor 
operates, but the expertise and interests of the actor. This means that if a 
certain actor has expertise and/or interests in different areas, they may operate 
on different levels and within the different task-specific jurisdictions. 
 The third difference between Type I and Type II multi-level 
governance systems is that under Type I multi-level governance jurisdictions 
exist on a set, limited number of levels. This is not to say that Type I multi-
level governance systems must all have the same amount of levels, but rather 
that within a given Type I multi-level governance, the number of levels 
cannot be increased or decreased. There is no limitation, however, on the 
number of levels in Type II multi-level governance systems. In such systems, 
the number of jurisdictions depends on which tasks need to be performed, 
resulting in jurisdictions that ‘come and go as demands for governance 
change.’134  
 Essentially, Type I multi-level governance systems have a ‘system-
wide architecture’ that is not designed to change with time and needs – 
reforms within such systems do not result in the creation of new jurisdictions 
but rather in the reallocation of tasks or functions between existing 
jurisdictions.135 This, combined with the fact that ‘[t]erritorial jurisdictions 
                                                 
132 Casella and Weingast (n 130) cited in Marks and Hooghe (n 112) 20. 
133 Lane and Hesselman (n 17) 97, citing Marks and Hooghe (n 112) 15-17. 
134 Hooghe and Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How?’ (n 112) 236. 
135 ibid 237. 
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are intended to be, and usually are, stable for period of several decades or 
more’, contrasts with the more fluid and flexible design of Type II systems 
that can respond to changing governance needs.136  
To summarise, the differences between Type I and Type II multi-level 
governance systems are the following: 
 
Characteristic Type I Type II 
Jurisdictions • General purpose 
• Divided according 
to territorial levels 
• Russian-doll 
models 
• Task specific 





• Non-intersecting • Intersecting 
Number of 
jurisdictions 
• Limited • Unlimited 
Design of system 
as a whole 
• Durable • Flexible 
 
Table 9.1: Type I vs Type II multilevel governance (source: the author137) 
 
It is important to note that although the two types of multi-level governance 
have been cast as ‘contrasting visions’, it is possible for them both to apply 
simultaneously; according to Marks and Hooghe it is even possible (and in 
fact very common) for Type II arrangements to be established, or organised, 
                                                 
136 ibid 236-237. 
137 This table is based on a similar table by Marks and Hooghe (n 112) 17; and Hooghe and 




by Type I jurisdictions.138 There are nonetheless consequences of the 
differences between the organisation of Type I and Type II multi-level 
governance systems. This is mainly that Type II systems are more flexible 
and less formalised than Type I systems. Indeed, Type I multi-level 
governance systems are considered to be somewhat hierarchical, based on the 
Russian doll model of jurisdictions (with individuals ‘situated at the 
bottom’139). A more hierarchical structure raises the question of to what 
extent Type I multi-level governance can be considered to be governance 
beyond government, but it has by now been recognised that there are 
‘intensified (horizontal) interactions between government and non-
governmental actors’ in Type I multi-level governance systems.140 In 
contrast, the flexibility of Type II multi-level governance allows movement 
of actors between levels and jurisdictions to the participation of actors in the 
system as a whole, and within the different jurisdictions – actors with the 
relevant expertise or interests in a certain field are able to voluntarily 
participate in Type II multi-level governance systems.141  
 Looking at the two types of multi-level governance in the context of 
international human rights, it can be said that most legal scholars would view 
the international human rights law framework to be organised in the manner 
of a Type I multi-level governance system. In other words, and as reflected 
in Chapters 1-7 of the present study, it can be considered to be divided into 
                                                 
138 See Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘Types of multi-level governance’ in Hendrik 
Enderlein, Sonja Wälti and Michael Zürn (eds), Handbook on multilevel governance (Edward 
Elgar 2010) 17, cited in Schakel (n 118) 103. See also Marks and Hooghe (n 112) 24, in which 
the authors mention that Type II multi-level governance ‘tends to be embedded in legal 
frameworks determined by Type I jurisdictions’. 
139 Lane and Hesselman (n 17) 97. 
140 Ian Bache, Ian Bartle and Matthew Flinders, ‘Multilevel governance’ in Christopher Ansell 
and Jacob Torfing (eds), Handbook on theories of governance (Edward Elgar 2016) 487, cited 
in Lane and Hesselman (n 17) 97. 
141 Ian Bartle, Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, ‘Rethinking governance: Towards 
convergence of regulatory governance and multilevel governance?’, Paper presented at the 
ECPR Standing Group on Regulation and Governance 4th Biennial Conference, University 
of Exeter, UK (2012); Hooghe and Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How?’ (n 112) 
11, cited in Lane and Hesselman (n 17) 97. 
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territorial levels (the international, regional and national). Within 
international law more generally, specialised regimes, or branches of law 
have emerged. Even within international human rights law the argument 
could be made that the ten core UN human rights treaties actually form the 
basis of ten fragmented sub-branches of international human rights law. Such 
fragmentation could lead to the conclusion that international human rights 
law may be moving towards being organised in a Type II multi-level 
governance manner. Certainly, when approaching human rights from a 
governance perspective (looking at extra-legal measures and including the 
activities of non-State actors), it is clear that much action taken for the 
purpose of better protecting human rights is organised in the manner of a 
Type II multi-level governance system. Moving forwards towards a multi-
level governance approach to international human rights, it is argued here 
that the more flexible and inclusive design of Type II multi-level governance 
is preferable than the more rigid organisation of Type I. 
9.4.3 Challenges to multi-level governance 
Several criticisms have been made of multi-level governance, which must be 
addressed. These range from criticism of the concept itself to criticisms of 
the ways in which is it used (or not) by scholars, as well as how it works 
operationally. In particular, the criticisms are often related to the challenges 
that multi-level governance systems face. The following sections will address 
some of the main concerns that have been raised regarding multi-level 
governance, looking specifically at some definitional aspects of multi-level 
governance, the coordination of actors in (particularly Type II) multi-level 
governance and the legitimacy and accountability of multi-level governance 
regimes. As far as possible, the challenges will be discussed in the context of 
the governance of international human rights. 
9.4.3.1 Definitions: territorial and functional governance 
First, concerning definitional issues and the use of terminology, Thomas 
Conzelmann has criticised Marks and Hooghe’s explanation that Type II 
multi-level governance allows individuals to make up a governance ‘level’. 




nature as ‘functional governance’, in contrast with the ‘territorial 
governance’ of Type I regimes142 which looks at, for example, the local, 
national, regional and international levels. Conzelmann raises this issue 
because if ‘the constituencies of Type II jurisdictions are individuals who 
share some geographical or functional space and who have a common need 
for decision-making’, as Marks and Hooghe have suggested, the ‘multi-level 
concept can relate to any situation of distinct actors with joint problems’.143 
The problem here is that this understanding of multi-level governance can 
easily be conflated with ‘governance’ generally, especially if one assumes a 
definition of governance as purpose-based – as different actors working 
together to achieve a common goal (see Section 9.2.1). From this perspective, 
in order to truly say that multi-level governance adds something to simply 
‘governance’, levels must be conceived of in territorial terms, although not 
in the same strict sense as under Type I multi-level governance.144 However, 
it is argued in this study that the coordination of activities in a multi-level 
governance, which will be discussed in the next section, should be considered 
one of its central characteristics. In addition, suggesting such a hybrid 
approach to the definition of Type I and Type II multi-level governance 
would create more challenges to the operationalisation and organisation of a 
multi-level governance regime. 
9.4.3.2 Coordination of actors and activities 
One of the key attributes of a multi-level governance system is coordination 
and communication between different actors. However, it is also one of the 
main challenges to and criticisms of multi-level governance, raising the 
question of how such coordination can be achieved, particularly when actors 
participate on an ad hoc basis. Until now, ‘[multi-level governance] theorists 
have not framed clear expectations about the dynamics of this polity.’145 
                                                 
142 Conzelmann (n 127), discussing Marks and Hooghe (n 112) 240. 
143 Conzelmann (n 127); see also Michael Keating, ‘Thirty Years of Territorial Politics’ (2008) 
31(1) West European Politics 60. 
144 For a full discussion, see Conzelmann (n 127). 
145 Marks and others (n 127) 167, cited in Piattoni (n 120) 23. 
MOVING BEYOND ACHIEVING HORIZONTAL EFFECT THROUGH LAW 
 359 
Although multi-level governance envisages coordinated action and perhaps 
even networks within a governance system, the details as to how this should 
be achieved ‘remain murky…apart from a generalized presumption of 
increasing mobilization across levels, [multi-level governance proponents] 
provide no systematic set of expectations about which actors should mobilize 
and why.’146 Unfortunately, due to constraints of time and space, delineating 
the precise manner in which this occurs in the governance of international 
human rights falls outside of the scope of this study. Instead, several 
suggestions will be made, more generally in this chapter and more 
specifically in Chapters 10 and 11, of measures that could be taken by various 
actors to better enable cooperation and collaboration to strengthen the 
protection of human rights.  
When considering the coordination of actors in a multi-level 
governance system, the first issue to consider is how and why actors become 
involved in governance. Generally speaking, the participation of a particular 
actor in a governance system is authorised. In multi-level governance 
structures, the authorisation of a certain actor to participate can be done by 
the actor themselves, or by an overarching governing body (e.g. the European 
Commission, in the context of European multi-level governance). 
Authorisation (and thus participation) seems to happen for two reasons. The 
first is that the actor has the relevant technical or ‘specialised’ knowledge to 
‘contribute to a specific policy’; the second is that they have a ‘legitimate’ 
concern in doing so.147 In the context of human rights, it is easy to imagine 
that many NGOs become involved for both of these reasons – they may be 
driven by a (legitimate) desire to improve the enjoyment of people’s rights, 
alleviate conditions of poverty,148 or to protect individuals’ dignity. At the 
same time, they may have staff that have a specialist knowledge in particular 
aspects of human rights (many NGOs, for example, focus on specific human 
                                                 
146 ibid. 
147 Piattoni (n 120) 201. 




rights issues).149 This method of authorisation allows for a collection of more 
localised actors to become involved in a multi-level governance system, 
boosting the likelihood that opinions of ‘the people’ are actually being taken 
into account.150 In this respect, the governance principle of subsidiarity is 
relevant. Subsidiarity stipulates that the governance authority, or role, should 
be given to the ‘lowest competent authorities’ (i.e. the most localised 
actor).151 It can therefore be considered to reinforce the benefit of multi-level 
governance that it allows governance ‘stakeholders’ to come from the local 
level as well as the national, regional or international territorial levels. In turn, 
this strengthens the participatory nature of a multi-level governance system, 
which is important if the system is to be considered one of ‘good governance’. 
The principle of subsidiarity should therefore play a role in the coordination 
of tasks and actors within a multi-level governance system. 
It has been pointed out that the notion of ‘volunteering’, or having a 
‘choice’ to participate in governance (mentioned above in relation to Type II 
multi-level governance systems) is not always a good reflection of reality, in 
that in many cases non-State actors may have no choice but to volunteer their 
expertise. For example, States can still coerce such participants to contribute 
on the basis of binding agreements, national legislation or even by requiring 
or stimulating action through non-binding initiatives. A clear example of this 
would be when States delegate certain functions to non-State actors in order 
                                                 
149 Examples of such NGOs include Amnesty International (initially established to prevent 
the proliferation of torture, but now focusing on broader human rights issues), UNICEF 
(focused on the protection of children’s rights), the Association for the Prevention of Torture, 
but also NGOs taking a broader focus, such as Human Rights Watch. 
150 Piattoni does warn that this system of authorisation could have issues of effectiveness, 
depending on whether the actors involved do actually have a ‘legitimate concern’, because 
this is not as easily identifiable as an actor that has the relevant technical or specialised 
knowledge. Piattoni (n 120) 201. 
151 See e.g. Maria de Lourdes Melo Zurita, ‘Towards new disaster governance: Subsidiarity 
as a critical tool’ (2015) 25 Environmental Policy and Governance 386, 387, discussing 
Nicholas Aroney, ‘Subsidiarity: ‘European lessons for Australia’s federal balance’ (2011) 39 
Federal Law Review 213, and Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann, ‘The global 
relevance of subsidiarity: an overview’ in Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (eds), 
Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Springer Verlag 2014) 1.  
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to fulfil their own human rights obligations under international treaties (for 
example the provision of public services, as explained above and in Chapter 
5). In this sense, as acknowledged in literature, there is still space for some 
critical engagement with the representation of the two Types of multi-level 
governance as completely distinct from one another (something that could 
also be linked to the discussion in Section 9.4.3.1 regarding what ‘levels’ 
refer to in Type II multi-level governance).152 
Having established why and how actors become involved in 
(especially Type II) multi-level governance systems, it is important to turn to 
what coordination actually is. Coordination is closely linked to cooperation, 
and can occur to varying extents. Gro Sandkjaer Hanssen, Per Kristen 
Mydske and Elisabeth Dahle have addressed the difficulties of coordinating 
different levels of government in the context of climate change adaptation in 
Norway.153 Their helpful study discusses what coordination within 
governance structures actually means, and how it differs in the way that it is 
achieved on different levels. For example, they highlighted the increase in 
network-oriented practices in which ‘the coordination mechanism is the 
mutual dependence and trust among operationally autonomous actors who 
recognise the need to achieve coordinated action in order to handle common 
problems’.154 At the national-local level, though, the scholars referred to Ian 
Bache and Matthew Flinders’ notion of a ‘cooperative turn’ in network 
governance,155 whereby the reliance of national governments on more 
localised actors to implement policies gives rise to an acute need to cooperate 
with the local actors, as well as those members of the private sector that can 
provide more capacity for the implementation of policies.156 Significantly, 
this led Hanssen, Mydske and Dahle to identify different ‘strengths’ of 
                                                 
152 Bache, Bartle and Flinders (n 140) 486. 
153 Gro Sandkjaer Hanssen, Per Kristen Mydske and Elisabeth Dahle, ‘Multi-Level 
Coordination of Climate Change Adaptation: By National Hierarchical Steering or by 
Regional Network Governance?’ (2013) 18(8) Local Environment 869. 
154 ibid 872. 
155 Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (eds), Multi-Level Governance (Oxford University Press 
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cooperation, expressed in a ‘ladder of coordination’, shown in Figure 9.2.  
 
 
Figure 9.2: Ladder of coordination (source: Hanssen, Mydske and 
Dahle157) 
 
Hanssen, Mydske and Dahle use the ladder to explain that lower levels of 
coordination involve discussions and interactions between actors, but it is not 
until the third level that actors actually change their behaviour to ensure 
coordination of activity, as well as coordination between actors in the sense 
of communication. This, the authors note, can happen through hierarchical 
instruments (e.g. ‘hard’ law or regulation that coerces an actor into particular 
behaviour) or self-regulation.  
Particularly at the third step of the ladder it becomes obvious (also 
looking at the outcome of the study) that a coordinated goal or purpose to 
governing activities needs to be established, preferably with common 
standards that can be applied by actors on different levels. Applying this to 
the context of international human rights, perhaps the biggest challenge to 
the coordination of human rights governance activities, in the context of non-
                                                 
157 ibid. 
1. Information and knowledge-sharing (mediation)
2. Common discussions and deliberation, 
coordinating world views
3. Adjusting behaviour to avoid 
externalities or gain synergies
4. Joint measures, 
co-management
Increasing level of coordination and mutual 
dependence
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State actors and human rights, is precisely this – the lack of common, agreed 
upon, or imposed standards to which particular non-State actors should 
adhere. This makes it very difficult for different actors to coordinate their 
actions towards the achievement of the common goal (the protection and 
realisation of human rights). Although many non-State actors do take 
measures of self-regulation (through codes of conduct), and initiatives exist 
on various levels to provide non-State actors with standards that they can 
follow (e.g. the UN global Compact and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights at the international level, legislation adopted by 
States at a national level and guidance published by NGOs on a sector-level), 
there is a conspicuous lack of agreement at the international level, and 
particularly within international human rights law, as to what standards non-
State actors should adhere to. Perhaps here the negotiations on a binding 
treaty on business and human rights could play a useful role, ‘coordinating a 
world view’ on the matter (as seen in step two of the ladder). Multilateral (or 
even bilateral) agreements or memoranda of understanding adopted between 
different actors working on different levels within particular areas of human 
rights could also improve the coordination of human rights governance. Such 
agreements could be between exclusively public actors, public and private 
actors, or exclusively private actors. 
 Looking at Hanssen, Mydske and Dahle’s findings as a whole, it does 
seem that at the core of coordination are communication and access to 
information – in other words, transparency. Transparency is crucial for the 
first step of information and knowledge-sharing (step 1 of Hanssen, Mydske 
and Dahle’s ladder) upon which the remaining three steps rest, and which 
also relies on the willingness of actors to cooperate with one another. In light 
of this, as well as the link between coordination and participation mentioned 
above and accountability discussed in Section 9.4.3.3, placing an emphasis 
on good governance principles throughout the governance of international 
human rights, in all activities and by all actors, could therefore go some way 
towards improving coordination within multi-level human rights governance. 
The role of good governance principles in a multi-level governance approach 




9.4.2.3 Legitimacy and accountability  
Another criticism of multi-level governance systems and literature on the 
topic relates to the legitimacy and (democratic) accountability of multi-level 
governance regimes.158 This section will first discuss the issue of legitimacy 
before moving on to problems of accountability in multi-level governance.  
As explained in Chapter 3.2.1, there are two kinds of legitimacy – 
input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the procedures 
according to which decisions (including inter alia those creating policies, 
regulations, or placing obligations on certain actors) are created, meaning that 
those affected by the decision were able to consent to or participate in the 
process. Output legitimacy refers to the effectiveness of the outcomes of the 
decisions. One of the problems of legitimacy caused by multi-level 
governance is that it can take the decision-making away from democratically 
elected representatives. The question arises – where does the legitimacy come 
from for non-State actors that are involved in multi-level governance 
systems? This is a question that has often been overlooked by literature on 
multi-level governance, which often fails to address the negative impact that 
the regimes may have on democratic values, particularly within the European 
Union.159 In terms of the input (procedural) legitimacy of multi-level 
governance systems, multi-level governance could actually improve 
democratic legitimacy within a nation-State.160 This is due to the fact that 
because multi-level governance structures allow for the participation of local 
actors, particularly if the abovementioned principle of subsidiarity is 
                                                 
158 See e.g. Papadopoulos, ‘Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and 
Multilevel Governance’ (n 21); and Yannis Papadopoulos, ‘Accountability and Multi-Level 
Governance: More Accountability, Less Democracy?’ (2010) 33 West European Politics 
1030. 
159 See e.g. Bache, Bartle and Flinders (n 140) 486-498; Ian Bache, ‘Researching Multilevel 
Governance’, Paper presented to the CINEFOGO/University of Trento Conference on ‘The 
Governance of the European Union: theories, practices and myths’, Brussels, January 25-6, 
2008. 
160 This has been pointed out by Fritz W Scharpf, ‘The Joint‐Decision Trap: Lessons From 
German Federalism and European Integration’ (1988) 66 Public Administration 239, 
discussed in Piattoni (n 120) 200). 
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followed, ‘policy-making can more closely reflect local citizens’ preferences 
and, hence, be more legitimate’.161 Similarly, the inclusion of local actors 
within a multi-level governance system allows for higher levels of 
participation (the good governance criterion to which legitimacy is closely 
linked – see Chapter 3.2.1).162  
In a similar vein, although democratic legitimacy may suffer under 
multi-level governance systems which rely on non-legal and non-binding 
mechanisms, institutions, processes and procedures established by non-
elected entities, the ‘benchmarking, transparency and direct civil society 
input’ common in multi-level governance systems could help to ensure that 
citizen’s interests are protected, and can improve levels of participation in 
decision-making.163 This is likely to be true in relation to the governance of 
international human rights, since many instruments containing guidelines for 
actors to better protect human rights are non-binding, and even those binding 
norms found in international human rights treaties do not have binding 
enforcement or judicial mechanisms.164 As suggested in Section 9.2.2, there 
is also a considerable amount of self-regulation by non-State actors vis-à-vis 
human rights. 
However, if there are problems of legitimacy within a multi-level 
governance system, it is possible that solutions offered in the context of 
                                                 
161 Ibid. 
162 As Christopher Lord notes, participation can even be considered to be an element of input 
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of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2004).  
163 Conzelmann (n 127) citing Bernard Gbikpi and Jürgen R Grote, ‘From Democratic 
Government to Participatory Governance’ in Jürgen R Grote and Bernard Gbikpi (eds), 
Participatory Governance: Political and Social Implications (Springer 2002) 17; Susana 
Borrás and Thomas Conzelmann, ‘Democracy, Legitimacy and Soft Modes of Governance in 
the EU: The Empirical Turn’ (2007) 29(5) Journal of European Integration 531; and 
Papadopoulos, ‘Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and Multilevel 
Governance’ (n 21). 
164 On the nature of the output of the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, see Chapter 
5 of this book. At the regional level, some of the output (i.e. case law) is binding upon Member 
States of the regional human rights organisations, but there remain some issues of 




‘organic’ governance could be used. For example, as Simona Piattoni 
suggests, parliaments could authorise non-governmental governance actors 
and thus ‘contribut[e] to “defining, controlling and legitimising post-
parliamentary forms of governance”’.165 This goes back to the notion that 
governance actors should be authorised before participating in a multi-level 
governance system, and would be more suited to Type I rather than Type II 
multi-level governance systems, where actors are able to authorise 
themselves to participate. As well as authorising non-State actors, Piattoni 
has proposed that parliaments could ‘monitor and hold accountable these 
specialized systems of governance, “possibly addressing problems and issues 
of long-term global development, the tensions and contradictions between 
sectoral developments, and overall social stabilization.’166 This suggests that 
legitimacy and accountability are closely linked, and that problems of 
illegitimacy could be overcome if those actors legitimately endowed with 
governing powers (i.e. the elected government) put measures in place to hold 
non-State actors accountable. In reality, this is most likely to succeed at the 
national level where States are able to use mechanisms within their domestic 
legal and political systems to hold actors to account. At the international 
level, the confines of the international human rights legal system and the lack 
of a centralised authority make such a solution more difficult to realise. It is 
here, therefore, that the self-regulation, voluntary and/or internal 
accountability mechanisms for non-State actors, as well as external 
accountability mechanisms that fall outside of the international legal 
framework, are crucial.  
The potential lack of accountability in multi-level governance is 
especially worrisome in light of the good governance approach suggested by 
this study. The definition of accountability adopted here is the same as that 
in Section 9.2.3.2 discussing accountability as a criterion of good 
                                                 
165 Piattoni (n 120) 196, quoting Svein S Andersen, and Tom R Burns, ‘The European Union 
and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democracy: A Study in Post‐parliamentary Governance’ in 
Svein S Andersen and Kjell A Eliassen (eds), The European Union: How Democratic Is 
It? (SAGE Publications 1996) 243. 
166 ibid. 
MOVING BEYOND ACHIEVING HORIZONTAL EFFECT THROUGH LAW 
 367 
governance. There may be problems of accountability in multi-level 
governance because of the ‘dilution’ of responsibility between different 
actors. This means that the allocation of responsibilities in particular needs 
to be made very clear, so that, in the context of international human rights, 
for example, individuals relying on human rights know which of the many 
governance actors should be held accountable. Moves towards ‘multi-duty 
bearer frameworks’ for human rights could help here,167 as well as the current 
research that is being taken regarding shared responsibility, through the 
SHARES project. To date, the focus within this is still on sharing 
(international) responsibility between multiple States, but there have been 
some publications on shared responsibilities between State and non-State 
actors.168  
The extent to which accountability is a problem within multi-level 
governance systems depends on the degree to which the dilution of 
responsibility between different (non-State) actors includes binding 
decisions, as opposed to tasks such as providing ‘consultative’ advice to 
democratically elected decision-makers.169 It could be that accountability 
would not be significantly compromised by a multi-level governance 
approach to international human rights; non-State actors involved in the 
governance of human rights, although conducting self-regulation and perhaps 
even supervision and regulation of other actors, are not necessarily given the 
authority to take binding governance decisions (although this is the case for 
private contracts, which bind the parties thereto). Binding governance 
decisions often remain within the ambit of States (at the international and 
regional levels) and State actors (at the national and local levels). The role of 
non-State actors in the adoption of binding decisions of international human 
                                                 
167 See e.g. Arne Vandenbogaerde, Towards Shared Accountability in International Human 
Rights Law: Law, Procedures and Principles (Intersentia 2016). 
168 See e.g. the SHARES Research Project on Shared Responsibility in International Law 
<http://www.sharesproject.nl/> accessed 12 November 2017; and Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen, ‘The Practice of Shared Responsibility in Relation to Private Actor Involvement in 
Migration Management’ in André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds), The Practice of 
Shared Responsibility in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2016). 




rights, as explained in Section 9.2.2 is indeed limited to a consultative 
responsibility – while NGOs, for example, may be involved in the 
development of a new human rights treaty, to become binding, the document 
must be adopted by States (acting through the United Nations). This is of 
course not to say that there are no deficits of accountability in international 
human rights governance – there is a well-documented ‘accountability gap’, 
particularly for what concerns non-State actors. However, the argument made 
here is that multi-level governance would not exacerbate the problem.  
Ways in which accountability could be improved within multi-level 
governance systems have been suggested by Carol Harlow and Richard 
Rawlings, in relation to the multi-level governance of the European Union. 
The scholars suggest that one option for improving the accountability of 
multi-level governance systems would be through ‘accountability networks’, 
defining such networks as: ‘(i) a network of agencies specialising in a specific 
method of accountability, such as investigation, adjudication or audit, which 
(ii) come together or coalesce in a relationship of mutual dependency, (iii) 
fortified by shared professional expertise and ethos’, to be ‘thickened’ by 
‘(iv) the execution of a common purpose’.170 This could certainly be applied 
within the context of international human rights. 
Another approach that has been taken to improve accountability with 
the European Union’s multi-level governance structure that could be used in 
the governance of international human rights can be found in the European 
Commission’s White Paper on European Governance.171 The document deals 
in part with the role of civil society and various networks that arise in multi-
level governance structures, suggesting ‘partnership arrangements’ between 
the European Commission and civil society, expecting through the 
agreements that civil society abides by the principles of ‘accountability and 
openness’.172 Although there is no central governing authority within 
international law with which civil society could make such an arrangement, 
                                                 
170 Harlow and Rawlings (n 73) 546.  
171 European Commission, ‘European Governance: A White Paper’ (COM(2001) 428 final). 
172 Conzelmann (n 127) 9-10; European Commission (n 171) 15-17. 
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the UN is certainly the body that spearheads efforts to protect human rights. 
At the national and local levels, such agreements could also be made with 
more localised public authorities. As well as improving accountability, such 
agreements, when seen in light of the comments above regarding the 
authorisation of governance activities conducted by non-State actors, could 
also have an effect on the legitimacy and coordination of a governance 
system. 
The UNDP has also suggested how to monitor accountability in the 
governance of international human rights. A study carried out by the 
organisation proposes the use of various indicators that  
capture mechanisms of monitoring and independent oversight (such as 
establishment of ombudsmen’s offices, and human rights monitoring at 
the domestic level), institutionalization of complaints facilities that are 
anchored in national institutions or in specific parts of the executive 
branch, as well as access to formal and informal justice (such as local 
and community dispute resolution mechanisms and those that link 
formal and informal systems).173 
Ultimately, there are many ways in which accountability can be improved 
within multi-level governance regimes. In the context of human rights, the 
added complication exists that current international legal accountability 
mechanisms do not cover the actions of non-State actors. There remain, 
however, many non-legal ways to achieve accountability at the international 
level, as at the regional, national and sub-national level. Recommendations 
for improving the accountability of the World Bank and non-State armed 
groups for what concerns human rights will be provided in Chapters 10, 11 
and 12.  
To conclude this section, there are several important criticisms and 
challenges of multi-level governance systems. The challenges, and in 
                                                 
173 UNDP, ‘Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic 
Uncertainty’ (2011) 280-281 
<http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Towards_Sustainin




particular coordination, legitimacy and accountability, appear to be linked to 
the three good governance principles of transparency, participation and 
accountability. As mentioned in the discussions, ensuring adherence to these 
three principles may go some way to answering the main challenges to multi-
level governance. This study therefore proposes that multi-level governance, 
as defined in Section 9.4.1, include the three principles of good governance, 




Figure 9.3: ‘Good’ multi-level governance (source: the author) 
9.4.3 A ‘good’ multi-level governance approach to international human 
rights    
The previous sections have explained this study’s understanding of 
governance, the governance of international human rights, and multi-level 
governance. In addition, it has been argued that to overcome some of the 
challenges faced by multi-level governance systems, and due to the close 
relationship between good governance and human rights, a good governance 
approach should be taken. This means that the three principles of good 
governance should be adhered to by all actors and throughout all governance 
activities. The present section will apply the findings of the previous sections 
to the context of international human rights, suggesting a ‘good’ multi-level 
governance approach to international human rights and its implications for 
the protection of human rights vis-à-vis non-State actors. 
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to the concept of multi-level action by many different actors. However, as 
shown by Chapters 1-8 of the present book, the international legal 
framework, only deals with non-State actors to a limited degree and with a 
limited effect on the protection of human rights. This study argues that rather 
than starting with the legal framework, when considering the impact of non-
State actors on the enjoyment of human rights, we should take a governance 
perspective. According to the definition of governance adopted in this study 
(i.e. governance beyond government and including non-legal activities), a 
governance approach allows much more direct focus to be placed on non-
State actors. A governance approach allows the activities of non-State actors 
that have a negative impact on human rights to be dealt with directly by 
instruments, processes, mechanisms and procedures. Further, a governance 
approach acknowledges the important role that non-State actors have in the 
drafting, adoption, implementation and enforcement of standards aimed at 
achieving the goal of ensuring the better respect, protection and fulfilment of 
human rights/human dignity. To ensure that governance actors activities 
contribute towards this goal, human rights-based approaches can be taken, as 
suggested in Section 9.3.2. 
Taking a multi-level governance approach enables the actors and 
activities of the governance of international human rights to be transformed 
into a system that is organised in a particular manner. As explained in Section 
9.4.2, the organisation of a Type II multi-level governance system is 
preferable to that of a Type I system in the context of international human 
rights. This is because of the flexible design of Type II multi-level 
governance systems which allow actors to move between levels and 
jurisdictions, and to volunteer as governance actors on an ad hoc basis. The 
flexibility is important in the governance of international human rights, which 
is constantly developing and including new actors, activities and subject-
matters.  
It may seem at this point as though the governance of international 
human rights already follows a Type II multi-level governance approach.174 
                                                 




This is true, to an extent. However, while many initiatives within the 
international governance of human rights take a multi-stakeholder approach, 
there is no recognisable system of organisation or coordination between 
governance actors and activities – when we envisage the governance of 
international human rights, we do not see a system as such, but rather a 
collection of (sometimes sporadic) activities. As explained in Section 9.4.3.2, 
coordination is a very important aspect of multi-level governance, and can 
have a significant impact on adherence to the three principles of good 
governance. It has been suggested that it is such a need for coordination 
between decisions on different levels, when more than one actor possesses 
authority, that actually gives rise to multi-level governance (rather than the 
coordination itself).175 In any case, coordination and cooperation would 
certainly have a great impact on the success of a multilevel human rights 
governance system, which, as other multi-level governance systems, would 
entail ‘a panoply of systems of coordination and negotiation among formally 
independent but functionally interdependent entities that stand in complex 
relations to one another and that, through coordination and negotiation, keep 
redefining these relations.’176 The crucial point here is that rather than 
conflicting with one another, different actors would, if not collaborate, then 
at least cooperate with one another to achieve the common goal of protecting 
human rights, including when they operate on different levels.  
                                                 
not in the specific context of human rights. James N Rosenau, for example argued more than 
20 years ago that multilevel governance had reached such levels of coordination and 
flexibility that it has already ‘outflanked’ intergovernmental organisations, which were in turn 
being proven to be ‘defective, inefficient, ineffective or largely irrelevant.’ James N Rosenau, 
‘Governance in a New Global Order’ in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), Governing 
Globalization (2nd edn, Polity Press 2003) 225, cited in Knight (n 3) 184. However, in the 
realm of human rights, there remains much work to be done to coordinate different actors and 
to determine how authority and responsibilities should be allocated throughout the various 
levels and of human rights governance. 
175 See Michael Zürn, ‘Globalization and Global Governance’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse and Beth A Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (2nd edn, SAGE 
Publications 2013), citing Arthur Benz (ed), Governance - Regieren in komplexen 
Regelsystemen: Eine Einführung (Springer Verslag 2004). 
176 Piattoni (n 120) 26. 
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In sum, a ‘good’ multi-level governance approach to international 




Figure 9.4: The ‘good’ multi-level governance of international human 
rights (source: the author) 
 
This approach will be applied in Chapters 10 and 11 in relation to the World 
Bank and non-State armed groups. 
For reasons of space, a full evaluation of how the current governance 
of international human rights could be transformed into a good multi-level 
governance system, will not be conducted in this study. Instead, more specific 
recommendations are provided in relation to the two case studies in Chapters 
10 and 11, and some more general recommendations will be made in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
As mentioned above, the current governance of international human 
rights does not yet constitute a multi-level governance system. To do so, 
governance activities and actors need to be better coordinated and the task-
specific jurisdictions of a Type II multi-level governance approach to human 
rights need to be clearly established. This could be done in relation to each 
main thematic area of human rights, which can be roughly based on the nine 
core UN human rights treaties. These would be: economic, social and cultural 
rights, civil and political rights, the elimination of racial discrimination, the 
elimination of discrimination against women, the rights of children, the rights 




















torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and the protection 
of people from enforced disappearance. It is also possible that specific human 
rights that are found within several of the core treaties would form a subset 
of the governance of international human rights which would be divided into 
task-specific jurisdictions. Examples of such right would be the rights to 
health, food, life, housing, private and family life and non-discrimination, 
which sometimes form the sole focus of particular governance activities. The 
jurisdictions themselves could roughly be divided into efforts to draft, adopt, 
implement and enforce human rights standards relating to each thematic area. 
Different actors could, as they do now, volunteer to take part in a particular 
governance jurisdiction according to their interests and expertise. Each 
jurisdiction could be coordinated by an allocated actor. In this sense, it would 
be useful to borrow from the United Nations ‘Cluster Approach’ to disaster 
response, adopted in 2005 in recognition of the need for better coordination 
between disaster sectors.177 The approach is demonstrated in Figure 9.5. 
 
                                                 
177 See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Cluster 
coordination’ <https://www.unocha.org/legacy/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-
coordination> accessed 22 December 2017, discussed in Lane and Hesselman (n 17). 
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Figure 9.5: The United Nations Cluster Approach to disaster management 
(source: Inter-Agency Standing Committee178) 
 
As Figure 9.5 shows, each cluster under the approach consists of groups of 
humanitarian organisations from within and outside of the UN in each main 
sector of humanitarian action.179 Each cluster is designated by the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee and is allocated clear responsibilities for 
coordinating disaster management efforts. Taking a similar approach within 
a multi-level governance system for the governance of international human 
rights could not only help coordination, but also go some way to allocating 
different human rights-related responsibilities between different actors 
involved in the system.  
                                                 
178 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ‘Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at 
Country Level (revised July 2015)’ <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-
transformative-agenda/documents-public/reference-module-cluster-coordination-country-
level> accessed 9 April 2018. 
179 Humanitarian Response, ‘What is the cluster approach?’ 
<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach> 




9.5 Concluding reflections on a multi-level governance approach to 
human rights 
Chapters 1-8 of this book explained and analysed the current legal framework 
for the protection of human rights at the international level. Chapter 8 in 
particular concluded that the tools available within the framework are 
insufficient for protecting the enjoyment of individuals’ human rights from 
the harmful actions of non-State actors. The present chapter sought to build 
on this finding by introducing a multi-level (good) governance approach to 
human rights.  
 First, this study’s understanding of governance was explained. This 
can be summarised as a collection of legal and extra-legal activities 
conducted by a range of State and non-State actors, for a common purpose. 
In the context of human rights, the actors include, inter alia, States, 
international organisations, (multi-national) corporations, NGOs, local 
communities and individuals. The governance of international human rights, 
which evidently goes beyond government, has the purpose of improving the 
respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and human dignity, and 
can be considered to be one sub-set of a larger framework of global 
governance. 
 Using this understanding of governance as a foundation, the chapter 
then introduced the notion of good governance, which can be boiled down to 
three main principles of transparency, participation and accountability. Good 
governance has extremely close ties with human rights, which can be 
considered to be mutually reinforcing with good governance. Reflecting this 
close relationship are human rights-based approaches, which include the 
three principles of good governance and can provide a more detailed 
conceptual framework that different actors can use to ensure that their 
activities are guided by human rights and contribute to the goal of 
international human rights governance. 
 The most significant governance approach suggested by this study – 
multi-level governance – was then explained. Multi-level governance has two 
dimensions, the vertical dimension which reflects the multi-level nature of 
multi-level governance systems, and the horizontal, which reflects the 
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‘governance beyond government’ aspect of multi-level governance systems. 
Every multi-level governance has these two dimensions. However, multi-
level governance systems may be organised in two ways – according to Type 
I, or Type II multi-level governance. The differences in organisation pertain 
mostly to the flexibility of the systems, the way in which the system is divided 
into different segments, or jurisdictions, and the ability of actors to move 
freely from one jurisdiction to another. In the context of the governance of 
international human rights, the more flexible Type II structure is preferable. 
There are several challenges to multi-level governance, particularly 
concerning coordination between actors and activities, the legitimacy of and 
accountability within the systems. However, several suggestions have been 
made for overcoming these solutions, which can be combatted particularly 
through adherence to the principles of good governance.  
 Ultimately, this study argues that a multi-level governance approach, 
within which all actors and activities work towards better coordination and 
compliance with transparency, accountability and participation, should be 
taken to international human rights. Rather than the current legal approach, a 
multi-level governance approach is better equipped to comprehensively 
address the issue of human rights interference by non-State actors, which as 
well as having a negative effect on human rights, also play an important role 
in the governance of international human rights. 
 The remaining substantive chapters of this book (Chapters 10 and 11) 
will apply the findings of the present chapter in the context of two case studies 
– the World Bank and non-State armed groups. Specifically, the role of 
different actors under a multi-level governance approach to international 
human rights will be discussed in relation to the two case studies. 
Recommendations of measures that could be taken under a multi-level 
governance approach to improve the impact of the two actors on the 







The World Bank, international human 
rights law and multi-level governance 
 
10.1 Preliminary remarks 
The World Bank is an international financial institution that operates on a 
global scale to ‘end extreme poverty within one generation and boost shared 
prosperity’.1 It is often assumed and very often stated that the World Bank 
should include international human rights standards in its policies and 
comply with human rights standards in its operations. Indeed, there has been 
a growing pressure on the Bank to improve its human rights footprint coming 
from international civil society (e.g. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International), human rights experts working under the auspices of the United 
Nations (e.g. Special Rapporteurs), local communities and scholars.2 
                                                 
1 See website of the The World Bank, ‘About the World Bank’ 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/about> accessed 28 September 2017. 
2 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch Submission: World Bank’s Draft 
Environmental and Social Framework’ (2015) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/07/human-rights-watch-submission-world-banks-draft-
environmental-and-social-framework> accessed 29 September 2017; Human Rights Watch, 
‘World Bank, IMF’ <https://www.hrw.org/topic/business/world-bank-imf> accessed 12 
October 2017; Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch’s Recommendations on the 
World Bank’s Guidance Notes Regarding the Implementation of the Environmental and 
Social Framework’ (5 September 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/05/human-
rights-watchs-recommendations-world-banks-guidance-notes-regarding> accessed 12 
October 2017; Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: The World Bank Inspection Panel’s Early 
Solutions Pilot Approach: The Case of Badia East, Nigeria’ (2 September 2014) AFR 




However, the basis used for holding the Bank to such standards varies. 
This chapter critically examines several bases for arguing that the 
Bank should engage with human rights through its policies and considers a 
new basis, drawing on the Bank’s own good governance approach as well as 
the United Nations’ HRBAs to development. Building on this basis, the 
chapter then further discusses the multi-level governance approach to human 
rights suggested in Chapter 9, applying it to the context of the World Bank.  
First, the relationship between the World Bank and human rights will 
be explained, with reference to arguments providing a basis upon which to 
impose human rights standards on the Bank (Section 10.2). During this 
discussion, three perspectives will be considered: (1) the legal position – what 
the status of the World Bank is under international human rights law, and 
whether it can be said to have existing legal human rights obligations; (2) the 
World Bank’s own position – how the Bank envisages its relationship with 
and role in the protection of international human rights; and (3) the 
relationship between the Bank’s policies and practices and human rights – 
how its attitudes are reflected in its policies and how the Bank’s operations 
impact human rights enjoyment in practice. Examples from the World Bank’s 
policies and practice in this respect are tenfold. However, in the interests of 
space the chapter focuses on four examples which show the closeness of the 
Bank’s relationship with human rights, highlight some developments towards 
increased engagement by the Bank with human rights, and underline several 
areas in which the Bank could improve its impact on the enjoyment of 
international human rights: (1) structural adjustment programmes and 
poverty reduction strategy papers; (2) the World Bank Inspection Panel; (3) 
the Bank’s Grievance Redress Service; and (4) the Bank’s (revised) 
Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies.  
The discussions in Section 10.2 provide the basis for suggestions 
                                                 
September 2017. UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (4 August 2015) A/70/274; Willem van Genugten, 
The World Bank Group, the IMF and Human Rights: A Contextualised Way Forward 
(Intersentia 2015); and Gernot Brodnig, ‘The World Bank and Human Rights: Mission 
Impossible?’ (2002) 17 The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies 1. 
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made in Section 10.3 as to how the Bank’s impact on the enjoyment of 
international human rights could be improved, with particular reference to 
the concepts of good governance, human rights-based approaches and multi-
level governance discussed in Chapter 9. Within Section 10.3, the role of 
different actors under a multi-level governance approach to human rights vis-
à-vis the World Bank is discussed, and suggestions for measures to achieve 
multi-level governance are provided.                                         
10.2 The relationship between the World Bank and human rights 
The World Bank is an international organisation that was established at the 
Bretton Woods Monetary Conference in 1944 and consists of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA) – two of the five organisations 
that comprise the World Bank Group.3 The initial aim of the World Bank was 
to ‘help rebuild European countries that had been devastated by World War 
II’,4 but they quickly became global, and now consist of ending extreme 
poverty and boosting shared prosperity, as mentioned above.5 More 
specifically, the Bank aims to ‘decrease the percentage of people living with 
less than $1.90 a day to no more than 3 percent by 2030’ in order to end 
extreme poverty, and ‘to promote income growth of the bottom 40 percent of 
the population in each country’ in order to boost shared prosperity.6 The main 
role of the World Bank in achieving these goals is to lend money to middle-
                                                 
3 The remaining three organisations are: The International Financial Corporation, The 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. ibid. The International Monetary Fund was also established at the 
Bretton Woods Monetary Conference, and the two organisations are commonly known as the 
‘Bretton Woods Institutions’. Bretton Woods Project, ‘What are the Bretton Woods 
Institutions?’ (23 August 2005) <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2005/08/art-320747/> 
accessed 9 January 2018. 
4 The World Bank, ‘History’ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history> 
accessed 9 January 2018. 
5 The World Bank, ‘About the World Bank’ (n 1). 
6 Amitava Chandra, The World Bank, ‘Ending Extreme Poverty and Boosting Shared 
Prosperity’ (19 April 2013) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/17/ending_extreme_poverty_and_pro




income and credit-worthy low-income countries, having lent over 500 billion 
USD since becoming operative in 1946.7 The World Bank has undeniably had 
an impact on improving development through its provision of loans, credits 
and grants to developing countries to support development in areas such as 
health, education, infrastructure and public administration, and through its 
knowledge-sharing activities (including technical assistance).8 However, the 
World Bank has not had a smooth relationship with human rights, the 
protection of which is now generally considered to be crucial to achieving 
development.9  
10.2.1 The Bank’s position under international law 
As it stands, international law is currently in a somewhat nascent state for 
what concerns international organisations. This was aptly summarised by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in its statement that ‘in 
contrast to the remarkable development regarding the number, role and 
expansion of powers of international organisations, the international legal 
                                                 
7 See World Bank, ‘International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are/ibrd> accessed 28 September 2017. 
8 The World Bank, ‘What We Do’ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do> 
accesesd 9 January 2018. 
9 The relationship between development and human rights has been heavily discussed by 
organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). See e.g. UNDP, 
‘Human Development Report 2000’ (2000) 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/261/hdr_2000_en.pdf> accessed 9 January 
2018. The importance of human rights for achieving development is also evident in the work 
of many development and human rights organisations that advocate a ‘human rights-based 
approach’ to development (discussed in Chapter 9 of this book, see also Section 10.3.1 below). 
See e.g. UNICEF, ‘Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming’ 
<https://www.unicef.org/policyanalysis/rights/index_62012.html#4> accessed 28 September 
2017; United Nations Development Programme, ‘A Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Development Programming in UNDP’ (2002) 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-
governance/human_rights/a-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-programming-
in-undp.html> accessed 28 September 2017. For further discussion on the importance of 
human rights to development, see Mary Robinson, ‘What Rights Can Add to Good 
Development Practice’ in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds), Human Rights and 
Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford University Press 2005). 
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system governing their activities is still markedly underdeveloped.’10 This 
has led to many academic discussions regarding the obligations of 
international organisations under international law, including in the field of 
international human rights, which remains an issue of hot debate. In relation 
to the World Bank specifically, several aspects of international law have been 
invoked to argue that the organisation has existing obligations to act in 
compliance with these standards, some prominent examples of which will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs.  
The World Bank is categorised as an international organisation (i.e. a 
non-State actor) and is not subject to human rights treaties creating binding 
international human rights obligations.11 Nonetheless, commentators have 
argued that the Bank is subject to human rights obligations under customary 
international law, general principles of international law,12 and the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations,13 among others.14 
Some commentators have also pushed for the imposition of direct obligations 
on international financial institutions, including the World Bank, through the 
adoption of an internationally binding treaty.15 This would raise multiple 
                                                 
10 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights José Maria Beneyto, ‘Accountability of 
International Institutions for Human Rights Violations’ (17 December 2013) Cod 13370, 6 
<http://www.assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2013/ajdoc172013.pdf> accessed 28 
September 2017. 
11 Manisuli Ssenyonjo and Mashood A Baderin, International Human Rights Law: Six 
Decades after the UDHR and Beyond (Ashgate Publishing Ltd 2010) 547. 
12 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch Submission Re the Situation of 
Human Rights Defenders Working on Business and International Financial Institutions to 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders’ (11 August 2017) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/11/human-rights-watch-submission-re-situation-
human-rights-defenders-working-business> accessed 12 October 2017. 
13 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organizations, with Commentaries’ (2011) II Part Two Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission. 
14 For an in-depth discussion of the various sources of international law that could form the 
basis of human rights obligations for the World Bank, see Sigrun Skogly, The Human Rights 
Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Cavendish Publishing 
2001). 





challenges, as any instrument imposing binding human rights obligations on 
the Bank would have to go through a long drafting and negotiation process, 
and receive the support and endorsement of many States to be effective.16  
 Although the World Bank (or indeed any international financial 
institution or international organisation) is not referred to by or party to the 
UN international human rights treaties,17 references to international 
organisations were found in General Comments of UN human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies in Chapter 5.3.1. For example, relying on Articles 22 and 
23 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,18 
the UN CteeESCR has held that international financial institutions should 
take human rights into account ‘in their lending policies, credit agreements, 
structural adjustment programmes and other development projects’ in order 
                                                 
16 A full discussion of these challenges falls outside of the scope of the present book. For a 
similar discussion regarding a binding treaty on business and human rights, see Lottie Lane, 
‘Private Providers of Essential Public Services and de Jure Responsibility for Human Rights’ 
in Marlies Hesselman, Brigit Toebes and Antenor Hallo de Wolf (eds), Socio-Economic 
Human Rights in Essential Public Services Provision (Routledge 2017) 150-155. 
17 Arguments have been made that international organisations can be bound by international 
treaties without having given their consent, but this is disputable on the grounds that the World 
Bank has its own international legal personality (see below) and that Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or 
Between International Organizations (adopted 21 March 1986) 25 ILM 543 (VCLT-IO) 
explicitly prevents treaties from binding international organisations without their consent. 
This does remain an issue of contention, though, as the VCLT-IO has not received enough 
ratifications to enter into force. Further, the treaties that would be applicable in the present 
context would fall under the scope of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (i.e. 
treaties between States). Kristina Daugirdas, ‘How and Why International Law Binds 
International Organizations’ (2016) 57(2) Harvard International Law Journal 325, 326.  
18 Article 22 reads: ‘The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other 
organs of the United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned with 
furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in this part of 
the present Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding, each within its field of 
competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to contribute to the effective 
progressive implementation of the present Covenant.’, and Article 23 reads: The States Parties 
to the present Covenant agree that international action for the achievement of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods as the conclusion of conventions, 
the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of 
regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study organized 
in conjunction with the Governments concerned.’  
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to promote human rights.19 The CteeESCR has further stated that ‘the 
incorporation of human rights law and principles in the programmes and 
policies’20 of international organisations and ‘[t]he adoption of a human 
rights-based approach by United Nations specialized agencies’21 (of which 
the World bank is one) ‘will greatly facilitate implementation’ of human 
rights’.22 However, as explained in Chapter 5, while general comments can 
be considered to be authoritative interpretations of the UN human rights 
treaties, they are by no means legally binding, and cannot be considered to 
provide a legal basis for arguing that international organisations have legally 
binding human rights obligations.23  
 The main method at the international level to allow individuals a 
remedy for harm caused by non-State actors was found in Chapters 5 and 8 
of this book to be a reliance on States’ positive obligation to protect 
individuals’ enjoyment of human rights from interference by third parties.24 
This is expected to occur through the adoption and enforcement of national 
laws and policies within a State. However, this avenue of redress is not 
                                                 
19 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the 
Covenant)’ (20 January 2003) E/C.12/2002/11, Section VI. Similar comments were also made 
in UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the 
Covenant)’ (12 May 1999) E/C.12/1999/5, discussed in Daugirdas (n 17) 337. 
20 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2000) E/C.12/2000/4, Section 5. 
21 ibid; UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15’ (n 19).  
22 ibid.  
23 Other UN bodies have also encouraged the World Bank to take action with relation to 
human rights. For example, the UN General Assembly has ‘invited’ the World Bank ‘to 
promote policies and projects that have a positive impact on the right to food, to ensure that 
partners respect the right to food in the implementation of common projects, to support 
strategies of Member States aimed at the fulfilment of the right to food and to avoid any 
actions that could have a negative impact on the realization of the right to food’. UN General 
Assembly, Resolution 62/164 on the Right to Food, (13 March 2008) A/RES/62/164 cited in 
UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean 
Ziegler’ (10 January 2008) A/HRC/7/5, para 24. 
24 This obligation forms part of the tripartite typology of human rights obligations which is 
very widely accepted and applied by UN treaty bodies and human rights academics and 
requires states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. See generally UN CteeESCR, 




possible vis-à-vis the World Bank, against which domestic law is unable to 
effectively protect individuals’ rights. Due to the doctrine of jurisdictional 
immunity of international organisations, ‘it is generally impossible for 
individuals to bring cases against the Bank in domestic or international legal 
forums’.25 This is despite the narrower scope of the Bank’s immunity 
compared to other international organisations.26 The Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement do allow some actions to be brought against the Bank at the 
domestic level. Article VII, Section 3 provides that actions may be brought 
against the Bank in ‘court[s] of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a 
member’, if the Bank has an office there, appointed appropriate personnel or 
‘has issued or guaranteed securities’.27 However, as Philippe Sands and 
Pierre Klein note, in practice this provision does not completely suppress the 
World Bank’s immunity.28 At least in the US, courts have used such clauses 
as Article VII, Section 3 (which are included in most regional development 
banks’ constitutive instruments) to preclude immunity in all private law 
cases.29 In the present context, this may still not allow much space for victims 
of human rights violations to seek redress against the World Bank. Even if 
private law cases could be brought against the Bank, the action forming the 
basis of the claim would have to include human rights standards in order for 
them to be upheld against the Bank in such a case. As was seen in Chapter 7, 
                                                 
25 Yvonne Wong and Benoit Mayer, ‘The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: A Tool for 
Accountability?’ in Jan Wouters and others (eds), The World Bank Legal Review Volume 6 
Improving Delivery in Development: The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and Accountability 
(The World Bank 2015) 498. For more on the immunity of the World Bank, see Meghan 
Natenson, ‘The World Bank Group’s Human Rights Obligations Under the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2015) 33(2) Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 489, 502-505. 
26 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (6th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2009) 495. 
27 See ibid. 
28 Sands and Klein suggest that the restriction on the Bank’s immunity seems to have been 
intended to make it possible for creditors or bondholders to bring law suits against the World 
Bank at the national level. ibid.  
29 Referring, for example, to the case of Lutcher v Inter-American Development Bank, US 
Court of Appeals, DC Circuit (1967) 382 F.2d 454. See Sands and Klein (n 26) 495. 
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at least in the UK, the judiciary is very careful with the extent to which it 
allows human rights to be incorporated into private law.  
 Another way of indirectly applying human rights standards to the 
World Bank could be by looking to the human rights obligations of the States 
that are members of the organisation. It can be said that Member States of the 
Bank must at all times respect their human rights obligations, including when 
they are acting as part of the World Bank (e.g. in the drafting of World Bank 
policies). The UN CteeESCR has in more than one General Comment noted 
the importance of States that are both party to international human rights 
treaties and members of international financial institutions ensuring that the 
institution give due consideration to the human rights standards that the States 
themselves have agreed to uphold.30 This may have the indirect effect that 
the World Bank respects human rights, but does not actually lead to legally 
binding obligations for the Bank per se. Indeed, to argue otherwise would 
require the World Bank to be treated only as a collection of States rather than 
as a separate international legal person. This would be contrary to the Bank’s 
Articles of Agreement and the agreement between the World Bank and the 
United Nations, which together afford it distinct international legal 
personality.31 Furthermore, the human rights obligations of each State vary 
                                                 
30 E.g. UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the 
Covenant)’, (8 December 1999) E/C.12/1999/10 and UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 
14’ (n 20) in Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with Human Rights 
(Intersentia 2011) 94. 
31 As Namita Wahi points out, various provisions within the World Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement clearly establish that the Bank fulfils the criteria for an entity to possess 
international legal personality. This includes: Articles 1(2), 5(5)(c) and 8(4) of the Agreement 
Between the UN and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
which illustrate the Bank’s functioning independent of its member States (see Protocol 
concerning the entry into force of the Agreement between the United Nations and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (15 November 1947) UNTS vol. 16, 
341); Article 1 International Bank of Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement 
(adopted 27 December 1945, amended 1989) UNTS 2, 13, which evidence the Bank’s 
capacity to create international rights and obligations; and Article 9(c) of the Bank’s Articles 
of Agreement, which demonstrates the Bank’s capacity to bring and defend international 
claims. Namita Wahi, ‘Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World Bank: A 




according to which human rights treaties they have ratified. This means that 
even if States follow their human rights commitments within the Bank, the 
human rights standards that may be followed could vary or be overlooked by 
States that have not ratified a certain treaty.32 Finally, it is unclear whether 
victims of human rights interference caused by the Bank would be able to 
gain redress against their State for failing to act according to human rights 
standards during their participation in the Bank. It would be very difficult and 
require extensive knowledge of how a particular decision was made within 
the Bank for an individual to show that an individual State were responsible 
for a violation of human rights arising from the World Bank’s activities.    
 The fact that the World Bank has its own international legal 
personality has led some experts to argue that it does have international legal 
obligations for what concerns human rights. For example, The Tilburg 
Guiding Principles on the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and Human Rights in 200333 suggest that the Bank’s separate 
international legal personality is strengthened by the fact that it is a 
specialised agency of the UN.34 The Principles claim that as a distinct 
international legal person, the World Bank has international legal obligations 
to ‘take full responsibility for the respect of human rights when its projects, 
policies or programmes negatively impact or undermine the enjoyment of 
                                                 
(2006) 12 University of California, Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 331, 364-
365. 
32 See for discussion Frederik Naert, ‘Binding International Organisations to Member State 
Treaties or Responsibility of Member States for Their Own Actions in the Framework of 
International Organisations’ in Jan Wouters and others (eds) Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations by International Organizations (Intersentia 2010), discussed in Jan Klabbers, 
‘Book Review: Jan Wouters, Eva Brems, Stefaan Smis and Pierre Schmitt (eds.), 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia, 
Antwerp, 2010), 600pp., ISBN 978-90-5095-746-5, retail price EUR 120,00’ (2011) 8 
International Organizations Law Review 273, 274. 
33 Willem van Genugten and others, ‘Tilburg Guiding Principles on World Bank, IMF and 
Human Rights’ in Willem van Genugten, Paul Hunt and Susan Matthews (eds), World Bank 
and Human Rights (Wolf Legal Publishers 2003) (Tilburg Guiding Principles). 
34 ibid para 6. 
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human rights’.35 While it is certainly desirable that the Bank take on such 
responsibility, the Principles also fail to provide a precise legal basis of the 
obligations of the World Bank. Furthermore, it appears from the wording of 
the Principles that the Bank’s obligations are of an ex post facto nature; it 
seems as though some evaluation of projects, policies and programmes which 
have already negatively impacted human rights is required by the Principles, 
rather than consideration and respect of human rights from the outset, for 
example during the drafting of its policies.  
 Although the Principles themselves are somewhat unconvincing, the 
finding that the World Bank does have some obligations under international 
law should not be summarily rejected. Such a finding is supported by the 
statement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion 
on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO 
and Egypt (WHO-Egypt advisory opinion) that ‘[i]nternational organizations 
are subjects of international law, and, as such, are bound by any obligations 
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law.’36 However, 
the statement has been subject to much criticism as the ICJ did not offer any 
evidence or basis for this claim, which reads on face value as though it 
equates being a subject of international law with being bound by general 
international law.37 This would suggest that any actors with international 
legal personality (including, for example, multinational corporations, non-
State armed groups and international NGOs, which could each be said to have 
a degree of international legal personality) would be bound by general 
international law.38 There is very little, if any, evidence to support such a 
                                                 
35 ibid para 5. 
36 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory 
Opinion) 1980 ICJ Rep 73, paras 89–90, cited in Daugirdas (n 17) 326. 
37 See Daugirdas (n 17) 333. See also Jan Klabbers, ‘The Paradox of International Institutional 
Law’ (2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review 151, 165, cited in Daugirdas (n 17) 
326. General international law generally refers to customary international law and general 
principles of law. Koen de Feyter, ‘The International Financial Institutions and Human Rights: 
Law and Practice’ (2004) 6(1) Human Rights Review 56, 57. 
38 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not, however, seem to suggest that all subjects 




claim. The ICJ’s statement in the WHO-Egypt advisory opinion also fails to 
specify which precise obligations are incumbent on organisations (or indeed 
upon all subjects of international law). Jan Klabbers, who has undertaken a 
significant amount of research on the matter, concludes that the ICJ could not 
have intended to hold that international organisations are bound by all 
customary international law. Indeed, if it had, this would be very problematic 
in light of the fact that international organisations have a very limited capacity 
to contribute the formation of customary international law.39  
 In light of the omission by the ICJ to specify which obligations 
international organisations are subject to, scholars have hotly debated the 
topic. A full discussion of the scholarly debate on this topic will not be 
attempted in the present book. However, it is important to note that many 
scholars accept the proposition that customary international law is applicable 
to international organisations,40 but not that they are subject to customary law 
in its entirety.41 However, even if we agree that customary international law 
                                                 
advisory opinion on the Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
(Advisory Opinion) 1949 ICJ Rep 174, 178 to the effect that each subject of international law 
has different rights and obligations under international law). For a discussion of these 
statements in the context of international organisations, see Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to 
International Institutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2002) 43.  
39 Jan Klabbers, ‘Sources of International Organizations’ Law: Reflections on Accountability’ 
in Jean D’Aspremont and Samantha Besson (eds), The Oxford Handbook on Sources of 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2017), cited in Daugirdas (n 17) 333-334. For 
comments on how international organisations can be considered to contribute to the formation 
of customary international law, see Michael Wood, ‘International Organizations and 
Customary International Law’ (2015) 48(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 609. 
40 E.g. Guglielmo Verdirame, who understand the ICJ’s statement to be ‘shorthand for 
customary international law or universal or quasi-universal applicability and for general 
principles of law’. See Guglielmo Veriame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the 
Guardians? (Cambridge University Press 2011) 71, discussed in Jan Klabbers, ‘Book 
Review: The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians?, written by Guglielmo 
Verdirame’ (2014) 11(1) International Organizations Law Review 235, 236-237. See also de 
Feyter (n 37) 57. See also International Law Association Committee on Accountability of 
International Organisations, ‘Third Report Consolidated, Revised and Enlarged Version of 
Recommended Rules and Practices’, New Delhi Conference Report (2002) <http://www.ila-
hq.org/index.php/committees> accessed 18 January 2018. 
41 Klabbers, for example, believes that customary international law that ‘require[s], permit[s], 
or prohibit[s] certain conduct’ (which human rights norms regularly do) does not apply to 
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can bind the World Bank, the question still remains as to which norms, if any, 
under international human rights law, have reached the status of customary 
international law. Ultimately, the question of which rights can be considered 
to be customary international law remains an issue of debate.42 Certainly, 
those rights which have obtained the status of jus cogens norms can be said 
to fall within the scope of international law obligations applicable to 
international organisations.43 However, the scope of such rights is relatively 
narrow, and mostly concern civil and political rights such as the prohibitions 
of torture and slavery rather than economic, social and cultural rights, which 
are particularly affected by the World Bank’s activities. 
 Further, even if customary international law does apply to the World 
Bank, Sigrun Skogly argues the norms that are applicable to international 
financial institutions are mostly negative in nature (as, she argues, they are in 
customary international law generally44), and would include only an 
obligation to respect human rights, and to a very limited extent, an obligation 
to protect human rights (to the exclusion of an obligation to fulfil them).45 
This would mean that the World Bank may be required to be mindful of 
human rights in its operations, but could not extend to an obligation for the 
Bank to take positive action to contribute to the realisation of human rights. 
Skogly’s findings are contested by Andrew Clapham, who pictures, if not 
                                                 
international organisations. Daugirdas (n 17) 333, discussing Klabbers, ‘Book Review: The 
UN and Human Rights’ (n 40) 237. 
42 As Daugirdas has noted, some scholars believe (for example) that economic rights 
constitute customary international law, while others reject this. See Daugirdas (n 17) 338, 
citing Skogly (n 14) 76-79; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(Oxford University Press 2006) 148-151; François Gianviti, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural 
Human Rights and the International Monetary Fund’ in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors 
and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2005) 121-122; and August Reinisch, 
‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council 
for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions’ (2001) American Journal of International law 851, 
862. 
43 See e.g. Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Accountability 
of international institutions for human rights violations: Introductory memorandum’ (10 May 
2013) AS/Jur (2013) 17. 
44 Skogly (n 14). 




obligations to protect and fulfil human rights in the same manner as States, 
customary international law obligations for the World Bank that go beyond 
an obligation to ‘refrain from acting in a way that immediately denies people’ 
human rights.46  
 In relation to those norms of customary international law which do 
bind the World Bank, the International Law Commission in 2011 – the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations may come into play. 
47 The Articles are an important development and have been applied in the 
past by bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights.48 However, they 
‘do not in principle address the so-called primary rules, which establish 
whether an organization is bound by a certain international obligation’.49 
Rather, the Articles specify under which circumstances an international 
organisation could be held responsible for breaches of its (already existing) 
international legal obligations. In light of the lack of clarity concerning 
binding obligations for the World Bank with regard to human rights at the 
international level, the Draft Articles will not be discussed further here.  
 Ultimately, it is difficult to conclude with certainty that the World 
Bank currently has binding international obligations under human rights law, 
at least to actively engage with human rights in its operations and to take 
positive action vis-à-vis human rights. Although the Bank may be bound by 
certain human rights that have reached customary or jus cogens status, this 
by no means extends to the full corpus of human rights that the Bank affects 
                                                 
46 Clapham (n 42) 150-151. 
47 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (2001) Vol. II Part Two Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (as corrected) A/56/10. 
48 E.g. in the cases of Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and 
Norway (Decision on Admissibility) App Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01 2 May 2007. See for 
discussion, Michael Wood International Law Discussion Group, ‘Legal Responsibility of 
International Organisations in International Law: Summary of the International Law 
Discussion Group meeting held at Chatham House’ (2011) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109605> accessed 28 September 
2017. 
49 Giorgio Gaja, ‘Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations’ [2014] United 
Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. 
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in practice, and the Bank does not appear to consider itself legally obliged to 
consider human rights – to the contrary, as Section 10.2.2.2 will discuss, the 
Bank considers itself legally bound by its constituent instrument to refrain 
from considering human rights.   
10.2.2 The World Bank’s own position on human rights 
Despite a propensity to underscore the importance of human rights for the 
eradication of poverty and the achievement of development, the Bank does 
not appear to accept legal arguments that it should include human rights 
considerations in its policies. This section will outline the Bank’s public 
support for human rights and evidence of its views regarding its own role in 
the protection of human rights. 
10.2.2.1 The Bank’s public endorsement of human rights 
In 1998, the World Bank published a report entitled ‘Development and 
Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank’, in which it stated its belief that 
‘creating the conditions for the attainment of human rights is a central and 
irreducible goal of development’.50 Since then, the World Bank has not shied 
away from discussing, and even endorsing human rights. In 2010, for 
example, the Bank published a detailed study on ‘Human Rights Indicators 
in Development’, which specifically dealt with the mutually reinforcing 
nature of human rights and development.51 A further publication in 2011 that 
was jointly published by the World Bank and the World Health Organization 
contained much ‘practical guidance about how human rights law is relevant 
to dealing with disability issues in development’.52 The ‘World Development 
                                                 
50 The World Bank, ‘Development and Human Rights’ (1998) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/820031468767358922/pdf/multi0page.pdf> 
accessed 10 January 2018. 
51 Siobhan McInerney-Lankford and Hans-Otto Sano, ‘Human Rights Indicators in 
Development’ (The World Bank 2010) 
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-8604-0> accessed 28 
September 2017. 
52 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) para 26, discussing The World Health Organization and 




Project’, which has resulted in several reports published by the World Bank, 
has also shown a progressively engaging and supportive attitude towards 
human rights. For instance, in the report of 2012 the Bank stated that ‘the 
ability to live the life of one’s own choosing and be spared from absolute 
deprivation is a basic human right.’53  
Another significant publication is the Bank’s report on ‘Integrating 
Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences, and 
Challenges’, which was published together with the OECD in 2013.54 The 
report emphasised the importance of human rights and development and the 
integration of the two. However, the significance of the report is tempered by 
the phrase that ‘the findings, interpretation, and conclusions expressed in this 
work do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its Board of 
Directors, or the governments they represent’ (which, as the Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights has pointed out, features 
in most of the Bank’s publications endorsing human rights).55  
In 2016, the World Bank’s support for human rights was reflected 
through the launch of a High-Level Panel on Water by World Bank President 
Jim Yong Kim and previous United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon.56 While the Panel is not directly an activity of the Bank per se,57 it is 
significant that Jim Yong Kim took on the responsibility for helping to 
                                                 
53 The World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development’ 
(2012) <https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-
1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf> accessed 28 September 
2017, discussed in UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) paras 23-24. 
54 The World Bank and the OECD, Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor 
Approaches, Experiences and Challenges (Washington DC 2013). 
55 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) para 27. 
56 See The World Bank, ‘The World Bank, ‘United Nations, World Bank Group Launch High 
Level Panel on Water’ (21 January 2016) <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2016/01/21/united-nations-world-bank-group-launch-high-level-panel-on-water> 
accessed 28 September 2017. 
57 The Panel is co-chaired by the Presidents of Mauritius and Mexico, and consists of a group 
of heads of State/Government from developed and developing countries. See ibid. 
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establish a panel, one of the themes of which is ‘valuing our water right’ 
which explicitly allows a focus on the human right to water.58 Most recently, 
the World Bank highlighted the importance of human rights, and discussed 
various aspects of international human rights law in particular, in its 2017 
World Development Report (see Section 10.3.1).59  
 Laudable as they are, these examples remain ambiguous as to what 
the Bank believes its own role in the protection of human rights to be – the 
studies and reports explicitly link development with human rights and the 
establishment of the Panel suggests a progressive attitude of the Bank 
towards human rights generally. However, these examples give us little 
insight into what the Bank is willing to do in its own practices.60 To gain 
more insight on this, it is necessary to examine the Bank’s interpretation of 
its Articles of Agreement.61 
10.2.2.2 The Bank’s interpretation of its Articles of Agreement 
In the first years of its existence the World Bank was focused on particular 
projects aimed at repairing damage caused to certain infrastructures during 
the Second World War.62 As an organisation with an economic focus, the 
lack of human rights activities by the Bank was initially logical (particularly 
given the timing of the Bank’s establishment, which was before the 
                                                 
58 The overarching aim of the Panel is to provide the leadership necessary to ‘ensure 
availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all’ – Sustainable 
Development Goal 6. See UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, ‘High-Level 
Panel on Water – Background Note’ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/HLPWater> 
accessed 28 September 2017. 
59 World Bank Group, ‘World Development Report: Governance and the Law’ (2017) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017> accessed 5 October 2017.  
60 In a 2015 report on the World Bank and human rights, the Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights noted that he was not ‘aware of significant internal impact 
resulting from those publications.’ UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) para 28. 
61 IBRD Articles of Agreement (n 31). 
62 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘The Bretton Woods Institutions and Human Rights: 
Converging Tendencies’ in Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter and Fabrizio Marrella (eds), 




emergence of modern international human rights law).63 Much like the earlier 
days of the European Union, the Bank restricted itself to the economic 
mandate given in its Articles of Agreement.64 The Articles prohibit the Bank 
from considering questions of a non-economic nature and from interfering 
with the political affairs of any member countries (of which human rights 
was seen to be one).65 Article IV, Section 10 of the Articles of Agreement 
provides:  
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of 
any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the 
political character of the member or members concerned. Only 
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these 
considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the 
purposes stated in Article I. 
Over time, the Bank’s General Counsels, whose opinions on the Articles of 
Agreement and human rights form the basis of the World Bank’s executive 
directors’ interpretation of such, has fluctuated.66 At times, General Counsels 
have interpreted the prohibition on dealing with political affairs narrowly (or 
rather, they have interpreted the meaning of ‘economic’ affairs more 
                                                 
63 The World Bank was established in 1944, before the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, and before the existence of binding international human rights law.  
64 The core focus of the European Union did not initially include human rights, with the Union 
focusing more on economic than social matters. However, the protection of human rights has 
become increasingly part of the Union’s focus, particularly with the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009. See for discussion Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The European Union and Human 
Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 11(4) Human Rights Law Review 645; and for a 
broader perspective, Viktor Muraviov and Olena Sviatun, ‘Protection of Human Rights in the 
European Union’ in Rainer Arnold (ed), the Convergence of the Fundamental Rights 
Protection in Europe (Springer 2016). 
65 See IBRD Articles of Agreement (n 31), Article III, Section 5(b); and Article IV, Section 
10 respectively. See also UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2). 
66 Bretton Woods Project, ‘World Bank appoints new General Counsel’ (31 January 2017) 
<http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2017/01/world-bank-appoints-new-general-counsel/> 
accessed 18 January 2018. For an overview of the different opinions of the General Counsel 
from the 1980s until 2015, see UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) paras 8-13.  
THE WORLD BANK, IHRL AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
397 
broadly), so as to allow, and in some instances to even require, action by the 
Bank for what concerns human rights. This was the view adopted by former 
General Counsel Roberto Dañino in 2006, but subsequent General Counsels 
have taken a more restrictive approach.67 Significantly, the previous General 
Counsel Anne-Marie Leroy rejected Dañino’s interpretation as going 
‘beyond the bounds of the Bank’s institutional mandate’, and argued that 
since his views had not been endorsed by the Board of Executive Directors, 
it could not be considered to represent the Bank’s policy.68 Instead, Leroy 
favoured a restrictive interpretation of the Articles of Agreement that limited 
the Bank’s considerations to economic ones.69 It is hoped that the current 
General Counsel, who has a background in human rights, takes a broader 
approach to the Bank’s role in the protection of human rights, but this is as 
yet unclear.70  
 As suggested by Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights Philip Alston, the restrictive view in relation to human rights seems 
                                                 
67 Roberto Dañino, ‘The legal aspects of the World Bank’s work on human rights: some 
preliminary thoughts’, in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds) Human Rights and 
Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford University Press 2005), discussed in 
UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) para 9. 
68 ‘Letter from Anne-Marie Leroy and Makhtar Diop to the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food and the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other international financial 
obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social 
and cultural rights’ (9 October 2012) 
<http://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/22nd/OTH_09.10.12_(7.2012).pdf> accessed 18 January 2018; 
and ‘Letter from Anne-Marie Leroy to the Special Rapporteur on the right to food and the 
Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other international financial obligations 
of States’ (16 January 2013) 
<http://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/22nd/World_Bank_16.01.13_(7.2012).pdf> accessed 18 January 
2018, both discussed in UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) para 11. 
69 ibid. 
70 In February 2017, Sandie Okoro was appointed as the General Counsel. Okoro has been a 
council member of JUSTICE, a human rights organisation. This has raised hopes that the 
Bank may take a more human rights-oriented approach in the future. See The World Bank, 





hypocritical considering the fact that the Bank has actively engaged in other 
issues ‘such as corruption, the rule of law, environmental degradation’, 
governance and criminal justice,71 which could all be construed as having a 
political nature.72  
 It is even possible to argue that the World Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement could be considered a basis for saying that the organisation should 
engage with human rights. The UN CteeESCR has explicitly addressed the 
human rights responsibilities of the World Bank, referring to both ‘negative’ 
and ‘positive’ action to be taken by the Bank to ‘ensure that their activities 
are fully consistent with the enjoyment of civil and political rights’.73 The 
significance of this lies in the Bank’s obligation in its Articles of Agreement 
to ‘cooperate with any general international organization and with public 
international organizations having specialized responsibilities in related 
fields’.74 The obligation is furthered by that to give consideration to the views 
and recommendations of such organisations when the Bank is ‘making 
decisions on applications for loans or guarantees relating to matters directly 
within the competence’ of the public international organisation/s.75 Stephen 
Herz and Anne Perrault understand this to mean that in relation to the UN 
CteeESCR (and other such UN human rights bodies), the World Bank must 
‘make a good faith assessment’ as to whether, and to what extent, they should 
follow the recommendation of the Committee, publicly justifying any 
decision not to do so.76 This is a somewhat overzealous interpretation, given 
that the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies cannot themselves be 
                                                 
71 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) para 39. 
72 For a full discussion of the Bank’s argument and grounds for invalidating it, see Brodnig (n 
2). 
73 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 2 International technical assistance measures (Art. 
22 of the Covenant)’ (2 February 1990) E/1990/23, para 6, quoted in Steven Herz and Anne 
Perrault, ‘Bringing Human Rights Claims to the World Bank Inspection Panel’ 
<http://www.bankinformationcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/InspectionPanel_HumanRights.pdf> accessed 28 September 2017. 
74 IBRD Articles of Agreement (n 31) Article V, Section 8(a). 
75 ibid Article V, Section 8(b). 
76 Herz and Perrault (n 73). 
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classed as international organisations. However, it would apply to the UN 
itself, particularly given that the World Bank is a specialised agency of the 
UN. Herz and Perrault’s understanding does allow an argument that far from 
precluding human rights from the considerations of the World Bank as has 
been suggested, its Articles of Agreement require the World Bank to take 
human rights into account in some circumstances. Were the Bank to consider 
such an interpretation of its Articles of Agreement, it could also go some way 
towards answering criticism by many experts that the Bank should engage 
more with UN human rights treaty bodies as well as the UN more generally.77 
10.2.3 Human Rights and the Bank’s policies and practice 
Given the World Bank’s wide scope of operations, it is natural that various 
of its policies and practices reflect different types of relationships with human 
rights. As the CteeESCR noted in its second General Comment, ‘[m]any 
activities undertaken in the name of ‘development’ have subsequently been 
recognised as ill conceived and even counter productive in human rights 
terms’.78 Indeed, the World Bank has now itself ‘acknowledged the 
relationship between the objectives of development and the realization of 
human rights’.79 Despite this, five examples of the World Bank’s practices 
will highlight the inadequacy of the Bank’s practical response to its human 
rights impact: (1) structural adjustment programmes and poverty reduction 
strategy papers; (2) the World Bank Inspection Panel; (3) the Bank’s 
Grievance Redress Service; and (4) the Bank’s (revised) Environmental and 
Social Safeguard Policies.  
                                                 
77 See e.g. UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) para 61. Calls have also been made for the treaty 
bodies themselves to make more effort to engage the Bank, see Anne F Bayefsky, The UN 
Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the Crossroads (Kluwer Law International 
2001) 55. 
78 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 2 International technical assistance measures (Art. 
22 of the Covenant)’ (2 February 1990) E/1990/23, para 7, quoted in Skogly (n 14). 




10.2.3.1 Structural Adjustment Programmes and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers 
A way in which the World Bank can affect human rights more directly is 
through the conditions it places on borrower countries. Initially, these were 
to be found in Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The Bank began 
offering SAPs in the late 1970s with the aim of improving borrower 
countries’ economic policies. Many concerns were expressed regarding the 
negative effect that the loans’ conditions had on rates of poverty and the 
enjoyment of human rights.80 Namita Wahi has noted that in essence SAPs 
remove decision-making power from the borrower country’s government on 
a wide range of issues previously ‘considered strictly within the province of 
independent nations’ sovereignty’.81 This raises questions over the 
substantive legitimacy of SAPs. Although borrower countries consent to the 
conditions, in the face of severe economic difficulties the necessity of 
receiving the Bank’s loan may give the countries little choice in doing so. 
The legitimacy of SAPs was particularly called into question when they 
required countries to reduce spending on (for example) ‘subsidies for food, 
medical care and education’,82 risking the violation of its human rights 
obligations. Should a State take measures to reduce spending on food, 
medical care and education, it may be held to have violated the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.83 The CteeESCR has held 
that while States are not expected to immediately implement the rights 
                                                 
80 See e.g. Carol Welch, ‘Structural Adjustment Programs & Poverty Reduction Strategy’ (12 
October 2005) Foreign Policy in Focus 
<http://fpif.org/structural_adjustment_programs_poverty_reduction_strategy/> accessed 5 
October 2017; and Canan Gunduz, ‘Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s 
Need for a Consistent Approach’ (2004) LSE International Development Working Papers No. 
04-49. 
81 Wahi (n 31) 341. 
82 Asad Ismi, ‘Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa’ [2004] 
Report commissioned by the Halifax Initiative Coalition 
<http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/ImpoverishingAContinent.pdf> accessed 28 
September 2017, 5. 
83 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS vol. 993, 3. 
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contained in the instrument in full, they should avoid taking retrogressive 
measures as much as possible; should a State take a retrogressive measure, it 
would ‘need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the 
maximum available resources’.84 While it is perceivable that taking a 
retrogressive measure in relation to one right in order to (better) protect 
another right may be accepted by the CteeESCR, the State would have to be 
very careful in taking and justifying such measures. 
 Much of the decision-making authority assumed by the World Bank 
is to ensure that the borrower country will be in a position to pay the loan 
back (‘economic conditionality’).85 Sigrun Skogly has distinguished these 
types of conditions from ‘political’ ones dealing more with democracy, the 
environment and governance issues.86 Both types of conditions have the 
potential to (positively or negatively) affect human rights enjoyment in 
borrower countries. The actual impact of SAPs has been somewhat 
contentious. For example, whilst many negative critiques have been made 
regarding how SAPs worsened human rights enjoyment, the results of an 
empirical study called the accuracy of such blanket allegations into 
question.87 Even so, criticism seemed rife enough for the World Bank to end 
the adoption of new SAPs in the late 1990s, introducing in their wake the 
‘poverty reduction strategy initiative’, a joint initiative with the IMF.88 The 
                                                 
84 UN CteeESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, 
Para. 1, of the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) E/1991/23, para 9. See also Chapter 11.7. 
85 Wahi (n 31) 343. 
86 Skogly (n 14) 23, cited in Wahi (n 31) 343. 
87 Abouharb and Cingranelli, for example, found that ‘possible that the worsened human rights 
practices observed and reported in previous studies might have resulted from the poor 
economic conditions that led to the imposition of the structural adjustment conditions rather 
than the implementation of the structural adjustment conditions themselves’. See M Rodwan 
Abouharb and David L Cingranelli, ‘The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural 
Adjustment, 1981-2000’ (2006) 50(2) International Studies Quarterly 233, 234. 
88 See World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, ‘The Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Initiative: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Support Through 2003’ (2004) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/oed> accessed 5 October 2017. For discussion, see e.g. Welch (n 




initiative aimed to ‘improve the planning, implementation and monitoring’ 
(or the ‘governance’) of ‘public actions geared toward reducing poverty.89  
 A central element of the initiative is a document that must be drafted 
by a national government lending from the World Bank which ‘outlin[e] a 
country’s objectives with regard to poverty reduction and stipulat[e] the 
policies needed to achieve these goals.’90 The documents are known as 
poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). An inclusive approach is 
considered to be central to the drafting of PRSPs, with input from various 
stakeholders at the national level as well as the World Bank and the IMF.91 It 
therefore seems as though more decision-making power regarding structural 
adjustment is given back to a borrow country, rather than having adjustments 
imposed upon them by the Bank through SAPs. Indeed, in relation to human 
rights, the PRSPs have been praised for allowing ‘both government and 
domestic stakeholders [to] assert greater control over policy making and 
resources’, which corresponds with the idea under international human rights 
law that State bear the primary responsibility for ensuring human rights 
within their territory/jurisdiction.92 However, Carol Welch, among others, has 
criticised the way that PRSPs have been adopted in practice, arguing that they 
have not actually been successful in improving SAPs.93 PRSPs have been 
criticised because despite the inclusive approach expected by the initiative, 
important stakeholders (including various members of civil society and 
indigenous communities) have faced significant challenges in or been 
excluded from participating in the drafting process of PRSPs.94 This is due, 
                                                 
whether this new approach to aid will improve health’ (2001) 323(7305) British Medical 
Journal 120. 
89 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (n 88) xiii. 
90 Welch (n 80). 
91 International Monetary Fund, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)’ (2016) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.aspx> accessed 5 October 2017. 
92 Gobind Nankani, John Page and Lindsay Judge, ‘Human Rights and Poverty Reduction 
Strategies: Moving Towards Convergence’ in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds), Human 
Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford University Press 2005). 
93 Welch (n 80). 
94 See ibid; Samia Liaquat Ali Khan (Minorities Rights Group International), ‘Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers: Failing Minorities and Indigenous Peoples’ (2010) 3, 13-14 
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in part, to the fact that consultations regarding PRSPs have been conducted 
too quickly for input from outside of governments to be carefully 
considered.95 Further issues of coordination between stakeholders, 
particularly between governments and civil society, have limited the positive 
impact of PRSPs on reducing poverty,96 and risk limiting their positive 
impact on the enjoyment of related human rights.97 The problems regarding 
the ways in which PRSPs are adopted raise concerns of participation that 
contradict the World Bank’s good governance approach (and the good, multi-
level governance approach suggested by the present book). However, the 
problems can also have an effect on the enjoyment of human rights. A less 
participatory process means that important concerns that could be raised by, 
for example, local communities, indigenous groups or women (or their 
representatives) regarding development issues closely related to human rights 
may be omitted from PRSPs. Indeed, the process of adopting PRSPs has led 
commentators to argue that PRSPs ‘have not been a very powerful 
mechanism for promoting either negative or positive human rights.’98  
 Furthermore, Welch explains that since PRSPs must gain the approval 
of the World Bank and the IMF, governments tend to pander to the 
international financial institutions when deciding on structural adjustments to 
include in the documents.99 In a similar way to SAPs, this could cause a 
country to compromise on important human rights considerations for the sake 
                                                 
<http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-873-
Download-full-report.pdf> accessed 5 October 2017.  
95 Frances Stewart and Michael Wang, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers within the Human 
Rights Perspective’ in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds), Human Rights and 
Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford University Press 2005). 
96 Khan (n 94) 3. Concerns regarding coordination were also raised by the World Bank itself 
during an evaluation of the poverty reduction strategy. See World Bank Operations Evaluation 
Department (n 88). 
97 This covers a broad spectrum of human rights, including civil and political as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights – the poverty reduction strategy papers are based on a 
broad understanding of poverty, which has the potential to increase the range of human rights 
that they impact. See Nankani, Page and Judge (n 92) 495. 
98 Stewart and Wang (n 95) 468. 




of economic ones. Ultimately, the outcome of a PRSP could have a similar 
(negative) impact on human rights as SAPs. Among others, these issues have 
led to concerns, particularly concerning the rights of minority and/or 
vulnerable groups such as women and indigenous peoples,100 that the 
enjoyment of human rights is being impaired at the hands of PRSPs, as it was 
by SAPs. 
 In order to ‘assist countries, international agencies and development 
practitioners in translating human rights norms, standards and principles into 
pro-poor policies and strategies’, the UN OHCHR’s adopted its ‘Principles 
and Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction 
Strategies’.101 The Principles and Guidelines provide useful guidance for 
those drafting PRSPs to incorporate certain human rights that are particularly 
linked to poverty, into the strategies.102 However, although the document 
includes a chapter on how human rights principles (under a HRBA) should 
inform the way in which poverty reduction strategies are formulated, 
implemented and monitored, it does not contain guidance regarding the 
process of drafting or adopting such strategies.103 To prevent PRSPs from 
having a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights, and to maximise 
the potential of strategies to have a positive effect on human rights (even if 
they are not explicitly based on human rights104), the process of their drafting 
and adoption should be carefully considered.  
                                                 
100 Khan (n 94). 
101 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Principles and 
Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies’ H/PUB/06/12 
(2006) Foreword 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Poverty/DimensionOfPoverty/Pages/Guidelines.aspx> 
accessed 17 January 2018. 
102 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 101) Guideline 
8. 
103 See Stewart and Wang (n 95) 468 discussing an earlier version of the Principles and 
Guidelines. 
104 Stewart and Wang have warned against encouraging poverty reduction strategy papers to 
be based explicitly on human rights, or at least to include the specific language of human 
rights as expressed in human rights instruments, as this risks the language of human rights 
being used ‘with very little change in reality’. See ibid 469. 
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10.2.3.2 The World Bank Inspection Panel 
The World Bank’s Inspection Panel was established in 1993.105 The Panel is 
an independent complaints mechanism endowed with the power to 
investigate the way in which the Bank’s projects are implemented. The aim 
of the Panel is to ensure that the World Bank is functioning in accordance 
with its operational policies and procedures (limited to those ‘with respect to 
the design, appraisal and/or implementation of projects’).106 To this end, the 
Panel receives requests (known as ‘requests for inspection’) by ‘affected 
parties’ who can ‘demonstrate that [their] rights or interests have been or are 
likely to be directly affected by an action or omission of the Bank’.107 It is 
not possible for individuals to request a review, as the 1993 Resolution 
establishing the Panel requires affected parties to be ‘a community of 
persons’,108 although this was subsequently clarified as referring to two or 
more individuals,109 potentially broadening the scope of situations that the 
Panel can review. 
The Inspection Panel is a welcome mechanism in that despite the 
omission of any explicit reference to human rights in the Panel’s mandate, it 
has considered several human rights-related complaints. In particular, Herz 
and Perrault have noted how the Panel has ‘identified four circumstances in 
which Bank policies and procedures may require the Bank to take human 
                                                 
105 The Inspection Panel was established by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and International Development Association, Resolution No. IBRD 93-10; 
Resolution No. IDA 93-6, 22 September 1993, reviewed in 1996 and 1999. 
106 IBRD and IDA, Resolution No. IBRD 93-10; Resolution No. IDA 93-6, 22 September 
1993, para 12, reiterated in the ‘Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel 
1996: Clarification of Certain Aspects of the Resolution’ 
<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelMandateDocuments/ReviewResolution1966.p
df> accessed 29 September 2017. 
107 IBRD and IDA, ‘Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel 1996’ (n 106). 
108 ibid. 
109 The World Bank, ‘1999 Clarification of the Board’s Second Review of the Inspection 
Panel’ 
<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelMandateDocuments/ClarificationSecondRevi




rights issues into account’.110 These range from more general obligations 
such as ensuring that projects do not breach the borrower country’s own 
human rights obligations and considering that country’s domestic law 
protections of human rights, to more specifically interpreting the Bank’s 
safeguard policy on indigenous peoples compatibly with the human rights 
objective of the policy.111 This could go some way to alleviating the concerns 
below regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and the Bank’s 
Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies (see Section 10.2.3.4). A recent 
discussion on human rights at the Civil Society Policy Forum, in which the 
Inspection Panel participated, commended the Panel on its engagement with 
international human rights law standards in previous complaints.112 
Although this appears to be a positive move, the Panel’s ability to 
actively protect and promote human rights remains restricted by the lack of 
human rights protection in the policies with which the Panel is authorised to 
ensure World Bank compliance. The Panel can refer to international law 
when investigating a complaint, and has even on occasion interpreted the 
Bank’s policies to include human rights considerations.113 However, the 
limitation means that the Panel may only consider human rights issues to the 
extent that the Bank’s policies themselves deal with human rights. If a policy 
itself does not comply with human rights standards, the Panel has no power 
to request the Bank to change the policy. Only in the event that a particular 
policy requires the Bank to act in a human rights-compliant manner, which 
the Bank then fails to do, may the Panel hear a complaint centred on human 
rights. Were the safeguard policies to include human rights more specifically 
in individual policies, it would make it a lot easier for the Panel to make a 
finding and recommendations that would be accepted by the Board of 
Executive Directors (which, as explained below, has the ultimate decision-
making power regarding complaints). Unfortunately, the limited scope of 
                                                 
110 Herz and Perrault (n 73) 2. 
111 ibid 2. 
112 NYU Law School Clinic on International Organizations (n 145). 
113 For an in-depth discussion and review of the cases in which the Inspection Panel has done 
this, see ibid. 
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human rights protection in the safeguards has led several human rights 
organisations to castigate rather than applaud the Panel’s effect on human 
rights.  
Recent cases brought to the attention of the Inspection Panel that have 
led to criticisms on the basis of human rights include the Badia East case in 
Nigeria, and the case concerning the Gambella region in Ethiopia. Both will 
be briefly explained.  
In 2014, the Inspection Panel failed to register a request for inspection 
in relation to a situation in which approximately 9,000 people from Badia 
East, Nigeria, who had been intended to be beneficiaries of a World Bank-
supported project, were forcibly evicted by the Lagos state government from 
their homes without meaningful consultation and without appropriate 
alternative housing being offered by local authorities.114 This led to violations 
of the right to housing (among other economic, social and cultural rights) 
and, as will be explained, the right to an effective remedy.115 The decision not 
to file the request was made pursuant to the Panel’s ‘pilot approach to support 
early solutions in the Inspection Panel process’. The approach is intended ‘to 
provide an additional opportunity for [Bank] Management and the Requesters 
to address the concerns about alleged harm raised in a Request for Inspection 
by postponing the Panel’s decision on registration of the Request’,116 as the 
Panel itself is unable to provide dispute resolution and problem-solving 
services.117 Under the ‘Early Solutions Approach’ a case will be closed before 
                                                 
114 See Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: The World Bank Inspection Panel’s Early Solutions 
Pilot Approach’ (n 2). 
115 Amnesty International, ‘At the Mercy of The Government: Violation of The Right to An 
Effective Remedy in Badia East, Lagos State, Nigeria’ (2014) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR44/017/2014/en/> accessed 17 January 2018. 
116 The World Bank, ‘The Inspection Panel at the World Bank: Operating Procedures April 
2014’ (2014) Annex 1 para 2 
<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelMandateDocuments/2014%20Updated%20O
perating%20Procedures.pdf> accessed 17 January 2018. 
117 ibid; and SOMO, Inclusive Development International, ‘An Evaluation of the Inspection 
Panel’s Early Solutions Pilot in Lagos, Nigeria’ (Natalie Bugalski, May 2016) 5 
<https://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Lagos-Early-




being filed by the Inspection Panel if the Panel considers that those who 
requested the inspection are content with the outcome.118 The outcome of the 
approach in this instance (which was the first time it had been used by the 
Inspection Panel) did lead to some financial compensation being provided to 
affected individuals, pursuant to a ‘resettlement action plan’ offered by the 
Lagos state government). However, field research conducted by SOMO and 
Inclusive Development International one year after the award of 
compensation showed that the individuals affected did not receive enough 
compensation to restore their standard of living to that before the evictions 
occurred, and that financial compensation alone was insufficient.119 The 
organisations have also criticised the Panel for using the approach at all, since 
the ‘serious human rights violations’ that the case involved were not 
‘amenable to early resolution’, and the requestors did not fully consent to the 
procedure – both of which are criteria for the pilot approach to be used.120 
Amnesty International has also reviewed the situation and has criticised the 
Panel for failing to acknowledge important breaches of the Bank’s 
operational policies when it responded to the complaints by the affected 
community, and for failing to make sure that the solution provided to the 
requestors was in conformity with international human rights standards.121 
Overall, the case raises many concerns regarding the requestors’ right to an 
effective remedy, as well as the role, if any, of the Inspection Panel in 
safeguarding human rights. 
The Inspection Panel has also been criticised for the way it dealt with 
                                                 
118 ibid. 
119 The field research involved surveys of individuals affected by the forced evictions and 
shows that although skills and job training was promised in addition to financial 
compensation, this had not been provided. Furthermore, some individuals remained homeless. 
See SOMO and Inclusive Development International (n 117) 8-9. 
120 SOMO and Inclusive Development International (n 117); The World Bank, ‘The 
Inspection Panel at the World Bank: Operating Procedures April 2014’ (n 116) Annex 1 para 
3(a). 
121 Amnesty International, ‘At the Mercy of The Government’ (n 115); and Amnesty 
International, Nigeria: The World Bank Inspection Panel’s Early Solutions Pilot Approach’ 
(n 2). 
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a complaint brought in 2012 concerning the resettlement of around 2 million 
people in Ethiopia.122 The World Bank had been funding a project for the 
protection of basic services, such as water, food, healthcare and education. 
Evidence arose, however, that the Ethiopian government used the funding for 
another project – the so-called ‘villagization’ project. Through this project, 
around 2 million people were resettled, including thousands from the 
Gambella region, known as the Anuak people. Many of the Anuak people 
claimed that they had been forcibly evicted and removed from their fertile 
lands to places where they had no access to food. They claimed that as a 
result, some people had died of starvation, and some who opposed the move 
and tried to go back were tortured and sexually assaulted. With the help of 
Inclusive Development International, a complaint was filed at the Inspection 
Panel. While finding that the Bank did indeed fail to comply with some policy 
requirements in this situation, the Inspection Panel failed to attribute any 
responsibility to the Bank for the treatment of the Anuak people. The 
reasoning for this was that examination of the evidence of shootings, beatings 
and sexual assaults of local farmers fell outside of the Panel’s mandate and 
was therefore ‘shelved’. Further, when the Panel visited Gambella to 
investigate the complaint, it did not pay attention to these aspects. While 
critics argue that this was ‘in order to exonerate the bank’,123 the situation 
highlights the fundamental weaknesses of the Panel’s mandate with respect 
to human rights.  
A further limit of the Inspection Panel’s ability to promote human 
rights is that the ultimate decision-making power regarding an inspection 
rests with the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. The Board receives 
                                                 
122 The request sent to the Inspection Panel (together with IDI’s legal and policy analysis of 
the request) is available online. See Inclusive Development International, ‘Request for 
Inspection by World Bank Inspection Panel’ (24 September 2012) 
<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/82-Request for Inspection 
(English).pdf> accessed 29 September 2017. 
123 Inclusive Development International, ‘World Bank Whitewashes Ethiopia Human Rights 
Scandal: Bank Absolves Itself of Responsibility and Denies Redress to Victims’ (2 March 
2015) <http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/world-bank-whitewashes-ethiopia-human-




recommendations from the Panel and will publish its decision as to ‘what 
steps should be taken to remedy the harm, or expected harm, caused by the 
project.’124 The Board is able to either accept or reject the recommendations 
of the Panel.125 This is worrying in light of the fact that the Board of 
Executive Directors appears to be largely responsible for the adoption of the 
Bank’s restrictive interpretation of its Articles of Agreement, mentioned 
above.126 In addition, despite being officially independent from the Bank,127 
the Panel’s physical location inside the World Bank’s headquarters raise 
concerns over its independence in practice.128 
Overall, the mandate and lack of enforcement powers of the Panel, as 
well as perturbing examples from practice, suggests that the Panel’s 
effectiveness as a tool for protecting human rights is limited. Although the 
World Bank has certainly increased its accountability through the Inspection 
Panel, it is effectively barred from upholding international standards to call 
out the World Bank management on its failures to respect and consider human 
rights. A more recent mechanism that may improve this will be discussed in 
the next sub-section. 
                                                 
124 SOMO and Accountability Counsel, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel’ 
<https://www.somo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/The-World-Bank-Inspection-Panel.pdf> 
accessed 17 January 2018. 
125 See also Willem van Genugten and others, ‘Tilburg Guiding Principles on World Bank, 
IMF and Human Rights’ in Willem van Genugten, Paul Hunt and Susan Matthews (eds), 
World Bank and Human Rights (Wolf Legal Publishers 2003) para 21, which also draws 
attention the lack of human rights expertise of members of the Inspection Panel. 
126 The interpretation is decided upon by a vote of the Board of Executives, usually following 
legal opinions provided by General Counsel. See IBRD Articles of Agreement (n 31) Art. IX; 
UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) paras 38-39. 
127 The Panel is described as an ‘independent complaints mechanism’ and consists of three 
members that are selected ‘on the basis of their ability to deal thoroughly and fairly with the 
complaints brought to them, their integrity and independence from Bank Management, and 
their exposure to developmental issues and living conditions in developing countries.’ The 
Inspection Panel, ‘About Us’ <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AboutUs.aspx> 
accessed 17 January 2018. 
128 See Bretton Woods Project, ‘World Bank Fails to Support Project Critics’ (6 July 2015) 
<http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2015/07/world-bank-fails-to-support-project-critics/> 
accessed 29 September 2017; Yvonne Wong and Benoit Mayer (n 25) 510.  
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10.3.2.3 Grievance Redress Service  
A new initiative was introduced by the World Bank in April 2015 to 
‘[enhance] the World Bank’s responsiveness and accountability’,129 holding 
some promise for human rights protection by the Bank. The Grievance 
Redress Service (GRS) is the Bank’s new complaints forum, allowing 
complaints to be filed by individuals and communities (or representatives 
thereof) who ‘believe that they are or may be directly and adversely affected 
by a World Bank-supported project’ to file a complaint.130 The GRS was 
adopted to enhance the Bank’s responsiveness and accountability by making 
the Bank ‘more accessible for project-affected communities and to help 
ensure faster and better resolution of project-related complaints.’131 To 
achieve this, the GRS guarantees to respond to complaints with an action plan 
and a timeframe for its implementation within 30 days of receipt.132 Further, 
the resolution of disputes will be in cooperation with the affected parties and 
the relevant borrower country, and will be accompanied by a monitoring and 
implementation process by the World Bank.133 
 The GRS is clearly stated as having no official relationship with the 
World Bank’s Inspection Panel, and both mechanisms can be used alongside 
one another, if relevant.134 Unlike the Panel, the GRS is not independent of 
the Bank.135 The fact that the GRS is not independent begs the question of 
how biased the GRS will be when considering complaints and whether it can 
be considered impartial, especially given that the formally independent 
Inspection Panel suffers from lack of true impartiality.  
                                                 
129 The World Bank, ‘Grievance Redress Service Brochure’ 
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/223151434995262110/GRS-2015-Brochure-web.pdf> 
accessed 28 September 2017, 2. 
130 The World Bank, ‘Grievance Redress Service’ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/products-and-services/grievance-redress-service> accessed 17 January 2018. 
Complaints can also be filed regarding the procurement process on a World Bank-financed 
contract. The World Bank, ‘Grievance Redress Service Brochure’ (n 129). 
131 The World Bank, ‘Grievance Redress Service’ (n 130). 
132 ibid.  
133 ibid. 
134 The World Bank, ‘Grievance Redress Service Brochure’ (n 129) 1. 




 Certainly, the cooperative approach of the GRS, which enables public 
participation and community engagement, are to be applauded as they 
provide an opportunity for the Bank to better respond to the needs of local 
communities. However, the options for resolution of complaints and the 
powers of the GRS remain somewhat unclear. For example, despite providing 
implementation monitoring, the GRS fails to specify what kind of measures 
could be imposed in the event of non-compliance, and how far the GRS can 
go in ensuring the success of the proposed resolution.   
 For human rights protection, the real potential of the new grievance 
mechanism lies in the scope of the GRS’s mandate. The GRS can only 
consider complaints relating to open, ongoing projects of the World Bank, 
but complaints are not limited to those relating to the Bank’s policies 
(therefore extending its mandate beyond the scope of the Inspection Panel’s). 
Rather, affected persons or communities may bring a complaint relating to a 
Bank-supported project.136 This potentially opens the door for human rights 
concerns to be addressed directly in complaints, improving the accountability 
and responsibility of the Bank. Unfortunately, the lack of any mention of 
human rights and the lack of specific standards to be considered in the GRS 
process means that it will be difficult to more accurately gauge the effect of 
the mechanism on the Bank’s human rights-related practices until it is 
possible to see how the body deals with specific complaints. At the time of 
writing, this remains to be seen, as no complaints have yet been brought 
before the GRS. If used to its fullest potential, the service could constitute an 
important part of a multi-level governance structure, as explained below.  
10.2.3.4 Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies 
One of the most controversial aspects of the World Bank’s relationship with 
human rights relates to its Environmental and Social Safeguards Policies. The 
Policies ‘serve to identify, avoid, and minimize harms to people and the 
environment’ in the development process and require certain social and 
environmental risks to be addressed by borrowing governments before 
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receiving investment support by the Bank.137 Such requirements include 
‘conducting environmental and social impact assessments, consulting with 
affected communities about potential project impacts, and restoring the 
livelihoods of displaced people’.138 The safeguards currently in place consist 
of 11 key Operational Policies and associated Bank Procedures which are 
particularly considered during the preparation and approval of World Bank 
projects.139 
An extensive review of the safeguards was recently concluded, with 
approval of the final outcome of the almost four-year-long process on 4 
August 2016.140 Conducted in response to the findings of the Independent 
Evaluation Group’s 2010 evaluation of the existing safeguards, the review 
aimed to update the safeguards, make them more effective and ‘enhance the 
development outcomes of World Bank operations’.141 However, despite an 
extensive and inclusive consultation process during the review, which 
included advice being given by human rights experts working for the United 
Nations and various international human rights non-governmental 
organisations, the ends result remains disappointing in its treatment of human 
                                                 
137 The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Framework Setting Standards for Sustainable 
Development - First Draft for Consultation’ 
<http://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/review-and-
update-world-bank-safeguard-
policies/en/materials/first_draft_framework_july_30_2014.pdf> accessed 28 September 
2017. 
138 The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Safeguards Policies’ (5 April 2017) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/environmental-and-social-policies-for-
projects/brief/environmental-and-social-safeguards-policies> accessed 17 January 2018. 
139 ibid. 
140 The World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies: World Bank 
Board Approves New Environmental and Social Framework’ 
<http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-
policies> accessed 28 September 2017. 
141 The World Bank, ‘Review and Update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies: 








rights and have already faced much criticism. The second (of three) draft of 
the policies sparked a group of UN human rights experts (consisting primarily 
of Special Rapporteurs and independent experts within the OHCHR) to claim 
that the draft ‘seems to go out of its way to avoid any meaningful references 
to human rights and international human rights law, except for passing 
references’.142 This is regardless of the fact that many of the issues being 
raised by the safeguards are intrinsically related to human rights, for example 
the rights to property and non-discrimination.143 The final draft adopted 
appears to be heedless of Human Rights Watch’s urgings to include 
obligations for the Bank to respect and protect human rights itself,144 
although it does include explicit reference to human rights in its Vision 
Statement. Here, the Bank has provided that its ‘activities support the 
realization of human rights expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’.145 While certainly a positive inclusion, as the UDHR is extensive in 
the range of rights that it covers, the Vision Statement is not a policy as such, 
                                                 
142 Stated in a letter to World Bank President Jim Yong Kim in December 2014. Available at 
<ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/EPoverty/WorldBank.pdf> accessed 28 September 2017, cited 
in Bretton Woods Project, ‘UN Experts Critique World Bank Draft Safeguards’ (2 February 
2015) <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2015/02/un-experts-critique-world-bank-draft-
safeguards/> accessed 28 September 2017. 
143 The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Framework: Setting Environmental and 




accessed 29 September 2017, Policies 5 and 7. 
144 Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch Submission: World Bank’s Draft 
Environmental and Social Framework’ (7 April 2015) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/07/human-rights-watch-submission-world-banks-draft-
environmental-and-social-framework> accessed 29 September 2017. 
145 The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Safeguards Policies’ (2016) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/environmental-and-social-policies-for-
projects/brief/environmental-and-social-safeguards-policies> accessed 12 October 2017, 
discussed in NYU Law School Clinic on International Organizations, ‘The World Bank 
Inspection Panel and International Human Rights Law’ (2017) <http://www.iilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/The-World-Bank-Inspection-Panel-FINAL-REPORT.pdf> 
accessed 12 October 2017. 
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and simply referring to the UDHR does not provide any detail as to how the 
Bank should concretely incorporate adherence to the rights throughout its 
activities. In addition, as Inclusive Development International has noted, the 
World Bank neglected to take the opportunity of reviewing the safeguard 
policies to set human rights standards as the ‘non-negotiable minimum floor 
for the treatment of project-affected people.’146 Indeed, while the reference 
to World Bank activities in the Vision Statement suggests that the Bank has 
undertaken to consider human rights more seriously through its new policies, 
most of the responsibility for meeting the standards set out in the policies has 
been allocated to borrowing States, rather than the Bank itself or jointly 
between the Bank and States.147 Furthermore, while some commentators have 
lauded the World Bank for the due diligence standards included in the 
policies,148 others have criticised the revisions herein, for being vaguer than 
the standards in the previous policies. In particular (and connected to the 
criticism regarding the allocation of responsibility) Inclusive Development 
International argues that borrowing States’ evaluation of social and 
environmental risks are not required to be carefully reviewed by the World 
Bank to ensure their veracity and reliability before approval for a project is 
given, ‘despite the obvious incentives on borrowers to downplay risks and 
undercount affected people to reduce costs and, indeed, the evidence of this 
malpractice in previous projects.’149 
One victory for human rights in the updated policies and safeguards 
was the inclusion of the requirement of securing FPIC of indigenous peoples 
who ‘are present in, or have collective attachment to a proposed project area’ 
before going ahead with a project in that area.150 The FPIC standard has 
                                                 
146 Inclusive Development International, ‘World Bank Safeguards’ 
<https://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/campaign/campaign-to-reform-the-world-banks-
policies-and-practice-on-land-and-human-rights/> accessed 12 October 2017. 
147 ibid. 
148 See NYU Law School Clinic on International Organizations (n 145). 
149 Inclusive Development International, ‘World Bank Safeguards’ (n 146). 
150 The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Framework: Setting Environmental and 




repeatedly been recognised within the field of international human rights.151 
While it is promising that the concept was included, the reference to human 
rights is made in the aims of the policy, rather than within the policy itself 
(which could be helpful to the Bank in delineating exact standards required 
by FPIC).152 Missed opportunities such as this have led critics to dub the 
World Bank as a ‘human rights free zone’ that ‘treats human rights more like 
an infectious disease than universal values and obligations’.153 
10.3 Moving forwards 
From these examples, it is clear that the World Bank can, and often does have 
large impact on the enjoyment of human rights. It nonetheless fails to allow 
for institutionalised protection of human rights through its policies and 
operations. After the outcome of the recent review of the Bank’s safeguard 
policies, it does not appear likely that the Bank will change its approach 
towards human rights in the near future. Moreover, although there are strong 
arguments to support the claim that the Bank has at least some obligations 
under international law, it also cannot be concluded with any certainty that 
the World Bank currently has existing international legal obligations to 
respect or protect human rights. We therefore cannot expect a purely legal 
argument to convince the Bank to do so. However, it may be possible to look 
beyond legal reasoning to argue that the Bank should actively engage with 
human rights in its own operations, due to its ‘good governance’ approach to 
development. 
10.3.1 Good governance and the World Bank 
The definition of ‘good governance’ was dealt with in detail in Chapter 9.2.6. 
                                                 
151 For a thorough discussion of this, see UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, ‘Legal Commentary on the Concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (14 
July 2005) E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1, paras 10 et seq. 
152 The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Framework: Setting Environmental and 
Social Standards for Investment Project Financing (n 143) 107. 
153 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (n 2) para 68. 
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However, it is of particular interest for this chapter to consider the specific 
ties and uses of the term by the World Bank. The following sections will 
therefore briefly revisit the term. In the late 1980s, the World Bank 
introduced the concept of ‘good governance’.154 Since then, the term has been 
widely adopted and used by many development and human rights 
organisations (both within and outside of the UN framework) as well as other 
international financial institutions.155 The Bank itself has now even gone so 
far as to create a matrix of policy objectives and actors within good global 
governance, to ‘establish a “global architecture of governance”’.156  
As in Chapter 9, the current chapter adopts a definition of good 
governance that relates to the performance and quality of governance 
activities,157 and requires governance systems to be transparent, accountable 
and participatory, with an emphasis on human rights protection under a 
HRBA. As a brief reminder, transparency requires that the drafting and 
implementation of norms and standards be clear and accessible to the public 
– people need to be aware of what the relevant rules are and how they work. 
In other words, transparency is closely linked to accessibility of information, 
                                                 
154 The World Bank, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term 
Perspective Study’ (1989) 60-61 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/498241468742846138/From-crisis-to-
sustainable-growth-sub-Saharan-Africa-a-long-term-perspective-study> accessed 12 October 
2017. 
155 See Naveed Ahmed, ‘Reinforcement of Good Governance in the International Financial 
Institutions’ (2015) 2(11) Law, Social Justice & Global Development. 
156 Stephen Welch and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, ‘Multi-Level Governance and International 
Relations’ in Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (eds), Multi-level Governance (Oxford 
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Governments: The World Bank’s Matrix for Global Governance’ in Rorden Wilkinson and 
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and making sure that standards are known and understood by those that they 
are imposed upon or those that are affected by them. Under the principle of 
transparency (as well as accountability), it is also important to clarify which 
actor is responsible for realising which standards within a governance system. 
Accountability allows affected individuals to hold responsible bodies directly 
to account. As mentioned in Chapter 9.3.1.2, the World Bank identifies two 
aspects of accountability – answerability and enforceability.158 Answerability 
involves the responsible body giving information about its decisions and 
actions and justifying them to the public, while enforcement is defined by the 
Bank as allowing actors to be sanctioned when they do not conform to their 
responsibilities.159 The third element of participation requires that each actor 
involved in or affected by norms should have a voice in their adoption and 
implementation.160  
Chapter 9.3.2 detailed the connections and interdependencies 
between good governance and human rights. In essence, ‘[g]ood governance 
is essential to the realization of all human rights, including the elimination of 
poverty and ensuring a satisfactory livelihood for all’,161 while human rights 
lend good governance concrete performance standards against which actors’ 
conduct can be judged. 
In a 1992 report, the Bank stated that good governance is ‘the manner 
in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and 
social resources for development.’162 It is thus clear that the term is intended 
to apply to borrower countries. Since its first use of the term, the World Bank 
                                                 
158 See Rick Stapenhurst and Mitchell O’Brien, ‘Accountability in Governance’ (World Bank 
Institute) 
<https://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/A
ccountabilityGovernance.pdf> accessed 22 September 2017, 1. 
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160 See Chapter 9.3.1.3. 
161 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the 
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162 The World Bank, 'Governance and Development' (1992) 
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has provided very extensive guidance as to what good governance is, how it 
relates to development and what is required for certain activities to meet good 
governance standards. A wonderful recent example is the ‘World 
Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law’ which provides 
detailed information and guidance on how to improve governance for 
development. Specifically, the report ‘explores how policies for security, 
growth, and equity can be made more effective by addressing the underlying 
drivers of governance.’163 
There is also evidence that the World Bank sees itself as having to 
abide by the standards of good governance. A full examination of the Bank’s 
incorporation of good governance principles within its operations falls 
outside of the scope of the present study. However, it is interesting to note 
that Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert have highlighted in this respect various 
initiatives that the Bank has taken to improve its good governance, including 
the establishment of a Department of Institutional Integrity,164 its Inspection 
Panel, and its Information Disclosure Policy165 (now replaced by the ‘Policy 
on Access to Information’166). The Inspection Panel in particular, despite its 
shortcomings with relation to human rights, has been viewed as a substantial 
development because of its contribution to increased accountability of the 
World Bank. In addition, it was the first body of its kind, establishing a 
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complaints mechanism for individual complaints vis-à-vis an international 
organisation.167 The Bank has also made important inroads towards good 
governance for what concerns transparency through its policies on 
information disclosure and access to information. However, although 
positive measures, there is still a lot of work to be done before the Bank can 
be said to successfully follow good governance.168  
While the arguments and evidence discussed above in favour of the 
World Bank actively engaging with human rights in its policies and 
operations are persuasive, they do not necessarily provide a clear rationale 
for it to do so. Rationales for taking HRBAs have been elaborated by 
proponents of the approach, in particular by United Nations institutions. The 
first is an ‘intrinsic’ reasoning, that taking human rights as a starting point is 
the right thing to do from a moral or legal perspective.169 The United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA), for example, highlights the fact that human rights 
represent universal values that ‘that provide a common standard of 
achievement for all women, men and children and all nations’, and suggests 
that taking a HRBA allows individuals to become the centre-point of their 
own development by making them rights-holders, making them active 
participants.170 Further, HRBAs reject the idea of development action being 
a case of charity in favour of seeing certain standards as rights, to which there 
are corresponding obligations that must be upheld.171 Unfortunately, as the 
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Bank has not yet been swayed by arguments that engaging with human rights 
is the ‘right’ thing for it to do, the intrinsic rationale for it to take a HRBA 
may be similarly unsuccessful.  
The second rationale for taking HRBAs is instrumental, meaning that 
through such an approach the World Bank would be able to achieve the best 
possible results regarding development and poverty reduction. The UNFPA 
explains that the holistic and inclusive approach adopted in HRBAs are 
highly beneficial for overcoming development outcomes.172 This is true not 
only in the range of issues that HRBAs take into consideration (i.e. civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural) but also the expertise on certain 
issues available within the international human rights framework (e.g. of the 
UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies) and the multi-sectoral approach 
to responsibility which, if adopted in the field of development ‘can more 
capably address gaps and challenges that arise and can lead to more effective 
and sustainable solutions in the long term’.173 In the context of poverty 
reduction specifically, the Swiss foundation CIFEDHOP notes that a 
conceptual framework has been developed by UN experts, based on initial 
theories by Amartya Sen.174 The framework highlights various ‘added 
values’ of integrating human rights in addressing poverty reduction, 
including the inclusive approach taken by human rights (as mentioned by the 
UNFPA) and the fact that human rights approaches address not only the 
consequences but also more structural causes of poverty, including the 
distribution of power and patterns of discrimination.175 Empirically, 
consideration of human rights in economic governance has been shown to be 
beneficial not only to the enjoyment of human rights, but also to the bodies 
                                                 
172 ibid. 
173 United Nations Population Fund and Harvard School of Public Health, ‘A Human Rights-
Based Approach to Programming: Practical Information and Training Materials’ (2010) 
<http://www.unfpa.org/resources/human-rights-based-approach-programming> accessed 28 
September 2017, 84. 
174 CIFEDHOP José Parra, ‘The Human Rights-Based Approach (n 169) 19. The theories of 
Amartya Sen referred to can be found in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, ‘Human Rights and Poverty Reduction’ (2004) Ref HR/PUB/04/1.  




involved in global economic governance. Research led by Daniel Kaufmann 
has shown that the successful implementation of World Bank-funded 
government investment projects substantially correlates to civil liberties 
within a State.176 This is seen, for example, in the rates of return of loans by 
international financial institutions, which are higher in relation to borrower 
countries with better civil and political human rights records.177 
In the event that the two main rationales for taking a HRBA are not 
found persuasive, it can also be argued that the World Bank should take a 
HRBA and good governance to achieving its mandate for reasons of 
consistency. As already explained, the Bank has repeatedly advocated a good 
governance approach to development and poverty eradication, and has 
explicitly linked the achievement of these goals with the realisation of human 
rights. In light of the interdependent relationship between good governance 
and human rights explained in Chapter 9.3.2 and in order to maintain 
consistency between what the Bank practices and what it preaches, the World 
Bank should consider how to integrate both of these approaches into its own 
policies and practices.  
10.3.2 Multi-level governance, human rights and the World Bank 
Taking a multi-level governance approach to human rights could provide 
some important benefits for individuals whose enjoyment of human rights is 
or could be affected by the World Bank’s operations. This section will map 
out a multi-level governance approach to human rights for what concerns the 
World Bank specifically. In particular, the discussion will address the World 
Bank’s place and role within a multi-level governance approach to human 
rights that adheres to principles of good governance. Suggestions will be 
made as to reforms that could be made to follow a multi-level governance 
                                                 
176 See Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Human Rights, Governance, and Development: An Empirical 
Perspective Challenges Convention’, in World Bank Institute, ‘Human Rights and 
Development’, Development Outreach Series No. 40633 (2006) 18. 
177 According to an empirical study. See Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann and Lant H 
Pritchett, ‘Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects’ (1997) 
11(2) The World Bank Economic Review 219, cited in Brodnig (n 2) 10.  
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approach, particularly by the World Bank. As such, this chapter goes a step 
further than Chapter 9 by looking towards the operationalisation of multi-
level governance. Including the World Bank in a multi-level governance 
approach and aligning its activities with the characteristics of multi-level 
governance may not require as many changes as one may expect. The most 
drastic change for the Bank would be the inclusion of human rights 
considerations in its policies. Institutionally speaking, multi-level 
governance approach would require more focus on cooperation and 
coordination of actions between different actors working towards the same 
goal, which will be discussed below. 
10.3.2.1 The role of different actors within a multi-level governance 
approach  
It is clear that although it is not always successful, and despite not explicitly 
engaging with human rights in its own work, the World Bank shares a 
common goal with many different stakeholders in the field of development. 
While some such actors do place a specific focus on human rights and various 
actors increasingly take HRBA, an overarching goal of reducing or 
eliminating poverty on a global scale is held by many actors (including States, 
civil society, scholars, etc.) in this context. It could even be said that there is 
a common goal of improving human rights through international 
development.178 Having established that a common goal exists, questions 
remain as to the roles that different actors would have within a multi-level 
governance approach to human rights in relation to the World Bank, as well 
as how their activities could be coordinated to ensure efficient and effective 
cooperation. 
The role of civil society in human rights (and in development) 
governance is quite well-defined, and has been briefly mentioned in Chapter 
9 of this book. NGOs have carved out a role for themselves, arguably at all 
levels of human rights governance and within many different human rights 
                                                 
178 This idea is linked to the concept of a ‘right to development’ which has been gained 
traction, particularly since the adoption by the UN General Assembly of its ‘Declaration on 




governance activities. Notably, they contribute to the drafting of (inter alia) 
regulations, policies, legislation and guidelines that aim to provide better 
protection for human rights. NGOs also have a pivotal role in raising 
awareness of, sharing information about and reporting on human rights 
situations on the ground. Additionally, NGOs also already provide 
considerable contributions to accountability mechanisms for States regarding 
their human rights obligations (i.e. through shadow reporting) as well as 
conducting research into the topic of the World Bank and human rights (and 
indeed non-State actors and human rights more generally).179 In relation to 
the World Bank, they have already proven instrumental in flagging up human 
rights concerns caused by the Bank’s practices and policies180 as well as 
bringing human rights-related issues to the attention of the Inspection Panel 
(even if they have not been taken up by the Panel).181 In this respect, civil 
society also has a strong connection with individuals and local communities, 
which themselves, as the victims of human rights interferences, have a large 
role to play in bringing attention to the human rights impact of the World 
Bank in practice. Thus, in a multi-level governance framework, civil society 
could maintain its current position vis-à-vis the World Bank and human 
rights, adapting to fill any appropriate gaps in governance activities that may 
arise in the future (possible due to multi-level governance’s flexible nature). 
The position of States in both development and human rights 
governance is also quite clear. For example, States have the prerogative to 
draft, implement and enforce (at least at the national level) human rights law 
standards as well as to commit themselves to adhering to such standards. It is 
also States’ prerogative to take unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures 
to better protect human rights and allocate (most often between themselves) 
                                                 
179 See e.g. Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: The World Bank Inspection Panel’s Early 
Solutions Pilot Approach’ (n 2). 
180 See e.g. Bretton Woods Project, ‘Bretton Woods Project - Critical Voices on the World 
Bank and IMF’ <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/> accessed 29 September 2017. 
181 See e.g. the Ethiopia PBS request brought by Inclusive Development International on 
behalf of the Anuak people (discussed above, Section 10.2.3.2). Inclusive Development 
International, ‘Request for Inspection by World Bank Inspection Panel’ (n 122). 
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human rights responsibilities at the international level. One matter that should 
be further clarified under a multi-level human rights governance system is 
the relationship between States and the World Bank. While on a cursory 
inspection the relationship seems clear, it would be important to clarify 
States’ human rights obligations when they are acting as members of the 
World Bank and the effect that this has on the Bank’s own activities. In 
addition, the governance role of States in relation to PRSPs should be further 
clarified – while it initially seems that they have a lot of discretion in choosing 
which structural adjustments to include in the documents, it has been 
suggested that they actually relinquish authority to the World Bank and IMF 
in order to gain their approval.  
In general, the position of international organisations within human 
rights governance system is relatively clear. The United Nations, in particular, 
along with its specialised agencies and subsidiary bodies, makes consistent 
contributions to human rights through both the UN legal framework and the 
international human rights system more generally. However, some aspects 
need further elucidation. For example, the exact relationship between United 
Nations institutions and the World Bank, which is currently subject to 
controversy over unspoken political influences between the organisation, 
should be clarified.182 In particular, meaningful engagement between the 
World Bank and the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies is crucial. 
Regarding international organisations other than the UN, much more 
clarification is needed concerning their role in human rights governance. 
While some do engage with human rights issues (e.g. the International 
Organization for Migration) many have yet to take a clear stance towards 
their role, if any, in human rights protection. One crucial piece of the puzzle 
would be to establish the legal obligations (if any) of international 
organisations for what concerns human rights. 
                                                 
182 For a full explanation of the controversy surrounding the relationship, see Axel Dreher and 
others, ‘Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security 





The Bank itself has a clear and authoritative position within 
international development and economic governance, which can be built 
upon to improve its contributions to multi-level human rights governance. 
Many aspects of the Bank’s current functions could play an important role 
herein. The Bank currently engages with experts, an example of which was 
seen in the discussion on its economic and social safeguard policies in 
Section 10.2.3.4. However, there is no evidence that it engages with 
international human rights treaty monitoring bodies, although they have 
explicitly mentioned the World Bank and could provide valuable guidance as 
to the standards that the Bank could include in its own policies or ensure are 
within its operations and the programmes that it funds.  
Finally, other actors such as private companies and the commercial 
banks and private sector investors which co-finance projects together with 
the World Bank, would have a role in a multi-level governance approach. The 
importance of private sector contributions to achieving sustainable 
development, which itself has a mutually reinforcing relationship with human 
rights, has been acknowledged by the Bank.183 Different branches of the 
World Bank (the IBRD, the International Finance corporation and the 
Multilateral Investment guarantee Agency) have worked together to provide 
better support for IDA countries and ‘to encourage greater private sector 
involvement’.184 This has included initiatives such as the ‘Private Sector 
Window’ which is ‘based on the recognition that the private sector is central 
to achieving the SDGs’ and is intended to ‘catalyze private sector investment 
and create jobs in the poorest and most fragile countries’.185 Enhanced 
participation by the private sector could have a large impact on the 
availability of resources for achieving sustainable development. This has 
been seen in Kenya, where a public-private partnership between the World 
Bank Group, the government of Kenya, Kenya’s national power distributor, 
                                                 
183 IDA, ‘Leveraging the Private Sector’ <https://ida.worldbank.org/results/abcs/abcs-ida-
leveraging-private-sector-ida-countries> accessed 18 January 2018. 
184 ibid. 
185 ibid.  
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private investors and commercial lenders was established to increase access 
to electricity in Kenya.186 However, as with any public-private partnerships, 
collaborative efforts between the World Bank and the private sector should 
adhere to human rights standards, and the World Bank, when entering into 
partnerships with private actors, should require them to comply with relevant 
human rights standards.  
10.3.2.2 Suggestions for measures to achieve a multi-level 
governance regime 
A first consideration when looking at changes that would need to be taken to 
establish a multi-level governance framework for human rights in relation to 
the World Bank is the Bank’s relationship with individuals and communities 
affected by Bank-supported projects. The Bank has made efforts to allow 
individuals and communities more direct access to the Bank when they 
believe that they have been negatively affected by a World Bank project – the 
Inspection Panel and the GRS. However, there is still a large power disparity 
between the institution and affected individuals vis-à-vis human rights, which 
should be addressed.187 This could be achieved, inter alia, by giving 
individuals and local communities more voice in decision-making processes 
(including those of the Inspection Panel). In particular, local populations and 
particularly vulnerable individuals (such as indigenous populations and 
women) should be more actively involved in the drafting of PRSPs. Such 
measures would increase participation and accountability within a multi-level 
governance framework and may also go some way to fostering more 
cooperation between individuals and local communities (as well as any 
NGOs acting on their behalf) and the Bank. 
 The Inspection Panel would remain a critical tool for holding the Bank 
accountable for human rights interference. After all, the Panel was 
established as an accountability mechanism and has been successful in some 
respects. However, the powers and independence of the Panel need to be 
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strengthened. This would include giving the Panel more decision-making 
power, rather than allowing the ultimate decision as to the outcome of a 
complaint to lie with the Bank’s management. Improving the Panel’s 
transparency would also be key. This could be done through more open 
engagement with affected communities, and through strengthening the 
operational policies of the Panel itself. Engaging more with affected 
communities on the ground would necessarily be required by a multi-level 
governance approach and would certainly improve participation. As one of 
the primary aspects of a multi-level governance approach is the cooperation 
and complementarity between action taken by different actors and levels to 
maximise the efficiency of measures, open engagement is extremely 
important. Strengthening the Panel would also be linked to further review of 
the environmental and social safeguard policies. If more human rights 
standards were (preferably explicitly, but also implicitly) included in the 
policies, the Panel would then have the discretion to assess the Bank’s 
operations according to such standards. In turn, the role of the UN human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies would be important here, as their 
interpretations of what standards should be met in relation to different human 
rights could be used as a benchmark by the Inspection Panel. Along with an 
improved Inspection Panel, the GRS could form an important link between 
the international and local level within a multi-level human rights governance 
system. The service could ensure that the World Bank stays connected with 
affected communities and remains able to work with the communities in real 
time towards mutually beneficial solutions. It may also allow the Bank to 
reflect the needs of local communities more accurately in its policies and the 
way that it conducts its operations more generally (e.g. by providing staff 
with more training), reducing the need for similar complaints in the future. In 
these ways, the GRS and the Inspection Panel could go some way to 
addressing one of the main challenges to multi-level governance – 
coordination between different actors. However, further measures would 
need to be taken to address issues such as the fact that the Bank has not 
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engaged meaningfully with the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies.188  
 Coordination would also have to be further fostered amongst civil 
society, which could be in a good position to help the Bank to develop a 
HRBA within its activities. Other international organisations, such as the 
UNDP or the UNFPA, could also collaborate with civil society and the World 
Bank in this respect. Concrete measures to achieve these goals and improve 
coordination could include the Bank establishing contact points/persons from 
within the Bank to liaise with other actors, including other international 
organisations, non-governmental organisations and the human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies (for example). To increase coordination between multiple 
actors, activities such as conferences could be organised to encourage 
information sharing and avoid the duplication of activities and efforts to help 
the Bank improve its impact on human rights. Of course, such activities 
would need to adhere to the principles of transparency, accountability and 
participation, so it would be important for local communities, human rights 
experts and other relevant actors to be involved in or at least have access to 
the activities (e.g. by attending the conference). Participation of actors could 
be on a more formal or informal basis. Other measures that could be taken 
would be for the contact person to deliver periodical reports on the activities 
that the Bank is taking to improve human rights, lessons that have been learnt 
and efforts that could be taken in the future to further reduce its negative 
impact on human rights.  
 The measures suggested here are merely examples of what could be 
done to move towards a multi-level governance approach to human rights 
and are by no means exhaustive. It is clear that action must be taken on all 
levels of a multi-level governance system, and that more coordination and 
cooperation between actors and levels is required. Perhaps most strikingly, in 
consideration of the suggestions for the Bank to take a HRBA, the delineation 
                                                 
188 The Bank does not appear to follow the guidance of the treaty bodies, that it should (for 
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of responsibilities of the Bank for human rights needs further clarification. 
Persuading the Bank to actively engage with human rights is a first (albeit 
high) hurdle on the path to better human rights protection.  
10.4 Concluding reflections on the World Bank, international human 
rights law and multi-level governance  
This chapter has demonstrated the relationship between global economic and 
development governance by the World Bank and human rights, and has 
explained how many of the Bank’s activities are problematic in this respect. 
While the Bank itself promulgates the close relationship between 
development and human rights, it has yet to acknowledge its own role in the 
protection of human rights. Whether the Bank is currently subject to 
international law obligations to actively engage with (or simple to respect) 
human rights is still a matter of debate, and the Bank does not seem to be 
swayed by moral arguments that it would be the ‘right thing’ for it to do, 
despite the large potential for it to affect human rights realisation. It can be 
concluded from the analysis above that there are several obstacles to 
achieving good governance standards within a multi-level governance 
approach to human rights for what concerns the World Bank.  
For example, the analysis showed that difficulties in achieving 
accountability of the World Bank are currently extensive, particularly when 
the current international human rights law framework and the lack of direct 
human rights obligations of the World Bank are borne in mind. In addition, 
despite measures taken by the world Bank to improve its own good 
governance, the analysis of the Inspection Panel and the environmental and 
social safeguard policies review suggested that further efforts should be taken 
towards participation and transparency. Taking a multi-level governance 
approach, suggestions were provided that could improve the coordination of 
actors as well as adherence to the principles of good governance. Given the 
range of actors already connected with the operations of the World Bank, 
including States, local communities (in the sense that they are often the most 
affected by the World Bank as well as the complaints mechanisms open to 
them) and civil society (e.g. through naming and shaming the World Bank, 
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and working with affected communities), a multi-level governance approach 
provides a promising framework for improving the Bank’s impact on human 
rights. As Section 10.3.2 discussed, this would require a strengthening of the 
current tools available to the Bank, and more empowerment of individuals 
whose human rights are affected by the Bank. It would ultimately require the 
World Bank to take a human rights-based approach, the biggest obstacle to 






Non-State armed groups, international 
human rights law and multi-level 
governance 
 
11.1 Preliminary remarks  
Non-international armed conflicts give rise to many dilemmas concerning the 
applicable laws, effective governance of different actors involved, how to 
ensure the protection of human rights, and how to protect civilians and 
societies from the devastating impact of war (to name a few). The ongoing 
non-international armed conflict in Syria, for example, has been described as 
causing the ‘biggest humanitarian emergency in our era’.1 The combination 
of a repressive regime, armed opposition groups and terrorist activities has 
left the country in a constant state of instability and chaos for several years. 
Millions of people have been forced to flee the country and/or live in abject 
conditions, without access to basic living supplies such as food, water and 
shelter. The enduring grapple for power between the Islamic State and the 
Syrian government exacerbates the already dire situation and prevailing 
humanitarian crisis.  
This chapter will critically assess the way in which international law 
addresses the actions of non-State armed groups (NSAGs) during non-
international armed conflicts (Section 11.2). As such, the analysis considers 
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how international humanitarian, criminal and human rights law apply to 
NSAGs during non-international armed conflicts. Once the applicability of 
human rights law more generally has been established, the chapter focuses 
on those human rights particularly at stake during humanitarian crises – 
‘subsistence rights’ falling within the category of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The analysis will show that while the rights are applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts, the current legal framework and initiatives 
adopted to encourage NSAGs to respect human rights struggle to provide 
adequate protection for individuals facing such strife (Section 11.3). The 
chapter then goes on to apply the multi-level human rights governance 
approach suggested in Chapter 9 to the context of NSAGs (Section 11.4). 
Finally, the chapter will evaluate the potential role of a new measure, 
ceasefire agreements, as part of a multi-level governance approach to human 
rights in the context of NSAGs and humanitarian crises.  
11.2 The law applicable to non-State armed groups during non-
international armed conflicts  
11.2.1 International humanitarian law 
The laws applicable to armed conflicts are extremely well rehearsed,2 and 
will be only briefly laid out here. The following section will focus on non-
international armed conflicts taking place between a State and at least one 
non-State armed group. The term ‘non-State armed group’ shall refer to a 
definition suggested by Geneva Call. It shall therefore include ‘any armed 
group, distinct from and not operating under the control of, the state or states 
in which it carries out military operations, and which has political, religious, 
and/or military objectives’.3 
                                                 
2 Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (1st edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2010); Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta, The Oxford Handbook 
of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2014); Katherine Fortin, The 
Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2017). 
3 Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca and Stuart Casey-Maslen, ‘International Law and Armed Non-
State Actors in Afghanistan’ (2011) 93(881) International Review of the Red Cross 47. As it 
is a non-governmental organisation, the definition of Geneva Call is not contained in a legally 
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The corpus of international humanitarian law applicable during non-
international armed conflicts is somewhat limited compared to that applicable 
during international armed conflicts. In the early days of international law, 
the lack of development of was perhaps due to a general understanding that 
because of its domestic nature, internal warfare fell within the scope of a 
State’s national jurisdiction and did not need not be regulated 
internationally.4 Although some customary international law pertaining to 
non-international armed conflicts existed (relating particularly to the 
recognition of belligerency), State practice on the matter rapidly declined.5 
However, the prevalence of non-international armed conflicts grew and their 
transnational effects became more evident (e.g. the influx of refugees and/or 
a ‘spill-over’ of hostilities to neighbouring States).6 Realisation grew that 
parties most affected by conflicts (i.e. civilians) were in need of protection 
regardless of the nature of the conflict, and accordingly the mid-20th century 
brought a greater acceptance of the application of humanitarian norms to non-
international armed conflicts. Nonetheless, despite efforts of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to encourage the application in practice 
(having adopted a resolution on the matter in 19387), progress was stopped 
short by the breakout of World War II. It was therefore not until 1949, after 
a rejection of the ICRC’s attempts to have the totality of international 
humanitarian law extended to cover non-international armed conflicts, that 
the somewhat restrictive Common Article 3 to the universally binding 
Geneva Conventions was adopted.8 The non-international armed conflict-
                                                 
binding document. However, it is very influential, given the vast experience and work of the 
organisation in the field of non-international armed conflicts and in relation to NSAGs. 
4 Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2002) 2. 
5 Lindsay Moir, ‘The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in 
Non-International Armed Conflicts to 1949’ (1998) 47(2) The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 337, 352. 
6 Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (n 4) 2. 
7 Moir, ‘The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts to 1949’ (n 5) 337, 354. 
8 Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford University Press 1997) 82-833. ‘Universal’ 
is used here in the sense that each member state of the UN has ratified the Geneva 




specific Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
was later hastily adopted in 1977,9 after further disagreements between States 
as to the extent to which their internal affairs should be opened to external 
scrutiny.10 
The standards contained in these instruments apply to both State and 
non-State parties to non-international armed conflicts. However, a high 
threshold must be met for Additional Protocol II to be applicable.11 This 
means that in many situations, only Common Article 3 providing minimal 
protections would apply, as the provision automatically applies upon the 
classification of a situation as a non-international armed conflict. By now, 
however, this body of law has matured, with a more expansive corpus of 
customary international humanitarian law applying to non-international 
armed conflicts.12 Notwithstanding criticism of this customary law, its 
application to NSAGs has been more broadly accepted than the application 
of treaty-based rules.13 
 In addition, the assertion that some rules of international armed 
conflicts are also applicable in non-international armed conflicts is becoming 
more commonplace;14 until the 1990s, developing the rules of non-
                                                 
and Commentaries – Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols, and Their 
Commentaries’ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp> 
accessed 29 September 2017. 
9 ICRC, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 
1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (Additional Protocol II). 
10 Best (n 8) 346-347. 
11 Article 1, para 1 APII requires that (alongside the existence of an armed conflict within the 
territory of a High Contracting Party) non-State parties to a non-international armed conflict 
have ‘responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them 
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.’ 
12 Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 102. 
13 Bellal, Giacca and Casey-Maslen (n 3) 56. 
14 Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute, ‘Harmonizing Standards for Armed 
Conflict’ <http://www.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-
institute/counterterrorism/harmonizing-standards-armed-conflict> accessed 29 September 
2017 cited in Sarah Cleveland, ‘Harmonizing Standards in Armed Conflict’ EJIL: Talk! (8 
September 2014) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/harmonizing-standards-in-armed-conflict/> 
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international armed conflicts beyond those provided for by Geneva law was 
‘never seriously entertained’.15 However, with the majority of armed 
conflicts currently occurring worldwide being non-international in nature,16 
the developments are now a welcome opportunity to mitigate the human 
suffering caused by armed conflicts, and thwart concerns regarding the 
deregulation of non-international armed conflicts.17  
 These developments nonetheless raise several conceptual concerns, 
perhaps the most notable relating to the legitimacy of applying treaty 
standards to NSAGs, which have not ratified the relevant treaties or 
contributed to the formation of customary law. At the international level, in 
the absence of an elected world government, the legitimacy of obligations 
stems originally from the sovereign equality of States and the fact that they 
bind only themselves through the creation and adoption of international 
norms.18 The source of legitimacy for the imposition of direct obligations on 
non-State actors at the international level without their participation therefore 
raises some questions, as mentioned in Chapter 3.2.1. Justifications proffered 
range from the ‘doctrine of legislative jurisdiction’19 to the analogy of 
                                                 
accessed 29 September 2017. 
15 Sivakumaran (n 12) 55. 
16 See the list of inter-State vs intra-State armed conflicts on the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, ‘Armed Conflict Database’ (2014) 
<https://acd.iiss.org/en/conflicts?tags=CF582C41FE1847CF828694D51DE80C08> 
accessed 29 September 2017. 
17 Whether or not the rules are effective is another question, which falls outside of the scope 
of this study. 
18 While State sovereignty was certainly the source of legitimacy for international law under 
the traditional Westphalian system, a ‘legitimacy crisis’ has since emerged, as ‘the system of 
legitimation at the international level has not kept pace with perceived changes in the 
operation or location of political authority.’ See Helen Keller, ‘Codes of Conduct and their 
Implementation: the Question of Legitimacy’ in Rudiger Wolfrum and Volker Roeben (eds), 
Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008) 257-258, citing Steven Bernstein, ‘The 
Elusive Basis of Legitimacy in Global Governance: Three Conceptions’ in Steven Bernstein, 
‘The Elusive Basis of Legitimacy in Global Governance: Three Conceptions’ (2004) Institute 
on Globalization and the Human Condition, Working Paper GHC 04/2 
<http://globalization.mcmaster.ca/research/publications/working-papers/2004/ighc-wps_04-
2_bernstein.pdf> accessed 9 October 2017. 




individual criminal responsibility.20 Perhaps the most persuasive justification 
is the argument that some procedural requirements of legitimacy need not be 
followed in relation to norms preventing heinous conduct. As discussed in 
Chapter 3.2.1, it has been argued that if the expected result of the obligations’ 
implementation is of paramount importance, it may negate the necessity of 
the norms being adopted with the consent of affected parties.21 Cedric 
Ryngaert asserts that in the absence of participation by a non-State actor, if a 
‘legal norm or its implementation has in itself an important substantive 
value’, participation is not necessary.22 Arguably, in the case of international 
humanitarian law that was extended to non-international armed conflicts 
primarily for the purpose of protecting civilians, this argument rings true. 
Indeed, ‘it has now become uncontroversial [...] that [NSAGs] are bound by 
international humanitarian law’.23 
Now that the law applicable during non-international armed conflicts 
is in a more (though by no means fully) developed state, the primary issue to 
be addressed is how to ensure that NSAGs comply with the relevant norms 
and close the gap between law and practice during non-international armed 
conflicts. Aligning the practice of NSAGs with the legal standards is an 
extremely challenging task. On the one hand, NSAGs may not be aware of 
the existence or meaning of humanitarian norms, and may lack the 
institutional structure to ensure compliance of their own fighters.24 
                                                 
may impose the obligations upon its nationals, including those who take up arms against the 
State or other nationals. See Jann K Kleffner, ‘The Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups’ (2011) 93(882) International Review of the 
Red Cross 443, 445; see also Clapham and Gaeta (n 2) 778. 
20 I.e. the argument that because individuals can be held responsible under international 
criminal law for war crimes, which consist of grave breaches of humanitarian law, they must 
therefore be obliged to comply with humanitarian law. See Kleffner (n 19) 449-451. 
21 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy 
of International Law’ in Math Noormann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor 
Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Routledge 2010) 73. 
22 ibid 71. 
23 Bellal, Giacca and Casey-Maslen (n 3) 56. 
24 Cedric Ryngaert and Anneleen Van de Meulebroucke, ‘Enhancing and enforcing 
compliance with international humanitarian law by non-state armed groups: an enquiry into 
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Alternatively, a NSAG may be unwilling to engage with the notion that it has 
legal obligations under humanitarian law.25 Even those NSAGs willing to 
abide by the laws may encounter an array of obstacles in implementing 
them.26 Whatever the reason for non-compliance, the negative effect is 
always felt by civilians. It is for this reason that organisations such as the 
ICRC have engaged with NSAGs, offering them education, practical training, 
and the opportunity to adopt unilateral declarations or enter into agreements 
with other parties to a conflict.27 Nonetheless, as Cedric Ryngaert and Van 
der Meulebroucke note, unlike for States, there is no formal advisory service 
available to NSAGs struggling to comply.28 
Notwithstanding the difficulties faced in ensuring NSAGs’ 
compliance with humanitarian law, their violation of international 
humanitarian law applicable to them may allow individuals belonging to a 
NSAG to be held responsible under international criminal law. This will be 
briefly explained in the following section. 
11.2.2 International criminal law 
Under Article 5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute), the Court has the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the crime 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of 
aggression.29 If found guilty, the individual (whether affiliated with a State 
                                                 
some mechanisms’ (2012) 16(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 443, 456-457. 
25 ICRC, ‘Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts’ (2008) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0923.pdf> accessed 
9 October 2017. 
26 E.g. knowing how to translate the legal text into operational policies, or determining the 
correct scope and content of obligations. 
27 See Section 11.3 for an in-depth discussion of declarations and agreements adopted by 
NSAGs. For a brief overview of the activities that the ICRC undertakes to engage with 
NSAGs, see ICRC, ‘Building Respect for Humanitarian Action and IHL among “other” 
Weapon Bearers’ (29 October 2010) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/building-
respect-ihl/dialogue-weapon-bearers/other-weapons-bearers/overview-icrc-other-weapon-
bearers.htm> accessed 13 October 2017. 
28 Ryngaert and Van de Meulebroucke (n 24) 457. 
29 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 




or not) will be held individually (criminally) responsible for their actions; a 
rare occurrence in the international sphere. The jurisprudence of the ICC to 
date shows no inclination of the institution to shy away from finding such 
responsibility, as can be seen from the Lubanga case,30 particularly relevant 
to this study given that the defendant in the case was Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
President of the rebel group ‘Union des Patriotes Congolais’. Lubanga was 
accused of ‘enlisting and conscripting of children under the age of fifteen 
years into the armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities’, which are classed as a war crime by the Rome Statute.31  
 The Lubanga case is significant in a general sense because it 
emphasises the heinousness of Lubanga’s actions in using child soldiers by 
making his conduct as a private individual the subject of scrutiny in the 
international arena, and demonstrates a willingness on behalf of the 
international community to hold private actors to count for their conduct. The 
Lubanga case is particularly significant in the present context because 
although it constitutes international criminal law jurisprudence, the fact that 
the defendant was found guilty for this crime could if it were possible to take 
action against him directly under international human rights law, support a 
complaint that he had also violated Article 38 Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and Article 4 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (Optional Protocol 
CRC).32  
11.2.3 International human rights law  
The extent to which NSAGs, as non-State actors, are bound by international 
human rights law has already been dealt with to a large extent by previous 
chapters of this book and will be briefly summarised here. In Chapter 3, the 
                                                 
30 International Criminal Court, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case 
of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012). 
31 Article (8)(2)(b)(xxvi) Rome Statute. 
32 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (adopted 25 May 2000, entered into force 12 February 2002). 
Article 4 would only be relevant, however, to those children between the ages of 15 and 18 
which would not be captured by Article 38. 
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applicability of jus cogens norms to NSAGs was discussed, as some 
international bodies have held the actors to be bound by ‘human rights 
obligations constituting peremptory international law’.33 As explained in 
Chapter 3, this is bolstered by international criminal law, some provisions of 
which have attained jus cogens status. However, as was also noted in relation 
to the World Bank, the range of jus cogens human rights obligations remains 
narrow, and does not include many of the rights that NSAGs have a great 
impact on.  
 Chapter 4.5 discussed the relevance of the Optional Protocol to the 
CRC on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict to NSAGs, and 
Chapters 5 and 8 showed that the harmful actions of NSAGs vis-à-vis human 
rights have been dealt with by some of the United Nations human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies. The analyses found that there are currently no direct 
obligations for NSAGs, although they are mentioned in Article 4 of the 
Optional Protocol. In addition, the prohibition of the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers by NSAGs in Article 4 does not fall within the scope of any 
monitoring or enforcement mechanisms, which ‘inevitably will hinder’ its 
effectiveness.34 This is particularly true in relation to NSAGs, which unlike 
States are not subject to external monitoring mechanisms (e.g. the Human 
Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review35).  
 The most significant application of indirect horizontal effect in 
relation to NSAGs was found in Chapters 5 and 8 to be categorical indirect 
                                                 
33 ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic’, A/HRC/19/69, para 106, cited in Geneva Academy, ‘Human Rights Obligations 
of Armed Non-State Actors: An Exploration of the Practice of the UN human Rights Council’ 
(2016) Academy In-Brief No. 7, 22 <www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-
files/InBrief7_web.pdf> accessed 6 November 2017. 
34 S Abraham, ‘Child Soldiers and the Capacity of the Optional Protocol to Protect Children 
in Conflict’ (2003) Human Rights Brief 10(3) 15, 17. 
35 The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a UN Charter-based system that involves peer 
review by States on a periodic basis, with each Member State of the UN having their human 
rights record reviewed within each ‘cycle’ of the system. See Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Universal Periodic Review’ 





horizontal effect, according to which non-State actors are re-categorised as 
State actors because they carry out certain public functions. Diagonal indirect 
horizontal effect (based on States’ obligation to protect human rights)36 
becomes difficult to uphold in situations where a NSAG operates outside of 
State control; as explained in previous chapters of this book, while States are 
expected to protect individuals’ human rights from interference by third 
parties, this obligation is one of conduct, not result.37 This means that if a 
State has taken all reasonable measures to protect human rights but 
nevertheless fails to do so, it has still fulfilled its obligation to protect (thereby 
discounting the possibility of an individual relying on diagonal indirect 
horizontal effect).38 This may not be a problem in itself, but becomes more 
problematic in light of the lack of direct horizontal effect for NSAGs. An 
illustrative example is that of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. The non-international armed conflict 
between the FARC and the State took place over a period of more than 50 
years, finally coming to an end in November 2016 when a peace accord 
between the parties was ratified.39 Before the end of the conflict, many 
concerns were raised regarding the effect of the conflict on human rights. In 
                                                 
36 See Chapter 8.3.1. 
37 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions’ (2005), 61 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training12en.pdf> accessed 18 August 
2017. 
38 See Chapters 3 and 8. 
39 The peace process for this conflict was fraught with tension. The parties finally successfully 
ended the four year-long negotiations in August 2016 when a peace agreement between the 
FARC and the Colombian government was reached. However, a referendum on whether the 
agreement should be ratified by Congress narrowly failed to gain enough support. This led to 
further negotiations, and the final agreement was ratified by the Colombian houses of 
Congress on 29-30 November 2016. See ‘Colombia’s Government Formally Ratifies Revised 
Farc Peace Deal’ The Guardian (1 December 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/01/colombias-government-formally-ratifies-
revised-farc-peace-deal> accessed 9 October 2017. For a full discussion of the peace process 
and ongoing issues with implementation of the agreement, see e.g. ‘Colombia Peace – 
Monitoring Progress in Peace Dialogues’ <http://colombiapeace.org/> accessed 9 October 
2017; and FARC-EP International, ‘Timeline’ <https://www.farc-epeace.org/peace-
process/timeline.html> accessed 9 October 2017. 
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the year 2000, the FARC gained effective control over a large area of 
Colombian territory, making it extremely difficult for Colombia to fulfil its 
obligation to protect in that area (see Section 11.3.1).  
The UN Human Rights Council nonetheless expressed concern at the 
lack of the Colombian State’s inquiry and investigation into crimes 
committed by demobilised individuals from the FARC against women and 
children, in particular for what concerned the recruitment of child soldiers.40 
Such lack of inquiry and investigation would presumably fail to comply with 
the State’s obligation under Article 4(2) of the Optional Protocol CRC to 
‘take all feasible measures’ to ensure that the relevant norms are respected.41 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights emphasised the 
importance of the obligation to investigate and punish actions by non-State 
actors in its assessment of whether Colombia had acted with due diligence in 
relation to FARC activity, but ultimately stated that ‘in situations of civil 
strife the State cannot always prevent, much less be held responsible for, the 
harm to individuals and destruction of private property occasioned by the 
hostile acts of its armed opponents.’42 This appears to place a lower (albeit 
more realistic) burden on States than the ECtHR. In the case of Ilascu and 
Others v Moldova and Russia the ECtHR was called upon to question the 
responsibility of Moldova for harm that occurred in an area of its territory 
over which it no longer had effective control.43 The Court opined that ‘States 
retain the obligation to use all means and resources available to them to 
guarantee human rights’44 and upheld Moldova’s responsibility. While 
encouraging States to make efforts to guarantee human rights throughout its 
                                                 
40 UN Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, ‘National 
Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(a) of the Annex to Human Rights Council 
Resolution 5/1: Colombia’ (2008) A/HRC/WG.6/3/COL/1, para 57. 
41 Article 4(2) Optional Protocol CRC. 
42 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, ‘Third 
Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia’ (1999) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Chapter IV 
para 4, discussed in Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(Oxford University Press 2006) 422. 
43 Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App No. 48787/99 (8 July 2004). 




territory regardless of situations of conflict is laudable, finding the State to 
have violated its obligations in areas where it is no longer capable of securing 
human rights is questionable. Although the approach of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights may appear to be too soft-handed, the much 
more heavy-handed approach of the ECtHR has been questioned, not least by 
dissenting judges.45 
Ultimately, whichever view is taken could result in a gap in human 
rights protection. Even if a State were to use all means and resources available 
to try to secure human rights in areas controlled by NSAGs, it may not be 
possible. Additionally, and unfortunately, the vast majority of previous cases 
upholding indirect horizontal effect at the international level have been in 
relation to civil and political rights.46 Until recently, it was not possible to 
bring an individual complaint in relation to rights contained in the ICESCR.47 
The entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant now allows for 
this possibility, but it remains to be seen how the UN CteeESCR will deal 
with such situations.48 These factors all culminate in a gap in effective legal 
protection of subsistence rights during armed conflicts. While some NSAGs 
take it upon themselves to provide public services and to essentially fulfil 
                                                 
45 ibid Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Nicolas Bratza. 
46 See Chapter 5. 
47 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted by General Assembly Resolution 63/117 (10 December 2008) A/RES/63/117. 
Although the Covenants were adopted at the same time, unlike the ICCPR the ICESCR was 
not accompanied by an Optional Protocol providing the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights with a mandate and jurisdiction to hear individual complaints against states 
for alleged violations of human rights obligations. Despite this fact, there have been some 
possibilities of bringing complaints directly in relation to economic, social and cultural rights 
prior to the Optional Protocol to ICESCR. E.g. under the Additional Protocol to the European 
Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints (adopted 9 November 1995, 
entered into force 1 July 1998) ETS No. 158; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 
21 ILM 58; and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights (adopted 10 June 1998, 
entered into force 25 January 2005). The African Charter and the Protocol have now been 
merged together by the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, 1 July 2008. 
48 The Protocol entered into force on 5 May 2013. See also Chapter 5.3.2. 
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some human rights on a de facto basis, there exists a legal lacuna. A 
correlative of this is an inequality in human rights protection. Victims living 
in an area controlled by the State may still be able to receive redress for their 
human rights violations by bringing a complaint directly against the State. 
For those living in NSAG-controlled areas, depending on the situation on the 
ground and the efforts that States have made in securing human rights 
enjoyment despite the control of the NSAG, this may not be possible. 
Individuals suffering the effects of severe humanitarian crises may therefore 
be left with no way of accessing essential materials. Despite laudable efforts 
by humanitarian aid organisations to deliver materials to those in need, and 
the humanitarian norms prohibiting the restriction of their access to areas in 
need of essential materials,49 some areas remain rife with crisis. For these 
reasons, more measures need to be taken to try to achieve a rounder, more 
comprehensive protection of human rights. 
The situation under international human rights law contrasts with that 
under international humanitarian law, which contains the fundamental 
principle of equality of obligations.50 This means that all parties to a conflict 
                                                 
49 The ICRC has identified the main customary international law rule as requiring parties to a 
conflict to ‘[...] allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for 
civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse 
distinction, subject to their right of control.’ Basic norms regarding access to and protection 
foodstuffs, healthcare and humanitarian personnel in relation to non-international armed 
conflict can be found in Article 3(2) Geneva Conventions; Articles 9, 11 and 18 Additional 
Protocol II. A full explanation of the norms in non-international armed conflict has been 
written by the ICRC. See International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Customary IHL Rule 
55: Access for Humanitarian Relief to Civilians in Need’ <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule55> accessed 2 October 2017. 
50 This is often referred to as ‘the principle of equality of belligerents’ and is reflected in 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which refers to ‘each party’ to a conflict, as 
well as Article 1(1) Additional Protocol II. Ezequiel Heffes, ‘Generating Respect for 
International Humanitarian Law: The Establishment of Courts by Organized Non-State 
Armed Groups in Light of the Principle of Equality of Belligerents’ (2015) 18 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 181. The principle has long been considered a central 
principle of international humanitarian law, although some scholars have called for it to be 
renounced. See Elihu Lauterpacht, ‘The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War’ (1953) 
30 British Yearbook of International Law 206, cited in Sivakumaran (n 12) 242; Marco 




owe the same obligations and hold the same rights ‘irrespective of the 
“justness” of the cause’, even during non-international armed conflicts.51 
Consequently, civilians belonging to both sides of the conflict are in theory 
equally protected from the effects of the conflict. However, as mentioned 
above, the developments in the range of laws applicable during non-
international armed conflicts remains limited in comparison with 
international armed conflicts. The limited scope of the norms renders the 
equality of obligations during non-international armed conflicts less 
meaningful, particularly in situations where the high threshold for the 
application of Additional Protocol II is not met. Indeed, the equality of 
obligations in non-international armed conflicts was seemingly a response to 
the need to ensure equal protection for civilians during internal as well as 
international conflicts rather than to recognise NSAGs as bodies competent 
of discharging obligations.  
In this respect, it is possible to compare the application of 
humanitarian law to NSAGs with that of human rights norms to some extent. 
States have shown a reluctance to impose direct obligations on non-State 
actors under both spheres of law, resulting in the (deliberate) gaps in the 
obligations of State vs non-State actors. With respect to both legal fields, the 
primary reason for this is the prevailing State-centric, Westphalian approach 
to international relations. States are still considered to be the primary subjects 
of international law; sovereign entities endowed with the power and 
responsibility of managing their internal affairs (including the regulation of 
non-State actors52). This is reflected, for example, in the fact that only States 
                                                 
international humanitarian law really be equal?’ (2011) 93 (882) International Review of the 
Red Cross 425; and René Provost, ‘The move to substantive equality in international 
humanitarian law: a rejoinder to Marco Sassòli and Yuval Shany’ (2011) 93 (882) 
International Review of the Red Cross 437. 
51 Sivakumaran (n 12) 242-246. 
52 As Robert Kolb explains, States are considered the ‘principal subjects of international law’ 
because they have the ‘largest spectrum of rights and duties’ necessary for an entity to have 
international legal personality. See Robert Kolb, Theory of International Law (Bloomsbury 
Publishing 2016). The regulation of non-State actors by States for what concerns human 
rights has been discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 8 of the present book, as an obligation to do 
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may be party to international human rights law treaties and the Geneva 
Conventions (including Additional Protocol II). Changes in the prevalence 
and power of NSAGs are highlighting the insufficiency of this paradigm for 
dealing with situations of humanitarian crisis during non-international armed 
conflicts. Interestingly, some level of equality has been transposed into the 
younger field of international criminal law, which, as already shown, allows 
for individuals to be held individually criminally responsible at the 
international level for certain crimes.53 Many international crimes pertain to 
conduct during armed conflicts, in particular those ‘grave breaches’ of 
humanitarian law that amount to war crimes, some of which concern human 
rights principles.54 Nonetheless, the norms involved do not relate to 
‘subsistence rights’ (discussed below, Section 11.2.3.3), the enjoyment of 
which is particularly impaired during humanitarian crises, rendering the 
value of international criminal law as a deterrent less valuable in this context. 
Consequently, the current gap in both humanitarian and human rights law 
makes it difficult to govern the actions of NSAGs effectively.   
11.2.3.1 The legitimacy of direct human rights obligations for non-
State armed groups 
As Christa Rottensteiner has noted, ‘the primary responsibility for meeting 
the needs of the civilian population in an armed conflict rests with the warring 
parties that are in effective control of the territory on which that population 
lives’.55 This could lead to the conclusion that direct human rights obligations 
                                                 
so has repeatedly been found to fall within the ambit of States’ obligation to protect human 
rights. See for discussion Daniel Augenstein and Lukasz Dziedzic, ‘State Obligations to 
Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ European University Institute Working Papers LAW 2017/15. 
53 The principle of individual criminal responsibility, bringing individuals within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, can be found in Article 25 Rome Statute. 
54 Examples of war crimes that also concern human rights standards include: torture, extensive 
destruction or appropriation of property, willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other 
protected person of the rights of a fair and regular trial and unlawful deportation. See Article 
2(a) Rome Statute. 
55 Christa Rottensteiner, ‘The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime under 




should be imposed on NSAGs in the future, which, as seen Chapter 3.2.1, 
may cause problems of legitimacy. However, the comments made in this 
respect in the context of direct obligations of NSAGs under international 
humanitarian law may also apply to (some) obligations under international 
human rights law, at least to the extent that the obligations overlap or build 
upon those found in humanitarian law. 
 There may also be fewer concerns of legitimacy of direct obligations 
when a NSAG has effective control over a territory of land. This is because 
the NSAG will often be acting (at least in part) as a governmental body within 
the territory, particularly when providing public services. If this is the case, 
the NSAG could be described as a ‘quasi-public’ entity (as in the case of 
Sadiq Shek Elmi v Australia).56 According to the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility,57 if this occurs, the 
NSAG (or ‘insurrectional movement’) that completely replaces a government 
will naturally assume all governmental obligations (including those 
emanating from the human rights treaties which the previous government had 
ratified).58 Significantly, these groups will also be answerable for any 
violations committed prior to their entry into government, the rationale being 
that to allow these groups to evade responsibility for earlier conduct would 
be ‘anomalous’.59 The distinction between holding such a NSAG responsible 
as opposed to one which has not achieved its ultimate goal of replacing the 
State is extremely important for reasons of transparency, and indeed 
legitimacy.60 
                                                 
56 Sadiq Shek Elmi v Australia v Australia (120/1998) UN Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (25 
May 1999), see Chapter 5.5.2. As well as having an impact on the legitimacy of direct human 
rights obligations for such NSAGs, the fact that they are operating as quasi-public entities 
opens the door (at least in theory) to the application of categorical indirect horizontal effect 
(see Chapter 8.3.2). 
57 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (2001) Vol. II Part Two Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission II Part Two (as corrected) A/56/10 (DASR), Article 10. 
58 See ibid 50, on Article 10 and commentary. 
59 ibid. 
60 While some NSAGs do aim to ultimately replace the sitting government, it is important to 
note that this is not the goal of all NSAGs. 
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Nonetheless, the legitimacy of direct human rights obligations for 
non-State armed groups does face some challenges. In terms of procedural 
legitimacy, it can be difficult to negotiate with and secure the consent of the 
groups in the drafting of obligations. Previous attempts to conclude 
agreements with NSAG as to their observance of both international 
humanitarian and international human rights law have had erratic success.61 
However, groups may be more willing to abide by human rights obligations 
if they are the result of a collaborative process between themselves and the 
State, preferably with a degree of supervision by the United Nations (as was 
the case with the aforementioned Human Rights Accord). To be perceived as 
legitimate by the NSAG, the process of placing obligations upon them must 
be transparent and open to negotiation. Given the already strained 
relationship between the State and the NSAG, with deep-rooted mistrust 
between the two, this transparency is of the utmost importance. Ensuring 
participation and transparency in efforts to increase the human rights 
protection of individuals during non-international armed conflicts is also 
crucial under the multi-level governance approach suggested in Chapter 9, 
which should adhere to the principles of good governance. 
On the other hand, it should not be the case that individuals under the 
control of a NSAG suffer from gross human rights violations because the 
NSAG is not willing to commit to human rights obligations. For this reason, 
substantive legitimacy may justify the legitimacy of the imposition of (some) 
direct human rights obligations on NSAGs without their consent. This could 
extend to the range of gross human rights violations considered to be 
international crimes (as defined in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court62). The effectiveness of such human rights obligations, given 
the continued abuse of them under international criminal law, is yet another 
challenge to be addressed, but falls outside of the scope of this chapter. 
                                                 
61 See e.g. June S Beittel, ‘Peace Talks in Colombia’ (31 March 2015) Congressional Research 
Service Report <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42982.pdf> accessed 29 September 2017. 




11.2.3.2 The doctrine of lex specialis and non-international armed 
conflicts 
The rhetoric pertaining to the application of international human rights law 
to armed conflicts was initially somewhat divergent. A major focus of this 
debate has revolved around the doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali 
(lex specialis), which many believe to render the application of human rights 
during armed conflicts inappropriate.63 As the literature engaging with this 
debate is extremely extensive, this section will present a summary of the 
doctrine and its consequences within the context of this chapter. The doctrine 
mandates that more precise and specialised law is to take precedence over 
more general laws. Reluctance to apply international human rights law during 
armed conflicts was also due to the differing natures and ‘roots’ of 
humanitarian and human rights law,64 as discussed in Chapter 2.2. To 
summarise, international humanitarian law seeks to diminish the devastating 
human cost of conflicts and to ensure a fairer fight,65 whereas international 
human rights law seeks to offer individuals certain standards of living as well 
as protection from potentially abusive actions by States.66 Furthermore, 
international human rights law imposes obligations on the State for the 
benefit of individuals, resulting in an inherently vertical relationship between 
obligation-holders and beneficiaries (or rights-holder). In contrast, as 
explained above, many humanitarian obligations are owed by all parties to 
the conflict, which essentially act as mutual beneficiaries (assuming that all 
parties comply with their obligations). 
                                                 
63 See e.g. William A Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation 
of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum’ 
(2007) 40(2) Israel Law Review 592, 594. 
64 Solis (n 2) 24. 
65 Asser Institute (2014) What is international humanitarian law? 
<http://www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?site_id=9&level1=13336&level2=13374&level3=1347> 
accessed 2 December 2014. This is evidenced by the core principle of distinction, allowing 
only the targeting of ‘military objectives’, but allowing any such classified individual to be 
killed at any time during the conflict, even when not directly participating. See Article 13(1) 
Additional Protocol II; Solis (n 2) 251-257. 
66 Whether the killing on sight of an enemy soldier would be classified as an ‘arbitrary’ 
execution falls outside the scope of the present study. 
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In more recent years, the international community has increasingly 
accepted the view of the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Territory that during armed conflicts 
international humanitarian norms and international human rights norms may 
apply simultaneously, in a complementary manner.67 It may be said, 
therefore, that the doctrine of lex specialis serves more to determine the 
precise rules to apply to a particular situation, rather than precluding the 
application of one body of law. This view is supported by Marko Milanović, 
who has highlighted that understanding the doctrine as being generally 
applicable to the human rights and humanitarian regimes as a whole, is 
mistaken.68 Following Heike Kreiger, Milanović’s suggestion is to assess 
which rule constitutes the lex specialis by looking at the relationship between 
specific norms, rather than regimes as a whole.69 The present study also 
departs from this starting point, understanding the lex specialis during 
situations of humanitarian crisis as being human rights law.  
11.2.3.3 The application of economic, social and cultural rights 
during non-international armed conflict 
Having established that international human rights law as such may be 
applicable during non-international armed conflicts, the following section 
will address the application of economic, social and cultural rights. The rights 
usually forming the subject of debates concerning the lex specialis during 
armed conflicts are civil and political rights, such as the right to life and the 
prohibition of torture. This is perhaps due to the existence of concrete norms 
in humanitarian law which also provide rules on the use of torture and the 
                                                 
67 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) 2004 ICJ Rep 136, para 106. 
68 Marko Milanović, ‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights 
Law’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 98-101. 
69 Heike Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11(2) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 265, 271, cited in Milanović, ‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, 




taking of life,70 although they differ from human rights law. However, the 
rights affected (and applicable) during armed conflicts are not limited to those 
whose subject matter is also dealt with by norms under humanitarian law. 
When non-international armed conflicts cause humanitarian crises that result 
in heavily reduced access to materials and services essential to a life of 
dignity, often referred to as ‘subsistence rights’ (such as healthcare, food, and 
water and sanitation), economic, social and cultural rights are of the utmost 
relevance.   
It may well be argued that in relation to the provision of food and 
water during armed conflicts, international human rights law constitutes the 
lex specialis. As implied above, deciphering which norm/s form the lex 
specialis in a given circumstance will require an examination of which norms 
are the most developed. In the present context of subsistence rights, human 
rights law has not only been given more content than the relevant 
humanitarian law norms, but also provides (in theory) more extensive 
protection of access to essential materials and services. 
For example, international humanitarian law rules do prohibit the use 
of starvation as a method of warfare and the targeting of essential resources 
(being classed as civilian objects),71 thereby providing limited protection of 
materials. The rules on access to humanitarian aid are more developed for 
international armed conflicts. For non-international armed conflicts, 
however, the applicable treaty rules do not explicitly refer to humanitarian 
aid.72 Regardless, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs has 
                                                 
70 For example, Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions provides for an absolute 
prohibition of torture, of which non-observance is considered a grave breach of international 
humanitarian law. See, e.g. Article 130 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War. 
71 This is pursuant to the customary humanitarian rule that prohibits ‘attacking, destroying, 
removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population’ 
(see ICRC, ‘Customary IHL - Rule 54: Attacks against Objects Indispensable to the Survival 
of the Civilian Population’ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule54> accessed 9 October 2017). 
72 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed 
Conflict Handbook on the Normative Framework Version 1.0’ (2011), 25-26 
<https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/Menschenrechtehu
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interpreted Common Article 3 to include a principle that civilian populations 
may not be intentionally subjected to situations that would, due to a lack of 
access to essential supplies, threaten their dignity or result in ‘serious mental 
or physical suffering’.73 However, these rules are constructed as ‘negative’ 
obligations – prohibitions of certain conduct requiring parties to refrain from 
interfering with access to essential supplies. While the same obligations can 
be found under economic, social and cultural rights, human rights law goes 
further, requiring States parties to not only respect the rights, but also protect 
and fulfil the rights by providing the means and/or substance for the right to 
be effectively realised.74  
In addition, the rule in Common Article 3 relating to the lack of access 
to essential supplies is not buttressed by a wider range of provisions 
applicable during non-international armed conflicts. Indeed, humanitarian 
assistance (i.e. the provision of food, water and healthcare) as such is scarcely 
regulated during non-international armed conflicts, which may raise a 
presumption that human rights law constitutes the lex specialis. Provisions 
regulating humanitarian assistance during international armed conflicts can 
be found in (for example) Article 23 Geneva Convention IV and Article 70 
Additional Protocol I.75 However, other provisions relating to humanitarian 
assistance during non-international armed conflicts are limited to Article 18 
                                                 
manitaerePolitikundMigration/Humanitarian-access-in-situations-of-armed-conflict-
Handbook-on-the-Normative-Framework_en.pdf> accessed 9 October 2017. 
73 ibid 26. 
74 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton 
University Press 1980) 260; UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘Final Report of Asbjørn Eide, 
Special Rapporteur for the Right to Adequate Food: The Human Right to Adequate Food and 
Freedom from Hunger’ (1987) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23. The obligation to fulfil forms part of 
the tripartite typology of obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, deriving from 
constructions by Henry Shue and Asbjørn Eide as a way of giving content to economic, social 
and cultural rights. See also Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, 
Materials, Commentary (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2010) 242. 
75 ICRC, ‘Q&A and lexicon on humanitarian access’ (2014) 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/humanitarian-access-icrc-q-




Additional Protocol II. The second paragraph of this article provides for the 
undertaking of humanitarian ‘relief actions’ (with the consent of the 
concerned State party) in the event that the ‘civilian population is suffering 
undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival’. The 
very vagueness of this protection, extending to ‘foodstuffs and medical 
supplies’ suggests that the much more embellished human rights law would 
offer more protection for subsistence rights than humanitarian law. It may be 
argued that the Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict 
2006 (the Manual) provides further detail in this respect.76 The Manual is a 
restatement of the law applicable during non-international armed conflicts, 
though like the ICRC codifications of law, it is not legally binding. Chapter 
5 of the Manual states that ‘humanitarian assistance should be allowed and 
facilitated by those engaged in military operations whenever essential needs 
in an emergency are not being met’ and provides more information on the 
definition of humanitarian assistance. The Manual still refrains from placing 
positive obligations on parties to the conflict to ensure that the essential needs 
are, in fact, met. Taken together with the lack of more detailed information 
on what constitutes essential foodstuffs etc., this contributed to the argument 
that the lex specialis in the present context is human rights law. 
Despite the general applicability of economic, social and cultural 
rights in times of armed conflict, there are measures which States may take 
to restrict the scope of their obligations. These consist primarily of 
derogations and limitations of the rights. However, further support for the 
argument that human rights law constitutes the lex specialis in relation to a 
humanitarian crisis caused by a non-international armed conflict may be 
found in the non-limitation and non-derogability of subsistence rights in such 
a situation; as Amrei Müller has suggested, the legitimacy of invoking these 
methods during an armed conflict to limit the applicability of subsistence 
                                                 
76 Michael N Schmitt, Charles HB Garraway and Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Manual on the Law 
of Non- International Armed Conflict With Commentary’ (2006) (San Remo Manual) 
<http://www.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Manual-on-the-Law-of-NIAC.pdf> 
accessed 9 October 2017. 
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rights is questionable.77  
11.2.3.3.1 Legitimate limitations of economic, social and cultural 
rights 
Legitimate limitations to economic, social and cultural rights are allowed 
under Article 4 of the ICESCR for the promotion of the general welfare in a 
democratic society, provided that they are not contrary to the nature of the 
right.78 This sole reason justifying limitations is more restrictive than the 
several reasons found in the ICCPR.79 Article 19 ICCPR on freedom of 
expression, for example, allows limitations for several reasons, including the 
respect of the rights or reputation of others, the promotion of national security 
or public order, or of public health or morals. Müller has persuasively argued 
that this reason effectively means that States may not limit the ‘minimum 
core’ of economic, social and cultural rights, since they would go against the 
nature of the rights.80 In addition to these requirements, limitations to 
economic, social and cultural rights must be prescribed by law, proportionate 
to the aim pursued, and necessary in a democratic society. Furthermore, as 
the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state, ‘[Article 4] was not meant to 
introduce limitations on rights affecting the subsistence [...] of the person.’81 
                                                 
77 Amrei Müller applies the criteria for limitations and derogations to economic, social and 
cultural rights to be found legitimate to situations of armed conflict, and finds them to be met 
in very restricted circumstances: Amrei Muller, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9(4) Human Rights Law Review 557. 
78 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS, vol. 993, 3. Legitimate limitations on human 
rights were discussed in Chapter 3.3.2. 
79 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976) UNTS vol. 999, 171. 
80 Müller (n 77) 575. The concept of a minimum core of human rights was introduced by the 
CteeESCR, and stipulate a minimum standard, or ‘floor’ of fulfilment of rights which no state 
party may fall below, regardless of the allowance in Article 2(1) of ‘progressive realisation’ 
of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR. See UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 3: The 
Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (Art.2, Para. 1, of the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) 
E/1991/23, para 10; see also Chapter 11.2.3.3.3, below. 




Taken together with the nature of subsistence rights as providing for the basic 
necessities required for human existence and dignity, it can therefore be 
inferred that limitations on subsistence rights would not be considered 
legitimate.   
11.2.3.3.2 Derogations from economic, social and cultural rights 
The question of whether State parties may derogate from economic, social 
and cultural rights in times of public emergency has been a matter of much 
debate. Derogating from a right essentially allows States to put their 
obligations on hold for a specified period of time. As derogating is an extreme 
measure, whether or not a particular right may be derogated from, and under 
which circumstances, is usually laid down in the text of a human rights treaty. 
However, this is not the case for the ICESCR, which neither contains a 
derogation clause allowing for derogations, nor a provision prohibiting 
derogations. This is unlike the ICCPR, Article 4 of which specifies the 
conditions for derogations from its provisions, and prohibits derogations 
from several rights.82 Nonetheless, the fact that there is no derogation clause 
in the ICESCR does not necessarily mean that States would be precluded 
from derogating from them  
However, it can be inferred from the purpose of derogation clauses 
that at least some economic, social and cultural rights are non-derogable. 
According to Müller, this would extend to subsistence rights.83 The purpose 
of derogations is not to allow States to decrease their attention to the rights, 
but (following the criteria of Article 4 ICCPR) must be to ensure that the 
State is in a position where it is capable of ensuring human rights and to 
restore a situation of normalcy.84 This is evident from the requirement that a 
State be in a ‘time of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation’ 
                                                 
Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations at Geneva addressed to the Centre for 
Human Rights’ (8 January 1987) E/CN.4/1987/17, 47 (Limburg Principles). 
82 Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 ICCPR, respectively. 
83 Müller (n 77) 593. 
84 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (article 4)’ 
(31 August 2001) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para 1. 
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before it may make derogations. Whilst it may be true that non-international 
armed conflicts may cause such a situation of public emergency, it cannot 
reasonably be expected that derogating from rights such as the right to food, 
water and healthcare, could help to restore the State to a situation of 
normalcy. On the contrary, reducing access to essential resources would 
aggravate, rather than ameliorate, a situation of public emergency.  
Allan Rosas and Monika Sandvik-Nylund have also suggested that 
the relationship between subsistence rights and the right to life can contribute 
to the argument in favour of the non-derogability of subsistence rights.85 
Subsistence rights are of the utmost importance for the protection of human 
dignity and survival in emergency situations, and are interrelated with the 
right to life – a non-derogable right (to the extent that a life may not be 
arbitrarily taken).86 This view is supported by several human rights bodies 
which, lacking jurisdiction over (or the justiciability of) economic, social and 
cultural rights, have interpreted the right to life to include subsistence rights. 
For example, the IACtHR has repeatedly read the right to life (protected by 
Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights),87 to include 
healthcare as one of its essential attributes.88 This reading is now ‘solidly 
part’ of the Court’s jurisprudence, having been embellished upon in several 
cases.89  
                                                 
85 Allan Rosas and Monika Sandvik-Nylund, ‘Armed Conflicts’ in Allan Rosas, Catarina 
Krause and Asbjørn Eide (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2001) 414. 
86 See Müller (n 77) 599. 
87 American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San Jose” (adopted 22 November 1969, 
entered into force 18 July 1978). 
88 See The “Children’s Rehabilitation Institute” v Paraguay, IACHR (Ser. C) No. 112 (2 
September 2004). 
89 E.g. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay Interpretation of the Judgment on 
Merits and Reparation, IACHR (Ser. C) No. 142 (6 February 2006), discussed in Tara J 
Melish, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge 




11.2.3.3.3 The nature of economic, social and cultural rights 
Whether or not the manner of using the right to life in this way is found to be 
persuasive for present purposes, the fact that Article 2(1) ICESCR allows 
economic, social and cultural rights to be progressively realised is also of 
relevance here.90 The provision means that whilst some immediate measures 
have to be taken by States to contribute to the realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights, their full realisation is not an immediate obligation. States 
must, however, make continuous and progressive measures to increase the 
realisation of the rights, depending on their available resources. While it may 
be argued that a State has less resources available during armed conflicts, 
which would naturally lead to a lesser degree of the rights’ realisation, the 
UN CteeESCR has introduced a concept of ‘minimum core obligations’ of 
the Covenant rights.91 Simply speaking, this means that there is a certain floor 
of human rights realisation that States must ensure, regardless of their 
particular domestic situation. In relation to the rights to food, water, and the 
highest attainable standard of health, which have been given more content 
through the CteeESCR’s General Comment Nos. 12, 15 and 14 
respectively,92 the minimum core would arguably provide more protection of 
subsistence rights than the norms under humanitarian law, despite their 
progressive nature. 
In addition, the CteeESCR has suggested that the notion of 
progressive realisation makes it extremely cumbersome for States to justify 
any retrogressive measures.93 The extent to which this would also hold true 
                                                 
90 Article 2(1) requires States to ‘take steps [...] to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means’. 
91 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 3’ (n 80) para 10. 
92 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the 
Covenant)’ (12 May 1999) E/C.12/1999/5; UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The 
Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant)’ (20 January 2003) E/C.12/2002/11; and 
UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2000) E/C.12/2000/4. 
93 The Committee stated that any retrogressive measures would ‘require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available 
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during armed conflicts, during which time resources may need to be 
redistributed, is unclear. However, it may be deduced that at least the 
minimum core of subsistence rights may not be derogated from, even during 
situations of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. This 
conclusion is particularly significant when viewed in light of the below 
discussion on the absence of human rights obligations for NSAGs. If 
subsistence rights were derogable, it would mean that the obligations on the 
State and NSAGs would be more equal, and would provide some level of 
justification for the fact that individuals’ rights were not being realised.  
 Overall, the above discussion demonstrates that the more elaborate 
standards relating to the provision of food, water and healthcare found within 
international human rights law makes these norms, rather than those found in 
humanitarian law, the lex specialis in the present context. This finding is 
strengthened by the conclusion that subsistence rights are non-derogable and 
may not be limited during non-international armed conflicts. Unfortunately, 
while this affords perhaps more protection to individuals within territory 
controlled by a State, it leaves individuals in areas controlled by NSAGs (as 
non-human rights obligations-holders) without human rights protection. 
Efforts to use human rights standards to remedy the gap in protection through 
the indirect application of human rights obligations to NSAGs will now be 
assessed. 
11.3 Initiatives in place to improve non-State armed groups’ compliance 
with international human rights standards 
There have been numerous methods used to reduce the human cost of non-
international armed conflicts, many of which also aim to more effectively 
govern the actions of NSAGs. The measures range from reports condemning 
the actions of the groups, to voluntary undertakings by NSAGs promising to 
adhere to particular international norms. Although the scope of the measures’ 
contents also varies, the (potential) effect of each measure on the protection 
of human rights makes each example discussed below relevant to the present 
                                                 




context. Several previous initiatives will now be assessed to determine the 
likelihood of similar approaches being able to improve the protection of 
subsistence rights during situations of humanitarian crisis. 
11.3.1 Voluntary undertakings by non-State armed groups 
NSAGs with effective control over an area of territory sometimes voluntarily 
undertake activities that have the de facto effect of contributing to the 
realisation of human rights obligations, whether the group itself views its 
actions in this way or not.94 Such activities range from the provision of some 
public services, such as water, education or healthcare, to the instatement of 
an internal justice system. NSAGs often undertake the activities in 
furtherance of their ultimate goal of either taking complete control over a 
territory and becoming the new governmental authority, or establishing a 
separate, smaller State within the territory of the State with which they are in 
a conflict. We can see examples of both of these instances if we look at the 
so-called Islamic State and the FARC, respectively. The mission of the 
Islamic State is to take control over a very large territory within the Levant, 
including Iraq and Syria.95 Within a relatively short period of time, the group 
gained effective control over an area of Syrian territory, establishing a 
‘capital’ known as Raqqa.96 Although the Islamic State has now lost control 
over this area,97 whilst in control, the group established what was essentially 
a State-like structure.98 This involved the group re-securing the provision of 
                                                 
94 This is very similar to the situations in some of the cases discussed in Chapter 5 involving 
the provision of public services by private companies, which contributed to the fulfilment of 
human rights. 
95 Australian National Security, ‘Australian National Security Database on Terrorist 
Organisations’ 
<https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/IslamicState.aspx> 
accessed 2 October 2017. 
96 Ben Hubbard, ‘ISIS Tightens Its Grip With Seizure of Air Base in Syria’ The New York 
Times (24 August 2014) <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/world/middleeast/isis-
militants-capture-air-base-from-syrian-government-forces.html> accessed 2 October 2017. 
97 Jason Burke, ‘Rise and fall of Isis: its dream of a caliphate is over, so what now? The 
Guardian (21 October 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-
caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist> accessed 11 January 2018. 
98 Julien Barnes-Dacey, ‘The Islamic State and the Struggle for Control in Syria’ (2 October 
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some public services, for example installing new power lines and setting up 
a ‘suq’ for locals to exchange goods, and reforming the education system.99 
The intentions of the group in doing these were most likely not related to 
human rights concerns. However, it could be argued that by providing the 
public services, the Islamic State did contribute to the provision of various 
human rights to (at least some) individuals within Raqqa, which the Syrian 
State was no longer able to fulfil itself. The humanitarian crisis in Raqqa 
nevertheless continued, as concerns of discrimination in the provision of the 
public services and the inability of the Syrian State (or indeed of third States) 
to exercise control or influence over the non-State armed group made it 
virtually impossible for external actors to improve the situation. 
The situation regarding the FARC is somewhat different. At various 
points during its conflict with the Colombian government, the group has 
controlled several areas of land within Colombia (in 2001, the government 
even conceded 42,000 square kilometres to the FARC, although the group 
did not retain long-term control over the area100). The actions of the FARC 
within such areas have been surprisingly State-like, as the group:  
deliver[s] social services, including health care and education. They 
also practise restorative justice through their revolutionary courts, and 
have implemented agrarian reform by breaking up large ranches and 
turning over smaller plots to landless peasants. They also collect taxes 
from local businesses to fund schools and clinics.101 
                                                 
2014) European Council on Foreign Relations 2 
<http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_islamic_state_and_the_struggle_for_control_i
n_syria325> accessed 2 October 2017. 
99 Aaron Zelin, ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Has a Consumer Protection Office’ The 
Atlantic (13 June 2014) <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-isis-
guide-to-building-an-islamic-state/372769/> accessed 2 October 2017. 
100 Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘FARC: Colombian Militant Group’ 
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/FARC> accessed 15 January 2018. 
101 Garry Leech, ‘Farc Rebel Group in Peace Talks: Is Colombia’s 50-Year War about to 
End?’ The Independent (20 July 2013) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/farc-rebel-group-in-peace-talks-is-




This shows that at least at times, the FARC has controlled a very well 
established, and fully-functioning community. The fact that the FARC has 
provided traditionally public services such as education and healthcare, 
which would normally fall within the remit of States’ obligations to fulfil the 
rights to education and the highest attainable standard of health, suggests that 
the group is capable of fulfilling certain human rights within their controlled 
territory.  
Voluntary undertakings in this manner can contribute to the practical 
realisation of subsistence rights, as many public services entail the provision 
of economic, social and cultural rights. However, the nature of the 
undertakings makes them very hard to regulate and monitor. The lack of a 
concrete agreement or obligation means that the NSAG providing the 
services may choose the extent to which it wishes to provide a particular 
service. This may in turn lead to discrimination in the provision of services.102 
Alternative initiatives that have been taken have therefore been necessary, 
and will be discussed in the following subsections. 
11.3.2 Action Plans and Deeds of Commitment 
There have been several initiatives taken by the United Nations and various 
NGOs to encourage NSAGs to adopt agreements specifying obligations with 
which they agree to comply. Most of the measures focus on humanitarian 
norms, rather than human rights law. This is logical, since NSAGs are subject 
to some humanitarian obligations, but the lack of pressure on groups to 
respect human rights norms distinctly from humanitarian norms could be a 
missed opportunity. Two of the largest initiatives taken to better govern the 
actions of NSAGs are the Security Council action plans and lists of shame 
(within the context of the recruitment and use of child soldiers), and Geneva 
Call’s Deeds of Commitment. Lessons may be learned from these two 
                                                 
102 The provision of services other than healthcare and education by the FARC, such as 
housing, appears to be limited to its members. Indeed, the promise of a better standard of 
living is often cited as an incentive for joining the FARC (e.g. Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs, ‘FARC – Rebels with a Cause?’ (2010) <http://www.coha.org/farc-–-rebels-with-a-
cause/> accessed 2 October 2017). 
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examples as to the likely challenges to securing a human rights-specific 
undertaking by NSAGs. Indeed, experiences with the Action Plans and Deeds 
of Commitment can demonstrate whether a solution to the problem at hand 
(securing NSAGs’ compliance with subsistence rights to alleviate 
humanitarian crises) may be found in these two measures. 
11.3.2.1 United Nations Action Plans 
United Nations Action Plans were introduced after the General Assembly’s 
Special Representative had identified six ‘grave violations’ towards children 
during armed conflict. Together with the lists of shame and various other 
initiatives, the Plans have formed the basis of the Security Council’s action 
in this context.103 This section will introduce the Action Plans and their 
relevance to the issue of non-State armed groups and human rights. The 
outcomes of the Plans will be discussed in Section 11.3.2.3. 
 In 2001 the Security Council adopted a resolution which urged the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to publish a list of all parties to 
armed conflicts who were recruiting or using child soldiers incompatibly with 
applicable obligations under international law, and in relation to situations 
which were, or could have been, on the agenda of the Security Council.104 As 
a consequence, with the intention of ‘naming and shaming’ armed forces, the 
first ‘1379 list’ in 2002 contained 23 groups.105 Further resolutions requested 
the Secretary-General to establish and implement a reporting mechanism on 
the use and recruitment of child soldiers.106   
A further initiative by the Security Council – the ‘Action Plan’ 
                                                 
103 See UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict, ‘Working with the Security Council to Protect Children’ 
<https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/mandate/engagement-of-the-security-council/> 
accessed 2 October 2017. 
104 UN Security Council, Resolution 1379 (2001) S/RES/1379, para 16. 
105 UN Security Council ‘Report of the Secretary General on children and armed conflict’ 
(2002) S/2002/1299, para 5, cited in Rachel Harvey, ‘Children and Armed Conflict: A Guide 
to International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law A Guide to International Humanitarian 
and Human Rights Law’ (2003) International Bureau of Human Rights 29-30. 
106 See UN Security Council, Resolution 1539 (2004) S/RES/1539; and UN Security Council, 




initiative – enables listed groups to have their names removed from the list 
of shame. The concept was developed in Security Council Resolution 1460 
(2003)107 and involves an agreement between the listed group and the 
Security Council. If appropriately implemented, this will result in the 
removal of groups from the ‘list of shame’.108 This is a positive development 
because it allows the NSAG to have some level of negotiation with the United 
Nations, which may prove to be crucial to the ultimate goal of halting their 
use of child soldiers. Rather than affording the groups legitimacy, the lists 
make an example of the groups and place them on the ‘naughty step’. In 
contrast, the action plans allow NSAGs a certain degree of autonomy, almost 
an initiation into the ‘adult’ world of international subjects, enabling their 
participation and giving them a chance to prove themselves, whilst 
maintaining the ‘training wheels’ and the ability of the Security Council to 
reign them in should they fail to honour the agreement.109 Despite the positive 
impact that the action plans can have, they are not able (nor are they intended) 
to have a broader impact on the enjoyment of human rights within an area 
controlled by a NSAG. Therefore, while they can contribute towards the 
governance of the actions of NSAGs, their specificity prohibits them from 
filling the governance gap in a more general manner. Within a multi-level 
governance approach to human rights this is not in itself a negative 
consequence, but it does point to the need to take further action to relieve 
situations of humanitarian crisis. 
11.3.2.2 Geneva Call Deeds of Commitment 
Similar comments can be made in relation to Geneva Call’s Deeds of 
Commitment. This section will introduce the Deeds of Commitment and their 
                                                 
107 UN Security Council, Resolution 1460 (2003) S/RES/1460. 
108 UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed 
Conflict, ‘Identifying Parties to Conflict Who Commit Grave Violations Against Children’ 
(2015) <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/sg-list/> accessed 2 October 2017. 
109 The fact that the groups voluntarily choose and undertake the commitments in the Action 
Plans allows them to assume responsibility for their actions at an international level. This 
brings them one (small) step closer to experiencing the international law-making and 
responsibility of States. 
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relevance to the issue of non-State armed groups and human rights. The 
outcomes of the Deeds will be discussed in Section 11.3.2.3. 
 There are three types of Deeds of Commitment, dealing with anti-
personnel mines, the protection of children from the effects of armed conflict, 
and the prohibition of sexual violence and gender discrimination, 
respectively.110 The Deed relating to the protection of children has been a 
landmark development within the global campaign against child soldiers. The 
Deed is the first international instrument that NSAGs could voluntarily and 
unilaterally sign, and be judged upon their implementation thereof. The 
Deeds have been instrumental in raising awareness and encouraging NSAGs 
to consider the human rights impacts of their actions more concretely. In 
particular, the Deed for the prohibition of sexual violence and gender 
discrimination provides a substantial list of commitments to which the groups 
agree to adhere. These include certain provisions that would also fall under 
international human rights law, such as a prohibition of discrimination 
against women, and equal access to healthcare.111 Additionally, the Deed 
does acknowledge that it is ‘one step or part of a broader commitment’ to 
human rights and humanitarian law.112 Nonetheless, there is no direct 
reference to human rights obligations of NSAGs.  
In contrast, the Deed on the protection of children does mention 
human rights in its main provisions, but restricts commitment to respect for 
the rights to life, human dignity and development.113 It is of course 
                                                 
110 Geneva Call, ‘Deed of Commitment’ (2014) <http://genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-
of-commitment/> accessed 2 October 2017; Geneva Call, ‘Syria: Geneva Call Trained 
Kurdish Authorities and Police Forces on International Humanitarian Norms’ (2014) 
<https://genevacall.org/syria-geneva-call-trained-kurdish-authorities-police-forces-
international-humanitarian-norms/> accessed 2 October 2017. 
111 Geneva Call, ‘Deed Of Commitment Under Geneva Call for the Prohibition Of Sexual 
Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict And Towards the Elimination of Gender 
Discrimination’ (2013) <https://www.genevacall.org/wp-
content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2013/12/DoC-Prohibiting-sexual-violence-and-gender-
discrimination.pdf> accessed 2 October 2017, para 5. 
112 ibid para 9. 
113 Geneva Call, ‘Deed of Commitment Under Geneva Call for the Protection of Children 




understandable that Geneva Call refrained from including a fuller range of 
human rights in the Deed. Given the worries of legitimising NSAGs by 
holding them to the same international obligations as States during armed 
conflicts (which has also contributed to the fact that rules of non-international 
armed conflicts are less expansive than those of international armed 
conflicts),114 concerns that NSAGs do not have the capacity to fulfil human 
rights obligations to the same extent as States and the aim of the Deeds,115 
the focus on humanitarian norms is not misplaced. Nevertheless, as per the 
approach taken by the Inter-American Court (discussed above), which would 
read some economic, social and cultural rights into the right to life, the Deeds 
could be interpreted to impose obligations on NSAGs to contribute to the 
realisation of subsistence rights. But even if the Deeds were to be read as 
such, two main problems ensue. On the one hand, the commitment is to 
‘respect’ the rights, which under international human rights law is an 
obligation to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights. 
Individuals in situations of humanitarian crisis, however, require their rights 
to be fulfilled. To summarise the discussion on this in Chapter 1.3.4, the 
obligation to fulfil requires obligation-holders to i) facilitate the realisation 
of rights by taking ‘positive initiatives to enable the full enjoyment’; and ii) 
provide ‘direct or indirect state services when individuals or groups are 
unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realise the right themselves by 
the means at their disposal’.116 This goes considerably beyond an obligation 
to refrain from taking action, and cannot legitimately be read into a 
commitment to ‘respect’ rights.  
                                                 
content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2013/12/DoC-Protecting-children-in-armed-conflict.pdf> 
accessed 2 October 2017. The fact that these commitments are only mentioned in the 
preamble, rather than the substantive provisions, reduces their potential influence. 
114 Sivakumaran (n 12) 68-77. 
115 Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (n 4) 194, cited in Andrew Clapham, ‘Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 88 International Review 
of the Red Cross 491, 502. 
116 See respectively, UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12’ (n 92) para 15; and UN 
CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (art.13)’ (8 December 1999) 
E/C.12.1999/10, para 6. 
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11.3.2.3 Outcome of the Action Plans and Deeds of Commitment  
As has been indicated, while not unsuccessful, the outcomes of these two 
initiatives have not been as significant as one would have hoped. 
Unfortunately, as the Security Council noted in its Fifth Cross-Cutting 
Report, published in 2013, ‘there has been little movement in getting non-
state actors to agree to action plans’ regarding child soldiers, compared to 
more successful efforts in relation to State forces.117 Furthermore, as of 2011 
less than 15% of NSAGs using child soldiers had agreed to one of the 
aforementioned action plans,118 although in recent years there have been 
some signings of the Action Plans and consequent de-listing of NSAGs.119 
This suggests that the Action Plans are becoming increasingly useful in the 
effort to regulate the actions of NSAGs. The Deeds of Commitment dealing 
with anti-personnel mines in particular have received a significant number of 
signatures, while the other two Deeds have received much fewer.120 There is 
no mechanism comparable to the removal of groups from the list of shame in 
relation to Deeds of Commitment. Nevertheless, Geneva Call has been 
extremely active in following up on the Deeds. For example, they have 
provided training for some NSAGs on how they can put their commitments 
                                                 
117 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Report Cross-Cutting Report on Children and 
Armed Conflict’ (2012) Security Council Report No. 3 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/cross_cutting_report_cac_2012.pdf> accessed 2 October 2017. 
118 See Watchlist on Children in Armed Conflict, ‘Next Steps to Protect Children in Armed 
Conflict’ (2011) <http://watchlist.org/publications/next-steps-to-protect-children-in-armed-
conflict-june-2011/> accessed 2 October 2017, in Jérémie Labbeé and Reno Meyer, 
‘Engaging Nonstate Armed Groups on the Protection of Children: Towards Strategic 
Complementarity’, International Peace Institute Issue Brief 
<https://www.ipinst.org/2012/04/engaging-nonstate-armed-groups-on-the-protection-of-
children-towards-strategic-complementarity> accessed 2 October 2017, 6. 
119 So far, 26 groups have signed action plans (15 of which were NSAGs) with 9 having been 
de-listed (see UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children 
and Armed Conflict, <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/action-plans/> 
accessed 2 October 2017). 
120 For a list of which groups have signed which Deeds, see Geneva Call, ‘Armed Non-State 





into practice (e.g. in Syria),121 and they continue to monitor groups to ensure 
that they are implementing the agreements.122 This is an important step in 
being able to fulfil the Deeds’ goals of holding NSAGs publicly accountable 
for their actions.123 For NSAGs, signing a Deed of Commitment is one step 
towards acknowledging (albeit limited) international responsibility for its 
actions. The Deeds suggest that once engaged, NSAGs are willing and 
capable of taking commitments seriously. If groups are hoping to establish 
themselves as a legitimate authority, it is crucial for them to be seen to make 
a tangible effort to abide by international obligations to which they would be 
bound were they to succeed. This is all the more important in light of the 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
according to which an insurrection group that succeeds in becoming the 
legitimate authority of a State may be held, ex post facto, internationally 
responsible for any breaches of international law that may be attributed to it 
before it came into power.124  
However, notwithstanding great expectations being placed on the 
United Nation’s action to (for example) combat the use of child soldiers by 
NSAGs, reports show that the technique of naming and shaming has not been 
extremely successful. The most recent report of the Secretary-General on 
children and armed conflict reported that there are currently 56 groups in 14 
countries (48 of which were non-State armed groups) that recruit or use child 
soldiers and had not taken measures within the previous year to improve the 
protecting of children (compared with eight groups that did take measures, of 
which only 3 were non-State armed groups).125 A good number of these 
                                                 
121 Geneva Call, ‘Syria: Geneva Call Trained Kurdish Authorities and Police Forces on 
International Humanitarian Norms’ (2014) <https://genevacall.org/syria-geneva-call-trained-
kurdish-authorities-police-forces-international-humanitarian-norms/> accessed 2 October 
2017. 
122 Geneva Call, ‘Armed Non-State Actors’ <https://genevacall.org/how-we-work/armed-
non-state-actors/> accessed 2 October 2017. 
123 Geneva Call, ‘Somalia’ <https://genevacall.org/country-page/somalia/> accessed 2 
October 2017. 
124 DASR (n 57) Article 10. 
125 The lists have been extended to include groups who show ‘patterns of killing or maiming 
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groups have remained on the list for 5 years or more.126  
So far, the Action Plans and Deeds may appear to be of limited value 
for the protection of human rights (and more specifically subsistence rights), 
particularly given their focus on humanitarian norms. However, their 
relevance for the protection of human rights could be increased by extending 
the commitments to cover more detailed human rights abuses.127 Indeed, 
Soliman Santos has envisaged Geneva Call basing Deeds of Commitment on 
human rights in the future.128 This could indeed be useful in terms of 
improving at least some NSAGs’ protection of subsistence rights during 
humanitarian crises. A human rights-specific commitment could include a 
provision that NSAGs participating in an ongoing conflict (or conflicts) agree 
that, should a situation of humanitarian crisis arise, they will fulfil certain 
obligations relating to subsistence rights (i.e. the minimum core). This could 
go some way to rectifying the main problem of using Deeds to alleviate 
humanitarian crises – the lengthy process involved in their adoption and 
implementation. This approach would still require methods capable of 
providing a much more immediate response. Such methods will be discussed 
in the context of a multi-level governance approach in Sections 11.4 and 11.5, 
below. 
                                                 
children’; ‘patterns of committing sexual violence against children’ (both mandated by UN 
Security Council, Resolution 1882 (2009) S/RES/1882); and ‘recurrent attacks or threats of 
attacks on schools and hospitals, as well as on protected persons in relation to schools and 
hospitals’ (UN Security Council, Resolution 1998 (2011) S/RES/1998). The list is available 
within the UN Security Council/General Assembly, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on 
Children and Armed Conflict’ (24 August 2017) A/72/361–S/2017/821. See also UN Office 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
‘Action Plans with Armed Forces and Armed Groups’ (2015) 
<https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/action-plans/> accessed 9 October 2017). 
126 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Annual report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy’ (28 June 2012) 
A/HRC/21/38, Annex 1. 
127 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (n 42) 292-293. 
128 Soliman M Santos, ‘Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for Armed Groups: An 
Annotation’, in Geneva Call, ‘Seeking Rebel Accountability: Report of the Geneva Call 
Mission to the MILF in the Philippines, 3-8 April 2002’ (2002), cited in Clapham, Human 




11.3.3 Common Article 3 Special Agreements between States and non-State 
armed groups  
One example of such an agreement is a ‘special agreement’ adopted pursuant 
to Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions. As mentioned above, 
unless Additional Protocol II applies, Common Article 3 is the only treaty 
norm applicable to non-international armed conflict. The provision 
encourages parties to non-international armed conflicts to bring other 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions into force through a special agreement. 
The agreements may state the law that parties are already bound to follow 
(declaratory agreements), or extend their legal obligations (constitutive 
agreements). Special agreements constitute clear commitments by parties to 
a conflict, providing an ‘important basis for follow-up interventions to 
address violations of the law’.129 The agreements can also potentially remedy 
the gap between law and practice that exists in relation to non-international 
armed conflicts, and the application of more extensive norms can ensure 
more equal protection of civilians during international and internal armed 
conflicts. Indeed, practice relating to special agreements shows that most 
agreements adopted involve those humanitarian norms concerning the 
protection of civilians.130 However, for the purposes of protecting subsistence 
                                                 
129 ICRC, ‘Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts’ (2008) 16, 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0923.pdf> accessed 9 October 2017. 
130 This includes those agreements adopted explicitly pursuant to Common Article 3, but also 
those that despite not mentioning the provision, are made to fulfil the same objectives (i.e. to 
‘pu[t] in place additional humanitarian rules between the parties to the conflict’). Andrew 
Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015) 513. Special agreements between NSAGs and 
States that extend the protection of civilians during armed conflict include, for example, the 
‘Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic 
Front of the Philippines’ 
<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/phil8.pdf> accessed 10 October 
2017; and the ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement to Protect Non-Combatant Civilians and Civilian Facilities 
from Military Attack’ (31 March 2002) 
<https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_020331_Agreement%20to%2
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rights during humanitarian crises they are fundamentally limited by their 
restrictive scope of their coverage (i.e. the Geneva Conventions). 
Nonetheless, lessons may be learned from the agreements which have 
arguably been the inspiration for agreements through which NSAGs assume 
both humanitarian and human rights obligations, which will be discussed in 
the following section. 
11.3.4 Human rights agreements 
Other than voluntary international commitments by NSAGs, there have also 
been several examples of human rights agreements between NSAGs and 
States.131 Perhaps the most famous of these is the human rights agreement 
concluded between the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Naçional 
(FMLN) and the government of El Salvador in 1990.132 The ‘Acuerdo de San 
José sobre Derechos Humanos’ included provisions that the NSAGs would 
comply with the same human rights obligations as the El Salvadorian State – 
a significant undertaking. The obligations of the FMLN in relation to 
particular human rights, for example the rights to freedom of association, 
expression and movement, are elaborated upon within the Agreement. 
Although the more specific obligations relate more to civil and political rights 
as opposed to economic, social and cultural rights, the agreement was very 
significant for two reasons. First, in terms of disregarding concerns of States 
that giving NSAGs direct human rights obligations would grant the groups 
                                                 
0Protect%20Non-Combatant%20Civilians%20from%20Military%20Attack.pdf> accessed 
11 January 2018. Both agreements are discussed in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli, 512-513. 
131 Agreements containing human rights provisions are not always labelled as ‘human rights 
agreements’ per se. However, there are several agreements between States and non-State 
armed groups that have been explicitly labelled as human rights (or human rights and 
humanitarian) agreements. Luisa Vierucci, ‘International humanitarian law and human rights 
rules in agreements regulating or terminating an internal armed conflict’ in Robert Kolb and 
Gloria Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward 
Elgar 2013) 417-418. 
132 ‘Acuerdo de San José sobre Derechos Humanos 1990’ A/44/971-S/21541, S/21541. A 
translated version is available on the website of the United States Institute of Peace, ‘Peace 
Agreements: El Salvador’, Peace Agreements Digital Collection 





unwelcome legitimacy,133 and second in the fact that the United Nations 
endorsed and agreed to monitor implementation of the Agreement.134 The 
recognition of the Agreement’s preamble that the FMLN had the capacity to 
fulfil the human rights obligations is also worthy of note, especially given 
widespread opposition to horizontal effect for this reason.135 Nonetheless, the 
agreement may not be as significant as expected in practice, given that, as 
Zegveld notes, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador that was established 
by the UN to monitor the agreements’ implementation ‘made no attempt 
whatsoever to monitor FLMN’s compliance with the human rights standards 
set forth in the agreement’.136 This certainly calls into question the 
effectiveness of the agreement for protecting human rights in practice.    
Another example of a bilateral agreement including human rights 
norms is the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law between the National Democratic Front of 
the Philippines and the Government of the Philippines 1998.137 This 
Agreement included a whole section dedicated to an impressive range of 
human rights to be protected.138 Although a laudable effort and very much a 
                                                 
133 Through consenting to the agreement and acknowledging the fact that the FLMN has the 
capacity to fulfil the obligations. See Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition 
Groups in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2002) 51. This concern is often at 
the forefront of States’ minds in the context of direct horizontal effect. See Anthea Roberts 
and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the 
Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) Yale Journal of International Law 37(1) 
107, 108. 
134 A UN peacekeeping operation called the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 
was established to monitor the agreement’s implementation. Information on ONUSAL is 
available via the United Nations’ Peacekeeping website. See ‘El Salvador - ONUSAL: 
Background’ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusalbackgr2.html> 
accessed 10 October 2017. 
135 Zegveld (n 133). 
136 ibid 51. 
137 ‘Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic 
Front of the Philippines’ . As mentioned above, this agreement can also be considered a 
Common Article 3 agreement, due to the fact that it also incorporates several norms of 
humanitarian law to be applied during the conflict between the two parties. 
138 Part III of the agreement deals with ‘Respect for Human Rights’, including a list of 25 
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positive development in itself, the ensuing peace was not long-lasting, and 
renewed efforts at reconciliation between the parties repeatedly fell 
through.139  
Overall, human rights agreements could be a good avenue for placing 
human rights obligations on NSAGs. However, their effectiveness in practice 
may be limited by lack of monitoring or, if the agreement is made at the end 
of hostilities (i.e. as an alternative to a peace agreement) a resumption of 
armed conflict that effectively renders the agreement void. Especially when 
considered in light of the reluctance of States to acknowledge the validity of 
declarations and agreements of NSAGs, it is clear that additional measures 
are desirable. 
11.4 Multi-level governance, human rights and non-State armed groups  
The multi-level governance approach to human rights explained in Chapter 
9, if implemented well, could provide individuals with more protection for 
their rights from the activities of NSAGs during non-international armed 
conflicts. The following sections apply the multi-level human rights 
governance approach to the context of NSAGs and suggests measures that 
could be taken to move towards the implementation and operationalisation of 
a multi-level governance regime. While this could include direct legal human 
rights obligations for NSAGs, the suggestions below will look beyond this to 
include extra-legal and non-binding measures by different actors to improve 
the human rights impact of NSAGs.  
11.4.1 The role of different actors within a multi-level governance approach 
This section will discuss the role of different actors in relation to non-State 
armed groups and human rights under a multi-level governance approach to 
human rights, and will suggest some measures that could be taken by the 
                                                 
human rights to be included. 
139 For a summarised timeline of the conflict between the Government of the Philippines and 
(amongst other NSAGs) the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, see Tasneem 
Jamal, ‘Philippines-CPP/NPA (1969 – 2017)’ (Project Ploughshares, 2012) 
<http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/philippines-cppnpa-1969-first-combat-deaths/> 




actors to improve human rights compliance by non-State armed groups. 
Suggestions are made in relation to local communities, States, international 
organisations and NGOs, business enterprises, specialised bodies under the 
United Nations, and NSAGs themselves.140 However, they will not be dealt 
with in this chapter as the suggestions made focus on the specific context of 
NSAGs’ impact on human rights during non-international armed conflicts.141 
The suggestions will be made in light of the previous discussion of initiatives 
that have been taken to improve NSAGs’ compliance with human rights and 
                                                 
140 Private military security companies are private businesses that offer military-like services, 
and are often contracted by governments to conduct certain activities during armed conflicts. 
The companies have been highly criticised for the negative impact that they often have on the 
enjoyment of human rights. As with other non-State actors, the companies do not fall within 
the remit of international human rights law and cannot be held directly accountable for 
interfering with human rights. There now exists an ‘International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers’ and the UN Human Rights Council established a working group 
for the development of a legally binding international instrument to regulate the activities of 
private military security companies. However, neither currently offer effective protection for 
individuals’ human rights. See respectively International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers’ (9 November 2010) 
<https://icoca.ch/sites/all/themes/icoca/assets/icoc_english3.pdf> accessed 16 January 2018; 
and UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 15/26, ‘Open-ended intergovernmental working 
group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the 
regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security 
companies’ (7 October 2010) A/HRC/RES/15/26. For discussion, see War on Want, 
‘Mercenaries Unleashed: the brave new world of private military security companies’ 
<http://www.waronwant.org/sites/default/files/Mercenaries%20Unleashed%2C%202016.pd
f> accessed 16 January 2018; Mohamad Ghazi Janabay, The Legal Regime Applicable to 
Private Military and Security Company Personnel in Armed Conflicts (Springer 2016); 
Willem van Genugten, Nicola Jägers and Evgeni Moyakine, ‘Private military and security 
companies, transnational private regulation and public international law: From the public to 
the private and back again?’ in Jernej Letnar Černič and Tara Van Ho (eds), Human Rights 
and Business: Direct Corporate Accountability For Human Rights (Wolf Legal Publisher 
2015); and Nicola Jägers, ‘Regulating the Private Security Industry: Connecting the Public 
and the Private through Transnational Private Regulation’ (2012) 6(1) Human Rights 
International Legal Discourse 56. 
141 While private military security companies are used during such conflicts, they are hired by 
States rather than NSAGs. The main binding international law regarding private military 
companies (often considered to be mercenaries) is the International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, financing and Training of Mercenaries (adopted 4 December 1989, entered 
into force 20 October 2001), which applied only to States.  
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will include activities at the local, national and international levels. 
At the local level, it is members of local communities themselves that 
will best be able to determine the concrete needs on the ground for ensuring 
that individuals can enjoy their subsistence rights once a conflict is ongoing. 
There are many challenges for other actors to successfully undertake 
governance activities during non-international armed conflicts. For example, 
it may be difficult or dangerous simply to gain access to an area in which a 
non-international armed conflict is taking place in order to engage with actors 
there and carry out activities. The information that local communities and 
individuals can provide, which may be communicated through members of 
the local community itself,142 is of vital importance for the media, NGOs that 
are involved in aid relief and (envoys of) international organisations such as 
peacekeeping forces. The knowledge may allow these external actors to 
better understand the situation on the ground and to offer the most appropriate 
aid or supplies to the local community.143 Furthermore, beyond providing 
information to other governance actors, local communities often have the 
closest proximity to humanitarian crises and human rights violations that are 
caused by non-international armed conflicts. Correlatively, members of the 
community and local organisations are often the first actors to offer help and 
aid to those affected.144  
                                                 
142 The conflict in Syria, for example, has seen many pleas for help published on social media 
websites such as Facebook, requesting aid from the international community to improve the 
conditions of the humanitarian crisis. See e.g. Kareem Shaheen, ‘“Save Us”: Aleppo Civilians 
Plead for Help as Airstrikes Resume’ The Guardian (14 December 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/aleppo-civilians-plea-as-airstrikes-
resume-syria> accessed 10 October 2017. 
143 See e.g. ICRC, ‘Humanitarian access in armed conflicts: the key role of local actors’ (18 
September 2017) <https://www.icrc.org/en/event/humanitarian-access-armed-conflicts-key-
role-local-actors> accessed 16 January 2018. 
144 See e.g. Oxfam, ‘How do you deliver lifesaving aid in an armed conflict? Support local 
responders.’ (4 October 2017) <https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/how-do-you-
deliver-lifesaving-aid-in-an-armed-conflict-support-local-responders/> accessed 16 January 
2018; and Oxfam, ‘Missed Out: The role of local actors in the humanitarian response in the 
South Sudan conflict’ (April 2016) 
<https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/rr-missed-out-




Business enterprises may similarly have a role at the local level under 
a multi-level governance approach to human rights (vis-à-vis NSAGs). The 
role of businesses during armed conflicts for what concerns human rights has 
been the subject of much discussion, as they can have both positive and 
negative effects on humanitarian situations.145 The negative effects of 
businesses are caused, for example, by them committing corporate war 
crimes or pillaging local communities and taking much-needed resources 
such as food.146 During non-international armed conflicts in particular, 
businesses may negatively affect human rights by colluding with NSAGs that 
themselves fail to respect human rights standards and aggravate situations of 
humanitarian crisis.147 However, businesses can also function as ‘suppliers 
of commodities and services that are vital to the war effort or indispensable 
to civilian survival’ and increasingly work together with humanitarian 
agencies and NGOs to ameliorate human suffering during armed conflicts.148 
An example of this was seen in Zimbabwe, where national and international 
companies paid their employees with crucial resources such as food and other 
essential items when, due to inflation, national currency was becoming 
almost worthless.149 Under a multi-level governance approach, such 
measures could be taken (depending on the availability of resources) by 
businesses operating during non-international armed conflicts, particularly in 
those areas controlled by NSAGs. The connections between businesses 
operating locally and other humanitarian actors is also crucial to the 
coordination of governance activities, and could be envisaged by partnerships 
                                                 
145 For an interesting discussion of the role of businesses during armed conflicts, see Hugo 
Slim, ‘Business actors in armed conflict: towards a new humanitarian agenda’ (2012) 94(887) 
International Review of the Red Cross 903. See also Institut Català Internacional per la Pau, 
‘Companies in conflict Situations: Building a Research Network on Business, Conflicts and 
Human Rights’ (2013) ICIP Research 01 
<http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/arxius_icip_research/web_-
_icip_research_num_01.pdf> accessed 16 January. 
146 Slim (n 145) 912-913. 
147 See ibid 912. 
148 ibid 913 [emphasis added]. 
149 ibid. 
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between such businesses and humanitarian organisations operating locally.150 
Another measure that could help to coordinate governance activities, 
particularly between the local level and national/international levels, is 
country visits by UN special rapporteurs to areas in which NSAGs are active 
(although not necessarily in which non-international armed conflicts are 
taking place). Notably, country visits involve the rapporteur engaging not 
only with the parties involved in the conflict but also the local populations. 
A relevant example of this is Philip Alston’s country visit to Sri Lanka in 
2005 where he carried out research into the activities of (among others) the 
LTTE (the main NSAG operating in the territory) for what concerned 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.151 Alston’s subsequent report 
included recommendations for improving the impact that the LTTE had on 
human rights, including action that should be taken by various actors, such 
as local police officers, the national government and the LTTE itself. 
 At the national level, States would have an important role under a 
multi-level governance approach to human rights for what concerns NSAGs. 
States should at a minimum be more willing to make agreements, such as 
those discussed in Sections 11.3.3 and 11.3.4 with NSAGs (preferably 
including human rights standards to be respected by both parties) and to 
engage with them meaningfully. One such type of agreement is short-term 
ceasefire agreements, which will be discussed in depth in Section 11.5.  
 At the international level, international organisations or NGOs (or 
indeed more likely the two kinds of actors together) could adopt a set of 
human rights principles for NSAGs to adhere to during non-international 
armed conflicts. A document like this could be akin to the UNGPs152 which 
were drafted by John Ruggie acting as a UN Special Rapporteur, with the 
                                                 
150 For a discussion of how to make businesses part of humanitarian action, see ibid 916-918. 
151 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Addendum to the Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Mission to Sri Lanka (28 November to 6 
December 2005), Philip Alston’ (27 March 2006) E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5. 
152 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 




input of a very large number of stakeholders, but which were subsequently 
endorsed by the UN General Assembly.153 Lessons could be learned from the 
weaknesses of the UNGPs to strengthen such a document for NSAGs. In 
particular, the guidelines could be more forward-looking, including human 
rights responsibilities for NSAGs that have not necessarily already been 
established (the UNGPs were intentionally conservative in that they were 
restricted to what was already accepted by States rather than pushing to 
increase the scope of human rights protection owed by business 
enterprises).154 Such multi-stakeholder initiatives are important under a 
(good) multi-level governance approach as suggested in Chapter 9, as they 
can help to improve coordination between different actors as well as increase 
the participation of different actors in governance activities at the 
international level. 
 More specialised bodies established under the auspices of the UN 
could also have a large role in clarifying the human rights standards to which 
NSAGs should adhere. For example, the UN human rights monitoring bodies 
could adopt a general comment on NSAGs and human rights, similar to that 
adopted by the UN CteeESCR for businesses and human rights discussed in 
Chapter 5.3.1.155 However, as seen in Chapter 5, the bodies have to date been 
restrictive in looking at the responsibilities of entities other than States, 
usually staying within the realm of State obligations. UN Charter-based 
bodies may be better suited to laying down more concrete standards for 
NSAGs and human rights, particularly given the attention that has been paid 
to the subject by special rapporteurs in the past (such as Philip Alston, 
mentioned above).156 
                                                 
153 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 17/4 (2011) A/HRC/RES 7. 
154 John Ruggie explains the reasons behind this in the report that included the UNGPs. See 
UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
John Ruggie’ (21 March 2011) A/HRC/17/31. 
155 UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24: State obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities’ (10 
August 2017) E/C.12/GC/24. 
156 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Addendum to the Report of the Special Rapporteur 
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  International NGOs such as the ICRC and Geneva Call already 
contribute substantially to better human rights protection during non-
international armed conflicts. The ICRC in particular plays a crucial 
governance role vis-à-vis NSAGs. The Geneva Conventions mandate the 
ICRC with activities such as visiting prisoners of war, organising relief 
operations, helping with the reunification of families and conducting a range 
of humanitarian activities during international armed conflicts, while the 
Conventions simply allow the ICRC to do the same in non-international 
armed conflicts.157 However, the ICRC’s activities go beyond this. The 
organisation regularly publishes scholarly articles in the ‘International 
Review of the Red Cross’. Several issues of the publication have focused on 
NSAGs, with an issue in 2011 on ‘Engaging armed groups’ that very 
extensively examined how to better engage with NSAGs to improve their 
compliance with international law – something that the ICRC does in practice 
on a regular basis. Although its main focus is on international humanitarian 
law, the ICRC (as well as Geneva Call) may be uniquely positioned to engage 
with NSAGs on human rights issues as well. Such efforts are crucial in a 
multi-level governance that adheres to good governance principles as it 
would ensure the participation of NSAGs. Effective engagement of NSAGs 
may also contribute to the transparency of a multi-level governance system 
because it may make it easier to encourage or educate NSAGs on how to 
make sure that their decision-making for what concerns human rights (e.g. in 
the provision of certain services) is transparent.158  
                                                 
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Mission to Sri Lanka (28 November to 6 
December 2005), Philip Alston’ (n 151). 
157 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘International Legal 
Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ (2011) 13-14 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf> accessed 11 
October 2017. 
158 For a discussion of the ways in which NGOs and NSAGs often interact, particularly in 
relation to efforts that NGOs make to improve NSAGs’ compliance with international law, 
see United States Institute of Peace, ‘NGOs and Nonstate Armed Actors Improving 
Compliance with International Norms’ (2011) Special Report No. 284 




 NSAGs themselves of course have a central role in a multi-level 
governance approach to human rights in the context of non-international 
armed conflicts. It is crucial that they continue to (for example) sign up to 
(and even more importantly) implement Deeds of Commitment and work 
towards getting themselves removed from the lists of the Security Council. 
NSAGs should also be willing to learn about international human rights law 
and standards, so that they can try to minimise the detrimental effect that this 
will have on human rights, particularly if they do gain effective control over 
part of a State’s territory. This would also require other actors to explain the 
relevant human rights standards to the NSAGs, and perhaps even to gather 
information from the State regarding the implementation of human rights in 
that area – more activities that could be undertaken by NGOs. 
As discussed in Chapters 9 and 10, one of the main challenges to 
applying a multi-level governance approach to human rights is the need for 
cooperation and coordination between different actors and governance 
activities. In the context of NSAGs, this is no different. Cooperation between 
NSAGs and States in a conflict with one another is particularly challenging. 
If a conflict is especially intense, the parties may be unwilling to cooperate 
with one another. This means that the input of external, neutral actors, such 
as other States, could be instrumental.159 In terms of coordination, given the 
number of aid and other non-governmental organisations that research and/or 
comment on the activities of NSAGs (in general as well as relating to human 
rights specifically), it is important to foster open communication between 
them. While many organisations publish reports publicly, increased 
knowledge-exchange and collaboration directly between organisations could 
allow them to respond more quickly to crisis situations, discover new 
challenges and pool resources where relevant. These measures would of 
                                                 
159 This is already seen regularly in the context of ceasefire and peace agreements which are 
often mediated by this parties. For example, the peace agreement reached between the FARC 
and the Colombian government were mediated by Norway and Cuba. See Renata Segura and 
Delphine Mechoulan, ‘Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the 
War’ (2017) <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IPI-Rpt-Made-in-
Havana.pdf> accessed 13 October 2017. 
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course also contribute to enhanced transparency of a multi-level governance 
system. Coordination between activities could also be improved by a greater 
awareness by actors of what other actors are doing to improve the respect of 
human rights by NSAGs, and mainstreaming efforts where possible. 
Ultimately, the ‘cluster approach’ to the multi-level governance of human 
rights that was suggested in Chapter 9 would be a very important tool for 
creating a framework according to which governance and human rights 
activities and responsibilities could be distributed. 
Ultimately, while it is clear that many actors have taken a range of 
measures to improve the human rights impact of NSAGs, the biggest 
challenge appears to be holding NSAGs accountable. The lack of adequate 
follow-up and enforcement of agreements with and undertakings by NSAGs 
makes it very difficult to ensure their accountability; while some of the 
measures discussed above have the potential to increase the accountability of 
NSAGs, it seems that most measures depend on the willingness of groups to 
comply with standards. Outside of the context of international criminal law, 
there is no effective mechanism for coercing NSAGs into complying with 
standards, even if they have voluntarily undertaken to do so. In addition, most 
of the measures that could improve accountability are not concerned with 
human rights specifically, and can only have an impact on the accountability 
of NSAGs for human rights to the extent that standards included in the 
measures overlap with human rights standards. As explained above, this is 
woefully limited in the context of subsistence rights. The next section will 
introduce the idea of including human rights provisions within ceasefire 
agreements to increase accountability of NSAGs and their protection of 
human rights, as part of a multi-level governance approach to human rights.  
11.5 A new measure: human rights provisions within ceasefire 
agreements between States and non-State armed groups 
Chapter 9 introduced the multi-level governance approach suggested by the 
present book. Under such an approach, both legal and extra-legal measures 
are taken to achieve the common goal of protecting human rights. It was 




subsistence rights in particularly) apply during non-international armed 
conflicts, their direct application to NSAGs remains problematic and is by no 
means established under international law. Furthermore, although they are 
certainly of value, the existing measures for encouraging NSAGs to comply 
with human rights standards discussed above face several challenges, for 
example engagement with NSAGs and State recognition of agreements. As 
explained in Chapter 9, it is important to incorporate and strengthen existing 
mechanisms and initiatives into a multi-level governance approach to human 
rights. In light of this, it is suggested that an existing measure that is already 
accepted by States and NSAGs – short-term ceasefire agreements – could be 
used under a multi-level governance approach to human rights. It is proposed 
in this section that such ceasefire agreements could contain human rights 
provisions particularly aimed at improving the protection of subsistence 
rights during humanitarian crises caused by non-international armed 
conflicts. The measure is envisaged as a joint governance activity undertaken 
at the national level between at least two actors (States and NSAGs) who 
would constitute the parties to the agreements.160 In the following sections, 
the nature and content of ceasefire agreements are explained, followed by an 
evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of using ceasefire agreements 
in the manner suggested.  
11.5.1 The nature and content of ceasefire agreements  
The term ‘ceasefire agreement’ refers to an agreement between two parties 
engaged in conflict with each other to end hostilities. Ceasefire agreements 
may take several forms, cover different scopes of content and durability, and 
have different purposes. For example, an agreement may aim to establish 
peace through a complete cessation of hostilities (also referred to as ‘peace 
agreements’). Ceasefire agreements may also be made as a way of 
temporarily ceasing hostilities in order to enable the parties to a conflict to 
negotiate a full peace agreement. Alternatively, a ceasefire agreement may 
                                                 
160 Other actors, such as bodies established by the UN for monitoring a ceasefire agreement, 
may also be involved in the governance activity (see below). 
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be more limited in temporal scope. Such agreements are often adopted for 
humanitarian purposes, to allow civilians temporary relief from hostilities in 
order to get access to essential materials (such as those seen between Hamas 
and Israel).161  
The recommendations of using ceasefire agreements will focus on 
short-term ceasefire agreements, although peace agreements and long-term 
ceasefire agreements could also be used in a similar manner. In the present 
context of mitigating humanitarian crises, short-term ceasefire agreements 
are the most relevant as they may be able to provide more immediate relief 
for affected individuals – peace agreements and long-term ceasefire 
agreements can certainly have a greater impact when successfully 
implemented, but can take many years of negotiation to come to fruition and 
face many challenges in implementation. Indeed, taking the example of the 
Colombian government, various attempts at negotiating a peace agreement 
with the FARC took place over decades, and the final agreement has already 
faced many challenges that have slowed down its implementation.162  
Before evaluating the use of ceasefire agreements under a multi-level 
governance approach to human rights, a brief note must be made regarding 
their legal status. Since the ‘Armed Activities Case’ before the International 
Court of Justice, the status of peace agreements has been in doubt.163 In this 
case, the Court effectively ‘downgraded’ the status of peace agreements from 
legally binding instruments to ‘modus operandi’.164 The reasoning for this 
seems to have been to prevent States from relying on peace agreements to 
                                                 
161 Noting in particular a 72-hour ceasefire agreement adopted between the parties with the 
aid of Egypt, in August 2014. See Jason Burke and Patrick Kingsley, ‘Israel and Hamas Agree 
Egyptian Proposal for 72-Hour Gaza Ceasefire’ The Guardian (10 August 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/10/gaza-israel-hamas-agree-72-hour-
ceasefire-egyptian-proposal> accessed 11 October 2017. 
162 Christopher Vasquez, ‘The Hardest Part Is Yet to Come for Colombia’s Peace Agreement’ 
World Policy Blog (7 March 2017) <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2017/03/07/hardest-
part-yet-come-colombia’s-peace-agreement> accessed 13 October 2017. 
163 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 2005 ICJ Rep 168. 




escape international responsibility for wrongful acts (an argument on which 
Uganda was relying in the case).165 Andrej Lang has argued that the Court’s 
judgment was also based on a reluctance to engage with the issue of the status 
of NSAGs under international law,166 which would be unavoidable, should 
agreements signed by NSAGs constitute a legally binding document. 
However, the legal status of the kinds of ceasefire agreements between States 
and NSAGs focused on in the current chapter remains somewhat 
anomalous.167 Even though many of these agreements do not fall within the 
realm of public international law, it is still possible for NSAGs to conclude 
legally binding agreements with States (for example by ‘including a third 
state party as a guarantor or using a Security Council Resolution’168).  
Ceasefire agreements generally consist of three core elements, which 
provide for: ‘(1) a cessation of hostilities, (2) the separation of forces, and (3) 
the verification, supervision, and monitoring of the agreement’.169 A key 
component to the success of ceasefire agreements is to ‘clearly indicate the 
rights and obligations of the parties’.170 This component is of particular 
relevance here, as it suggests that some level of detail concerning the rights 
and obligations is required. This supports (in light of the above discussion as 
to the relevant les specialis) an argument that human rights norms, rather than 
humanitarian norms should be included in the agreement to improve the 
protection of subsistence rights. The legal status of the agreements proposed 
                                                 
165 Andrej Lang, ‘“Modus Operandi” and the ICJ’s Appraisal of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement in the Armed Activities Case: The Role of Peace Agreements in International 
Conflict Resolution’ (2008) 40 New York University Journal of International Law and Policy 
107, 109.  
166 ibid 125. 
167 See Philipp Kastner, Legal normativity in the resolution of internal armed conflicts 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 13-14. 
168 The Public International Law & Policy Group, ‘The Ceasefire Drafter’s Handbook: An 
Introduction and Template for Negotiators, Mediators, and Stakeholders’ (2013), 7 
<http://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/PILPG-Ceasefire-Drafters-Handbook-Including-Template-
Ceasefire-Agreement.pdf> accessed 11 October 2017. 
169 ibid 1. 
170 ibid 1-2. 
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will therefore depend on the situations of their adoption. 
11.5.2.1 Advantages of using ceasefire agreements as tools for compliance 
under a multi-level governance approach to international human 
rights 
One advantage of using ceasefire agreements, as suggested above, concerns 
the fact that their use is already widely accepted by both States and NSAGs, 
reflected in the prevalence of their adoption.171 In light of the reluctance of 
States to endorse NSAGs’ unilateral declarations or agree to Common Article 
3 Special Agreements (premised on a concern that to do so would ‘grant a 
degree of legitimacy’ upon the group),172 the acceptance by both actors is 
crucial. 
Including human rights obligations in ceasefire agreements that are 
already being negotiated would also be less resource-intensive and faster than 
the adoption of (for example) a new agreement specifically for the protection 
of human rights. In particular, short-term ceasefire agreements may be used 
to place economic, social and cultural (or subsistence) rights obligations on 
NSAGs and States alike in order to provide some relief from situations of 
humanitarian crisis. This could include the provision of public services that 
NSAGs sometimes undertake to provide (as seen in Section 11.3.1) 
including, inter alia, water and housing. The extent of obligations included 
in a cease-fire agreement would depend on the situation on the ground, 
determined by the needs of the local communities affected by the 
humanitarian crises as well as the resources and capacity of NSAGs and 
States to provide the services. In current practice, ceasefire agreements often 
                                                 
171 In relation to the conflict in Myanmar alone, for example, between 2011 and 2014, 
ceasefire agreements were adopted between the government and 14 non-State armed groups. 
Min Zaw Oo, ‘Understanding Myanmar’s Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements’ (2014) 
Swiss Peace 2/2014, 7 
<http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/Catalyzing_Reflectio
ns_2_2014_online.pdf> accessed 11 October 2017. 
172 ICRC, ‘ICRC Q&A and Lexicon on Humanitarian Access’ (17 June 2014) 17 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/humanitarian-access-icrc-q-




include provisions that, although humanitarian in nature, relate to economic, 
social and cultural rights (for example relating to the delivery of aid).173 
Making the human rights aspects of these provisions explicit could be a 
reasonable way of placing more direct human rights obligations on NSAGs 
in a position to contribute to the fulfilment of subsistence rights. This is 
especially true given that there are already some ceasefire agreements that 
include human rights-related provisions and work towards the protection of 
international humanitarian law and humanitarian aid.174 For example, the 
(long-term) agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Communist 
Party of Nepal provides an expansive list of human rights obligations for both 
parties, ranging from the right to life and the prohibition of torture to the right 
to food and the right to health.175 As such, including more context-specific 
and detailed human rights obligations for NSAGs in short-term ceasefire 
agreements would not be an excessive development. Furthermore, using 
short-term ceasefire agreements in this way could lead to more human rights 
agreements, or indeed to long-term ceasefire agreements that contain human 
rights provisions.176  
In addition, the agreements would only affect the specific NSAG 
subject to the agreement. On the one hand, this should mollify State concerns 
that more general human rights agreements for NSAGs would either grant 
them legitimacy or move too far towards treating them as subjects of 
international law (as discussed in Chapter 2 of this book). As such, the 
agreements would not raise concerns regarding changes to the international 
                                                 
173 For example, a local ceasefire agreement adopted in Damascus. See ‘Truce in Damascus 
District Allows in Aid: Monitor’ (12 November 2014) Reuters 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-damascus/truce-in-damascus-district-allows-
in-aid-monitor-idUSKCN0IW0QP20141112> accessed 11 October 2017.  
174 ibid. 
175 ‘Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic 
Front of the Philippines’ (n 130). 
176 The agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal, for 
example, provides an expansive list of human rights obligations for both parties, ranging from 
the right to life and the prohibition of torture to the right to food and the right to health. ibid. 
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legal framework, as would a more general legally binding human rights 
instrument for NSAGs. On the other hand, ceasefire agreements can include 
conflict-specific details. This is crucial when dealing with different groups, 
their mode of operations and the specific challenges faced in trying to 
improve access to subsistence rights in a particular area (especially when 
under the control of a NSAG).  
A further advantage to using ceasefire agreements is the huge 
symbolic value that they would have. From the perspective of NSAGs, they 
could be a way for them to prove that they have both the willingness and 
capacity to act as a State-like entity by fulfilling certain human rights 
standards. Whether or not this is desirable from an objective perspective, the 
group may enhance its reputation both with the individuals over which they 
exercise control, and the international community at large. Ceasefire 
agreements would nevertheless fall short of changing the groups’ status under 
international law, and since NSAGs already conclude ceasefire agreements, 
no developments in the international legal framework would be necessary.  
Furthermore, and of great importance, the agreements could result in 
increased accountability for NSAGs, which is extremely important under the 
multi-level governance approach suggested by this book. Victims would not 
be able to receive the same redress for violations of ceasefire agreements by 
NSAGs as they would against a State under international human rights law 
(i.e. bringing a complaint before a human rights treaty monitoring body or 
court). However, since many ceasefire agreements are monitored by the 
United Nations (which would ideally be the case for the agreements proposed 
here), it may be possible for them to gain some degree of redress. The type 
of redress available would of course depend upon the provisions and 
circumstances under which the agreement is drafted and the extent to which 
the parties would consent to be monitored. The fact that the agreements 
require consent from both parties would, however, increase the legitimacy of 
the obligations placed on the parties.177 Concerns as to the (particularly 
                                                 
177 The argument here is that ‘international norms that affect non-state actors [...] are in need 




procedural) legitimacy178 of direct human rights obligations for NSAGs could 
be mitigated by the inclusion of the NSAG in the drafting process, and 
ultimately by their consent in the adoption of the ceasefire agreement. As 
well as improving transparency and accountability, this may also make 
NSAGs more likely to observe the obligations to which they commit 
themselves. Indeed, the importance of engaging with non-State actors before 
requiring certain behaviour of them has been repeatedly stressed.179 The 
importance of engagement is reflected through the work of Geneva Call, 
which has ‘demonstrate[d] that constructive engagement with [armed non-
State actors] can be effective and can yield tangible benefits for the protection 
of civilians’.180 In the Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict it was further emphasised that ‘[i]mproved 
compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law will 
always remain a distant prospect in the absence of, and absent acceptance of 
the need for, systematic and consistent engagement with non-State armed 
groups’.181 Such engagement between States and NSAGs, which can be 
achieved through the use of short-term ceasefire agreements containing 
human rights provisions, can not only have positive effects on the protection 
of civilians and their human rights, but also constitute a participatory method 
for governing the conduct of NSAGs. As explained in Chapter 9, this is 
crucial to a good, multi-level governance approach to international human 
rights.  
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178 See ibid. 
179 See United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ‘Remarks to the UN Security Council 
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Finally, from the perspectives of States, the agreements may be more 
palatable than the adoption of a more general agreement imposing human 
rights obligations on NSAGs. Indeed, in adopting an agreement they could 
be seen to be fulfilling their own due diligence obligations; adopting an 
agreement with a NSAG which would compel the group to protect human 
rights within the territory they control could be considered a means of 
encouraging NSAGs to respect human rights. In this way, although the idea 
of acknowledging that NSAGs are capable of fulfilling some human rights 
obligations may not be attractive to States, doing so in a way which allows 
the NSAG to be held accountable may actually work in their favour. 
11.5.2.2 Disadvantages of using ceasefire agreements as tools for 
compliance under a multi-level governance approach to 
international human rights 
While the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights obligations in 
ceasefire agreements has many advantages, they unfortunately also have 
some drawbacks. Most of these relate not to the use of the agreements per se, 
but to issues of their adoption and enforcement.  
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage is the fragile nature of ceasefire 
agreements. Practice shows that the rate of violation of ceasefire agreements 
is very high. It is therefore likely that future agreements including human 
rights obligations would also be breached. However, there are techniques 
relating to the drafting and implementation of ceasefire agreements that can 
mitigate these risks. For example, it has been suggested by Nicholas Haysom 
and Julian Hottinger, that drafting provisions within ceasefire agreements as 
precisely as possible (in terms of the obligations and geographical and 
temporal scope) can facilitate effective implementation.182 Effective 
implementation often relies on a monitoring mechanism for a ceasefire 
agreement.183 Unfortunately, such a mechanism would be less amenable for 
                                                 
182 Haysom and Hottinger’s suggestions are made on the basis of both practical experience 
and research into the failings of ceasefire agreements. Nicholas Haysom and Julian Hottinger, 





the short-term ceasefire agreements in question. This constitutes a 
disadvantage of their use related to their short-term nature, which could 
prevent the agreements from having a long-term impact on economic, social 
and cultural rights realisation. Providing a long-term solution is not the 
intention behind the suggestion, however. Instead (and contrary to common 
ideas of seeing economic, social and cultural rights as long-term goals to be 
achieved in the future), one aim of the agreements is to place more focus on 
the potential of economic, social and cultural rights to contribute to solving 
very immediate problems.  
A further disadvantage of the proposal is that although ceasefire 
agreements and peace agreements have been adopted between State and non-
State groups in the past,184 the addition of human rights provisions in the 
agreements may perturb NSAGs. This will of course depend on the individual 
group, their aims and motivation, and how important third-party opinions are 
to them. A group that seeks to establish itself as a new State, for example, 
may be more willing to take on these typically State obligations. This is 
evident from examples such as the National Liberation Front of Algeria and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization.185 Other groups who have an ideology 
less in line with the established global political system (for example those 
that operate outside of the legal regime and effectively disregard the 
international framework in place) may not consider such influences to be 
important.186 In these cases, other initiatives would have to be contemplated. 
However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the proposed idea of including 
some human rights provisions in ceasefire agreements is not envisaged as a 
panacea. Rather, it is intended to supplement and complement existing 
initiatives, forming one part of a multi-faceted governance solution.   
                                                 
184 In Burma, for example, a group of ‘ceasefire groups’ emerged after the signing of several 
agreements between state and NSAGs. See Human Rights Watch, ‘The Recruitment and Use 
of Child Soldiers in Burma’ (2007) 95 <https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/10/31/sold-be-
soldiers/recruitment-and-use-child-soldiers-burma> accessed 11 October 2017. 
185 Noelle Higgins, ‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National 
Liberation’ (2014) <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a132.pdf> accessed 26 January 2018, 24-26. 
186 See Hyeran Jo, Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2015). 
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The potential lack of political will of NSAGs and States alike to adopt 
the kind of ceasefire agreement suggested is a problem faced throughout the 
international human rights system. For example, the will of States to ratify 
human rights treaties (especially relating to economic, social and cultural 
rights) has been a challenge since their inception.187 In particular, moving 
from ratification as a form of lip service to the implementation of concrete 
human rights standards has been a constant challenge. However, the potential 
to have the agreements monitored by the United Nations, or by a different 
external monitoring body (perhaps Geneva Call),188 would prove 
instrumental in ensuring that the obligations are followed.  
11.6 Concluding reflections on non-State armed groups, human rights 
and multi-level governance  
This chapter discussed a prevalent and persistent challenge faced during non-
international armed conflicts – the protection of individuals’ rights vis-à-vis 
NSAGs, particularly during humanitarian crises. The current international 
law framework, including international humanitarian and criminal law as 
well as international human rights law, do not afford individuals consistent 
or comprehensive protection for their human rights. Specifically, although 
human rights more generally and economic, social and cultural rights in 
particular were shown to be applicable during non-international armed 
conflicts, there is very little mention of them even in initiatives that have been 
taken to better regulate the activities of NSAGS during non-international 
armed conflicts. The discussion of initiatives showed that they focus 
predominantly on international humanitarian law, which is understandable 
given the direct application of some humanitarian law rules to NSAGs. 
However, they do little to improve the protection of individuals’ human 
                                                 
187 In relation to economic, social and cultural rights, this is evident in the fact that despite its 
adoption in 1966, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights did not enter into force until 2013 (UN Treaty Collection Database). 
188 Geneva Call’s experience in engaging with NSAGs and monitoring the implementation of 
Deeds of Commitment could prove invaluable in both the drafting and supervision of the 





 To improve the situation, the multi-level governance approach 
suggested in Chapter 9 was applied to the context of NSAGs, bearing in mind 
the good governance principles of transparency, accountability and 
participation. It can be concluded that while multi-level and multi-actor 
activities can already be found in this context, many more governing 
activities need to be taken. In particular, efforts need to be continued to 
engage effectively with NSAGs and to coordinate governance activities in 
the context of non-international armed conflicts and human rights. An 
important change to make would be for actors on the international level (e.g. 
States and international organisations) to better clarify which human rights 
standards constitute the lex specialis during non-international armed conflicts 
and to work towards including them explicitly in future initiatives aimed at 
regulating NSAGs.  
 One particular method that was suggested could be seen as having an 
important place within a multi-level governance approach in the context of 
NSAGs – ceasefire agreements that include human rights provisions. The 
measure builds on existing tools, taking advantage of the fact that they are 
often adopted by States and NSAGs to mitigate the negative effects of 
humanitarian crises during non-international armed conflicts. Ceasefire 
agreements have a great potential to introduce the idea of human rights 




Conclusions and recommendations 
 
1. General remarks  
This study was conducted in response to the growing power and influence 
and (negative) impact of non-State actors in relation to human rights and the 
lack of clarity regarding their position under international human rights law. 
As explained in the introduction to this book, a wide range of non-State actors 
have a direct bearing on the enjoyment of human rights. On many occasions, 
the lack of direct international human rights obligations for non-State actors 
has failed to result in their legal responsibility at the international level. As 
we have learnt through history, major reforms in international law are often 
only made at huge human expense – the current international human rights 
law framework and regime, for example, were established in reaction to the 
atrocities of World War II. Albeit on a different scale, a huge number of 
people are suffering at the hands of non-State actors, becoming victims of 
human rights interference for which they cannot claim redress. However, 
binding international law is still waiting for correlative reforms. 
Various chapters of the present book have shown that actors within 
the existing legal framework are not blind to the impact of non-State actors, 
and various entities have taken action to try to prevent and remedy human 
rights interference by non-State actors, particularly in relation to business 
enterprises. However, the entities are often constrained by their mandates or 
the cases that appear before them (the UN human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies and regional and national courts/commissions) and their competence 
to deliver binding judgments (again, the UN human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies, as well as various NGOs and international organisations). The result, 
as will be explained further below, is insufficient protection of individuals’ 
rights vis-à-vis non-State actors. While there have been steps towards 
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concrete, binding obligations for business enterprises on various levels, there 
is still some way to go before this will yield concrete results for human rights 
protection. In the meantime, and outside of the context of business 
enterprises, individuals will have to rely on other, non-binding measures to 
ensure the protection of their human rights. This book has suggested a new, 
multi-level governance approach to the protection of international human 
rights within which new and pre-existing measures outside of the framework 
of binding international human rights law could together form a 
comprehensive, inclusive and more effective system for the protection of 
human rights.  
 This chapter summarises the findings of this study, highlights the 
study’s contributions, suggests further research that could be undertaken and 
makes final recommendations to a variety of actors. 
2. Conclusions on the nature and scope of international human rights 
obligations 
Part 1 of this book provided the theoretical framework within which the 
remainder of the study was conducted. Accordingly, Chapters 1-3 answered 
the two research questions: ‘What is the nature and scope of international 
human rights law and obligations and have they traditionally allowed space 
for non-State actors?’; and ‘What is the ‘horizontal effect’ of international 
human rights law, and how is it related to the nature of human rights 
obligations?’. The questions were answered with reference to examples from 
the abundance of scholarly works and case law on the issues. Overall, there 
have been considerable developments in the way in which human rights law 
obligations have been classified, as well as in relation to the horizontal effect 
of human rights.  
 In terms of international human rights law obligations, since the 
inception of international human rights law as we know it, crucial 
developments have been made in classifying, breaking down and giving 
content to obligations. The tripartite typology of human rights is largely to 
thank for this. Initially proposed in a more scholarly context, the typology 
has had, and will continue to have, huge practical implications. For example, 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
495 
it enables the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies in particular to give 
further content to human rights obligations, which paves the way for more 
clarity and allows States to better understand what is expected of them under 
the relevant human rights treaties. From the perspective of victims, it also 
makes it easier for them to know for what kind of State behaviour they can 
claim a violation of their rights. The typology was used as a conceptual tool 
throughout the book. From a conceptual point of view, the biggest advantage 
of the typology is probably that it transcends undesirable distinctions and 
hierarchies between different human rights.  
 Despite the developments concerning the classification of human 
rights and their obligations, the scope of who is subject to these obligations 
has not undergone similar expansion. Indeed, the vertical application of 
international human rights law still dominates. There are several reasons why 
the legal framework has not yet expanded to include human rights obligations 
for non-State actors, at the centre of which is State sovereignty. For the most 
part, States remain unwilling to place non-State actors on a level legal playing 
field as themselves by making them full subjects of international law. There 
are also concerns that to do so would legitimise the harmful actions of non-
State actors, or, from scholars’ points of view, that placing direct human rights 
obligations on non-State actors would allow States to hide behind them to 
avoid complying with their own obligations.  
Whatever the reason for the lack of direct international human rights 
obligations for non-State actors (i.e. direct horizontal effect), support for 
them has certainly been growing in recent years. Horizontal effect can be 
described as the direct application of international human rights vis-à-vis a 
non-State actor. This allows victims whose rights have been negatively 
affected by non-State actors to hold them directly accountable – to bring a 
legal complaint against the non-State actor for not complying with human 
rights standards. At the international level, within international human rights 
law, this is not yet possible. However, significant moves towards direct 
horizontal effect have been made, particularly in the context of business and 
human rights (e.g. the drafting of a binding treaty on business and human 
rights). Soft law instruments in this area have also played an important role, 
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with documents such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights having unequivocally established a business responsibility to respect 
human rights. Further moves towards direct horizontal effect have happened 
outside of the human rights law framework at the international level (e.g. in 
private arbitrations) and at the national level through cases and legislation. 
These developments do not invalidate the claim, however, that there is 
currently no direct horizontal effect of international human rights law at the 
international level. The question also remains at the international level 
whether imposing direct human rights obligations on non-State actors would 
be legitimate. At least in relation to some actors and under certain 
circumstances (e.g. after a participatory drafting process), legitimacy should 
not pose an obstacle to achieving direct horizontal effect. 
Under indirect horizontal effect, which has evolved in the absence of 
direct horizontal effect, States are held directly and internationally 
responsible for the conduct of non-State actors that interfere with the 
enjoyment of human rights. Simultaneously, an indirect, international 
obligation to act in a human rights-compliant manner is placed on non-State 
actors. The obligation placed on States often requires them to place direct 
obligations (or at least standards of behaviour) on non-State actors at the 
national level. A central obligation placed on States in this regard is the duty 
of due diligence, which is known in public international law more generally 
as well as having been developed specifically in the context of international 
human rights. The obligation is closely connected to the tripartite typology 
of human rights and actually falls under State’s ‘obligation to protect’. 
Indeed, the typology is more closely connected to non-State actors than may 
initially be expected.  
Several instruments, including the UNGPs and the UN Guiding 
Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights1 uphold the responsibility 
                                                 
1 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ (2012), adopted by the UN Human Rights Council, 
‘Final draft of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights’, submitted by the 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ 
(18 July 2012) A/HRC/21/39. 
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of non-State actors to ‘respect’ human rights. Reference to a responsibility of 
non-State actors to ‘protect’ human rights is less common, and sometimes 
seems to have been fused with their responsibility to respect human rights.2 
A responsibility to fulfil human rights has not yet been proffered at the 
international level, although there appears to be a move towards an obligation 
for States to mobilise the resources of non-State actors in order to comply 
with their own obligation to fulfil, thus recognising the positive practical 
impact that non-State actors can have on the enjoyment of human rights. 
These initial findings concerning the horizontal effect of international human 
rights law were discussed in Chapter 3 and provide an answer to the research 
question: ‘What is the ‘horizontal effect’ of international human rights law, 
and how is it related to the nature of human rights obligations?’. 
3. Conclusions on the horizontal effect of international human rights  
3.1 Findings on the horizontal effect of international human rights 
The theoretical framework established in Part 1 was relied on heavily in the 
remainder of the book, particularly in Chapters 4-8, which addressed the 
research question: To what extent, and how, is the horizontal effect of 
international human rights reflected in international, regional and national 
legislation, jurisprudence and scholarly works? The analyses conducted in 
Chapters 4-8 demonstrated that the movement towards the direct horizontal 
effect of human rights witnessed in Chapter 3 in relation to some non-State 
actors cannot be said to apply across the board. The chapters comprised the 
study’s comparative analysis, which took place on two levels. First, the 
legislation and jurisprudence concerning horizontal effect were compared 
                                                 
2 This is certainly true in relation to the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights, 
which detail the ‘due diligence’ responsibilities of businesses under the responsibility to 
respect human rights (whereas for States this typically falls under the obligation to protect 
human rights). See UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, John Ruggie’ 
(21 March 2011) A/HRC/17/31. 
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across the international, regional and national levels. Second, within these 
levels, comparisons were made between the approaches to horizontal effect 
taken by different human rights adjudicatory bodies. While the examples of 
horizontal effect (whether direct or indirect) within legislation was more 
limited at the international and regional levels, the analyses yielded 
particularly significant results for what concerns the application of horizontal 
effect in jurisprudence on all levels.  
 The findings of the chapters have already been summarised and 
critically discussed in Chapter 8, which identified the three main kinds of 
indirect horizontal effect employed at the international, regional and national 
levels. The first and most common kind was ‘diagonal indirect horizontal 
effect’. We can see, in the vast majority of cases at the international and 
regional level, the State’s positive obligation to protect individuals being 
applied to create indirect international obligations for non-State actors. At the 
international level and within the Inter-American human rights system much 
emphasis has been placed on States’ due diligence obligations. On many 
occasions, States have been held accountable for not having fulfilled certain 
procedural obligations vis-à-vis non-State actors – notably obligations to 
prevent, investigate and punish non-State actors that interfere with the 
enjoyment of human rights. A specific State obligation to regulate non-State 
actors has also developed at the international and regional levels. This 
obligation requires States to regulate certain private entities (for the most 
part, privatised companies or companies providing public services) to ensure 
that they respect human rights. The obligation to regulate (as indeed the 
obligation to protect more generally) could also be considered as an indirect 
obligation for non-State actors to respect human rights.  
 The second kind of indirect horizontal effect found in practice was 
categorical indirect horizontal effect. This has been applied at the 
international and national levels, where in certain limited circumstances, a 
non-State actor can be re-categorised as a State actor for the purposes of 
human rights. Within the United Kingdom where this form of horizontal 
effect is provided for in legislation (Section 6(3)(b) HRA 1998), its 
application in practice has not been very consistent, and has been criticised 
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by scholars. Compared to diagonal indirect horizontal effect, which has at 
least clarified State obligations in relation to non-State actors and human 
rights, categorical indirect horizontal effect as applied in the UK has failed to 
clarify the precise circumstances under which a non-State actor can be 
considered a ‘public authority’ and therefore be held responsible for 
violations of human rights contained in the ECHR. At the international level 
the extreme rarity with which categorical indirect horizontal effect has been 
applied prevents the conclusion being drawn that this is a fully established 
approach at that level.  
 The third type of indirect horizontal effect identified through the 
analyses is ‘value-driven indirect horizontal effect’. This has been used 
almost exclusively at the national level, where the laws being applied are not 
human rights laws per se (as is the case at the international and regional 
levels), but rather private laws that are interpreted so as to be compliant with 
the human rights found in the ECHR. Value-driven indirect horizontal effect 
features regularly in UK common law cases where (for example) existing 
causes of action have been incrementally developed so as to ensure the 
compliance of the common law with the ECHR. The source for this kind of 
horizontal effect is the obligation of domestic courts in the UK not to act in a 
way that is contrary to the ECHR, found in Section 6(3)(a) Human Rights 
Act 1998. Value-driven indirect horizontal effect has been applied with 
regard to various human rights found in the ECHR, with case law regarding 
each right having been developed in a slightly different way. It is also 
possible to see this approach to a limited extent in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR itself.3 
3.2 Problems with the application of horizontal effect in human rights law 
There are several key limitations to indirect horizontal effect and the way in 
which it has been applied in practice. First, the adjudicatory bodies rarely lay 
down clear standards of conduct expected of non-State actors, but 
                                                 
3 See Chapters 6 and 8 discussing the case of Pla and Puncernau v Andorra, App No. 
69498/01 (2004). 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
500 
(understandably, given their mandate and competence) focus solely on the 
conduct expected of States. Whether this means that non-State actors would 
be expected to meet the same standards as States to respect human rights 
remains to be seen. Further, the reasoning of the bodies at the international 
level often leaves the source or basis of diagonal indirect horizontal effect 
unclear, as the treaty bodies have not tended to explain on which sources of 
international law they rely. This is changing though, as more recent general 
comments in particular include references to relevant and varied sources of 
international law.  
To some extent, the lack of a clear legal basis in the reasoning of the 
treaty bodies can also be said of the reasoning of bodies at the regional level. 
The basis of the ECtHR’s ‘positive obligations’ doctrine, for example, has 
been debated by scholars.  
A further point to make here is that the bodies examined rarely engage 
with scholarly discussions. Given that, at least at the national level, scholars 
have been instrumental in identifying types of horizontal effect and 
developing theories thereof, this is quite problematic; together with the lack 
of source, the reasoning of the bodies does not make it clear which approach 
is being taken in a particular case. At the international level, this has led to a 
lack of conceptual clarity. Indeed, although the bodies examined have not 
avoided discussing non-State actors where necessary, they rarely seem to 
have engaged with ‘horizontal effect’ as a concept at all. 
Additional issues of conceptual clarity at the international level derive 
from the fact that the treaty bodies engage with concepts such as attribution, 
but do not make it clear whether they follow the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of the State for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.4 However, at least in the most recent general 
comment of the UN CteeESCR, which directly referenced several provisions 
                                                 
4 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries’ (2001) Vol. II Part Two Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (as corrected) A/56/10 30-143 (DASR). As explained in 
Chapter 4 of the present book, the provisions within the DASR pertaining to attribution are 
considered to have obtained the status of customary international law. 
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of the DASR,5 this does seem as though it might be changing. At the regional 
level while there is also very little, if any direct engagement with horizontal 
effect as such and the discussions of due diligence are less clear than other 
bodies, the ECtHR has developed a clear doctrine of positive obligations 
which includes action that has to be taken by States to protect individuals 
from the harmful conduct of non-State actors. 
Another problem is that although horizontal effect as applied in 
practice does provide some clarity for States, non-State actors and victims, it 
still does not allow victims direct redress against the actor that caused the 
interference with their human rights. It also cannot lead to accountability of 
the State or non-State actor in every case. This is due, for example, to the fact 
that the obligations under diagonal indirect horizontal effect are obligations 
of conduct, not result, meaning that it is the measures taken by States to try 
to protect individuals from non-State actors, rather than successful protection 
itself, that determines whether the obligations have been complied with. 
Moreover, as shown in the analyses, indirect horizontal effect as 
applied by the bodies examined does not cover all non-State actors. This is 
linked to the final, and significant problem with the current application of 
horizontal effect – that the courts and other human rights adjudicatory bodies 
are limited by their mandates and (with the exception of the treaty bodies’ 
general comments) by the kinds of cases that are brought before them. Unless 
a case against a particular actor or regarding a certain issue related to non-
State actors’ impact on human rights is brought before a body, it is not 
possible for them to apply the relevant law horizontally. Although the 
international treaty bodies can choose to address issues that they regard as 
pressing through their general comments, and have indeed used this to 
implicitly consider matters of horizontal effect in the past, they are still 
limited in their work by what would be considered as legitimate within their 
mandates. The treaty bodies are tasked with monitoring the implementation 
                                                 
5 See UN CteeESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24 on State Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities’, 10 
August 2017, E/C.12/GC/24. 
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of specific human rights treaties which, as shown in Chapter 4, contain very 
limited reference (if any) to private actors or to horizontal effect. If the bodies 
were to begin addressing direct human rights responsibilities/obligations for 
non-State actors under the treaties, not only would this be considered to go 
beyond their mandate, but also beyond the limits of treaty interpretation 
allowed for under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.6 
Taken together, the analyses in Chapters 1-8 highlight the limitations 
of the current legal approach to non-State actors and human rights. In short, 
there are significant gaps in human rights protection, in the identification of 
concrete standards of behaviour expected by non-State actors, and in the 
ability of victims to gain redress for interferences with their human rights. 
One of the main contributions of the present study is therefore the critical 
analysis of horizontal effect as applied in practice, as well as the identification 
of the limitations of the current legal approach to human rights and non-State 
actors at the international level. 
It is certainly time to look beyond law not only in an effort to fill the 
gaps in ‘hard’ law, but as a proper approach in itself. In other words, we 
should not view governance approaches and activities as an option to fall 
back on when law does not solve an issue, but start from the opposite 
perspective – one that begins by taking governance approaches, within which 
legal approaches can also be taken. Starting directly and singularly from a 
legal perspective actually has the effect of viewing the issue of non-State 
actors and human rights through blinkers and automatically encourages the 
notion that extra-legal or non-binding activities are second-rate or stop-gap 
options. The approach taken to non-State actors and human rights should be 
much more holistic and inclusive than this.  
4. Conclusions on a multi-level governance approach to non-State 
actors and human rights 
Taking the findings of Chapters 1-8 as a starting point, the book then 
                                                 
6 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) UNTS vol. 1155, 331. 
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addressed the research question: ‘Moving beyond horizontal effect through 
human rights law, how can a governance approach to human rights be 
envisaged?’. 
A governance approach to international human rights was thoroughly 
explained in Chapter 9, which then suggested that a more specific, multi-level 
governance approach that adheres to principles of good governance should 
be taken. 
 Taking a governance, rather than a legal approach to human rights 
allows non-State actors to be placed squarely within the human rights regime. 
As Chapter 9 explained, governance goes ‘beyond government’ and involves 
many activities by non-State actors. The importance of adherence to good 
governance principles throughout a governance system (i.e. in the drafting, 
adoption, implementation and enforcement of standards) was also 
emphasised in Chapter 9. Good governance, which requires transparency, 
accountability and participation, has a very close link with human rights. The 
connections have been highlighted by several international institutions, 
including the UN Human Rights Council, and are particularly visible through 
the lens of human rights-based approaches. Each good governance principle 
can be found in the elements of HRBAs, which can be used by all relevant 
actors as a conceptual framework to ensure good human rights governance 
on all levels. 
There are two core aspects of multi-level governance – the multi-level 
and the governance. The multi-level aspect is quite self-explanatory, and in 
the context of international human rights would apply on four main levels – 
the international, the regional, national and local. The governance aspect of 
the multi-level governance approach suggested follows the definition of 
governance provided in Chapter 9 – it includes both legal and extra-legal 
measures, by State and non-State actors, for the common purpose of 
protecting human rights.  
A quick note must be made on the two types of multi-level 
governance which were discussed in Chapter 9. The distinction between Type 
I and Type II lies in their organisational structure. Type I seems to fit the 
current legal approach, where tasks are delineated clearly between territorial 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
504 
levels. The ‘jurisdictions’ in Type II multi-level governance are more flexible 
and there is no central authority determining how governance tasks are 
allocated to different actors within the system, who can participate on a 
voluntary and ad hoc basis. Within Type II multi-level governance regimes, 
the jurisdictions are task-specific, or content-specific, and are divided on the 
basis of what needs to happen on each level. This means that some actors 
operate on more than one level but within the same topic area. It was argued 
in Chapter 9 that the flexibility of Type II (since intersecting membership 
between jurisdictions is allowed) means that it is a more organic type of 
governance and may be more suited to the ever-changing global environment. 
Indeed, Type II multi-level governance better reflects the current 
international human rights governance regime, although it was seen in 
Chapter 9 that although there are multi-level and multi-actor governance 
activities, measures need to be taken before the regime can be called one of 
‘multi-level governance’ per se. 
In this vein, there are several challenges to following a multi-level 
governance approach and establishing a true multi-level governance regime. 
A particular challenge is coordination, between actors and their activities. 
Some suggestions to improve coordination were provided in Chapters 9, 10 
and 11, and are summarised below (Section 7). Another challenge is the 
allocation of tasks, which in Type II multi-level governance can be 
particularly difficult in order not to duplicate efforts or leave governance 
gaps. In this respect, the principle of subsidiarity, which dictates that the 
lowest competent authority should perform a task, could be helpful. It is also 
possible, of course, for actors to form a network with which to organise and 
even authorise themselves, or for an overarching governing body that exists 
on a certain level to authorise actors to perform certain tasks. The latter option 
would also answer some questions of the legitimacy of multi-level 
governance regimes, although the former could also borrow from 
collaborative governance and transnational network theories. Finally, it is 
helpful to use the work of Hanssen and others, who have identified different 
strengths of coordination. The creation of synergies and communication 
between actors as well as the converging of behaviour of different actors can 
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occur through hierarchical instruments (i.e. by a governing body) or through 
self-regulation. As will be shown in Section 7, measures that could be taken 
to overcome challenges to and of multi-level governance would also ensure 
better adherence to principles of good governance. The measures, taken 
together with those in Chapters 10 and 11, answer the research question: 
‘What kind of measures can be taken under a multi-level governance 
approach to human rights in order to better protect individuals’ rights from 
non-State actors?’.  
5. Conclusions regarding the case studies 
Having suggested that a multi-level governance approach be taken to 
international human rights, Chapters 10 and 11 discussed and applied the 
approach to the context of two specific non-State actors, the World Bank and 
non-State armed groups, respectively. While the suggestions made in the case 
study chapters are specific to the two actors, the findings in Chapter 9 could 
equally be tested and applied to other non-State actors too (see Section 6). 
The conclusions drawn in Chapters 10 and 11 show that although the World 
Bank and non-State armed groups may be very different types of entity, the 
same governance system, if correctly implemented, could help to improve 
their impact on the enjoyment of human rights. 
5.1 The World Bank, international human rights law and multi-level 
governance  
The World Bank is a difficult entity to pin down in terms of human rights 
compliance. The organisation has a clear relationship with human rights and 
has been repeatedly targeted by human rights experts for its lack of real 
engagement with human rights in its policies and operations. This is despite 
the fact that the Bank appears to consider the realisation of human rights to 
be an important factor in the eradication of poverty – the Bank’s ultimate 
goal. However, finding a legal (or indeed extra-legal) way in which to 
establish that the Bank has human rights obligations or to persuade the Bank 
that it should engage with human rights, is not easy. The examination of legal 
arguments that are often put forward in this respect found them to be 
insufficient to establish a clear obligation to this effect. As an international 
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organisation, the World Bank does not have direct human rights obligations, 
although it has been mentioned on occasion by the UN human rights treaty 
bodies. An academic initiative in the form of the Tilburg Guiding Principles 
on the World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights in 2003 claimed that the 
organisation has an obligation to ‘take full responsibility for the respect of 
human rights when its projects, policies or programmes negatively impact or 
undermine the enjoyment of human rights’.7 An alternative approach is to 
view the Bank as having to act in compliance with the human rights 
obligations of its individual Member States, although this was also found to 
be inadequate and insufficiently convincing. The most convincing source of 
obligations for the World Bank under international human rights law was 
found to be customary international law, which is by now quite widely agreed 
to apply to international organisations. However, whether international 
human rights have reached this status (bar the narrow range of human rights 
considered to be jus cogens norms) is still a matter of debate. 
 The fact that the legal arguments for the World Bank to comply with 
human rights standards are not fully convincing is very problematic in light 
of the Bank’s relationship with human rights. Chapter 10 showed that there 
are several aspects of the Bank’s operations and practices that can have a 
negative impact on human rights, and that despite some improvements (e.g. 
the inclusion of policies such as free, prior and informed consent in the 
revised environmental and social safeguard policies), the Bank does not 
provide for the protection of human rights in its own policies and 
programmes.  
In light of these findings, it was suggested in Chapter 10 that the 
connections between the World Bank’s good governance approach and 
human rights should be utilised. It was therefore proposed that a ‘human 
rights-based approach’ should be used as the basis for the Bank to explicitly 
include human rights considerations in its policies and operations, or to 
                                                 
7 Willem van Genugten and others, ‘Tilburg Guiding Principles on World Bank, IMF and 
Human Rights’ in Willem van Genugten, Paul Hunt and Susan Matthews (eds), World Bank 
and Human Rights (Wolf Legal Publishers 2003) para 5. 
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instrumentalise human rights within the organisation. The Bank has made 
efforts to conform to principles of good governance, and has made particular 
progress towards transparency and accountability. However, it still has some 
way to go before it can be said to operate in full compliance with good 
governance, which as shown in Chapter 9, is very closely linked to human 
rights. While the arguments that the Bank has legal human rights obligations 
were found to be less persuasive, the arguments for the Bank to take a HRBA 
were more so.  
 The multi-level governance approach to human rights should also 
include adherence to the principles of good governance. The application of 
the approach to the World Bank highlighted several shortcomings of the 
Bank’s practice in this respect, particularly in relation to the Inspection Panel 
and the review of the environmental and social safeguard policies. The 
suggestions that were offered in Chapter 10 proposed measures and activities 
that could be taken by the range of actors connected to the Bank’s operations 
in order to move towards a multi-level governance regime. The final 
recommendations are summarised in Section 7, below.                                                                                                  
5.2 Non-State armed groups, international human rights law and multi-level 
governance 
The second case study, discussed in Chapter 11, concerned very different 
entities from the World Bank. Rather than working together with and 
consisting of States, non-State armed groups are very often characterised by 
their opposition to States and their desire to become the governmental 
authority in a particular area. However, as with the World Bank, the law 
applicable to non-State armed groups, which often operate in times of non-
international armed conflict, is a subject of much debate. Firstly, the question 
arises whether human rights law even applies during armed conflicts. 
Secondly, if this is the case, are non-State armed groups subject to human 
rights obligations? The second question is particularly interesting in light of 
the fact that non-State armed groups are certainly bound by at least some 
norms of international humanitarian and international criminal law. Within 
the specific context of Chapter 11 – the mitigation of humanitarian crises 
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caused by non-international armed conflicts – it was found that human rights 
law does indeed apply at such times, and could even be said, in relation to 
subsistence rights, to constitute the lex specialis. An argument was also made 
that subsistence rights are non-derogable and should be upheld in full during 
conflicts. Nonetheless, even though non-State armed groups feature in one 
UN human rights treaty (the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict8) and 
have been mentioned by several UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies 
in cases as well as general comments, they are, by their nature, non-State 
actors. Consequently, they do not have binding or direct human rights 
obligations at the international level.  
 The measures taken to try to improve non-State armed groups’ 
compliance with standards of international law have had mixed results, and 
have mostly focused on specific thematic areas, such as the recruitment and 
use of child soldiers, that are dealt with under international humanitarian, 
rather than human rights law. The measures include the United Nation’s 
Action Plans, Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitments and special agreements 
under Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and even general 
human rights agreements. The outcome of the measures suggests a need to 
take additional, complementary measures. The multi-level governance 
approach suggested in Chapter 9 and applied to non-State armed groups in 
Chapter 11 would allow for such measures to be taken, whilst strengthening 
the coordination, participation, transparency and accountability of measures 
already underway. The final recommendations offered by this study in 
relation to non-State armed groups will be discussed in Section 7, below. 
6. Contributions of the study and suggestions for future research 
This study makes several contributions to law and governance studies by 
answering the primary research question of: ‘How are interferences with 
human rights caused by non-State actors dealt with under international 
                                                 
8 See Article 4 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (25 May 2000, entered into force 12 February 
2002). 
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human rights law and practice, and how could a multi-level governance 
approach apply to better protect individuals’ human rights from the harmful 
conduct of non-State actors?’. 
As well as contributions made by the book as a whole, individual 
chapters within the present study contribute in their own right to scholarly 
discussions and provide various (governance) actors with suggestions as to 
how human rights could better be protected vis-à-vis non-State actors. For 
example, the up-to-date review and critique of the tripartite typology of State 
obligations under international human rights law provides an overview of 
how human rights are delineated. Further, in Chapter 3 the study provided a 
current explanation of the horizontal effect of human rights at the 
international level. Although ‘indirect horizontal effect’ is not unknown 
within scholarly works on the horizontal effect of human rights international 
level, Chapter 3, together with Chapters 5 and 8, provided an in-depth 
understanding of what this term means. Similar contributions are made 
concerning the regional level in Chapters 6 and 8.  
 Chapter 5 built on and updated several scholarly works concerning 
the application of horizontal effect by the UN human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies (e.g. Andrew Clapham’s rigorous study in his seminal book Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors). As well as providing a thorough 
analysis and comparison of the ways in which different human rights systems 
deal with the issue of non-State actors and human rights, this chapter 
highlighted the limitations of the current, legal approach to human rights and 
non-State actors, explained above. 
The findings in in Chapters 4-8 are naturally limited by the sources 
analysed and may have been slightly different had, for example, the practice 
of all of the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies been analysed. 
Finally, the national level analysis is very much an overview of the situation 
regarding horizontal effect in the United Kingdom, and may be very different 
in other national systems. Within the timeframe of the study, a more 
exhaustive analysis was not possible. The results of the analyses nevertheless 
remain valid and contribute to the legal scholarship on non-State actors and 
human rights; it is likely that the types of indirect horizontal effect found in 
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the practice of the systems examined are present in the practice of those 
bodies not examined at the international level. A systematic analysis of the 
practice of these bodies could be conducted in future research, perhaps in 
order to form a comprehensive database on the application of horizontal 
effect at the international level (or indeed at the regional and even national 
levels). Given that the findings of Chapters 4-8 showed that there are different 
approaches taken by the bodies examined depending on the actor in question 
as well as the right at stake, future research could perhaps be structured with 
this in mind. 
 As stated in Section 5, the findings of the case study chapters are more 
or less confined to the context of the actors they address. However, the multi-
level governance approach itself should be applicable to a wide range of non-
State actors. Further research could therefore conduct more case study 
analyses pertaining to different kinds of non-State actors (e.g. NGOs) in order 
to test the approach suggested in Chapter 9 of this study and to make 
suggestions specific to each kind of non-State actor. 
7. Final recommendations to different actors  
Throughout the study, various recommendations for action that should be 
taken by different actors were made. The recommendations, as well as several 
additional recommendations, are explained in this section. The actors 
included are: States; the United Nations (and the human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies in particular); non-governmental organisations, regional 
and national adjudicatory bodies; the World Bank; and non-State armed 
groups. General recommendations for all actors and from a more normative 
perspective are also included in this section. It is important to highlight that 
the recommendations in this section are not exhaustive and are mostly 
tailored to the case studies examined. The recommendations are therefore 
simply examples of the type of action that needs to be taken by the actors to 
better protect human rights under a multi-level human rights governance 
regime.  
7.1 States (and State actors) 
States should fulfil their obligation to protect individuals’ rights from the 
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harmful actions of non-State actors. In particular, States should ensure that 
all State actors are familiar with the requirements of the duty of due diligence 
to investigate, prevent and punish human rights abuse by non-State actors. In 
this context, States should ensure that appropriate measures are taken at the 
domestic level to implement the findings of the human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies and regional human rights courts, as set down both in cases 
and in general comments. Particular attention should be paid to preventative 
measures to proactively protect rights. States should also regulate non-State 
actors effectively, making sure that when they delegate tasks for the 
fulfilment of human rights to private actors, that the private actors will uphold 
the same human rights standards as would be expected of the State. 
In relation to the World Bank, States should ensure that local 
populations are provided with better opportunities to have a voice in decision-
making processes e.g. the poverty reduction strategy papers, and work 
together with the Bank to allow individuals better access to remedy when 
their rights are violated by a Bank-related programme or project. States 
should also ensure that representatives of the State act in compliance with the 
State’s human rights obligations when acting on their behalf in the World 
Bank, as well as in other international organisations. 
In relation to non-State armed groups, States should be willing to enter 
into agreements with the groups and to engage with them meaningfully. In 
order to do so, States should reach out to third parties that may be able to 
mediate between themselves and the groups. In particular, in situations of 
humanitarian crisis, States should seek enter ceasefire agreements that 
include human rights provisions and allow for the immediate subsistence 
needs of the affected population to be provided for, with a view to 
establishing long-term agreements to this effect. 
7.2 The United Nations  
The United Nations has a huge role to play in the protection of human rights. 
Different actors operating under the auspices of the UN could take measures 
under a multi-level governance approach to human rights. Given that 
reference has been made throughout this book to the work of the Human 
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Rights Council focus on the practice of the UN human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies in Chapters 5 and 8, the following recommendations focus 
only on the role of these two actors. 
7.2.1 The Human Rights Council 
The Human Rights Council has already taken a great deal of measures in 
relation to non-State actors, particularly regarding business and human 
rights.9 Lessons could be learned from action in this area and adapted to the 
context of other non-State actors. This could be particularly helpful in 
relation to non-State armed groups.10 For example, the Human Rights 
Council could adopt, together with help from academia, experts, NGOs 
(particularly the ICRC and Geneva Call) and with the participation of non-
State armed groups, a set of human rights principles for the groups to adhere 
to during non-international armed conflicts. These could take a similar format 
to UNGPs which were unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights Council 
and adopted with the input of many different stakeholders and ultimately 
gained the support of many State and non-State actors. Another option would 
be to establish working groups on the protection of human rights vis-à-vis 
certain non-State actors, as it has done in relation to transnational business 
enterprises. Again, this would be very useful in relation to non-State armed 
groups, and could clarify the human rights obligations, if any, of the groups 
under international human rights law.  
Within the ambit of the Human Rights Council, the special 
rapporteurs, which have contributed very significantly to research on non-
State actors and human rights, should continue to conduct such research and 
make recommendations to States and other relevant actors concerning the 
compliance of non-State actors with international human rights standards. An 
                                                 
9 This includes, for example, the endorsement of the UNGPs and the establishment of the 
open-ended inter-governmental working group transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights, discussed in Chapter 3. 
10 Such an approach may be less appropriate with regards to the World Bank, which as a 
single, international organisation is of a very different nature and on a different footing than 
non-State armed groups and business enterprises. 
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example of such action – the report by Philip Alston in his capacity as Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions – was 
discussed in Chapter 11.11 As well as being an important measure for 
engagement of actors such as non-State armed groups, the activities of 
Special Rapporteurs can also contribute to better coordination between 
different actors.  
7.2.2 International human rights treaty monitoring bodies  
First, the bodies could better explain or better reference sources of law in 
their views on individual complaints but in particular in their general 
comments. Chapter 5 showed that this is beginning to happen, and is 
important for improving the persuasiveness of the bodies’ findings and 
recommendations. This measure would be particularly important for what 
concerns the bodies’ use of the term ‘attribution’, and the problems that this 
has caused in the clarity of their findings (see above). Another option for the 
bodies would be to engage with scholarly debates in their general comments, 
which could be a further step to that which they have recently made by 
referring on several occasions to academic works regarding non-State actors 
and human rights.  
Second, the bodies could make their reasons for not addressing an 
issue more specific. In some instances the bodies have mentioned that they 
cannot address a certain issue because it was not contested by the parties to 
an individual complaint. However, it could also be useful for them to explain 
if their reason for not engaging with something is due to the constraints of 
their mandate.  
 Third, the treaty bodies should make themselves aware of the practice 
of other UN treaty bodies, in order to be able to keep their language consistent 
when using the same concepts as the other bodies. This could help clarify 
responsibilities for States and non-State actors, as well as make the findings 
                                                 
11 This report was adopted by the Human Rights Commission, the predecessor of the Human 
Rights Council, in 2005. UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Addendum to the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Mission to Sri Lanka 
(28 November to 6 December 2005), Philip Alston’ (27 March 2006) E/CN.4/2006/53/Add. 
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of the bodies more accessible, especially for claimants of human rights 
violations.  
Finally, the bodies could adopt a general comment to address the State 
and non-State obligations/responsibilities in relation to specific non-State 
actors, much like General Comment No. 24 of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Given that several bodies have 
referred to ‘obligations’ of non-State armed groups and the World Bank in 
the past, it is certainly conceivable that they could adopt general comments 
pertaining to these two actors.  
7.3 Regional and national (human rights) courts  
The shortcomings of the work of regional and national human rights courts 
were found to be quite similar to those of the UN human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies. For this reason, the recommendations are also similar and 
will not be explained in detail here. Put simply, the bodies should provide a 
better explanation of or reference to sources of law that they use and be more 
explicit in their application of the relevant law, for example by explain their 
methods more thoroughly. There could also perhaps be more communication 
and coordination between the regional and national systems (amongst 
themselves), although it is important that the systems are able to stay true to 
the specific values of their particular region/nation. 
7.4 Non-governmental organisations 
As explained in Chapters 9, 10 and 11, NGOs already have an important role 
in the protection of international human rights which would continue in a 
multi-level human rights governance regime. It is therefore important that 
NGOs keep contributing as they already do to the protection of international 
human rights, by, for example, providing shadow reports to the UN human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies, submitting amicus curiae briefs on behalf of 
individuals regarding complaints of human rights violations, drafting 
guidelines/principles for various actors on human rights protection, and 
providing various non-State actors with concrete guidance as to how they 
could better respect/protect human rights. In particular, NGOs could help 
organisations and actors such as the World Bank to develop and 




NGOs should also continue to share information on and increase 
public awareness of non-State actors and human rights. In the context of the 
World Bank this could include bringing issues to the attention of the 
Inspection Panel. Further, in relation to the World Bank, NGOs could try to 
foster more coordination between the Bank and different actors, perhaps 
acting as intermediaries in communication between actors. In a similar vein, 
NGOs could also help to foster engagement between the Bank and other 
actors, such as the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies and local 
communities. 
In relation to non-State armed groups, NGOs also play a central role 
in human rights governance. Where possible, the ICRC should perform the 
tasks that it is mandated to do during international armed conflicts (i.e. 
visiting prisoners of war, organising relief operations and helping the 
reunification of families, and a rage of humanitarian activities) during non-
international armed conflicts as well. The ICRC should also continue raising 
awareness and publishing scholarly works on non-State armed groups. Such 
efforts would help the transparency of human rights governance and perhaps 
contribute to coordination between different actors. 
All NGOs working in relevant fields should try to engage with non-
State armed groups on human rights issues as well as humanitarian ones, and 
perhaps even offer training and help them understand international human 
rights law and what it means. This is particularly important in relation to those 
groups trying to gain the control of, or already with control over a certain area 
of territory). This could be an important step in establishing better 
coordination between non-State armed groups and other actors, as well as 
increasing the likelihood that human rights may be better protected during 
humanitarian crises. 
NGOs should also foster communication and try to coordinate 
activities with one another to avoid the duplication of efforts and gaps in 
activities. This could also allow them to respond more quickly to situations, 
discover new challenges and pool resources and efforts, which in turn, if 
other NGOs and other actors became aware of what was being done to 
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improve human rights protection, would also improve coordination and 
transparency.  
7.5 The World Bank 
The main recommendation for the World Bank is to take a HRBA. As 
explained in Chapter 10, this would help with its adherence to the principles 
of good governance as well as the fulfilment of its own mandate and goals. 
Chapter 10 highlighted the ‘added value’ of human rights for eradicating 
poverty, including as shown through empirical research in the specific 
context of the World Bank, such as that of Daniel Kaufmann. 
Simply speaking, adopting a HRBA would require the bank to: (1) 
ensure that all activities within development cooperation should aim to 
‘contribute directly to the realization of one or several human rights’; (2) 
allow human rights principles to guide their programmes during all stages of 
the process, comprising ‘planning and design (including setting of goals, 
objectives and strategies); implementation, monitoring and evaluation’; and 
(3) accept that the ‘relationship between individuals with valid claims (rights-
holders) and State and non-State actors with correlative obligations (duty-
bearers) is determined by human rights’, and work to strengthen the capacity 
of each.12 It would further require the Bank to act in compliance with the 
principles of:  
(a) Universality:  
(b) Indivisibility; 
(c) Participation and consultation; 
(d) Non-discrimination; 
(e) Accountability; 
(f) Transparency; and 
                                                 
12 The Statement was adopted following an ‘Inter-Agency Workshop on a Human Rights-
Based Approach’ in May 2003. See United Nations Development Group, ‘The Human Rights 
Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among 
UN Agencies’ (2003) <https://undg.org/document/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-
development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies/> accessed 
12 November 2017. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
517 
(g) Do no harm or do less harm.13 
As part of a multi-level governance approach, the World Bank should also 
engage meaningfully with actors such as the international human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies, human rights experts and bodies.14 As mentioned above, 
it was shown in Chapters 5 and 10 that the Bank has been referred to on 
occasion. In light of this, if the Bank were to engage with the bodies and 
perhaps ask for guidance, as well continuing to seek the guidance of 
individual experts such as those that provided guidance regarding the recent 
review of the safeguard policies, it could help the organisation to identify 
which standards should be included in their policies, and how. 
 The World Bank should also strengthen the powers, independence 
and transparency of its Inspection Panel, as well as its transparency, for 
example by strengthening the operational policies of the Panel. Crucially, 
references to human rights within the environmental and social safeguard 
policies should be strengthened as part of the HRBA explained above. This 
would also strengthen the ability of the Inspection Panel to protect human 
rights. 
Although the grievance redress service had not been used at the time 
of writing, as well as an important measure for participation and 
accountability, this could form an important link between the Bank and local 
communities, so should be used and reviewed on a regular basis. Further in 
the context of communication with other actors, contact points or persons 
could be established within the Bank to liaise with other actors for what 
concerns human rights. 
Further, the World Bank should be mindful of human rights when 
entering into public-private partnerships and when working together with 
                                                 
13 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Final research-based report of the Human Rights Council 
Advisory Committee on best practices and main challenges in the promotion and protection 
of human rights in post-disaster and post-conflict situations’ (10 February 2015) 
A/HRC/28/76 para 40. See also Marlies Hesselman and Lottie Lane, ‘Disasters and Non-State 
Actors’ (2017) 26(5) Disaster Prevention and Management 526, 528-529. 
14 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, Philip Alston’ (4 August 2015) A/70/274 para 78. 
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private companies and the commercial banks and private sector investors that 
often co-finance loans with the World Bank. To this end, the Bank should 
carefully consider which private actors it enters into partnership with, to 
avoid working with those which have a bad human rights record. 
Finally, in order to improve transparency, the World Bank should 
publish periodic reports on the activities that it is taking for the protection of 
human rights.  
7.6 Non-State armed groups  
As explained in Chapter 11, there are several measures that non-State armed 
groups could take under a multi-level governance approach to international 
human rights. The main recommendation made is for non-State armed groups 
involved in a non-international armed conflict that creates a situation of 
humanitarian crisis to adopt ceasefire agreements with other parties to the 
conflict which include human rights provisions. As this recommendation was 
also explained above in relation to States, it will not be explained further here. 
Non-State armed groups should also continue to sign up to Deeds of 
Commitment, and focus on implementing them successfully. Similarly, those 
groups on the list of the Security Council should work towards having 
themselves removed. If a non-State armed group hopes to gain control of an 
area or even replace the government of a State, it needs to be willing and 
make an effort to learn about international human rights law and the kinds of 
measures it should be taking to protect human rights, during armed conflicts 
but also in times of peace. In order to do so, the group could reach out to 
organisations such as NGOs, as mentioned above. This could also be done 
with regards to the adoption and with implementation of any agreements that 
non-State armed groups make with States, in which case the organisations 
could function as mediators, as well as the commitments that the groups sign 
up to (such as the Deeds of Commitment). 
7.7 Business enterprises 
Recommendations for activities under a multi-level governance approach to 
international human rights by business enterprises were suggested in Chapter 
11. In particular, businesses operating in an area in which a non-international 
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conflict is ongoing should avoid colluding with non-State armed groups that 
are exacerbating situations of humanitarian crisis and preventing the 
enjoyment of human rights. Further, businesses should take the positive step 
of working together with humanitarian agencies to act, where possible, as 
suppliers of important commodities such as food, water and healthcare. 
7.8 General recommendations 
As well as measures that should be taken by each actor under a multi-level 
governance approach to international human rights, there are several that 
should be taken by all actors within the regime. Following Hanssen and 
others’ ladder of coordination discussed in Chapter 9, this includes measures 
for improved coordination, knowledge-sharing and transparency. This could 
be achieved through Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings’ ‘accountability 
networks’, or the partnership agreements in the European Commission’s 
White Paper on Multi-Level Governance. Such agreements could be, for 
example, between the UN and civil society at the international level, and 
could improve accountability for non-State actors, as well as the legitimacy 
of and coordination within the governance system. Another important 
measure would be for international conferences to bring different actors 
together, in order to improve knowledge-sharing, communication and 
coordination between the actors. A good example of such a conference is the 
annual UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, in which over 2000 
stakeholders participated in 2017. 
 Another, and perhaps the most significant general recommendation 
suggested in Chapter 9 of this book, relates to the coordination of governance 
activities and actors and the establishment of task-specific jurisdictions 
(following the argument that a Type II multi-level governance system is best 
suited to the governance of international human rights). It may be possible to 
do this along the main thematic areas of human rights, based on the core UN 
human rights treaties. The areas could be labelled as: economic, social and 
cultural rights, civil and political rights, the elimination of racial 
discrimination, the elimination of discrimination against women, the rights 
of children, the rights of migrant workers, the rights of people with 
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disabilities, the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and the protection of people from enforced disappearance. It is also 
possible that specific human rights that are included in several of the core 
treaties would form a subset of the governance of international human rights 
which would be divided into task-specific jurisdictions. The jurisdictions 
themselves could roughly be divided into efforts to draft, adopt, implement 
and enforce human rights standards relating to each thematic area. Different 
actors could, as they do now, volunteer to take part in a particular governance 
jurisdiction according to their interests and expertise. Each jurisdiction could 
be coordinated by an allocated actor. In this sense, the United Nations 
‘Cluster Approach’ to disaster response, which was adopted in 2005 in 
recognition of the need for better coordination between disaster sectors, could 
be extremely useful.15 
Finally, general recommendations concerning more normative issues 
can also be made in light of this study’s findings. For example, the obligations 
of State when they are acting as members of international organisations, such 
as the World Bank should be clarified, as well as the effect that this has on 
the Bank’s own activities. In a similar vein, it is necessary to clarify the 
obligations of the World Bank, and indeed other international organisations, 
under international human rights law.  
8. Final thoughts 
All in all, the international community seems to be at a cross-roads for what 
concerns international human rights and non-State actors. Given the rate at 
which and the seriousness of interferences with human rights that are caused 
by non-State actors globally, which reach into even very remote areas of the 
globe, it is crucial that action is taken. While international human rights law 
may be a promising avenue for some actors, it is unlikely, and to some extent 
                                                 
15 The cluster approach is depicted in Figure 9.5. The original figure can be found at Inter-
Agency Standing Committee, ‘Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at Country Level 
(revised July 2015)’ <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-transformative-
agenda/documents-public/reference-module-cluster-coordination-country-level> accessed 9 
April 2018. 
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also undesirable, that binding instruments will be adopted in the near future 
that can address interferences by the wide range of non-State actors that 
currently operate. Although legal practitioners may be more limited by their 
mandates/competence, legal scholars should address the issue with an open 
mind. They should be willing to borrow from other fields (such as governance 
studies/political science) in order to establish a comprehensive, inclusive and 
effective system for human rights governance that is capable of addressing 
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Veel niet-statelijke actoren kunnen het genot van mensenrechten enorm 
beïnvloeden. Dit geldt met name voor niet-statelijke entiteiten die publieke 
functies uitoefenen, die controle hebben over een territorium, of die invloed 
hebben op staten bij de goedkeuring en uitvoering van nationale wetten en 
beleidsmaatregelen. Desondanks hebben niet-statelijke actoren momenteel 
geen directe verplichtingen onder internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving; 
het huidige internationale juridische kader voor mensenrechten blijft gericht 
op de staat, met de positieve verplichting om de mensenrechten van 
individuen te beschermen tegen het schadelijke gedrag van niet-statelijke 
actoren. 
De belangrijkste onderzoekvragen van deze studie zijn: ‘Hoe worden 
schendingen van mensenrechten (mede veroorzaakt) door niet-statelijke 
actoren behandeld in internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving en -praktijk, en 
hoe zou een multi-level governance-benadering toegepast kunnen worden om 
de mensenrechten van individuen beter te beschermen tegen het schadelijk 
gedrag van niet-statelijke actoren?’ Om dit laatste te bereiken, is in de studie 
gekozen voor een ‘law and governance-benadering’, die verder kijkt dan 
alleen juridische oplossingen voor het  bewerkstelligen van betere 
mensenrechtenbescherming. De theoretische, vergelijkende en kritische 
analyses van verschillende mensenrechtenstelsels op internationaal, regionaal 
en nationaal niveau bieden een grondig inzicht in de positie van niet-statelijke 
actoren in internationale mensenrechtenkaders en de uitdagingen die de 
huidige wettelijke kaders ondervinden bij het beschermen van personen tegen 
inmenging door niet-statelijke actoren. Deze bevindingen worden gebruikt als 
basis om te suggereren dat er een multi-level governance-benadering van 
internationale mensenrechten moet worden gevolgd, waarin juridische en 
extra-juridische maatregelen worden genomen om niet-statelijke actoren aan 




respectievelijk de Wereldbank en niet-statelijke gewapende groeperingen,  
onderzoeken de huidige juridische en praktische tekortkomingen in 
mensenrechtenbescherming, en laten zien hoe een multi-level governance 
benadering kan bijdragen aan het oplossen hiervan.  
Deel 1 levert het theoretische raamwerk voor de studie, met name de 
aard en omvang van mensenrechtenverplichtingen en de mate zij al dan niet 
ruimte laten voor niet-statelijke actoren. Dit deel van het onderzoek 
beantwoordt de vragen: ‘Wat is de aard en reikwijdte van internationale 
verplichtingen op het gebied van de mensenrechten en bieden ze ruimte voor 
verplichtingen voor niet-statelijke actoren?’; en ‘Wat is het horizontale effect 
van internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving en hoe verhoudt dit zich tot de 
verschillende soorten mensenrechtenverplichtingen?’ 
Hoofdstuk 1 gaat kritisch in op de classificaties en de aard van 
mensenrechtenverplichtingen. In het bijzonder wordt de tripartiete typologie 
van mensenrechten besproken die van toepassing is op alle mensenrechten: 
de verplichting om mensenrechten te respecteren, te beschermen en te 
vervullen. Door deze typologie kunnen staten (als plichthouders) beter 
begrijpen wat er van hen verwacht wordt in het kader van de relevante 
mensenrechtenverdragen, en wordt het gemakkelijker voor slachtoffers van 
mensenrechtenschendingen om te weten op welk soort gedrag zij staten 
kunnen aanspreken. De typologie wordt gedurende de hele scriptie als een 
conceptueel hulpmiddel gebruikt. 
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat over de traditionele, op de staat gerichte benadering 
van mensenrechten, die ertoe heeft geleid dat verplichtingen verticaal zijn en 
door de staat verschuldigd zijn aan individuen. In dit hoofdstuk is onderzocht 
waarom staten en de academische wereld terughoudend zijn om niet-statelijke 
actoren als subjecten binnen de reikwijdte van internationale 
mensenrechtenwetgeving te brengen. De meest belangrijke redenen zijn de 
soevereiniteit van de staat en het voorkomen dat staten zich achter de 
verplichtingen van niet-statelijke actoren kunnen verschuilen om niet aan 
eigen verplichtingen te voldoen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 legt uit wat het ‘horizontale effect’ van internationale 




omschreven kan worden als de directe toepassing van internationale 
mensenrechten tussen niet-statelijke actoren wordt eerst uitgelegd. Direct 
horizontaal effect stelt slachtoffers wier rechten negatief zijn beïnvloed door 
niet-statelijke actoren in staat hen rechtstreeks aansprakelijk te stellen – dat 
wil zeggen om een juridische klacht in te dienen tegen de niet-statelijke actor 
wegens het niet naleven van mensenrechtennormen. Binnen de internationale 
mensenrechtenwetgeving is dit nog niet mogelijk. Er zijn echter aanzienlijke 
stappen gezet in de richting van een direct horizontaal effect, met name in de 
context van het bedrijfsleven en de mensenrechten. ‘Soft law’-instrumenten 
op dit gebied spelen een belangrijke rol. Hierin wordt de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor bedrijven om mensenrechten te respecteren 
ondubbelzinnig vastgesteld. Verdere stappen richting direct horizontaal effect 
zijn te vinden buiten het kader van internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving 
op internationaal niveau (bijvoorbeeld in internationaal privaatrecht) en op 
nationaal niveau (op basis van wetgeving en jurisprudentie). 
Deze ontwikkelingen doen niet af aan de bewering dat er momenteel 
geen direct horizontaal effect is van internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving 
op internationaal niveau. De vraag blijft ook op internationaal niveau of het 
opleggen van directe mensenrechtenverplichtingen aan niet-statelijke actoren 
legitiem zou zijn. Ten minste met betrekking tot sommige actoren en onder 
bepaalde omstandigheden, kan direct horizontaal effect als legitiem worden 
geconstrueerd.  
Bij afwezigheid van een direct horizontaal effect, is er een zogenaamd 
‘indirect horizontaal effect’ ontstaan, waarbij staten rechtstreeks en 
internationaal verantwoordelijk worden gesteld voor het gedrag van niet-
statelijke actoren die het genot van mensenrechten schaden. Tegelijkertijd 
wordt een indirecte, internationale verplichting opgelegd aan niet-statelijke 
actoren om op een mensenrechtenconforme manier te handelen (wat een 
indirect horizontaal effect is). De verplichting die aan staten wordt opgelegd, 
vereist namelijk vaak dat zij directe verplichtingen (of tenminste 
gedragsnormen) aan niet-statelijke actoren op nationaal niveau opleggen. Een 
centrale verplichting die in dit verband aan de staten wordt opgelegd, is de 




Verschillende internationale instrumenten hebben de tripartiete 
typologie toegepast op niet-statelijke actoren waarbij de nadruk ligt op het 
‘respecteren’ van de mensenrechten. Verwijzingen naar een 
verantwoordelijkheid van niet-statelijke actoren om de mensenrechten te 
‘beschermen’ is minder gebruikelijk en lijkt soms op een 
(mede)verantwoordelijkheid om de mensenrechten te respecteren. Een 
verantwoordelijkheid om de mensenrechten te vervullen is nog niet op 
internationaal niveau ondersteund, hoewel er voor staten een verschuiving 
lijkt te zijn naar een verplichting om middelen van niet-statelijke actoren te 
mobiliseren om aan hun eigen verplichtingen om te vervullen te voldoen. 
Nadat de parameters van het kader voor de rechten van de mens in 
deel 1 zijn vastgesteld, gaat het onderzoek verder met de behandeling van 
verplichtingen/verantwoordelijkheden van niet-statelijke actoren in recht en 
praktijk (delen 2 en 3). Deel 2 en 3 beantwoorden de derde onderzoeksvraag: 
‘In welke mate en hoe wordt het horizontale effect van mensenrechten 
weerspiegeld in internationale, regionale en nationale wetgeving, rechtspraak 
en wetenschappelijke werken?’. 
Deel 2 bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 4 en 5, waarin het horizontale 
effect van internationale mensenrechten op internationaal niveau aan de orde 
komt. Ten eerste worden in hoofdstuk 4 voorbeelden van horizontale 
effecten besproken die te vinden zijn in de internationale wetgeving, met 
name in internationale mensenrechtenverdragen. Hoewel er geen direct 
horizontaal effect wordt gevonden, toont de analyse een interessante, zij het 
beperkte, (chronologische) verschuiving naar meer expliciete opname van 
verantwoordelijkheden/verplichtingen voor niet-statelijke actoren in 
internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving. Het sterkste voorbeeld werd 
gevonden in een verdrag dat bepalingen bevat die sterk zijn geworteld in 
internationaal humanitair recht in plaats van mensenrechtenwetgeving – 
artikel 4 van het facultatief protocol bij het Verdrag inzake de Rechten van 
het Kind – dat bepaalt dat niet-statelijke gewapende groeperingen moeten 
afzien van het werven of gebruiken van kindsoldaten. Aangezien niet-
statelijke gewapende groeperingen echter geen partij bij het verdrag kunnen 




Hoofdstuk 5 van het boek bestaat uit een vergelijkende analyse van 
de manier waarop vijf verdragsorganen van VN mensenrechtenverdragen 
horizontaal effect toepassen in hun ‘Algemene Commentaren’ en in 
‘Zienswijzen’ met betrekking tot individuele klachten. Ondanks het 
ontbreken van een direct horizontaal effect in de relevante verdragen, heeft 
ieder orgaan zich gebogen over situaties waarin inmenging in mensenrechten 
werd veroorzaakt door niet-statelijke actoren. In veel gevallen hebben 
verdragsorganen een beschermverplichting voor staten erkend om individuen 
tegen het schadelijke gedrag van niet-statelijke actoren te beschermen, 
hoewel de inkleuring van de verplichting verschilde naargelang welke niet-
statelijke actor de schade had veroorzaakt. Hoewel de instanties nogal wat 
details hebben verstrekt over de ‘due diligence-verplichtingen’ van staten, 
hebben ze zich grotendeels niet beziggehouden met de gedragsnormen die 
door niet-statelijke actoren zelf worden verwacht. De redenering van de vijf 
VN-mensenrechtenverdragsorganen wordt bekritiseerd in dit hoofdstuk. 
Deel 3 gaat naar het regionale en nationale niveau, bestaande uit twee 
hoofdstukken met kritische en vergelijkende analyse. Hoofdstuk 6 bevat de 
analyse van wetgeving, jurisprudentie en literatuur gerelateerd aan drie 
regionale mensenrechtensystemen: (1) het Europese systeem onder de Raad 
van Europa; (2) het Afrikaanse systeem onder de Afrikaanse Unie; en (3) het 
Inter-Amerikaanse systeem. Uit de analyse bleek dat de 
verantwoordelijkheden van niet-statelijke actoren soms in de wetgeving 
worden genoemd, hoewel dit meestal alleen voor individuen geldt. Uit de 
jurisprudentie blijkt dat de regionale mensenrechtenorganen steeds meer 
bereid zijn zich in te laten met de mogelijkheid van 
mensenrechtenschendingen door niet-statelijke actoren, hoewel de 
terminologie verschilde naargelang welke actor werd besproken en binnen 
welk regionaal systeem. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een analyse van het horizontale effect op 
nationaal niveau uitgevoerd, waarbij het horizontale effect wordt onderzocht 
zoals toegestaan door de Human Rights Act 1998 (de Mensenrechtenwet) van 
het Verenigd Koninkrijk (VK). De wetgeving, literatuur en de praktijk van de 




argument te zijn dat er een direct horizontaal effect is op grond van de 
Mensenrechtenwet. Er zijn echter twee belangrijke manieren gevonden 
waarop mensenrechtennormen kunnen worden gehandhaafd ten opzichte van 
niet-statelijke actoren. Ten eerste maakt de Mensenrechtenwet het in bepaalde 
situaties mogelijk dat niet-statelijke actoren als ‘public authorities’ worden 
beschouwd en daarom de mensenrechten moeten naleven zoals vastgelegd in 
het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM). In de praktijk 
is de jurisprudentie hierover inconsistent en worden de precieze 
omstandigheden waaronder een niet-statelijke acteur als een 
overheidsinstantie kan worden beschouwd, niet verduidelijkt. Ten tweede, 
vanwege de verplichting van binnenlandse rechtbanken in het VK om niet te 
handelen op een manier die in strijd is met het EVRM, heeft de 
Mensenrechtenwet toegestaan dat mensenrechtennormen worden opgenomen 
in common law-zaken tussen twee niet-statelijke actoren. Deze aanpak is 
toegepast met betrekking tot diverse mensenrechten die worden gevonden in 
het EVRM, wat leidt tot verschillende uitkomsten. 
De bevindingen van de hoofdstukken 5-7 vormen de basis van deel 4 
van het boek, dat de hoofdstukken 8-11 bevat en twee onderzoeksvragen 
beantwoordt: ‘Naar een horizontaal effect in mensenrechtenwetgeving: kan 
een bestuurlijke benadering van mensenrechten worden overwogen'’?; en 
‘Wat voor activiteiten kunnen worden genomen op basis van een multi-level 
governance-benadering van mensenrechten om de rechten van personen beter 
te beschermen tegen niet-statelijke actoren?’.  
Hoofdstuk 8 bestaat uit een kritische reflectie op de analyse van het 
horizontale effect van internationale mensenrechten op internationaal, 
regionaal en nationaal niveau. Het hoofdstuk identificeert drie soorten 
‘indirect’ horizontaal effect: (1) diagonaal indirect horizontaal effect; (2) 
categorisch indirect horizontaal effect; en (3) waarde-gedreven indirect 
horizontaal effect. Diagonaal indirect horizontaal effect verwijst naar de 
toepassing van de beschermverplichting van staten op een manier dat deze 
indirecte internationale verplichtingen voor niet-statelijke actoren creëert. Dit 
was de meest gebruikte aanpak. Op internationaal niveau en binnen het inter-




diligence verplichtingen van de staten, met name de verplichting om 
schendingen van niet-statelijke actoren te voorkomen, te onderzoeken en te 
bestraffen. Een specifieke verplichting van de staat om ervoor te zorgen dat 
bepaalde niet-statelijke actoren mensenrechten respecteren door deze te 
reguleren, heeft zich ook op internationaal en regionaal niveau ontwikkeld. 
Deze verplichting kan ook worden beschouwd als een indirecte verplichting 
voor niet-statelijke actoren om de mensenrechten te respecteren. Categorisch 
indirect horizontaal effect is van toepassing in situaties waarin een niet-
statelijke actor opnieuw kan worden gecategoriseerd als een overheidsactor 
voor de doeleinden van mensenrechten. Dit omvat situaties waarin een niet-
statelijke actor een quasi-overheidsfunctie of zelfs deze status heeft 
aangenomen. Hoewel dit op nationaal niveau veel voorkomt op grond van de 
Human Rights Act van het VK, is deze methode op een veel beperkter niveau 
toegepast op internationaal niveau en helemaal niet toegepast op regionaal 
niveau. Het waarde-gestuurde indirecte horizontale effect is ook bijna 
uitsluitend op nationaal niveau toegepast, waarbij de toegepaste wetten geen 
mensenrechtenwetgeving zijn (zoals op internationaal en regionaal niveau), 
maar eerder privaatrechtelijke wetten die zo worden geïnterpreteerd dat ze 
voldoen aan de mensenrechten in het EVRM. 
Hoofdstuk 8 identificeert verschillende beperkingen van indirect 
horizontaal effect zoals toegepast in de onderzochte systemen. Sommige 
beperkingen komen voort uit de redenering van de instanties (bijvoorbeeld de 
rechtsgrondslag voor de redenering zijn niet altijd gegeven), terwijl andere te 
wijten zijn aan de beperkingen van de mandaten van de organen. Uiteindelijk 
is de mate van bescherming die het huidige horizontale effect van 
internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving biedt, onvoldoende. 
De bevindingen en kritieken in hoofdstuk 8 zijn de basis voor 
hoofdstuk 9, waarin een governance-benadering van de internationale 
mensenrechtenwetgeving wordt geïntroduceerd. Het hoofdstuk suggereert dat 
met name een aanpak op basis van multi-level governance wordt gevolgd. Het 
hoofdstuk stelt dat governance-benaderingen en -activiteiten niet als een 
terugvaloptie moeten worden beschouwd wanneer de wet een kwestie niet 




gevolgd; juridische oplossingen zouden deel moeten uitmaken van een 
bredere, governance-benadering van internationale mensenrechten. Het 
hoofdstuk laat zien dat een governance-benadering van mensenrechten 
toestaat dat niet-statelijke actoren volledig onder het mensenrechtenregime 
vallen – governance gaat ‘beyond government’ en omvat niet alleen de 
activiteiten van de overheid, maar ook van niet-statelijke actoren. Hoofdstuk 
9 betoogte dat alle betrokken actoren zich moeten houden aan de beginselen 
van ‘good governance’: transparantie, verantwoording  en participatie en dat 
good governance nauw verbonden is met mensenrechten. Deze connectie is 
vooral zichtbaar door de lens van mensenrechtenbenaderingen, die door alle 
relevante actoren kunnen worden gebruikt als een conceptueel kader om te 
zorgen voor goed mensenrechtenbeheer op alle niveaus. 
De multi-level governance-benadering heeft twee kernaspecten: het 
‘multi-level’ en het ‘governance’ (bestuur) aspect. Het multi-level aspect 
spreekt voor zich en zou in het kader van de internationale mensenrechten 
van toepassing zijn op vier hoofdniveaus: het internationale, het regionale, 
het nationale en het lokale niveau. Het ‘governance’ aspect omvat zowel 
juridische als extra-juridische activiteiten, door statelijke en niet-statelijke 
actoren, met het gemeenschappelijke doel van bescherming van de 
mensenrechten. Er zijn ook twee soorten multi-level governance (Type I en 
Type II), die zich onderscheiden door hun organisatiestructuur. Het blijkt dat 
een Type II multi-level governance meer geschikt is voor het besturen van 
internationale mensenrechten. De reden hiervoor is dat de organisatie van 
Type II multi-level governance flexibeler is dan Type I-systemen en dat er 
geen centrale autoriteit is die bepaalt hoe bestuurstaken worden toegewezen 
aan verschillende actoren binnen het systeem, die op vrijwillige en ad-hoc-
basis kunnen deelnemen. Type II multi-level governance-regimes zijn 
namelijk op een taak-specifieke manier georganiseerd en activiteiten worden 
verdeeld over niveaus op basis van wat er op elk niveau moet gebeuren. Dit 
betekent dat sommige actoren op meer dan één niveau opereren, maar binnen 
hetzelfde onderwerp. 
Verschillende uitdagingen voor het volgen van een multi-level 




regime worden ook besproken in hoofdstuk 9, inclusief de coördinatie tussen 
actoren en hun activiteiten en de toewijzing van taken aan verschillende 
actoren. Manieren om deze uitdagingen aan te pakken zijn voorgesteld, 
bijvoorbeeld door gebruik te maken van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel, 
netwerken te vormen tussen actoren, of een overkoepelend bestuursorgaan op 
te richten op bepaalde niveaus om actoren toe te staan bepaalde taken uit te 
voeren. Ten slotte worden suggesties gegeven voor activiteiten die moeten 
worden genomen om te komen tot een benadering van internationale 
mensenrechten op meerdere niveaus. 
Hoofdstuk 10 gaat in op de eerste case-study van het boek: de 
Wereldbank, als internationale organisatie. Ten eerste wordt de relatie tussen 
de Wereldbank en mensenrechten uitgelegd vanuit drie perspectieven: (1) de 
rechtspositie – of de Bank kan worden geacht bestaande verplichtingen te 
hebben krachtens internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving; (2) de eigen 
positie van de Wereldbank – hoe de Bank haar relatie met en rol in de 
bescherming van internationale mensenrechten voor ogen heeft; en (3) de 
relatie tussen het beleid en de praktijken van de Bank en de mensenrechten – 
hoe haar attitudes worden weerspiegeld in haar beleid en hoe de activiteiten 
van de Bank in de praktijk van invloed zijn op het genot van mensenrechten. 
De analyse toont aan dat, behalve voor een beperkt aantal 
mensenrechtennormen in het internationaal gewoonterecht en voor 
dwingende normen van internationaal recht (jus cogens), de Bank niet kan 
worden geacht directe verplichtingen te hebben op grond van internationale 
mensenrechtenwetgeving. De Bank erkent zelf het belang van mensenrechten 
met betrekking tot haar doelstelling om armoede uit te bannen, maar heeft 
onvoldoende stappen ondernomen om mensenrechtennormen op te nemen in 
haar eigen beleid en programma's. Hoofdstuk 10 beveelt aan dat de Bank een 
op mensenrechten gebaseerde benadering gaat volgen, die nauw verbonden 
is met haar huidige pleidooi voor een aanpak van goed bestuur. Ten slotte 
wordt de multi-level governance-benadering van Hoofdstuk 9, toegepast op 
de Wereldbank om suggesties te doen voor manieren waarop de naleving van 
mensenrechtenstandaarden door de Bank zou kunnen worden verbeterd. 




governance-benadering of -regime vorm te geven en te implementeren. Hier 
worden aanbevelingen gedaan met betrekking tot verschillende actoren, 
waaronder samenwerking met mensenrechtenorganen en -deskundigen ten 
behoeve van advies, het versterken van de bevoegdheden, onafhankelijkheid 
en transparantie van het inspectiepanel van de Bank en het zorgvuldig kiezen 
van partnerschappen met particuliere actoren om te voorkomen dat zij 
samenwerken met degenen die een slecht mensenrechten stat van dienst 
hebben. 
Hoofdstuk 11 bevat de tweede case-study: niet-statelijke gewapende 
groeperingen. Als eerste analyseert dit hoofdstuk de manier waarop 
internationaal recht de acties van niet-statelijke gewapende groeperingen 
tijdens een niet-internationaal gewapend conflict reguleert. De analyse gaat 
na hoe internationale humanitaire, strafrechtelijke en mensenrechtelijke 
wetgeving van toepassing is op niet-statelijke gewapende groeperingen 
tijdens niet-internationale gewapende conflicten. Nadat de toepasbaarheid 
van de mensenrechtenwetgeving meer in het algemeen is vastgesteld, richt 
het hoofdstuk zich op die mensenrechten die met name in het geding zijn 
tijdens humanitaire crises – ‘subsistence rights’ die vallen onder de categorie 
economische, sociale en culturele rechten. Het hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat 
de toepasselijke normen met betrekking tot subsistence rights zijn te vinden 
in de internationale mensenrechtenwetgeving, wat de lex specialis is in deze 
kwestie, in plaats van het internationale humanitaire recht. De analyse van 
zowel het rechtskader als initiatieven die zijn genomen om niet-statelijke 
gewapende groeperingen aan te moedigen de mensenrechten te respecteren, 
leveren een adequate bescherming op voor personen die met dergelijke 
conflicten worden geconfronteerd. De multi-level governance-benadering 
wordt vervolgens toegepast op niet-statelijke gewapende groeperingen en er 
worden aanbevelingen gedaan om actie te ondernemen om tot een dergelijke 
aanpak over te gaan. Deze omvatten activiteiten van verschillende actoren 
zowel binnen als buiten het internationale mensenrechtenrechtenkader. Met 
name de potentiële rol van mensenrechtenbepalingen in staakt-het-vuren-
overeenkomsten wordt beoordeeld, omdat zij een benadering op meerdere 




groeperingen en humanitaire crises  kunnen ondersteunen. 
 Tot slot worden in de ‘Conclusies en Aanbevelingen’ de bevindingen 
van de hoofdstukken 1-11 samengebracht en aanbevelingen gegeven voor 
verschillende actoren om te komen tot een multi-level governance-benadering 
van internationale mensenrechten. Dit omvat de VN-toezichtsorganen voor 
mensenrechtenverdragen, de VN-Mensenrechtenraad, regionale 
mensenrechtenverdragsorganen en nationale rechtbanken, niet-
gouvernementele organisaties, de Wereldbank, niet-statelijke gewapende 
groeperingen en bedrijven. De aanbevelingen omvatten het explicieter maken 
van benaderingen ten aanzien van het horizontale effect van internationale 
mensenrechtenwetgeving, het leren van succesvolle activiteiten met 
betrekking tot bedrijven om zo ook andere actoren aan te moedigen om te 
voldoen aan mensenrechtennormen, en het verbeteren van betrokkenheid en 
informatie-uitwisseling tussen verschillende actoren betrokken bij 
mensenrechtenbeheer. 
Al met al lijkt de internationale gemeenschap op een kruispunt te staan 
voor wat betreft internationale mensenrechten en niet-statelijke actoren. 
Gezien de toenemende omvang en ernst van gedragingen van niet-statelijke 
actoren wereldwijd die leiden tot mensenrechtenschendingen, is het van 
cruciaal belang dat meer actie wordt ondernomen. Hoewel internationale 
mensenrechtenwetgeving voor sommige actoren een veelbelovend pad kan 
zijn, is het onwaarschijnlijk en in zekere mate ook onwenselijk dat in de 
nabije toekomst bindende instrumenten zullen worden aangenomen die 
schendingen kunnen aanpakken door het brede scala van niet-statelijke 
actoren. Hoewel juristen die in de praktijd werken misschien beperkt zijn door 
hun mandaat/bevoegdheid, moeten zeker academici dit probleem met een 
open geest behandelen en buiten het typisch juridische kader moeten kijken. 
Ze zouden bereid moeten zijn om van andere disciplines te lenen om een 
alomvattend, inclusief en effectief systeem voor mensenrechtenbeheer in te 
stellen dat in staat is om de huidige en toekomstige uitdagingen voor de 
bescherming van mensenrechten aan te pakken – een multi-level governance-
regime. 
 
